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If you think you understand Lebanon, you have not 
been explained properly.1
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 1 Lebanese saying cited on the first page of Pierre Jarawan’s Am Ende Bleiben die Zedern 
(2016). 
A Spring evening in 2013. I am chatting with a leader of the local Palestinian  
youth movement on the corniche of Tyre, the ancient port city in South  
Lebanon. We had met before to discuss his interpretation of the relations 
between Lebanese and Palestinian authorities in informal refugee settlements 
in the area. Not particularly interested in this issue, my interlocutor instead 
reflects on the challenges he and his friends face in organizing their nascent 
movement. One of his frustrations, he says, is that the situation and status of 
Palestinians in Lebanon is ‘totally clouded and unclear.’ In fact, he adds, ‘it is 
meant to be cloudy, we’re not supposed to understand!’1
 Five years later. I am behind my computer, talking about the Lebanese 
response to the Syrian refugee ‘crisis’ with an experienced and context-savvy 
inter-agency coordinator for an international humanitarian organization on 
Skype. Vexed about her attempts to comprehend Lebanon’s legal and institu-
tional framework for engaging with Syrian refugees, she sighs: ‘So, like, it all 
does not make sense. At least not enough sense for us to be able to understand 
how they’re doing it, why they’re doing it and who in the government is doing 
it.’2 Noting my bewilderment, she laughs, adding: ‘If you’re confused, don’t 
worry, everybody is confused here.’
These remarks represent many similar reflections by the wide array of people with 
whom I discussed the way in which refugee communities in Lebanon govern and 
are governed. They are the point of departure for this book, which interrogates 
how uncertainty and ambiguity shape Lebanon’s attempts to deal with the refu-
gees it hosts.
Refugee governance and uncertainty
In 2018, 68.5 million people fled their homes, the highest number of refugees 
since World War II. The displacement of more than six million Syrians escaping 
their war-torn country is one of the most urgent refugee crises that the world cur-
rently faces. As with other refugee flows, the great majority of Syrian refugees 
seeks shelter and safety in Syria’s neighboring countries. Facilitating such ‘recep-
tion in the region’ has become the cornerstone of the international community’s 
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response to displacement. European policies outsource the governance of migra-
tion by investing in development in ‘the region’ and ‘deals’ with regional host 
countries. Many of such regional host countries that are affected by the arrival 
of large numbers of refugees, however, already struggle with a range of political, 
socio-economic, and institutional challenges.
This intersection of existing institutional predicaments and refugee crises 
means that regional refugee governance is often ad hoc, piecemeal, and chaotic. 
Considering the centrality of regional shelter in most refugee experiences as well 
as in international refugee policy, understanding this ‘mess,’ as a human rights 
lawyer called it, is of great importance.3 Yet, there has been comparatively little 
research and even less theorization of regional host states’ treatment of refugees 
(Norman, 2017). To remedy this situation, this book turns to Lebanon. Lebanon 
hosts the highest per capita number of refugees worldwide. Sheltering approxi-
mately 200,000 Palestinian refugees and around 1.5 million Syrian refugees, it is 
heavily implicated in both the world’s most protracted and, arguably, most urgent 
refugee ‘crises’ respectively. Like many regional host countries, moreover, Leba-
non grapples with a war-torn past, political instability, social and ecological ten-
sions, and severe economic problems.
The experience of refugees in Lebanon is accordingly determined by insecurity 
and uncertainty. Lebanon’s refugee governance appears to be overwhelmingly 
fragmented and inconsistent. This is evident in the stories of refugees themselves, 
who describe the situation they face as ‘a lot of chaos’ (Lebanon Support, 2016: 
23). It surfaces in the accounts of the humanitarian organizations that try to aid 
refugees. They point out the constant fear and unpredictability that refugees face 
in the absence of a coherent legal framework and stable policy and the result-
ant bureaucratic discrepancies (Amnesty International, 2015) and express many 
of their own challenges in assisting refugees as following from the ‘exceptional 
complexity’ and arbitrariness of Lebanese refugee governance.4
Uncertainty is a recurrent theme in the studies of analysts as well. These high-
light the emergence of a ‘legal limbo’ (Turbay, 2015: 23) and a ‘no-policy-policy’ 
(El Mufti, 2014); the prevalence of ‘impromptu decisions’ (Al-Masri, 2015: 12) 
that is typified by ‘ad hoc changes and discretionary applications’ (Bidinger et al., 
2014: 37); and, as a consequence, the ‘sea of insecurity’ in which refugees find 
themselves (Yassin et al., 2015: 38). It is even a central tenet in the experiences 
of state officials tasked with refugee governance. They acknowledge ‘that the 
absence of policies has created a state of chaos because of varied standards and 
decisions.’5
This book seeks to explore and understand this overwhelming experience of 
uncertainty by all major stakeholders involved in refugee governance in Lebanon. 
To describe such governance uncertainty, I develop the notion of ‘institutional 
ambiguity,’ which revolves around the key aspects of informality, liminality, and 
exceptionalism. The aim here, however, is to go beyond rendering visible the 
institutional ambiguity that shapes refugee governance and explain how such 
ambiguity emerges and why it prevails. The book seeks to understand how institu-
tional ambiguity operates and is reproduced, what its effects are, and who benefits 
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and who suffers from its consequences.6 In particular, it aims to empirically cap-
ture and analyze the strategic dimensions of institutional ambiguity, which are 
conceptualized as a ‘politics of uncertainty.’
As a property of refugee governance, it is assumed that the logics of institutional 
ambiguity will be determined by ‘refugeeness,’ the experience of forced displace-
ment to another country, on the one hand, and by ‘governance,’ the organization 
of public authority, on the other hand. I thus turn to these respective literatures to 
venture an answer to the aforementioned questions.
Refugees
Ever since the ‘birth’ of ‘the refugee’ as an object of politics, policy, and knowl-
edge production (Malkki, 1995), uncertainty has been a key theme in the field of 
critical refugee studies (Nassar and Stel, 2019). Together with mobility, uncer-
tainty is increasingly recognized as the defining feature of refugee life. Yet while 
the interface between uncertainty and migration is widely acknowledged, its theo-
rization is still rudimentary. Where there is an explicit engagement with uncer-
tainty, scholars working in critical border and refugee studies traditionally tend to 
focus particularly on the ‘radical uncertainty’ produced by the conflict that gener-
ated displacement and by the process of displacement itself (Horst and Grabska, 
2015).
Analyses of the refugee-sovereignty nexus that think through the international 
state system and the production of refugees as ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Betts, 
2014: 1), however, engage more explicitly with the ‘protracted uncertainty’ that 
emerges for refugees in host country settings after displacement (see, for instance, 
Brun, 2015; Gibney, 2014; Horst and Grabska, 2015; Hansen, 2014; Stepputat 
and Nyberg Sørensen, 2014; Zetter, 2007). Protracted displacement, Grabska and 
Fanjoy (2015: 76) note, often turns into protracted uncertainty ‘when plans for 
the future cannot be made because the past and the present are marked with pre-
cariousness and unpredictability.’ Here, by far the most attention has been paid 
to the ways in which refugees experience and navigate such uncertainty (see, for 
instance, Brun, 2015; El-Shaarawi, 2015; Eule et al., 2018: 51; Hasselberg, 2016; 
Kramer and Balaa, 2004; Marston, 2003; Norman, 2017).
Key publications have, nevertheless, been calling for an acknowledgement of 
uncertainty as not just a lived experience but also a potential disciplinary strategy 
(Ansems de Vries and Guild, 2019). Biehl (2015) has done pioneering work in 
outlining how refugees in Turkey are not merely living in uncertainty, but are 
governed through it. Norman (2017) shows how in Egypt the absence of formal 
refugee policy is often mistaken for neglect, whereas it in fact reflects a deliberate 
policy of ambivalence. El-Shaarawi (2015: 39, 46), while not investigating these 
policies and politics herself, flags the importance of seeing the uncertainty that 
refugees face as not merely ‘profoundly personal,’ but also ‘inextricable from 
refugee policy and politics on both the state and international level.’
These political dimensions of uncertainty, however, often remain under-
explored. Chimni (2003) describes how in India the absence of a legal framework 
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has resulted in a situation in which there are ‘only ad hoc mechanisms in place’ to 
deal with refugees. This legal limbo, which he calls a form of ‘strategic ambigu-
ity,’ has resulted in ‘arbitrary executive action’ and makes refugees ‘dependent on 
the benevolence of the state’ (Chimni, 2003: 443). Why exactly such ambiguity is 
strategic and for whom, however, is not pursued. Ilcan, Rygiel and Baban (2018) 
explore the ‘architecture of precarity’ designed to govern Syrian refugees in Tur-
key, but the agency and interests behind the production of such precarity, which 
they see as generating vulnerability and ambiguity, are not investigated. In fact, 
precarity and the resultant ambiguity are seen as symbolizing ‘the failure of poli-
cies to address the displacement,’ obscuring the possibility of uncertainty consti-
tuting a governance strategy in its own right (Ilcan, Rygiel and Baban, 2018: 66).
Mostly, then, refugee studies acknowledges the ‘governing effects’ of uncer-
tainty. A subsequent investigation of the agency behind such outcomes is often 
lacking. Recent work, however, increasingly questions if and how decisions 
and mechanisms that are assumed to be ‘ordering’ are in fact – and at times 
strategically – reproducing institutional ambiguity. The sub-field of refugee 
studies concerned with the study of asylum and immigration systems has been 
groundbreaking in conceptualizing the partially strategic nature of the ‘disjunc-
ture, uncertainty, and ambiguity’ defining refugee governance (El-Shaarawi, 
2015: 40). Calavita’s (1998: 53) seminal study reveals the ways in which immi-
gration laws ‘actively “irregularize” people by making it all but impossible to 
retain legal status over time.’ Summarizing this innovative reading of institutional 
dysfunction, Whyte (2011: 21) argues that, in governing refugees, uncertainty is 
not an ‘unfortunate byproduct,’ but rather ‘fundamental to the system’s function-
ing as a technology of power.’ Furthering this paradigm shift, Griffiths (2013: 
263) suggests that ‘disorder should be understood as a technique of power, with 
governance through uncertainty constructing certain immigrants as expendable, 
transient and ultimately, deportable.’
Scholars like Anderson (2014), De Genova (2002), Rozakou (2017), and Whyte 
(2011) demonstrate how authorities seek to create institutional ambiguity to mini-
mize accountability and maximize discretionary power in dealing with irregular, 
often forced, migrants by ‘deliberate nonrecording’ that allows, as Kalir and Van 
Schendel (2017: 1) put it, for exploitation and ‘state-produced social oblivion.’ 
My central argument departs from this body of work that does not see institutional 
ambiguity as just a contingency of state failure, but rather explores it as a possibly 
‘intentional state practice’ or a ‘conscious strategy’ to abandon, expel, exploit, or 
discipline particular societal groups (Kalir and Van Schendel, 2017: 2; Whyte, 
2011: 18).
Governance
Governance broadly refers to processes to organize collective representation and 
accountability and the provision of public goods. This is not, and has never been, 
a privilege of the state, but regards a set of interactions involving multiple societal 
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actors (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde, 2006: 85; Rose and Miller, 1992). Follow-
ing Foucault (1983), to govern means to determine the field of action of others. 
It thereby refers to a ‘more or less systematized’ mode of power (Lemke, 2000: 
5). More specifically, in this book, governance refers to acknowledging specific 
issues, groups, or spaces, producing frameworks to regulate them, and enforcing 
these frameworks. Policies – sets of instructions issued by a specific governance 
actor on how to reach a particular governance goal that can range from laws to 
decrees or other executive decisions – and the related implementation processes 
are a crucial aspect of governance.7
In this book, the particular governance issues that are under scrutiny regard 
refugees’ status, spaces, and representation. These domains of governance are 
selected because they fundamentally determine the parameters of refugees’ pres-
ence in a host country and thereby predispose other aspects of refugee life, such 
as security, mobility, and access to services. Refugee status refers to whether refu-
gees are legally acknowledged as refugees, but also to their residency status and 
the related registration and recording procedures. Refugee spaces pertain to the 
arrangements for refugees’ shelter and tenure and the associated legal frameworks 
and political decisions, often with encampment as a central contention. Refugee 
representation on the one hand concerns the mandates allocated by the host coun-
try considering who is responsible for dealing with what aspects of refugees’ pres-
ence. On the other hand, it relates to the question of who speaks for refugees and 
acts on their behalf and the internal organization of refugee communities.
Governance is mostly understood as an attempt to minimize ambiguity by cre-
ating rules and regulations and ensuring their implementation in a standardized 
manner, with bureaucratic organizations acting as ‘ambiguity-reducing machines’ 
(Best, 2012: 91). Yet, uncertainty and unpredictability are a fact of life every-
where. This is often the inescapable effect of ‘bureaucratic muddling through’ 
and ‘fuzziness’ (Davenport and Leitch, 2005: 4) or of ‘policy flaws’ caused by 
‘decision accretion’ (Smithson, 1989: 239). Ambiguity is then either an inevita-
ble manifestation of an inherently ‘unknowable world’ or ‘residual,’ surviving 
despite efforts to minimize it (Best, 2012: 92, 91). But ambiguity can also be the 
result of concerted efforts. Foucault has long recognized the disciplinary power 
of uncertainty. In critical management studies, ‘strategic ambiguity’ is defined as 
‘the deliberate use of ambiguity in strategic communication’ to allow for multiple 
interpretations (Davenport and Leitch, 2005: 2). Legal scholars have also pointed 
out the centrality of ‘legal ambiguity’ in structuring governance, which, Oomen 
et al. (2019: 7) note, is often purposefully invoked and expanded.
The notion of strategic ambiguity assumes that uncertainty serves purposes, 
that it is politically convenient and therefore strategically deployed (Aradau, 
2017: 339). Such convenience can regard general public interests: political 
decision-makers may need to deal with limited capacities and resources or to 
broker consensus, for which ambiguity can be advantageous. Navigating ‘com-
peting interests’ often results in ‘negotiated compromises that are purposively 
vague’ so as to facilitate ‘unified diversity’ (Davenport and Leitch, 2005: 3). 
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Ho (2001: 400) even calls ‘institutional indeterminacy’ the ‘lubricant’ on which 
governance runs. Ambiguity also allows governance actors to be flexible and 
adaptive. Policy-makers’ insistence on ‘clarity and rule promulgation’ can be 
counter-productive, because passing legislation ‘often requires ambiguous lan-
guage and contradictory goals to hold together a passing coalition’ (Matland, 
1995: 147). Strategic ambiguity can also follow from private interests, pro-
ducing the maneuvering space in which political decision-makers maximize 
their own influence at the expense of others. Finally, strategic ambiguity can 
serve more specific political objectives concerning the governance of particular 
groups, spaces, or issues (Nassar and Stel, 2019).
Uncertainty, evidently, is more profound for some people than for others and 
more apparent at some times and in some places. The ‘governing effects’ of uncer-
tainty that are fundamental in refugee studies, then, are a core concern in the 
literature on hybrid political order as well. This field of study, further discussed in 
Chapter 1, focuses on the question of how governance operates ‘beyond govern-
ment’ (Risse, 2013) or under ‘split sovereignty’ (Hoffman and Kirk, 2013) when 
state authorities are unable or unwilling to take on the extensive range of exclu-
sive governance activities assumed by the Weberian ideal-type. Uncertainty is 
mostly taken for granted and assumed to be a structural feature of these contexts. 
The question of how public and political authorities operate in such hybridity 
and whether their behaviour challenges, extends, or exacerbates it is only rarely 
addressed.
This book builds on and extends the notable exceptions to this situation. Cha-
bal and Daloz’s (1999) book on ‘disorder as a political instrument’ produced a 
paradigm shift in debates about patronage and neopatrimonialism. It agendized 
the importance of recognizing ‘disorder’ as a ‘different order’ in which political 
actors can capitalize on an existing ‘state of confusion, uncertainty, and some-
times even chaos’ by perpetuating and aggravating it (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 
xix). Administrative ‘inefficiency,’ minimal institutionalization, and the relativity 
of formal rules then become cause as much as consequence of hybrid forms of 
political order. Das and Poole’s (2004) influential reading of state power as oper-
ating through unpredictability and ‘unreadability’ has further theorized the disci-
plining effect of inaccessible information and opaque decision-making. Tapscott’s 
(2017: 263) ground-breaking work on institutionalized arbitrariness further con-
ceptualizes this utility of fostering unpredictability and uncertainty as a mode of 
governance.
Contingent and strategic uncertainty
Work on refugees and governance thus tends to regard uncertainty as over-
whelmingly contingent, either upon the refugee condition defined by unex-
pected displacement and temporary settlement or upon a hybrid governance 
context determined by ‘weak institutions’ and a lack of capacity and resources. 
Yet in both literatures, there are increasingly influential alternative readings of 
Introduction 7
uncertainty as well. These contend that such exclusively structural analyses 
are insufficient as they overlook important elements of agency, interests, and 
responsibility in the emergence, institutionalization, and reproduction of gov-
ernance uncertainty. They suggest that disorder does not have to be the antith-
esis to dominance, as often intuitively assumed, but can be an instrument of it 
(Cullen Dunn, 2012: 2). As is the case with the governance of security, refugee 
governance practices do not just tame unknowns, but also enact and utilize them 
(Aradau, 2017: 329).
This book works with this idea of strategic ambiguity – with uncertainty con-
sistently recurring and demonstrably serving interests – in exploring the institu-
tional inconsistency that permeates refugee governance in Lebanon. It does so 
by synthesizing and sophisticating the core tenets of these emerging literatures 
in, first, a heuristic device – institutional ambiguity – and, second, an explana-
tion of the agential aspects of the production and reproduction of institutional 
ambiguity – the politics of uncertainty. Crucially, the book does not contend that 
institutional ambiguity is only, or even predominantly, strategic. As proposed by 
structuration theory, agency and structure, strategy and contingency, constitute a 
dialectic (Giddens, 1984). I put analytical premium on the strategic aspects of the 
emergence and endurance of institutional ambiguity because these are conceptu-
ally underdeveloped and, perhaps therefore, empirically striking and as such offer 
the most significant room for contribution.
The idea that uncertainty and insecurity were not simply incidental or circum-
stantial but also partially strategic surfaced in many of the accounts that under-
lie my analysis. Refugees keenly felt the repressive aspects of ambiguity. The 
frustrated remark of a Palestinian youth leader with which I opened this chap-
ter was what got me thinking about the politics behind uncertainty in the first 
place. Humanitarians and civil society representatives also routinely pointed out 
the interests underpinning vague and absent policies and arbitrary implementa-
tion dynamics. A project manager for a non-governmental organization (NGO) 
working with refugees in the Bekaa and North Lebanon was convinced that ‘the 
whole thing has been intentionally left informal, non-regulated; or regulated but 
not enforced.’8
Even Lebanese state representatives described the treatment of refugees in the 
country as trapping them in an ‘institutional void’: a ministerial advisor referred 
to the agency behind the non-policy towards Syrian refugees, saying that ‘some-
one refused to organize the presence of the Syrian displaced.’9 As previously 
presented in Nassar and Stel (2019), analysts working on refugee governance in 
Lebanon similarly emphasize the strategic aspects of the legal, spatial, and politi-
cal uncertainty faced by refugees, calling ‘the absence of policy and governance’ 
a ‘strategy of exploitation’10 and suggesting that governance appears to be ‘clearly 
aimed’ at ‘maintaining nebulousness’ (Ghanem, 2016: 54). In light of this situa-
tion, the book’s core research interest is to understand how institutional ambiguity 




Ambiguity refers to plurality of definition, meaning, and interpretation. Ambi-
guity produces uncertainty in the sense that, as Tapscott (2018) defines it, gov-
ernance policies and practices are ‘experienced as meaningfully unpredictable 
by those for whom they are of political consequence.’ I use institutional ambi-
guity to synthesize a vast array of concepts used across disciplines. It is a tool 
to capture the institutionalization, with which I mean the recurrence and (tacit) 
acceptance, of ambiguity as operating on three main axes: informality, liminality, 
and exceptionalism. These three dimensions of institutional ambiguity, as appar-
ent in the following operationalization, extensively overlap and constitute each 
other to produce a broader environment of inconsistent, partial, and negotiable 
institutionalization.
Informality
I understand formal governance as those issues, spaces, and populations that are 
recognized and addressed in official state policies (Yassin, Stel and Rassi, 2016). 
Informality, then, regards those governance concerns that are not acknowledged, 
regulated, and/or made implementable by the state. Importantly, this does not 
mean that these issues, spaces, and populations are not governed. They are likely 
to be taken on by non-state governance actors, or even by state governance actors, 
but in an unofficial, de facto capacity rather than a de jure fashion. Informality 
is thereby closely related to illegality, extra-legality, and the criminalization of 
refugees (De Genova, 2002; Zaiotti, 2006). The absence of formal refugee or 
residency status infamously contributes to stripping refugees from the ‘right to 
have rights.’ Informal governance also analytically associates with bureaucratic 
invisibility and illegibility as it can render refugees (or other categories of people) 
administratively nonexistent (Griffiths, 2013; Janmyr and Mourad, 2018; Kalir 
and Rozakou, 2016).
Informality makes governance irregular and personalized and thereby more 
unpredictable but also more pliable and negotiable for those able to navigate and 
instrumentalize ‘a shifting and ill-defined’ boundary between public and private 
(Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 149). Like liminality and exceptionalism, it is not a 
binary category. Refugee status, for instance, might be denied, but other (tempo-
rary and exceptional) administrative categorizations can be devised to neverthe-
less allow a form of regulation. Refugee shelter arrangements, to give another 
example, might be acknowledged formally by some state institutions, whereas 
they are not recognized by others. Refugees’ representation structures, similarly, 
could be acknowledged and regulated by state institutions, but be partially infor-
mal nevertheless if the relevant directives and decisions are not implemented or 
enforced.
When explored from the perspective of a politics of uncertainty, it is particularly 
‘planned illegality’ (Chiodelli, 2012) and the imposition of informality – under 
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which refugees are ‘led to break the law in order to survive’ (Agier, 2008: 12) – 
that is at stake. If formally governing something means that the state makes itself 
responsible for it, then the governance inaction that renders refugee governance 
informal is an act of abandonment. In this way, my understanding of such poten-
tially ‘purposeful informality’ (Polese, Kóvacs and Jancsics, 2018: 208) closely 
resonates with the idea of informality as an expression of sovereignty. Informality, 
then, is not a challenge to the state as much as it is produced by the state itself. 
Following Roy (2005: 149), state agencies themselves ‘determine what is infor-
mal and what is not’ and ‘which forms of informality will thrive and which will 
disappear.’ Even in hybrid political orders rife with capacity problems, formal 
recognition, regulation, and enforcement are never just a bureaucratic or technical 
issue. They involve significant political choice and struggle. To study informality, 
then, means confronting how the state is not simply an apparatus of planning, but 
a system that ‘produces the unplanned and unplannable’ (Roy, 2005: 156 in Nas-
sar and Stel, 2019).
Liminality
Liminality engages with the notion of temporal uncertainty. As Agier (2008: 
30) so imperatively noted, the word ‘refuge’ itself ‘denotes a temporary shelter, 
while waiting for something better.’ Neither refugees nor the states hosting them 
know if and when refugees may return. Liminality is thus a default cornerstone 
of refugee life, but it is also a characteristic of hybrid order, where suspen-
sion and undeterminedness can be important ingredients of political capital. 
In the context of thinking through a politics of uncertainty, then, liminality is 
closely related to exceptionalism in that it is something that can be extended and 
instrumentalized by placing specific issues, communities, or spaces ‘in between’ 
(Menjivar, 2006: 999) or ‘outside’ (Griffiths, Rogers and Anderson, 2013: 5) 
time, putting them forever ‘on hold’ (Agier, 2008: 47). This turns crisis from 
an opportunity for transformation into an instrument to maintain the status quo 
(Hage, 2015: 1).
Liminality regards the constantly reinforced transitional and temporary nature 
of governance practices. It refers to a ‘permanent impermanence’ (Brun, 2015: 
19), a ‘stuckedness’ (Hage, 2009) that characterizes the increasingly protracted 
nature of most refugee situations and results in ad hoc arrangements and a ‘domi-
nance of the short-term’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 161). Liminal arrangements 
are unstable and place people in limbo. They preclude integration and institution-
alization and reinforce transience. This ‘liquid’ appropriation of time, as Bauman 
(2007) theorized, reflects and enables the pervasiveness of uncertainty. Temporal 
uncertainty denotes a dual ambivalence with regard to time as it ‘simultaneously 
threatens imminent and absent change;’ ‘stickiness’ and ‘suspension’ on the one 
hand and ‘frenzy’ and ‘rupture’ on the other (Griffiths, 2014). Thus, as a compo-
nent of institutional ambiguity, liminality captures the simultaneous processes of 
stasis and transformation.
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An extensive literature concerned with the governmentality of waiting indi-
cates the disciplinary power of making people wait without ‘purpose, fairness or 
progression,’ rendering their experience of time and life simultaneously meaning-
less and endless (Brun, 2015: 19; see also Anderson, 2014; Griffiths, Rogers and 
Anderson, 2013; Jefferson, Turner and Jensen, 2019). At the same time, work 
on deportation and deportability refers to the implications of acute and unex-
pected change imposed on people that is similarly enabled by the conditionality 
inherent in ‘permanent temporariness’ (Cullen Dunn, 2014: 304; see also Franck, 
2017). This can add up to what Tazzioli (2017) has conceptualized as ‘contain-
ment through mobility,’ a situation in which people are temporally pinned down 
through spatial relocation.
Building on foundational work regarding the ‘strong relationship between 
power, the state and management of time,’ liminality refers to more than just inde-
cisiveness or even stalling, but regards time as a potential instrument of control 
(Rutz, 1992 in Griffiths, Rogers and Anderson, 2013: 29). This disciplinary effect 
of time can be a result of neglect or inherent in bureaucracy, but ‘time traps’ can 
also reflect strategy and design (Eule et al., 2018: 151, 160–161). Being made 
to wait as well as being subjected to acute and dramatic institutional ruptures 
are reflections of power relations and bureaucratic domination. Protracted tem-
porariness and ‘ageing’ emergencies are not inevitable (Carpi, 2015a). They are, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has well-noted 
(2004: 2 in Milner, 2014: 153), ‘the result of political action and inaction.’
Exceptionalism
The idea of a ‘state of exception,’ coined by Agamben (2005) and extended, 
adapted, and nuanced by many others, has its roots in critical refugee studies. It 
denotes a central paradox of governance by marking specific groups or issues as 
outside normal legal and political regimes, but inside specific surveillance and 
repression mechanisms. Exclusion, ‘outsideness,’ and ‘othering’ in one realm 
are complemented by extreme discipline in other domains (El-Shaarawi, 2015: 
40; Hanafi and Long, 2010; Salter, 2008) – dynamics that are routinely legiti-
mized through securitization processes (Nassar and Stel, 2019). Crucially, then, 
the analytical value of exceptionalism as a component of institutional ambigu-
ity does not lie in its sometimes assumed establishment of a nigh totalitarian 
order by an apparently cohesive sovereign. Rather, what exceptionalism signifies 
is the arbitrary definition and application of regulations and mandates. Excep-
tionalism, Carpi (2017: 121) established, is not a ‘product of fate,’ but rather of 
experimentation (Turner, 2005: 318). It can be imposed and lifted, defined and 
redefined, resulting in unpredictably changing rules of the game. As Cons (2007: 
21) concludes, exceptionality is not a neat in/out binary. Instead, it ‘produces 
an overwhelming sense of uncertainty, insecurity and confusion’ that allows 
and facilitates exploitation and enhances the discretionary power of authorities 
(Cons, 2007: 21).
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This materializes through legal and spatial governance practices. Legally, 
exceptionalism denotes the political and administrative distinctions between dif-
ferent categories of people – refugees and citizens, for instance – and the ways in 
which arbitrariness becomes a routine everyday experience for populations that 
are placed outside any such categorizations in legal ‘gray’ areas (Menjivar, 2006). 
This makes them dependent on the goodwill of those holding power over them. 
The idea of exceptionalism compellingly reveals that legal suspensions or voids 
tend not to be ‘filled by an ethics of care and responsibility,’ but are rather signals 
‘that a particular class of persons exists only at the mercy of the state’ (Chimni, 
2003: 465). The exceptionalism invoked by discourses of crisis11 and ‘perpetuated 
emergency’ allows for governance actors to shirk responsibility while retaining 
authority (De Genova and Tazzioli, 2016; Janmyr and Knudsen, 2016: 391). It 
produces for particular groups the ‘experience of a fragile and uncertain relation-
ship to the law and to states’ (Agier, 2008: 11; see also Cons, 2007: 24).
Spatial exceptionalism is especially apparent in encampment policies. These 
often materialize refugees’ informality and simultaneously entrench it. Refu-
gee camps both signpost and ensure the temporary nature of refugees’ presence, 
‘warehousing’ them for protracted periods of time in ‘suspended spaces’ with-
out ever acknowledging this de facto permanence (Janmyr and Knudsen, 2016: 
391). Refugee camps and detention and deportation centres, as well as ‘sensi-
tive spaces’ such as borderlands and frontiers more broadly, are spaces taken out-
side the legal order, but nevertheless, and thereby, integral to the political order 
(Agamben, 2005; for reflection and critique, see Agier, 2011; Diken, 2004; El-
Shaarawi, 2015; Hanafi, 2008; Hanafi and Long, 2010; Malkki, 1995; Ramadan, 
2009; Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017). As with legal exceptionalism, this entails 
simultaneously claiming control and denying responsibility in and for these spaces 
(Cons, 2007; Tapscott, 2017, 2018). Refugee settlements, ‘ambiguous spaces’ of 
concurrent inclusion and exclusion (Oesch, 2017), thereby become sites of aban-
donment, spaces that are ‘knowingly neglected’ (Davies, Isakjee and Dhesi, 2017: 
18) or ambiguously and precariously outsourced, generating complex governance 
assemblages and layered forms of sovereignty.
The politics of uncertainty12
My interpretation of a politics of uncertainty starts out from an anthropological 
understanding of uncertainty. This suggests that uncertainty can best be understood 
through the analysis of the empirical manifestation of particular governmentalities 
in specific, and subjective, technologies and experiences (Samimian-Darash and 
Rabinow, 2015). The notion of a politics of uncertainty acknowledges that institu-
tional ambiguity will be part of any governance practice. In particular, it will be in 
place by the general settings of hybrid political order and will be extended through 
the behaviour of authorities that pursue the overall aim of staying in power (or 
gaining power) and governing ‘cheap and efficiently’ in such settings (Tapscott, 
2017: 268). What the idea of a politics of uncertainty adds is accounting for the 
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possibility that institutional ambiguity also follows from more specific attempts 
to manage ‘problematic’ populations, here refugees. It posits that a combination 
of inaction and ambiguous action reproduces informality, liminality, and excep-
tionalism towards a specific population, following more specific interests that go 
beyond the generic objective of accumulating and preserving power.
Institutional ambiguity often results from inaction in the realm of formal politi-
cal decision-making (Barber, 2017). Governance inaction manifests itself in a lack 
of official acknowledgement, regulation, and enforcement of particular issues; 
the extent to which matters relating to, in my case, refugees are recognized and 
addressed in policies and the degree to which such policies are subsequently fol-
lowed up on. In the context of the politics of uncertainty, inaction is only analyti-
cally salient if it regards an issue that formally falls within the jurisdiction of the 
governance actor in question – if, in other words, an authority could have acted 
but did not (McConnell and ‘t Hart, 2014).
The notion of inaction closely resonates with work on ‘standoffish policy- 
making’ (Mourad, 2017; Slater and Kim, 2015), street-level bureaucrats’ ‘shirk-
ing’ behaviour (Lipsky, 1980 in Eule et al., 2018: 212), the ‘politics of doing 
nothing’ (McConnell and ‘t Hart, 2014), and the structural violence of ‘politi-
cal abandonment’ (Davies, Isakjee and Dhesi, 2017; Davies and Polese, 2015; 
Gupta, 2012). ‘Policy-as-indifference,’ a term coined by Norman (2019), can 
function as a form of de facto outsourcing. As El-Shaarawi (2015: 47) notes, for 
instance, ‘passive non-response’ towards the arrival of Iraqi refugees marginal-
ized them and made them disregard Egypt as a place of permanent settlement. A 
‘not-dealing-with’ modality of governance, as Kalir and Van Schendel (2017: 6) 
have called it, is also evident in processes of ‘active’ non-recording and suspen-
sion of official decision-making.
Although passivity can stem from a lack of capacities and resources, these dif-
ferent conceptualizations of governance inaction all demonstrate that it may be 
a choice as well. Although passivity is often depicted as apolitical or indicating 
neutrality, McConnell and ‘t Hart (2014) convincingly argue that ‘doing nothing’ 
is at heart a political activity. Inactivity, then, just as much as political action, 
Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi (2017: 19) show, ‘can be wielded as a means of con-
trol, coercion and power.’ Following the logic of nonperformativity, inaction may 
often be cloaked, and even facilitated, by apparent proactiveness (Ahmed, 2004, 
2006; Norman, 2005: 196; Pinker, 2015: 99). The very pronunciation of a deci-
sion may then serve to in fact deter the actual implementation of the same deci-
sion, with a ‘tacit interest’ working to ‘contradict the stated aim or goal of the 
inquiry’ (McGoey, 2007: 219).
In addition to governance inaction, the politics of uncertainty is constituted 
by ambiguous action that retains and exploits informality, liminality, and excep-
tionalism. At times, governance actors’ approach of issues related to refugee 
status, space, and representation is primarily determined by inertia and avoid-
ance, but such inaction is never total or predictable. In many instances issues 
will be recognized, decisions on how to regulate them will be made, and efforts 
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towards implementing such regulations will be proposed. Yet, such recognitions, 
decisions, and proposals are often ‘equivocally phrased’ (Best, 2012: 92): partial, 
inconsistent, or vague. Policy objectives, instruments, and planning are routinely 
unclear. Documents or papers, often regarded as the summit of rational, account-
able statecraft, are in practice mostly as ‘tenuous and provisional as the political 
relationships with which they were entangled’ (Pinker, 2015: 119; see also Hull, 
2012). Interestingly, even the proliferation of policy can work as a form of policy 
ambiguity. Eule et al. (2018: 41) show that migration policies are often highly 
changeable. This makes them unstable and far less coherent and unified than usu-
ally assumed by both those implementing them and those subjected to them.
Statements, circulars, mandates, and directives can leave excessive room for 
contestation, interpretation, and discretion through implicit formulations, contra-
dictory communication, and incomplete or fragmented operationalizations. They 
produce confusion, but, through that, opportunity and room for maneuver as well. 
Such ambivalence or anticipation may be inevitable components of governance, 
but, as the field of critical policy studies emphasizes, they are also shaped and 
manipulated in both the formulation of policies – their wording and identification 
of priorities, instruments, and implementers – and the varied decisions constitut-
ing the subsequent implementation and inevitable interpretation and negotiation 
of policies. Anthropologists of the state have increasingly shown how, as a result, 
‘state power is reproduced through practices that are less than coherent or fully 
rationalized, emerging rather as shifting, illegible, decentred, contingent, or capri-
cious’ (Pinker and Harvey, 2015: 17).
Inaction and ambiguous action will always be part and parcel of governance. 
Policy-making always lags behind societal needs. And when policies are formu-
lated, they are always at least partly ambiguous: Objectives and instruments are 
often very general and mandates and responsibilities regularly vague. Laws usu-
ally designate what cannot be done, but, as Eule et al. (2018: 86) point out, ‘rarely 
encompasses the full range of possible actions we may undertake.’ This means 
that state officials always have substantial discretionary power that is located both 
in policies themselves and in limited institutional oversight (Eule et al., 2018: 81). 
Even if policies are relatively clear-cut, policy implementation – with its shift-
ing and complex contexts and various, often competing, actors and the contend-
ing and complementary interpretations and interests associated with them – will 
inevitably produce unintended outcomes, diffuse much of the clarity that might be 
part of carefully formulated policies, and result in institutional ambiguity.
What I am interested in here, however, is strategic institutional ambiguity. To 
purport that institutional ambiguity is at least partly strategic is to assume that it 
serves interests, which may be actively pursued or indirectly determine decision- 
making. These can regard political objectives to gain and hold onto power, or par-
ticular concerns regarding the governance of certain groups, spaces, and issues. 
These different functions of institutional ambiguity will importantly overlap. Con-
cerns related to generic making-do in challenging circumstances and brokering 
compromises among various stakeholders will be informed by political concerns 
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to amplify power and complemented by yet different incentives related to manag-
ing specific crises or to subdue, exploit, or remove specific groups. Institutional 
ambiguity will always be both contingent and strategic, and when strategic, it 
serves both more pragmatic and generic governance interests and more political 
and specific ones. My focus in this book, however, will be predominantly on the 
latter type.
The functionality of a politics of uncertainty has two dimensions. These, as 
accounted for in Chapter 6, crucially intertwine and interact. For those doing the 
governing, institutional ambiguity serves to create room for interpretation and 
maneuver. This flexibility or leeway grants governing actors bargaining power. It 
also generates limited transparency and a form of ‘diffuse’ (Hull, 2012: 115) or 
‘deniable’ (Davenport and Leitch, 2005: 4) responsibility that ultimately produces 
unaccountability and impunity for governance actors. This is a general form of 
arbitrary governance that maximizes power generically (Tapscott, 2017), but it 
simultaneously produces effects on the level of those being governed that might 
be politically convenient as well.
Informality, liminality, and exceptionalism generate vulnerability, hampering 
refugees’ access to livelihoods and protection (Ilcan, Rygiel and Baban, 2018; 
Saghieh, 2015). This contributes to their controllability, exploitability, and deport-
ability, but institutional ambiguity also disciplines more directly. For those being 
subjected to it, institutional ambiguity produces uncertainty, confusion, and 
ambivalence. Unpredictability, or destabilization of expectations, undermines 
agency and results in demobilization. This is by no means absolute. The ‘gov-
erned’ also govern themselves and subvert and resist forms of uncertainty that 
they face (Hasselberg, 2016). Although power is not unidirectional, it is funda-
mentally asymmetrical. The concern of this book, therefore, is with the ways 
in which uncertainty constrains and limits the people that face it. Informality, 
liminality, and exceptionalism undermine people’s ability to plan and act and trap 
them in precariousness by producing anxiety, instability, and passiveness (Nassar 
and Stel, 2019). Cullen Dunn (2014: 300) has captured the disciplinary power 
of uncertainty in the term ‘absolute zero’ to denote how pervasive and enduring 
institutional ambiguity can paralyze people, draining them of energy and imped-
ing them to act as coherent subjects. For people to meaningfully or constructively 
relate to a governance actor, for instance, there must be an understanding of what 
or who this actor is and what its prerogatives and responsibilities are (Tapscott, 
2017).
As further conceptualized in Chapter 6, institutional ambiguity amounts to a 
politics of uncertainty when it operates as a precondition for the control, exploi-
tation, and expulsion of refugees that serves the actors that produce it through 
lacking or ambiguous governance. Institutional ambiguity serves to control refu-
gees, because it makes them ‘insecure, passive and pessimistic’ (Griffiths, 2013: 
280). It prevents them from planning, organizing, and mobilizing as they have no 
way to credibly anticipate the consequences of any action (Eule et al., 2018: 93). 
Crucially, in the case of refugees, authorities will not seek to discipline them in 
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the traditional Foucauldian sense that assumes citizens that ultimately need to be 
included in the governance fold. Rather, the form of control aspired to regarding 
refugees – especially in contexts such as Lebanon where integration is widely seen 
as entirely undesirable – is one premised on exclusion, distancing, and demobili-
zation, a form of control that allows for exploitation as well as eventual expulsion.
‘Chronic uncertainty’ and the ‘ontological insecurity’ it produces can physi-
cally and mentally destabilize people to the extent that they are made passive and 
innocuous (El-Shaarawi, 2015: 40, 46–47, 52; Griffiths, 2014: 2005; Whyte, 2011: 
21). The destabilization of expectations, the undermining of rights, the fragmen-
tation of networks, and the production of existential challenges related to shel-
ter, security, and health that follow from institutional ambiguity make refugees 
dependent on and exploitable for Lebanese strongmen, mediators, and brokers 
who – as Chapter 1 will show – are closely connected to the Lebanese authorities 
that are at the root of institutional ambiguity. The extra-legality and social vul-
nerability manufactured through institutional ambiguity, finally, renders refugees 
‘deportable.’ Existential destitution ‘encourages’ refugees to consider return or 
further flight even if these options are entirely unsafe and legal limbo facilitates 
deportation in a more direct sense.
Studying ambiguity and uncertainty:  
methods and approach
To understand how institutional ambiguity operates in the context of Lebanese 
refugee governance and, more specifically, how and why it emerges and is main-
tained, extended, navigated, and contested, requires a specific methodological and 
analytical approach.
The empirical analysis central to this book draws on two case-studies that rep-
resent two different research projects of which relevant information about data 
generation will be provided in more detail in the respective chapters. The Pales-
tinian case-study reflects a longer-term study into the local governance dynamics 
in informal Palestinian refugee settlements in South Lebanon (Stel, 2017). The 
pertinence of systematic uncertainty and the political drivers of this reality here 
surfaced in an inductive way as one of the main factors explaining why Palestin-
ian authorities and Lebanese local governance representatives interacted the way 
they did.
This realization that institutional ambiguity is a key aspect of refugee govern-
ance in Lebanon was subsequently explored more deductively in the research 
constituting the Syrian case-study. This entailed a more targeted exploration of the 
causes, characteristics, and consequences of the informality, liminality, and excep-
tionalism that – desk research quickly revealed – determined Lebanon’s response 
to this new refugee ‘crisis’ in perhaps even starker degrees.13 Key research ques-
tions here were: How does institutional ambiguity manifest itself, nationally and 
locally, for different groups of stakeholders? Who benefits from such ambiguity or 
is empowered by it (economically, politically, socially) and who is disadvantaged 
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or marginalized as a result of it? How is it reproduced, navigated, and defied? 
What are the root causes of institutional ambiguity, and how do these relate to 
questions of capacity and political will?
The selection of these two case-studies thus followed from an empirical imper-
ative to better understand Lebanon’s governance of subsequent and mutually 
reinforcing refugee ‘crises.’ My book, however, also aspires to further our theo-
retical understanding of the (re-)production of institutional ambiguity and to help 
sophisticate the analytical toolkit available to study this issue. Following Ragin’s 
(1994) perspective on research as a dialogue between evidence and ideas, then, 
my empirical cases are not only a means to extend a theoretical idea and my con-
ceptualizations are more than merely the instrument to understand an empirical 
phenomenon. The interplay between empirical and conceptual questions allows 
for a constructive and innovative engagement with both.
From a theoretical perspective, therefore, my focus on refugee governance in 
Lebanon functions as an extreme case-study into institutional ambiguity and the 
politics of uncertainty at large. Exploring the governance of refugees, a category 
of people facing particular uncertainty, in Lebanon, a country that, as a hybrid 
political order, is known to be particularly ambiguous in terms of politics and 
institutions, provides a unique window to capture and analyze the politics of 
uncertainty that might be at work more subtly in many other instances. By delib-
erately focusing on exceptional levels of uncertainty, institutional ambiguity as an 
empirical phenomenon becomes visible and researchable.14
The mutually reinforcing empirical and theoretical ambitions at the heart 
of this book pose the not-insignificant question of how to study inaction and 
ambiguous action. How to locate and make sense of things that are either not 
there – in the case of inaction – or inherently vague – in the case of ambiguous 
action? In analyzing the strategic aspects of institutional ambiguity, the impera-
tive is to establish how institutional ambiguity follows from specific decisions 
in policy formulation and policy implementation and to tease out the interests 
driving these decisions. But how to get at motivations that are often unconscious 
or disguised? Institutional ambiguity, by its very nature, ironically defies – and, 
when part of a politics of uncertainty, is meant to defy – understanding and 
thereby analysis.
I engaged with this fundamental challenge by drawing on methodological and 
analytical strategies developed in the field of ignorance studies, that is introduced 
in more detail in Chapter 6, which purports that not-knowing can be considered an 
‘active accomplishment’ and is often strategically feigned, maintained, or imposed 
(Gross and McGoey, 2015: 5; see also Cons, 2007; Lindberg and Borrelli, 2019; 
Nassar and Stel, 2019; Stel, 2019). Such an approach to capturing the politics of 
uncertainty is inspired by postcolonial and feminist theory that signaled the ways 
in which class, gender, and race ‘produce absences of knowledge’ (Croissant, 
2014: 11) and takes cues from critical organization and management studies (Dav-
enport and Leitch, 2005; McGowan, 2003). It entails two crucial exercises: First, 
to explicitly seek out inconsistencies, contradictions, and ‘silences’ in people’s 
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discourses and behaviours rather than discard them (Stel, 2019); and, second, to 
specifically explore such tensions and gaps in the data not as ‘measurement errors’ 
or ‘thin data,’ but as research findings in their own right that offer a relevant win-
dow onto the broader institutional context in which they are generated (Mazzei, 
2003: 357). Rather than precluding understanding, silences and ambiguities in the 
data can convey important clues about the nature of governance and authority in 
the settings in which they were generated (Jaworski, 2005: 2; Pinder and Harlos, 
2001: 333; Randazzo, 2015: 3; Zerubavel, 2006: 8). What is knowable, after all, 
is not decided on individually but ‘enculturated,’ negotiated socially and enforced 
politically (Poland and Pedersen, 1998: 298).
This approach harnesses work on ‘metadata’ (Fujii, 2010), unspoken thoughts 
or tacit understandings implicit in rumors, inventions, denials, evasions, and 
silences. It engages with the idea of ‘infrapolitics,’ ‘political action [that] is studi-
ously designed to be anonymous or to disclaim its purpose’ (Scott, 1990: 199). 
Fundamentally, it asks: Who does (not) – or claims (not) to – know what and why 
is this so? Inspired by a rich literature dealing with fieldwork in ‘difficult’ settings, 
it reiterates that distilling ‘reliable’ data and ‘valid’ analyses is not simply a mat-
ter of deducing truthfulness or accuracy and distinguishing ‘fact’ from ‘fiction’ 
but rather of systematically exploring what so-called lies and falsehoods com-
municate about social reality and political institutions (Carpi, 2015b: 2). More 
practically, it asks a specific set of questions from the data: What is not being said? 
(mobilizing work on gaps and silences); What is not being done? (addressing 
the matter of inaction); What is sensitive? (drawing on studies of taboo, evasion, and 
denial); What is taken for granted? (inspired by Bourdieu’s notion of ‘doxa’); 
and What is inconsistent? (pertaining to contextuality in terms of timing, setting, 
and audience)
As outlined in Olivier de Sardan’s (2016: 121) ‘anthropology of gaps, discrep-
ancies and contradictions,’ such an approach demands qualitative, triangulated, 
and contextual data and iterative, critical, and reflexive analysis. It requires a 
study of policy practices rather than policies as such, of de facto behaviour and 
effects in addition to de jure stipulations. My analysis is based on elaborate desk 
research as well as extensive fieldwork. The Palestinian case-study draws on 12 
months of ethnographic fieldwork in two informal Palestinian refugee settlements 
in 2012, 2013, and 2014, during which observational notes were systematically 
generated; 40 informal meetings, five group interview sessions, and 232 indi-
vidual in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted; and complementary 
documentary material was collected (Stel, 2017). The Syrian case-study makes 
use of two bodies of data. The first was collected during six months of long-
distance data generation in 2017 and 2018 that produced 34 in-depth interviews 
and 18 informal discussions with national stakeholders. The second resulted from 
three months of fieldwork in early 201815 that revolved around the governance of 
two specific informal Syrian refugee settlements in the Bekaa Valley. This field-
work entailed 35 semi-structured, in-depth interviews and various informal meet-
ings with local stakeholders and the collection of relevant documents. In both 
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case-studies, these data were generated and reflected upon in close collaboration 
with local fieldwork partners.
My data mostly derives from interviews with political authorities and state 
representatives working nationally and locally, (self-proclaimed) political and 
communal refugee representatives, humanitarian ‘professionals,’ activists and 
representatives of ‘civil society,’ and a range of experts from academia, journal-
ism, and think thanks.16 This book, then, does not reflect a traditional street-level 
bureaucracy in that it offers only limited access to the internal understandings 
and individual deliberations of state officials.17 Rather, by soliciting the reflec-
tions and experiences of political authorities and state representatives as well as 
their humanitarian ‘partners’ and the refugees they are supposed to govern, the 
book offers a multi-dimensional analysis that draws on not only the implicit or 
explicit considerations of decision-makers themselves, but also on reflections on 
their stated and unstated interests by a multitude of stakeholders.
Despite my aspirations for comprehensiveness, my research questions are nec-
essarily bounded. Thus, in situating my analysis and argument, four important 
disclaimers with regard to demarcation are warranted. First, my analysis centres 
on ambiguity in the governance of refugees in host countries. The uncertainty pro-
duced by the process of displacement itself, well-documented in refugee studies, 
lies beyond the scope of my argument. Second, my interest specifically regards 
the role of political governance actors in the institutionalization of ambiguity. 
Although I focus on governance by the state, in the context of Lebanon’s hybrid 
political order that is introduced in Chapter 1, this comprises a much broader 
mediated assemblage that includes officially non-state political and ‘traditional’ 
authorities. Nevertheless, my analysis does not explicitly consider the role of 
the Lebanese public and civil society in shaping such governance. Similarly, 
I recognize that humanitarian agencies also routinely keep refugees in the dark 
about procedures and criteria, so as to prevent them from ‘gaming the system,’ 
and are heavily implicated in forms of ‘epistemic disorientation’ (Atme, 2019; 
Carpi, 2014, 2015a; Cullen Dunn, 2012; Ferguson, 1994; Schmidt, 2019; Tazzioli, 
2019). Yet while this is apparent throughout the case-studies and while Chapter 6 
discusses the complicity of the humanitarian sector in the broader governmental-
ity that the politics of uncertainty denotes, the focus of this book is on strategic 
ambiguity in the political regime.
Third, not discarding the fundamental importance of such projects, my analysis 
here does not aim to ‘give voice’ to refugees in a direct way. My quest to inter-
rogate the strategic dimensions of ambiguity started out with the lived experi-
ences of refugee communities that hosted me during my initial fieldwork, who 
understood the uncertainty they faced as a disciplinary strategy. Yet, although 
these experiences are prevalent throughout my analysis, the primary focus of the 
book does not regard the coping mechanisms of refugees. Instead, inspired by 
political anthropology approaches to ‘study up’ (Nader, 1972), I depart from these 
perceived disciplinary effects of uncertainty and trace them through the govern-
ance arenas in which they originated (Hasselberg, 2016: 94). Going beyond the 
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experience of uncertainty to teasing out the politics of uncertainty contributes to 
validating refugees’ implicit political understandings of institutional ambiguity 
and helps us to critically question our reading of the broader (dis)order that con-
tributes to shaping their lives.
Fourth, I am acutely aware that my analysis and its implications can be read as 
first and foremost a critique on Lebanon’s engagement with the refugees it hosts. 
This, as I further substantiate in the book’s final chapter, would be a mistake. 
I recognize the enormous feat of hosting such a large number of refugees as Leba-
non has faced, above all by the Lebanese population – of which the poorest seg-
ments welcomed the largest numbers of refugees – but also by many if not most 
state officials who do the best they can under extremely restraining circumstances. 
My analysis is certainly critical of particular practices and aspects of Lebanon’s 
refugee governance. This perspective, however, should be carefully situated in 
the relevant geopolitical context. Problems in regional host states can never be 
understood in isolation from the political hegemony of Western policy actors in 
the global migration regime. Western states have contributed to causing or failed 
to prevent and solve the devastating conflicts that have produced the Palestin-
ian and Syrian refugee crises. They condone and encourage the type of regional 
refugee governance that is the object of study in this book in their ruthless attempt 
to outsource migration management and safeguard their own countries from the 
predicaments they think hosting refugees entails. Clearly, governance of forced 
migration in the ‘Global North’ prefigures and parallels the maleficent inaction 
and ambiguity here explored for the Lebanese case (Stel, 2018).
Thus, while my argument, for instance, suggests that limited political will is as 
important as capacity deficits in explaining the informality, liminality, and excep-
tionalism that characterize refugee governance in Lebanon, this should not be 
taken to mean that Lebanon – or any other host country where institutional ambi-
guity is particularly significant – is entirely or even primarily responsible for the 
‘mess’ it finds itself in.18 The parameters that incentivize these modes of govern-
ance have geopolitical and (neo-)colonial drivers. Ultimately, as De Waal (2014) 
surmises: ‘The agenda for poor and troubled countries is set by rich and powerful 
countries’ and these ‘are attuned principally to their own requirements of crisis 
management.’ Such ‘crisis management’ by the Global North crucially encour-
ages and props up the regional politics of uncertainty as explored in this book.
Outline
The book departs from a two-fold argument. It suggests that, on the one hand, the 
twin notions of institutional ambiguity and the politics of uncertainty offer a fruit-
ful new perspective on refugee governance in Lebanon and, on the other hand, 
that studying Lebanon’s refugee governance from this perspective can critically 
enhance our understanding of the ways in which political authority operates in a 
more general sense. Chapter 1 has the dual aim to advance in further detail the 
notion of hybrid political order and the forms of arbitrary governance that flourish 
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within it, outlining the more contingent and structural roots of institutional ambi-
guity. It introduces the particulars of the sectarian, neopatrimonial, and oligopo-
listic incarnation of such hybridity in Lebanon.
This is followed by four empirical chapters engaging with the two case-studies 
central to the book, first discussing the national policy and local governance 
dimensions of Lebanon’s response to the arrival of Syrian refugees, in Chapters 2 
and 3 respectively, and then analyzing the Lebanese engagement with the more 
protracted Palestinian refugee presence in the country, in Chapters 4 and 5, that 
has crucially affected the governance of Syrian refugees. In these chapters, I dem-
onstrate how institutional ambiguity is evident in the governance of Syrian and 
Palestinian refugees’ status, spaces, and representative institutions and how this 
manufactures refugees’ vulnerability in these three realms and enables authorities 
to control, exploit, and render deportable refugees.
This outline follows from my structurationist take on the analysis of politics in 
which agency – someone’s capacity to initiate change in her or his circumstances – 
and structure – the rules of social life – are mutually constituting entities. Whereas 
Chapter 1 introduces and analyzes the structures and context that induce ambigu-
ity, the book’s empirical chapters focus on the political actions that shape and 
reinforce it. Chapter 6 brings these perspectives together. It relates the analytical 
framework presented in this Introduction with the empirical insights mustered 
in the case-study chapters and extends the idea of the politics of uncertainty as 
introduced here by drawing on the emerging field of ignorance studies. It suggests 
we can further understand the strategic aspects of the inaction and ambiguous 
action that produce institutional ambiguity by exploring these as forms of feigned, 
maintained, and imposed ‘not-knowing.’ This allows for a stronger analytical 
linkage between means – institutional ambiguity – and ends – control, exploita-
tion, and expulsion – in Lebanese refugee governance dynamics. It furthers a 
nuanced reading of the agency behind institutional ambiguity that stays far away 
from conspiracy theories of masterminded chaos without succumbing to systemic 
platitudes.
The book’s concluding chapter extends the insights arrived at beyond the spe-
cifics of the empirical contexts studied. It explores what my case-studies have to 
say about practices and processes of power, order, and political authority more 
broadly. Speaking to the academic literatures underlying my framework in the 
fields of refugee studies, hybrid governance, and ignorance studies, it explicates 
the empirical and conceptual contributions and political implications of my 
analysis.
Notes
 1 Author’s interview – Tyre, 7 May 2013.
 2 Author’s interview – Skype, 14 December 2017.
 3 Author’s interview – Skype, 16 March 2018.
 4 Author’s interview with international development manager – Skype, 19 December 
2017.
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 5 An advisor to the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, cited in Frangieh and Barjas 
(2016).
 6 The book thereby synthesizes, revisits, and extends earlier work on the interface 
between institutional ambiguity and refugee governance in Lebanon published in Stel 
(2015, 2016, 2017) and Nassar and Stel (2019).
 7 My understanding of policy implementation was greatly facilitated by a review by 
Meike Frotzheim.
 8 Author’s interview – Skype, 19 December 2017.
 9 Statement of advisor to the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs, livestream of event 
at the American University of Beirut – 23 November 2017.
 10 Author’s informal discussion with project evaluation specialist – Skype, 21 August 
2017.
 11 I do not take the ‘crisis’ frame applied to the presence of refugees in the country by the 
Lebanese government for granted. When I refer to the Syrian or Palestinian refugee 
crises, I acknowledge but do not validate this dominant state discourse. Crisis denotes 
first and foremost the predicaments of refugees themselves.
 12 This term previously appears in other work in different fields (Jones, 2014; Petersen, 
1996; Power, 2004; Schedler, 2013), but my conceptualization here is distinct from 
these earlier applications empirically as well as politically.
 13 The locus of fieldwork in the Palestinian case-study was located in South Lebanon 
and that of the Syrian case-study in the Bekaa. In both studies, however, local 
manifestations of institutional ambiguity were systematically linked to district/
provincial and national governmentalities, which allows me to speak of an encom-
passing politics of uncertainty instead of isolated local incarnations of institutional 
ambiguity.
 14 This raises the question as to which of the institutional ambiguity detected is on account 
of the refugee status of the governance subjects I focus on and which of it stems from 
the hybridity of the Lebanese governance setting central to my analysis. This issue is 
addressed throughout the book and further taken up in the concluding chapter. In a 
nutshell, I argue that the politics of uncertainty leveled against refugees in Lebanon is 
an extreme and particular version of the politics of uncertainty that Lebanese citizens 
face, which in turn reflects governance more broadly and helps shed new light on 
how deliberate forms of institutional ambiguity work as a governance modality more 
universally.
 15 This part of the fieldwork was conducted by a fieldwork partner. This denied me the 
opportunity of field ‘immersion’ that I initially and ideally sought. The subsequent 
intense coordination with my fieldwork partner on the ground – who, having lived in 
the country for years and having professionally worked on refugee issues for a long 
time, did bring extensive immersion to the table – has added a layer of reflexivity to 
data generation and analysis that helped navigate the ever-present question of whether 
confusion and uncertainty simply reflect researcher ignorance or indeed signal institu-
tional ambiguity (Gershon and Raj, 2000: 10).
 16 Interviews conducted for the Palestinian case-study (in 2012, 2013, and 2014) were 
not recorded, and citations from these interviews throughout the book are thus 
based on notes. Interviews for the Syrian case-study (held in 2017 and 2018) were 
mostly recorded and, unless indicated otherwise, quotes from these conversations are 
verbatim.
 17 See Kalir, Achermann, and Rosset (2019), Lindberg and Borrelli (2017), and Mencütek 
(2019:14) for further deliberations on physical and psychological access to state 
officials.
 18 Here the distinction between rulers and ruled, artificial and problematic though it may 
be, is essential. An important asset of the idea of a politics of uncertainty is that it 
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allows to at least tentatively locate some of the agency behind pervasive institutional 
ambiguity. Yet, such responsibility can – in hybrid settings where accountability is 
convoluted – not be extended to the broader population of a particular country, even 
if these are nominal democracies and even if over time people become implicated in 
institutional ambiguity through their everyday negotiation of it.
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You have political leaders in this country, they don’t have the sense of govern-
ance. They have the sense to make consensus on how they can maintain their 
power-sharing platform. But that’s it. That’s it. This is very simple. It is simple 
as it is. I cannot add more and I don’t have to add more and there is nothing 
to add. Because all the intelligent solutions are here; they don’t want to adopt 
intelligent solutions. They want to keep creating problems and problems and 
problems and problems and talking and talking and talking. That’s it. And if 
someone like me, for example, came in and has an official position, they can 
propose a first solution, a second solution, third solution, fourth solution . . . 
And it will not work.1
In this book, I want to shed light on the ways in which Lebanese authorities stra-
tegically uphold and extend institutional ambiguity to deal with so-called refu-
gee ‘crises.’2 This assumes that ambiguity follows from both state structures and 
the behaviour of the people constituting these structures. It does not assume that 
state agencies are the only organizations implicated in the institutionalization of 
ambiguity. Businesses, transnational networks, and humanitarian regimes will all 
have a stake in this process. My concern with states follows from my interest in 
thinking through the relation between ambiguity and political forms of power. But 
most of the organizational logics explored in this book for state agencies might 
be fruitfully extrapolated to other societal realms. In fact, the notion of stateness 
that is put forward in this chapter sees the state as a hybrid, mediated assemblage 
that encompasses much of what traditional, formal approaches to the state would 
consider to lie beyond it.
To understand the political work that institutional ambiguity might do for Leba-
nese state agencies in their governance of refugees then requires two things: first, 
to establish a way to conceptually understand ‘the state’; and, second, to make 
sense of the empirical specificities of the Lebanese state in light of such a concep-
tualization. Drawing on and contributing to debates on hybrid order and twilight 
institutions, the chapter’s first two sections address these issues respectively. The 
final section subsequently reflects on the structural, systemic features of insti-
tutional ambiguity in Lebanon, considering the peculiarities of its state system 
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and political arrangements. This chapter thereby sets the scene for the case-study 
chapters that will follow and that will focus on the more agential dimensions 
of Lebanon’s governance of the Syrian and Palestinian refugee presence in the 
country.
Conceptualizing the state beyond the illusion  
of sovereignty
Many regional host states for refugees are considered ‘weak’ or ‘fragile.’ In work-
ing towards a better understanding of the political functionality and institution-
alization of ambiguity, however, such a pathological approach to governance is 
hardly helpful. Discarding any reality that does not live up to an abstract European 
ideal-type as ‘failed’ reifies rather than interrogates disorder. Drawing on work on 
‘the anthropology of the state’ (Sharma and Gupta, 2006; see also Das and Poole, 
2004; Gupta, 1995, 2012; Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Joseph and Nugent, 1994; 
Klem, 2012; Kosmatopoulos, 2011; Olivier de Sardan, 2008; Trouillot, 2001), 
I thus take ‘fragility’ as the starting point instead of the conclusion of my attempt 
to think through the political work that institutional ambiguity does. In this chap-
ter, the premise is that, as a result of the legacies of colonialism and war as well as 
current geopolitical realities, sovereignty in the states that host the majority of the 
world’s refugees is contested (Bacik, 2008; Fregonese, 2012). No single political 
authority can impose its will and use violence with impunity. This makes govern-
ance complex and unpredictable per definition.
In the shifting assemblages of formal state agencies, political parties, ‘tradi-
tional’ authorities and ‘strongmen,’ civil society organizations, religious institu-
tions, and private enterprises, it appears as if ‘the state does not exist and the state 
is everywhere’ at the same time (Ismail, 2006: 165). As further explored in the 
next section, in Lebanon too, ‘the state’ [al dawle] seems to simultaneously repre-
sent everything and nothing. References to the state are often very generic, with-
out an indication to a specific actor, institution, department, ministry, or person. 
It could refer to a municipality, the government, the army or police, the national 
electricity company, or all of those at the same time. For refugees especially, the 
state is often an external, largely unknown, and unspecified ‘they,’ a vague, face-
less, address-less entity.
This paradox of simultaneous presence and absence can be unpacked by distin-
guishing between a ‘state system’ and a ‘state idea’ (Abrams, 1988; Migdal, 2001). 
The state system then refers to the collection of actors, practices, and institutions 
that legally make up the state as understood in a colloquial sense, constituting 
a material reality. The state idea is the socio-political construct that gives these 
actors, practices, and institutions a perceived coherence and collective intention 
and thereby conjures the state as an ontological structure. This tension between 
systems and ideas is relevant to the structural aspects of institutional ambigu-
ity. When investigating ambiguity, dichotomous distinctions between ‘state’ and 
‘society’ or between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ are useless. What is at stake is not 
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mapping who or what is inside or outside the state, but rather the shifting overlap 
and dynamic co-constitution of different forms of political authority by a variety 
of governance actors.
The notion of hybrid sovereignty is helpful in this exercise (see the work of 
Balthasar, 2015; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1997; Hoffmann and Kirk, 
2013; Kingston, 2004; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 2008; Risse, 
2013; Risse and Lehmkuhl, 2007; Scheye, 2009; Van Overbeek, 2014; Wickham-
Crowley, 1987; Wiuff Moe, 2011). The idea of hybridity emphasizes the multi-
plicity and interactive nature of governance and stresses the symbiotic relation 
between what are often thought of as bounded political actors or separate institu-
tional fields. If ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ are recognized as mutually constitutive, dis-
tinctions like public and private and formal and informal become a moving target. 
These constructed boundaries can be claimed and denied by authorities and the 
people these authorities purportedly govern (although, as we will see, most often 
more successfully by the former than by the latter). The matter at hand, then, is not 
to define or pinpoint ‘the state,’ but rather to explore the empirical manifestations 
of the state system’s inherently ‘elusive, porous, and mobile’ interfaces with other 
forms of political authority (Mitchell, 1990: 77).
If a ‘political order’ is the sum of institutionalized power and governance rela-
tions that one can empirically grasp at a given time and place, then hybrid political 
orders are countries that do not have a sovereign authority or one single focal point 
of governance (Boege et al., 2008; Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009; Hagmann 
and Hoehne, 2009; Kyed, 2017). Sovereignty is never absolute, but some ‘orders’ 
are more hybrid than others.3 This regards the extent to which state systems have 
been able to co-opt governance functions. Hybridity often reflects the effects 
of colonial divide-and-rule legacies and neocolonial institutional imposition. It 
operates on various fronts. Hybridity regards a multiplicity of political authorities 
(inside and beyond the formal state system), a plurality of political institutions 
(with de facto practices often holding as much sway in political decision- 
making as de jure policies) and changeable political dynamics (where protracted 
communal power bases are combined with volatile alliances) (Stel and Van der 
Molen, 2015). In short, hybrid orders refer to a situation characterized by ‘con-
tradictory and dialectic co-existence’ of governance actors in which ‘diverse and 
competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power 
co-exist, overlap, and intertwine’ (Boege et al., 2008: 17). The idea of hybrid 
order or hybrid sovereignty thus puts the tight, complex, and changing relations 
among different governance actors centre stage. This brings into focus the politi-
cal heterogeneity and non-synchronicity that is essential to understand the struc-
tural components of institutional ambiguity.
Under hybrid sovereignty, governance, the organization of public goods and 
political decision-making, thus takes place inside but also beyond the state sys-
tem. Various political authorities that are simultaneously part of and parallel to the 
state system compete for and negotiate over the power to govern. These ‘twilight 
institutions’ are authorities that command significant governance capacity and 
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legitimacy, but are outside or only partially included in the formal state system 
(Lund, 2006). They often draw on the state idea in organizing and legitimizing 
their provision of security, welfare, and representation, casting their governance 
activities in ‘languages of stateness’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Stel, 2016). 
From the perspective of fragility, these authorities compete over governance 
power with the formal state system. In reality, however, their ‘twilight’ nature 
means that they more often partially co-opt – or are co-opted by – the state system, 
which governs in a mediated or negotiated manner (Menkhaus, 2006; Hagmann 
and Péclard, 2010; Scheye, 2009; Stel, 2015, 2017). In hybrid orders, various 
governance actors are ‘doing the state’ together (Migdal and Schlichte, 2005: 14). 
To work with hybridity, essentially, is to approach the state as a strategic field in 
which relationality – actors’ embeddedness in multiple and dynamic networks – is 
the constitutive element.
As my account of Lebanon’s political order that follows shows, I do not mean 
to romanticize hybridity or mediation. Elite collaboration in practice does little for 
accountability, and competing regimes of violence undermine human security in 
many ways. But a conceptual premium on relationality allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism revolves around the idea 
of ‘state capture,’ the notion that the ‘public’ state system is appropriated by the 
‘private,’ or communal, interests of authorities that initially operated beyond this 
formal state system but have come to occupy it. The state system is then per-
ceived as an empty shell that is nevertheless the ‘ultimate prize’ for political elites 
because of the redistributable resources it brings with it and the inherent legiti-
macy it can tap into in the form of the state ‘idea’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). From 
a hybridity perspective, this ‘capture’ is a more iterative process, where various 
forms of authority compete and negotiate over who can wield political power 
when and where and over whom. Rather than ‘traditional’ or ‘communal’ authori-
ties that take over the state, which suggests an endpoint, twilight authorities that 
operate simultaneously inside and outside the state system constantly redefine and 
reallocate the power of the state agencies making up this state system.
In hybrid orders, to be able to govern, the state system is made up by more or 
less implicit partnerships and arrangements with a diverse range of local inter-
mediaries and rival sources of authority that it partially subsumes. It requires and 
nurtures this assembled and multi-layered institutional power among social, polit-
ical, and economic authorities. Where the idea of competition between ‘state’ and 
‘non-state’ that is central to notions of fragility suggests its own form of predict-
ability, the reality in which the state system – simultaneously or alternatingly – 
governs through as well as against other political authorities makes for a more 
complicated governance landscape in which ambiguity is a built-in feature. ‘Rules 
of the game’ or ‘social contracts’ will be more elusive in such settings, where gov-
ernance will be subject to constant change and reinterpretation that are part of the 
mediation or negotiation of political authority.
Crucially, this is a matter of scale and degree. The analytical value of focusing 
on the hybridity of sovereignty and political order does not lie in pointing out that 
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such hybridity exists – because it does everywhere and at all times – but in the 
analytical space it opens up to explore how it functions and what its effects are. 
My conceptualization of institutional ambiguity should be situated in this analyti-
cal space. In studying the institutionalization and the political use of ambiguity, 
bringing to the fore the hybridity of specific political orders is helpful because 
it reveals the structural and systemic aspects of uncertainty. It reveals how the 
inherently undefined nature of the interfaces between the ‘twilight’ actors operat-
ing in the assembled and shifting configurations of power underpins institutional 
ambiguity. These systemic drivers of ambiguity provide the context in which 
the agential aspects of ambiguity – the ways in which political authorities repro-
duce informality, liminality, and exceptionalism through inaction and ambiguous 
action – that I put centre stage in my further analysis emerge.
This book specifically explores how state agencies, the political authorities that 
are part of the formal state system, produce and reproduce institutional ambigu-
ity in governing refugees. This may seem counter-intuitive considering the prior 
acknowledgement that to speak of hybridity is to problematize state agency. To 
discuss any state system as a coherent and unitary institutional actor is to reify the 
state idea that political actors may project, but which does not accurately describe 
reality on the ground. But that political decision-making in hybrid political orders 
is crucially located beyond the formal state system does not undermine the utility 
of a focus on state policy-making and implementation (or the lack of it) for under-
standing how institutional ambiguity works.
State agencies and institutions matter even if this is in entirely different ways 
than the dominant state ‘idea’ would claim. In Lebanon, specifically, Mouawad 
and Baumann (2017: 69) have shown, ‘the state lies at the intersection of multiple 
societal and elite dynamics [and] informal networks and social service allocation 
structures are embedded in public institutions.’ From a hybridity perspective, the 
formal state system operates as an arena as well as an instrument of governance 
for a wide array of political authorities that have their institutional reach inside 
and beyond the state system. The policy-making and implementation behaviour 
of state agencies is the product of the negotiation, contestation, and mediation of 
various political authorities. It thereby offers a helpful entry point into hybridity 
and the way hybridity constitutes ambiguity.
Doing the state in Lebanon
When Lebanese talk about their state, the perceived absence of this state is often 
invoked in the exclamation ‘Where is the state?!’ [wayn el-dawle?!] (Mouawad 
and Baumann, 2017; see also Kosmatopoulos, 2011) My interlocutors often spoke 
of an ‘empty state’. This has to do not so much with the physical absence of the 
state – material manifestations of the presence of state agencies are abundant – but 
more with its elusiveness. Where does the state end and sectarian parties begin? 
What can and will the state do and for whom and under which conditions? Where 
to find information on which rules apply where? Analysts, too, have been skepti-
cal, seeing Lebanon as ‘a poster child of a failed state’ (Joseph, 2011: 152). In the 
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wake of the infamous Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), the term ‘Lebanoniza-
tion’ was coined to indicate the destructive fragmentation of a country (Migdal, 
2001: 136).4
Lebanese sovereignty has been eroded externally, through a perverse colo-
nial legacy that hardened existing sectarianism. After being part of the Ottoman 
Empire for four decades, the territory that now constitutes Lebanon was made part 
of the French Mandate until it gained independence in 1943. Since then Lebanon 
has faced almost continuous external intervention by regional sectarian power 
brokers and geopolitical alliances that turned it into the ‘battleground of the Mid-
dle East’ and have made its independence nominal at best (Hirst, 2010).5 The 
country was invaded by Israel in 1982, which occupied parts of South Lebanon 
until 2000, and was under de facto Syrian occupation, so-called tutelage, from 
1976 until 2005. It has seen various armed conflicts since then, such as the 1996 
Israeli ‘Grapes of Wrath’ campaign, the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, 
and the 2007 Nahr el-Bared clashes.
Lebanese sovereignty has been internally contested as well. Lebanon estab-
lished a unique system of sectarian consociationalism to share power among the 
18 different recognized sectarian communities in the country – of which the Sunni 
and Shia Muslims and Maronite Christians have historically been the largest and 
most influential. These various sectarian communities reflect religious or cultural 
distinctions between Lebanese groups and each have their regional strongholds; 
political parties; social institutions like schools, clinics, and charities; and armed 
militias. The country’s inter-sectarian power-sharing formula that was meant to 
unite these different groups while protecting their autonomy at the same time stip-
ulates that Lebanon’s President should be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Min-
ister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim and includes 
corresponding sectarian quota that guide the allocation of all public positions.
Resulting from trade-offs between the French mandatory power and the domi-
nant, predominantly Maronite Christian, Lebanese elites at the time, this system 
was designed to accommodate much of the patriarchal and feudal patronage net-
works that predated it. The parameters for this, in Hudson’s (1968) words, ‘pre-
carious republic’ were agreed upon in an unwritten ‘National Pact’ in 1932 that 
also stipulated the exact divisions of power based on the national census that was 
held that year, which has been the country’s last census until today.6 The 1989 
Ta’if Agreement that officially ended the Lebanese Civil War expresses the vision 
to move away from political sectarianism but in fact merely updates the division 
of power between Muslim and Christian seats in Parliament and the relative influ-
ence of the positions of the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament.
As noted, Lebanon’s limited sovereignty does not mean the Lebanese state is 
failed, weak, or absent. Both the state idea and the state system are at the heart of 
Lebanese governance. The state system is imperfect but omnipresent. As Hermez 
(2015: 513) sums up:
The state installs traffic lights, is involved in tenders for infrastructure con-
struction projects, builds and maintains roads, holds elections, passes laws, 
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manages prisons, arrests criminals, and, most invasively, maintains military 
and police checkpoints that, however ineffective, structure daily life and the 
zones of possibility for action, and force people to maintain relations – a level 
of social and political capital – to bypass this state of affairs if need be.
The state idea resonates fiercely in Lebanon as well. Lebanese citizens may be 
ambivalent towards and skeptical of the state, but they do believe in and look for 
its ‘ideal face’ (Obeid, 2010; see also Carpi, 2019; Hazbun, 2016). Despite the 
fact that their own behaviour often undermines this belief, political parties also 
routinely pledge allegiance to the notion of a ‘strong state of institutions’ (Ghad-
dar, 2016), feeding the notion of the Lebanese state as forever anticipated and 
‘awaited’ (Mouawad, 2015 in Carpi, 2019).
Hybrid sectarianism
This omnipresence of the state system and idea in Lebanon indicates that what 
defines the Lebanese state is not weakness, but rather hybridity. It is not the 
absence of stateness, but the elusiveness of what the state is and the unpredict-
ability of its institutional manifestations and operations that determines govern-
ance in Lebanon. Lebanon’s political system is ‘an unusual hybrid’ (International 
Crisis Group, 2015: 16). It is centred on a ‘fetishised sectarian balance’ that facili-
tates endemic patronage and an oligarchic and clientelistic distribution of state 
resources and positions (Perdigon, 2015). The country’s system of sectarian con-
sociationalism is premised on the existence of clear communal boundaries, elite 
coordination, and balance of power. It reflects but also entrenches the historical 
centrality of politicized sectarian allegiance. Access to the welfare, security, and 
representation that the Lebanese state nominally should offer all its citizens is thus 
mediated through sectarian identity and the related political networks.
This amalgamation of sectarian authority and parliamentary democracy that 
consociationalism institutionalized makes for a particular hybrid order that com-
bines not just different power structures, but also different logics of rule. The 
Lebanese President is elected for a six-year term. The government, or Council of 
Ministers, acts as the state’s executive, developing laws, policies, and decrees. 
Lebanon’s legislative is a unicameral parliament that is elected every four years 
by popular vote. While Members of Parliament can advance proposals for new 
laws and policies to the government, Lebanon’s executive has been dominant 
in the country’s policy-making. As a result of sectarianism, El-Ghali and Baal-
baki (2017: 10) note, ‘most policy issues are usually settled outside parliament.’ 
When Lebanon’s so-called troika – the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker 
of Parliament – agree, parliament will pass any decision without debate. This 
led a public administration expert consulting for various Lebanese ministries 
to conclude that ‘In Lebanon, we don’t have policy-makers, let’s be very clear. 
Because we don’t have policies. We have decision-makers.’7 When I asked him 
about the difference between a policy and a decision, he answered: ‘In a policy 
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you have a sustainability and in decision-making you have always changes.’ 
This explains why the Lebanese policies that are there tend to be ambiguous, or 
‘partial, temporal and provisional,’ as Mencütek (2019: 52) observes (see also 
Verdeil, 2018).
Since Lebanon’s legislative does not serve as an effective check on the 
executive, accountability is nominal at best. Various studies show that corrup-
tion is rife and that disciplinary mechanisms have been cosmetic and ineffec-
tive (Kisirwani, 1997; Leenders, 2004, 2012; Office for the Minister of State 
for Administrative Reform, 2011). That formal accountability is extremely 
wanting is further demonstrated by the fact that, while officially independ-
ent, Lebanon’s judiciary is entirely under the control of the executive. This is 
acknowledged by leading politicians and religious leaders and by judges them-
selves. The late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri infamously stated: ‘I have inter-
fered, I do interfere and I will continue to interfere in the work of the judiciary 
because this is how it is done in this country’ (quoted in Takieddine, 2004: 24 
in Knudsen, 2009: 63).
Political decision-making in Lebanon thus depends on an intricate process of 
inter-sectarian negotiation that requires broad consensus, which is almost never 
attainable. Lebanon’s state system, consequently, has operated more like a ‘vetoc-
racy,’ where rule through veto produces endemic deadlock. Since Syria withdrew 
from Lebanon in 2005, competition among two broad inter-sectarian alliances has 
defined Lebanese politics. The March 8 bloc, led by Lebanon’s Shia parties and 
their Christian allies, is considered pro-Syrian and is supported by Iran. March 14, 
conversely, headed by the main Sunni party and its Christian partners, allies with 
Saudi Arabia and its Western supporters, and is considered anti-Syrian.
While this alignment was initially based in respective resistance to and support 
for Syrian tutelage over Lebanon, it gained new pertinence in light of the Syrian 
War, in which – despite Lebanon’s official policy of disassociation – the different 
Lebanese alliances supported opposing sides in the conflict. This extreme polari-
zation has generated institutional paralysis. As Batruni and Hallinan (2018: 1) 
conclude, ‘political quagmires’ and ‘maximal delays’ define Lebanese govern-
ance. Pressing issues routinely get ‘neglected or shelved’ (Mencütek, 2019: 135). 
Although 45 parliamentary sessions were exclusively convened for this purpose, 
for instance, it took 30 months to appoint a President. Forming a government 
after elections often takes as much as ten months. Between 2007 and 2008, there 
was an, inherently severely curtailed, caretaker government for 18 months. The 
country went without a national budget for a decade since the withdrawal of Syria 
in 2005. Reflecting on such paralysis, a previous advisor to the Lebanese Minister 
of Social Affairs noted:
In Lebanon everything is possible! I will tell you something: . . . we stayed 
between 2005 and 2017, which means twelve years, without a budget in Leb-
anon. How can it be? It happened. In Lebanon, it happens. So we can have 
no policy, actually, because we have a minimal state. So this is part one, 
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we always had a laissez-faire, laissez-passer type of a minimal state that let 
everything ongoing [sic], especially on the economic side. Secondly, actually 
there was . . . we don’t have a united position inside the government. So we 
have one government, but actually it is not one government, it’s maybe five, 
six governments inside the government.8
Passing a law, the ultimate institutionalization of decision-making, requires 
active participation of parliamentary committees and a national assembly vote. 
Considering the extreme polarization described earlier, this is often impossi-
ble in Lebanon. Reflecting on the ‘reality and problems of the public admin-
istration’ in Lebanon, the Office for the Minister of State for Administrative 
Reform (2011: 7) concluded that ‘in terms of policy making and planning pub-
lic administrations in general lack strategic planning which is based on clear 
visions as well as long and medium-term plans resulting thereof.’ Rather than 
through laws, then, Lebanon is governed through decrees, which, unlike laws, 
can be approved by the government without direct involvement of parliament 
and are hence a more common policy modality. Even decrees, however, are 
often too ambitious. When this is the case, decisions are made by ‘ministerial 
decision,’ which only demands the approval of a single minister, not the whole 
government, and thus constitute the most realistic form of policy-making in the 
country.
In its ‘government monitor,’ the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (2019) 
showed that in its first hundred days, the government that was installed in Feb-
ruary 2019 published 522 legislative texts in the Official Gazette: 25 laws, 347 
decrees, and 150 ministerial decisions. The great majority of these were adminis-
trative measures. Of the 32 regulatory measures, only one could be classified as a 
reform, a ‘legislative or institutional change that goes beyond day-to-day policy 
management.’ In Lebanon, then, the main legislator is in fact not the legislature 
but the executive (Knudsen, 2009: 69). As one government advisor explained: 
‘Policies are seen as political and need consensus, decrees are seen as opera-
tional and don’t – this is why there are few policies, but many decrees.’9 Paralysis 
extends beyond policy-making, moreover. As Mencütek (2019: 132) shows, even 
those laws, decrees, and decisions that are made are often not acted upon due to 
lack of commitment, consensus, or resources.
In Lebanon perhaps more than elsewhere, policy then is, as El-Ghali and Baal-
baki (2017: 6) note in their exploration of Lebanese decision-making, ‘whatever 
governments choose to do or not to do.’ Hybrid sovereignty dictates what Leba-
nese state agencies do and not do and how they (not) do it. It cements short-term 
thinking and crisis management, having politicians focused on avoiding or navi-
gating specific breakdowns rather than on developing shared meta-policies for 
the issues that cause such breakdown. The public good in Lebanon has become 
defined as avoiding the outbreak of violent conflict, and this results in the insti-
tutionalization of ambiguity. Lebanon’s political parties embody and reproduce 
such ambiguity.
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Twilight parties
Lebanon’s main parties are the Party of God (or Hezbollah) and Hope (Amal) for 
the Shia community, the Future Movement (Mustaqbal) among Lebanon’s Sun-
nis, the Progressive Socialist Party for the country’s Druze, and the Free Patriotic 
Movement, the Lebanese Forces, and Kataeb (the Lebanese Phalangist Party) 
among Maronite Christians.10
Crucially, political parties in Lebanon do not operate on a political program. 
They organize to serve the interests of sectarian elites. Most parties have pro-
grams or manifestos, but these do not appear to meaningfully influence their 
actions. Indeed, political parties avoid commitment to any specific policy in their 
programs, limiting themselves to generic and uncontroversial positions (Hassan, 
2019). As the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies has shown time and again, in 
Lebanese elections national parties run with and against the same parties in differ-
ent places depending on the sectarian demographics of these localities (Atallah, 
2018). Even members of the same party rarely hold the same policy views (Atal-
lah and Diab, 2018). Members of Parliament are often not aware of the official 
position of their party – as manifested in either a program or the statements of the 
official party leader or spokesperson – on specific policy domains and disagree as 
often as they agree with members of the same party on policy matters. In terms of 
political principle or policy, political parties in Lebanon lack coherence entirely.
As vehicles of sectarian clientelism, however, they are consistent and effec-
tive. Political parties in Lebanon encompass clan and family allegiances, religious 
institutions such as the confessional family status courts, and geographic and eco-
nomic patronage networks (Sensenig-Dabbous, 2009: 2). They are a mix between 
the reinvented power of the semi-feudal sectarian patrons, so-called zuama, that 
held sway before the Civil War; the political institutionalization of the militias 
that challenged and co-opted these traditional elites during the war; and various 
post-war business tycoons – with different parties being dominated to a different 
extent by each of these traditions and logics.11 Most Lebanese parties are inti-
mately related to militias that claimed to serve and protect sectarian communities 
during the Lebanese Civil War. The war produced a far-reaching breakdown of the 
state system. This, Ramadan and Fregonese (2017: 10) show, resulted in ‘further 
hybridizations between state and nonstate actors, with elements of the govern-
ment, army, and armed militias contesting and at times collaborating to control 
territory and infrastructure.’
Much of Lebanon’s institutional ambiguity reflects the entrenchment of uncer-
tainty during and due to armed conflict. Embodying both cause and effect of the 
‘cantonization’ of Lebanon during the war, political parties are the institutional 
front office of much broader territorial and institutional sectarian strongholds with 
related religious and welfare institutions, civil society organizations and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), international alliances, and armed groups. 
Party structures overlap with sectarian communal organizations that encompass 
civil society organizations, businesses, and militias. In essence, then, they serve 
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as communal, rather than strictly political, representatives. This makes sense in 
light of the fact that, as Catusse and Karam (2010: 15) note, the Arabic word for 
party [hizb] is associated, or even interchangeable, with notions of ‘clubs’, ‘clans,’ 
‘militias,’ and ‘confessions.’
Therefore, while political parties are in formal terms merely political organiza-
tions that represent the interests of their electoral constituencies throughout the state 
system, in practice they simultaneously operate an institutional structure parallel to 
the state system to serve their sectarian constituencies. In my analysis, Lebanese 
political parties are not confined to the narrow institutional vehicle of the formal 
party, but encompass the political manifestation of larger communal-sectarian net-
works. In this way, sectarian communities and the state system meet in Lebanon’s 
political parties. Ultimately, it is these parties that are ‘doing the state’ in Lebanon.
Political parties in Lebanon are formal electoral representatives that shape state 
governance. They are also parallel governance actors in their own right, com-
manding their own institutions in terms of welfare, security, and representation. 
This makes them twilight institutions in the sense that they simultaneously oper-
ate inside and beyond the Lebanese state system. When developing the idea of 
‘twilight institutions,’ Lund (2006: 689) conceived of such institutions as being 
engaged in ‘an ambiguous process of being and opposing the state.’ That they 
are simultaneously governing in the name of the state and autonomously from it 
explains, for example, the paradoxical instances in which Lebanese political par-
ties are seen as, and present themselves as, representatives of ‘the people’ against 
the government, despite the fact that their own representation in said government 
is the very reason they can claim that such representation might have any effect.
Lebanese political parties have strong interscalar institutions, with neighbor-
hood dynamics that are intricately and tightly linked to national and geopolitical 
decision-making and ‘elite-level bargains’ (Belhadj et al., 2015: 7). The ‘politi-
cal boss class,’ Ghaddar (2016) shows in her analysis of the ‘machine politics’ 
in the ‘alleyways’ of Lebanon’s third largest city, Sidon, ‘dominates the entire 
political process in Lebanon, from the presidency and cabinet all the way down 
to neighborhood ward.’ Studies into local Lebanese security arrangements show 
that political party representatives are usually the first to respond to any incident 
and that state security agencies, such as the army and police, only intervene when 
they have a ‘political green light to do so’ (Belhadj et al., 2015: 9; see also Carpi, 
2016; Mazzola, 2019: 15).
As a Lebanese analyst (cited in Belhadj et al., 2015: 9) summarized:
Those who should be seen as doing the job on the ground are the mandated, 
uniformed institutions, even if the process of how and where they show up 
is wired through the parties. This status quo serves the parties and the state; 
there is consensus.
Such dynamics are not limited to security issues. A former official of the Lebanese- 
Palestinian Dialogue Committee, for instance, explained that municipal employees 
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usually ‘redirect’ any sensitive issue to the relevant local party functionary, not-
ing that the hands of a mayor, for instance, are often tied, and pointing out that 
there are ‘ceilings of decision-making’ that civil servants cannot breach without 
consulting with the dominant party cadres in the region.12
The formal state system is represented on various institutional levels. Under 
the Ministry of Interior, there are provincial governors [muhafaza], district gover-
nors [qaemaqam], and municipalities [baladiyat], and the respective administra-
tions as well as mukhtars (village or neighborhood officials responsible for basic 
personal status documentation). Other ministries also have their respective local-
level bureaucracies. Despite routine lip service to principles of decentralization, 
however, such local state structures suffer from lack of capacities and resources. 
Local authorities often feel abandoned by the national state, and the literature on 
the Lebanese system abundantly refers to the gaps between different levels of 
governance and the failure of nominal decentralization (Ghanem, 2016; Harb and 
Atallah, 2015).
This produces yet another one of the paradoxes that seem to define Lebanon: 
As a result of lacking policies and funds, local state agencies are simultaneously 
abandoned and curtailed (Mourad and Piron, 2016) – a dynamic that will feature 
throughout the book’s empirical chapters. Interaction through formal state chan-
nels is often lopsided, with national state agencies dictating what needs to be 
done locally without providing sufficient means or responding to local demands. 
This does not mean that the analyses and needs of local political authorities are 
not accommodated nationally. Rather, the intricacies of local governance predica-
ments and local political dynamics are communicated ‘upwards’ via the paral-
lel institutions of political parties and their subservient sectarian and communal 
networks. The more closely state agencies and political party structures are inter-
twined, as is the case, for instance, in the security sector, the more efficient such 
informal ‘decentralization’ is.
Because the relative power of each political-sectarian party determines the nature 
and functioning of state agencies, Lebanon is often said to lack a unified state, 
rather constituting a multitude of states, as different parties rule different regions 
or cities in the country. While this may ring true for many practical purposes, these 
different local ‘party states’ all operate according to the same overarching logic of 
hybrid sectarianism that was described previously. Various Lebanese regions cer-
tainly have different cultures, and the relative influence of particular institutions – 
clans, religious authorities, ‘civil society’ – may differ accordingly, but, as the 2019 
October Revolution drove home, the centrality of sectarian-political parties that 
co-opt and coordinate these various power poles is a constant.
In all of Lebanon, political parties are in many ways the central hub in the 
hybrid order that is constituted by the complex interconnections among diverse 
actors, ranging from state agencies to civil society organizations and NGOs and 
to clans, militias, and organized crime. Political parties, at once parasitic on the 
state and constitutive of it, are at the heart of Lebanon’s hybrid political order. 
They function as a ‘fluid frontier’ between what are formally state and non-state 
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institutions and actors (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010: 549). If the Lebanese state is 
a mediated one (Stel, 2015, 2017; Mazzola, 2019), then Lebanon’s political par-
ties, as the politically institutionalized vanguard of sectarian communal organi-
zations, are the central mediators (Stel and Van der Borgh, 2017). Combining 
functions of representation, provision, and brokerage, parties constitute de facto 
centripetal forces in Lebanon’s hybrid sovereignty.
Fregonese’s (2012: 659) theorization of Lebanon as ‘a constellation of hybrid 
sovereignties’ highlights the crucial positions that political parties hold in Leba-
non’s hybrid political order. Fregonese (2012: 657) identifies Lebanon’s political 
parties as the main institutional hub of the ‘tight circular connections between 
state and nonstate actors’ that define hybridity. Hezbollah, often considered the 
most ‘successful’ and thereby perhaps quintessential Lebanese party,13 in Fregon-
ese’s (2012: 668) words, is ‘simultaneously a political party, . . . an armed resist-
ance movement, a provider of social services, and a provider of infrastructure: it 
is simultaneously part of the state, nonstate, and state-like.’
To varying degrees, this applies to other political parties as well. Hazbun (2016: 
1057) shows how the Lebanese Phalangists and the Future Movement first devel-
oped autonomous political and business networks. As these parties entered gov-
ernment, such networks were ‘integrated into state structures to form hybrid state 
institutions . . . by displacing existing institutions and figures or else by creating 
parallel state institutions that could work around rival (hybrid) state institutions’ 
(Hazbun, 2016: 1057). A representative of one of the dominant parties in South 
Lebanon explained that when he referred to ‘the state,’ he meant ‘our people in 
the state’ through which decisions can be made.14 Political parties thus do not just 
shape policy-making inside the state system, they also mediate the interpretation 
and implementation of any law, decree, or decision from outside the state’s insti-
tutional structure.
This twilight nature of Lebanon’s political parties and the institutional broker-
ing it enables is especially important when it comes to the governance of non-
citizens such as refugees. In contrast to formal state agencies, political parties, 
which are formally related to state agencies through their elected representatives 
but also have a separate institutional governance structure, are well-positioned 
to engage with those populations that are excluded from the formal mandate of 
the state. As will become evident in the empirical chapters of this book, refugee 
populations that are ignored by or distance themselves from formal state policies 
and agencies often are accommodated by the sectarian-political institutions that 
are associated with Lebanon’s political parties. This works both ways. Communi-
ties without citizen or residency status depend on informal parallel governance 
by, among others, parties. Parties, by dealing with the sensitive reality of refugee 
governance that has been excluded from state mandates through legal vacuums 
and policy deficiency, reinstate their centrality as de facto power brokers in Leba-
non’s broader hybrid political order. What is crucial here is, of course, that these 
same political parties have imposed informality, liminality, and exceptionalism 
on refugees by excluding them from Lebanese laws and policies in the first place.
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Although Lebanon’s political parties are often called communal, in essence 
they are elitist.15 They serve themselves rather than their so-called constituen-
cies. Lebanon’s ‘social contract’ is sectarian rather than national. The provision of 
‘public goods’ is mediated through the sectarian elites and their parties. This also 
means that to ensure consensus, Lebanon’s political system is premised on elite 
deal-making rather than on broad popular representation (El-Husseini, 2004). 
As shown by Atallah (2016), Lebanon’s electoral law, which results in infamous 
gerrymandering, ‘allows the elite to select their constituency rather than voters 
electing their representatives.’ Public policy in Lebanon, El-Ghali and Baalbaki 
(2017: 21) note in their meta-study on Lebanese governance, is determined by 
the preferences of the ruling elite rather than by the demands of their ‘constituen-
cies.’ Surveying Lebanon’s legislative processes over the last years, the Lebanese 
Center for Policy Studies has empirically evidenced that Members of Parliament 
are hardly aware of citizens’ concerns and do not legislate on citizens’ priorities 
(Atallah, 2018).
Despite sectarian and geopolitical polarization, Lebanon’s consociational sys-
tem revolves around the creation and protection of elite consensus across sects. 
Political rivalry and scheming should not obscure the fact that the interests of 
Lebanon’s post-war ‘elite cartel’ converge on the issue of protecting the status 
quo (El-Husseini, 2004). Consociationalism, after all, is premised on the idea of 
mutual deterrence. The fact that all political-sectarian leaders need their peers 
to ‘control’ their respective constituencies makes for a tense equilibrium. The 
resilience of the current institutional ambiguity that defines Lebanon’s political 
decision-making system stems from such shared elite interests. The International 
Crisis Group (2015: 14) writes:
Perpetuation of a shaky equilibrium inherited from post-civil war arrange-
ments has become the desirable status quo. Informal agreements negotiated 
on the margins of any formal, institutional framework have become factions’ 
primary tool to overcome state paralysis and preserve their mutual interest 
in sustaining the system. Given their ad-hoc nature, such arrangements, sus-
ceptible to shifting domestic and regional dynamics, are imperfect, easily 
reversed, temporary stop-gaps, not durable solutions.
The twilight nature of political parties and their utility as vehicles for the realiza-
tion of elite interests also has an economic dimension. Several, often dynastic 
families dominate business as well as politics (Chabaan, 2016; Diwan and Haidar, 
2019; Nahas, 2012). In Lebanon, the political class is ‘embedded in the private 
sector,’ as ‘most businessmen are former state officials and most politicians have 
some businesses’ (Lebanese political analyst cited by Stel and Naudé, 2016: 264). 
The Lebanese political system is not just one of sectarian clientelism, it is essen-
tially oligopolistic. In Lebanon, the combination of neoliberal capitalism and sec-
tarianism has produced a situation of extreme inequality in which privatization 
is just another way to allocate spoils among Lebanon’s governing elites. Instead 
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of providing public goods, the Lebanese state ‘allowed the existence of informal 
markets’ to provide services (Uzelac and Meester, 2018: 37). The fact that such 
‘informal markets’ are directly controlled by those associated with the country’s 
sectarian elites has led commentators to talk about a ‘mafiocracy’ (El Mufti, 2012). 
Party leaders often do not claim official positions in government for themselves, 
but instead install trusted aides so that they are free to act as ‘super-ministers’, as 
an observer cited by the International Crisis Group (2015: 14) called them, ‘whose 
power is greater but unofficial’ and spans the state system, the private sector, and 
often civil society as well.
Uncertainty by consensus is thus not straightforward ‘state capture.’ The inher-
ent heterogeneity and fragmentation of hybrid orders prevents any such unitary 
co-optation. Rather, it aligns with the understanding of hybridity that revolves 
around the twilight nature of political parties as outlined earlier. In Lebanon, state 
agencies are often associated directly with the party of the person who is head-
ing it. In my interviews, for instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ran by the 
political leader of the Free Patriotic Movement who also happens to be the son-
in-law of the President (affiliated with the same party), was discussed as a direct 
extension of that party, with interlocutors talking about ‘the ministry of foreign 
affairs and other political parties’16 or ‘the ministry of foreign affairs and its con-
stituents.’17 At the same time, as a consequence of the sectarian quota system, 
ministries or other state departments are far from politically coherent, as different 
functions and positions within each agency have to be distributed across different 
sectarian groups and hence parties, which produces built-in centrifugal logics.
The systemic features of institutional ambiguity
Putting into conversation the notions of hybridity and ambiguity allows me to 
get at the structural dimensions of institutional ambiguity. It also contributes to 
debates on hybrid order by opening up the black box of hybridity. Linking hybrid 
order and institutional ambiguity enables us to go beyond the observation that 
orders are hybrid and gives us new analytical tools to study how and why they are 
hybrid. So how does Lebanon’s hybrid political order that orbits around twilight 
governance actors institutionalize ambiguity? How does hybridity produce sys-
temic uncertainty and unpredictability in Lebanon?
Under hybridity, the provision of services, the organization of security, and 
practices of representation, consultation, and accountability are highly informal 
in that they are importantly determined beyond the state system. In Lebanon, sec-
tarian elite competition has produced overwhelmingly ‘messy frameworks’ and 
‘informal and uncodified institutions’ and ‘public,’ ‘private,’ and ‘communal’ 
realms are institutionally entangled (Leenders, 2004: 16, 2l; see also Nahas, 2012: 
126). The contestation of such shifting boundaries has produced ‘highly unpre-
dictable and ambiguous outcomes’ (Leenders, 2004: 16).
In addition to informality, the hybridity of Lebanon’s political order also pro-
duces systemic liminality. Where institutional frameworks exist, they are routinely 
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‘put on hold, often “temporarily,” but without alternative regulations and proce-
dures serving to guide routine operations’ (Leenders, 2012: 120). Rules, regula-
tions, and decisions are always subject to reconsideration and reinterpretation, but 
this is particularly the case where such regulations are predominantly informal 
and routinely politicized. Hage (2015: 11) describes Lebanese politics as being 
in a ‘permanent critical state’ that puts a premium on short-term perspectives and 
shrinks the space for long-term planning and imagining alternative orders. This 
means that all forms of order that are arrived at are temporary and conditional, 
which makes governance unstable and open-ended. Indeed, Carpi (2019) con-
ceptualizes the Lebanese state as not just producing liminality but as inherently 
liminal itself.
This form of liminality, in turn, constitutes exceptionalism. Entire state agen-
cies – such as the Council for Development and Reconstruction that we will 
encounter later – are subsequently created with the aim to ‘circumvent the stale-
mates built into the political arrangement’ and are thereby allowed to operate 
beyond formal regulations (Leenders, 2012: 209). Because political-sectarian 
leaders and their parties operate as twilight institutions that function inside as 
well as beyond the state system, the application of the rule of law becomes a 
matter of discretionary power. Reflecting on Lebanon’s ‘self-defeating survival 
strategies,’ the International Crisis Group (2015: 16) concluded: ‘The constitu-
tion is violated at will; law-breaking is the norm and often goes unpunished; a 
politicised judicial system guarantees impunity for the well-connected and human 
rights abuse against vulnerable populations.’ This does not herald the irrelevance 
of formal rules and regulations, but it signifies how their implementation becomes 
provisional and unpredictable.
In his seminal book on Lebanon’s post-war political settlement, Leenders (2012) 
shows in striking detail how institutional informality, liminality, and exceptional-
ism are built into the Lebanese state system as a result of fundamental hybridity. 
Meticulous analyses of the bureaucratic operations of key state agencies – such as 
the Ministry of Health, Middle East Airlines, and the Beirut Port Authority – and 
of the quarry, reconstruction, and electricity sectors reveal that institutional ambi-
guity in terms of both regulation and implementation is the defining characteristic 
of the Lebanese state system. Procedures and mandates for these various agencies 
and sectors, are ‘opaque, contradictory, ambiguous, or . . . nonexistent’ (Leenders, 
2012: 82–83). Such institutional ambiguity can follow from the hyper-presence 
of institutions, the over-bureaucratization of procedures, as well as the absence of 
policies and administrative structures (Halkort, 2019: 318).
Analyses of the workings of Lebanon’s various security agencies, which are 
perhaps the most potent state institutions the country has, arrive at similar conclu-
sions. In his critical account of the often assumed capacity deficit of Lebanese 
security agencies, Van Veen (2015: 6) warns ‘that it would be a severe analytical 
mistake to regard the inability of Lebanon’s main state security organizations to 
ensure either national or citizen-oriented security as a case of organizational dys-
function.’ Instead, he argues, the organizational dysfunction of these agencies ‘is 
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precisely the type of functionality desired by significant parts of Lebanon’s elite 
and serves their purposes well’ (Van Veen, 2015: 6; see also Nashabe, 2009). Maz-
zola’s (2019) dissection of the linkages between senior state security officers and 
sectarian patrons similarly shows how the formal boundaries of the state system 
are deliberately blurred so that political elites can co-opt or constrain security 
agencies to create space for their own forms of provision and mediation.
This institutional ambiguity lies at the core of Lebanon’s political settlement. 
The unwritten National Pact that premised Lebanese independence, the Lebanese 
constitution, and the Ta’if Accord that marked the end of the Civil War, Leend-
ers (2012: 124) points out, are ‘riddled with ambiguities about routine decision 
making.’ The Lebanese constitution is ‘deliberately vague and ambiguous,’ for 
instance, when it comes to setting a number of ministries, demarcating the number 
of state positions someone may simultaneously occupy, stipulating deadlines for 
forming governments, or providing regulations for political parties (Batruni and 
Hallinan, 2018: 4; Sensenig-Dabbous, 2009: 2). The foundational agreements of 
Lebanese politics are similarly equivocal about the exact division of power of 
Lebanon’s ‘troika,’ so that the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parlia-
ment ‘capitalize on any ambiguities’ and interpret their mandates in their own 
favour (Leenders, 2012: 129). This inevitably places elites at loggerheads with 
each other and produces yet more deadlock and, to deal with this, improvised 
deal-making that entrenches exceptionalism.
Institutional ambiguity in this way serves three inter-related interests that vali-
date the idea of a more strategic politics of uncertainty. First, as described earlier, 
it is instrumental in the intra-elite competition that defines Lebanese politics. But, 
second, it also serves shared elite interests in that institutional ambiguity pre-
cludes transparency, ensuring impunity for the endemic corruption of Lebanon’s 
political class. Institutional ambiguity thus undermines accountability and serves 
the interests of Lebanon’s elites. The underlying logic of allotment – allocating 
the spoils of public office – that follows from sectarian consociationalism means 
that governance is selective. The same institutions can be used to pave the way 
for some and obstruct the road for others. This points to the third aspect of the 
political utility of institutional ambiguity: It cements the relevance of Lebanon’s 
elitist political parties as political mediators. To navigate Lebanon’s ‘minefield 
of administrative ambiguities,’ citizens inescapably depend on the institutional 
peddling provided by the sectarian-political patrons who create and keep in place 
these ambiguities (Leenders, 2004: 1).
The structural interface between hybrid order and institutional ambiguity can 
be understood through the idea of aleatory sovereignty. Aleatory sovereignty 
emerges at the interface of multiple forms of power and makes governance unpre-
dictable and apparently random. It refers to situations where ‘there are so many 
interwoven projects, logics, goals, and anxieties of rule operating at once’ that 
for most people these will be impossible to comprehend (Cullen Dunn and Cons, 
2014: 102). In Lebanon, citizens, political authorities, and any other social organi-
zation will have to navigate such ‘shifting landscapes of unpredictable power’ 
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(Cullen Dunn and Cons, 2014), but to protect their interests and guard and extend 
their positions within hybrid settings, political authorities will not merely navigate 
institutional ambiguity. They may also use and extend it, seeking to ‘maximize 
their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty, and sometimes even chaos’ that 
they are faced with (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: xix).
The twilight nature of the authorities that successfully navigate hybridity 
allows them to capitalize on what Tapscott (2017) calls fluid jurisdictions by con-
stantly redefining what is and what is not the state’s responsibility or mandate. 
This makes it unpredictable if, where, and how state agencies might intervene and 
which rules and regulations will be upheld when and for whom. Authorities can 
then sometimes outsource authority while claiming it back at other moments. This 
is further exacerbated by the strategic cultivation of ill-defined and overlapping 
mandates and hierarchies and the existence of parallel institutional structures. If 
societal organizations, other political actors, and citizens cannot meaningfully 
know what does and does not fall under state jurisdiction, they cannot coher-
ently make claims on state agencies, which enhances state agencies’ discretion-
ary power. This will be particularly pertinent for refugees as they are not merely 
withheld many formal entitlements that citizens, at least nominally, have, but will 
also lack the socialization that allows Lebanese to at least to some extent navigate 
Lebanon’s peculiar hybridities.
Institutional ambiguity is structurally premised. Hybrid sovereignty incentiv-
izes the strategic extension of uncertainty through inaction and ambiguous action. 
The plurality and dynamism inherent in hybrid orders will often preclude decisive 
and explicit political action as this is mostly not politically opportune. Instead, 
inaction and ambiguous action will be more strategic to amass, maintain, and 
expand power in an aleatory governance field. The institutionalized nature of 
such inaction in Lebanon is broadly recognized (Baumann, 2019: 2; Salamay and 
Payne, 2008: 466). For Borgmann and Slim (2018: 12), a ‘culture of denial’ has 
defined Lebanon historically and ‘substitutes for effective policy decisions.’ Leba-
non’s post-war amnesia, Mourad and Piron (2016) similarly point out, means that 
a lot of social cleavages have to be ignored and hence cannot be acted upon if the 
genie of civil war is to be kept in its bottle.
Hybrid political order does not merely encourage inaction. It also puts a pre-
mium on ambiguous action. Like the original National Pact, most ‘rules of the 
game’ in Lebanon’s hybrid political order are unwritten (El Mufti, 2012). The 
Lebanese policies that are written down are often vaguely formulated. This is 
a logical consequence of the ambiguity and non-committal of the programs of 
Lebanon’s political parties, which, Hassan (2019: 2) shows, are routinely made 
up of positions that allow ‘flexibility’ and ‘contradictions’ on policy positions. 
Such ambiguity in policy positioning prevents key stakeholders, ranging from 
citizens and civil society to international donors, from holding the government 
accountable (Atallah, Dagher and Mahmalat, 2019: 1). In fact, inaction in one 
realm produces ambiguity in another realm. This is illustrated by Lebanon’s 
information economy. For a state that depends on quota to maintain its illusion 
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of power-sharing, statistics, or any other form of demographic information, 
are remarkably hard to come by. Evidence-based policy-making, El-Ghali and 
Baalbaki (2017: 18) reveal, hardly takes place or is at least not institutionalized. 
The rotation of bureaucrats that is dictated by sectarianism, moreover, under-
mines institutional continuity and learning. Looking specifically at the Lebanese 
response to the Syrian refugee crisis, Uzelac and Meester (2018: 26) conclude that 
in many cases data is either not produced or of questionable quality, ‘making it 
subject to various interpretations and contentious debate.’
Institutional ambiguity, then, is a defining trait of the Lebanese state. It is a 
structural characteristic of sectarian hybridity and follows from and facilitates 
the ‘twilight’ nature of the parties through which the country’s sectarian socio-
political and economic elites have organized themselves. Hybrid order produces 
institutional ambiguity directly, by structurally entrenching it, and indirectly, by 
incentivizing political actors to reproduce it. It is well-recognized that institu-
tional disarray serves the interests of elites as an instrument to trump competitors. 
My book builds on this observation and extends it by arguing that institutional 
ambiguity is not just a generic cause and consequence of inter-elite competition, 
but can also serve as a more concerted elite strategy to govern particular societal 
groups. Looking at refugee governance, in the upcoming chapters I show how 
under hybrid political order, political authorities do not utilize institutional ambi-
guity only to navigate hybridity and uphold and extend power within it, but can 
and will leverage it in ways that enable the control, exploitation, and expulsion 
of refugees.
Notes
 1 Author’s interview with former advisor to the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs – 
Skype, 22 January 2018.
 2 My book, as such, is concerned with the relations between refugees and the Lebanese 
state. Although ‘state’ and ‘society’ are of course crucially related, this is to say that 
I do not focus on the societal and private relations between Lebanese and Palestinian 
and Syrian refugees, which have often been far more hospitable (Serhan, 2019: 243).
 3 Or hybrid in different ways. While this is often assumed, hybridity is certainly not 
exclusively applicable to ‘non-Western’ countries or conflict-affected settings. Bergh 
(2009: 45), for instance, shows that the hybrid political order notion needs neither a 
post-war nor a peace- or state-building context to be valuable. Processes of decentrali-
zation, privatization, and the proliferation of civil society also generate contexts the 
hybrid political order lens might help to illuminate (Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009: 49).
 4 A detailed discussion of the causes, dynamics, and consequences of the Civil War is 
beyond the scope of this book. Please refer to Fisk (1990), Hanf and Salam (2003), 
Hirst (2010), and Traboulsi (2007).
 5 Such interventions regard regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also 
Western states such as the United States and multi-lateral bodies such as the United 
Nations.
 6 A 2011 demographic study by Statistics Lebanon found that 27 percent of the pop-
ulation are Sunni Muslim, 27 percent Shia Muslim, 21 percent Maronite Christian, 
8 percent Greek Orthodox, 5 percent Druze, and 4 percent Greek Catholic, with the 
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remaining 7 percent belonging to smaller Christian denominations and other religious 
groups (Mencütek, 2019: 131). Such studies, however, are not formally acknowledged 
and do not impact the sectarian-consociational quota that are in effect.
 7 Author’s interview with former advisor to the Lebanese Minister of State for Displaced 
Affairs – Skype, 22 January 2018.
 8 Author’s interview – Skype, 9 April 2018.
 9 Author’s interview with former advisor to the Lebanese Government – Skype, 19 
February 2018.
 10 These parties are not officially limited to these sectarian communities and mostly con-
vey a discourse of nationalism, but in practice serve as vehicles for sectarian interests.
 11 A disaggregated analysis of each party – its institutional legacy, its engagement with 
ambiguity, and/or its positioning vis-à-vis refugees – is beyond the scope of this book, 
which posits that, without denying such crucial variations, the shared interests among 
Lebanon’s political elites are crucial in understanding the ways in which institutional 
ambiguity functions to govern refugees.
 12 Author’s interview – Beirut, 23 July 2013.
 13 Hezbollah is often considered the exception to the Lebanese rule. Its exceptionalism, 
however, lies in its ‘foreign politics,’ not in its parallel institutions. These are more 
extensive than those of other parties, but apart from its armed forces, not qualitatively 
different.
 14 Author’s interview – 27 July 2013.
 15 This elite is fairly circumscribed. Leenders (2004: 4–5) shows that out of the 243 posts 
(ministers, prime ministers, vice ministers, and ministers of state) that were assigned 
in the period from 1989 until 2003, 177 posts were distributed among 49 persons who 
obtained these positions at least twice (and, he writes, in some cases, up to seven times) 
or held two posts simultaneously.
 16 Author’s interview with former advisor to a Lebanese Ministry – WhatsApp, 12 
January 2018.
 17 Author’s interview with refugee protection expert of an international humanitarian 
organization – Skype, 18 January 2018.
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When you see the level of bureaucracy and complications that the Syrians have 
to go through in order to request legal status, you understand that this is inten-
tional because the authorities can simplify the residency process and have a 
better distribution of capacities and resources. Due to these complications and 
ambiguity in the process, it’s become very difficult for lawyers to assist Syrians 
and guide them through the process. One of the biggest fears of every Syrian 
in Lebanon is to hand over their passport to the General Security, because they 
never know if or when they would get it back.1
This first empirical chapter turns towards Lebanon’s response to the Syrian refugee 
arrival, focusing on the political and policy dynamics that have shaped Lebanon’s 
national response to the Syrian refugee ‘crisis.’ After providing a brief historical 
contextualization of the relations between Lebanon and Syria, the chapter pro-
ceeds with three sections. It first traces the evolution from a ‘no-policy-policy’ 
to a situation of ‘formalized informality,’ describing the emergence of institu-
tional ambiguity in Lebanon’s governance of Syrian refugees. The subsequent 
section turns to the consequences of this institutional ambiguity and chronicles the 
manufactured vulnerability that followed in its wake. The chapter’s third section 
engages with the partially strategic drivers of institutional ambiguity. By means 
of a series of in-depth vignettes, it demonstrates how the institutional ambiguity 
that has shaped much of Lebanon’s national response is at times, at least to some 
extent, the manifestation of a politics of uncertainty.
The data that underlie the analysis presented in this chapter comprise extensive 
desk research and 34 in-depth, semi-structured interviews and 18 more informal 
conversations with people involved in the development of Lebanon’s response 
to the arrival of Syrian refugees.2 These conversations with state officials, min-
isterial consultants, humanitarian professionals, and researchers, journalists, and 
activists revolved around both the formal and informal decision-making dynamics 
to address this ‘crisis,’ exploring questions such as: How and why were certain 
national decisions on how to (not) engage with the refugee presence made? How 
can watershed moments be explained? and What are the rationales and inter-
ests that drive fragmentation, ambiguity, and inconsistency and how have these 
evolved?3
Chapter 2
The governance of Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon
No-policy-policy and  
formal informality
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Context and history
The Syrian conflict internally displaced 6.5 million people and forced more than 
6 million others to flee abroad, overwhelmingly to neighboring countries. The 
number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is extremely contested, as will be discussed 
in detail in one of the vignettes presented later in this chapter. In Spring 2018, 
there were 995,512 registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon and an estimated half 
million refugees that are not registered with the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Janmyr, 2018).4
The socio-economic, cultural, and political histories of Lebanon and Syria are 
closely intertwined. Until independence in 1943, the two countries were part of 
the same province in the larger Ottoman Empire and under the same French colo-
nial system. In more recent history, the de facto occupation of Lebanon by Syria 
has intensified their economic and political entanglement. After intervening in 
the Lebanese Civil War in 1976, the establishment of the Arab Deterrent Force, 
which consisted of 90 percent Syrian soldiers, allowed a Syrian military pres-
ence in Lebanon that lasted until 2005. The 1990 Ta’if Agreement that ended the 
Lebanese Civil War in 1990 describes the ‘fraternal’ connection between the two 
countries as ‘a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood 
ties, history, and joint brotherly interests’ (Atallah and Mahdi, 2017: 11). In prac-
tice, this meant Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, which was extended throughout 
domestic and foreign politics.
After the killing of previous Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, there were 
massive public protests against the Syrian presence in Lebanon, which was seen 
as responsible for, or at least complicit in, this assassination. Protesters demanded 
Syria’s compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, 
adopted the previous year, that requested Syria to withdraw from Lebanon to ena-
ble free and fair presidential elections. The uprising indeed led to the withdrawal 
of Syrian troops in Lebanon and ended the post-war pax Syriana characterized 
by overt Syrian tutelage in Lebanon. The Syrian regime nevertheless continued 
to wield significant influence over the country in the post-2005 period through its 
political allies. These developments, moreover, divided Lebanon’s political land-
scape into two distinct alliances determined by their relation to Syria: March 8 
and March 14, referring to the respective pro- and anti-Syrian rallies that were 
held on these dates in 2005.
Syria’s engagement with Lebanon was never only political, but had impor-
tant economic aspects as well. These economic ties outlived the Syrian mili-
tary presence in Lebanon. After independence, ‘good neighborliness’ resulted 
in various bilateral treaties between the countries, such as the 1964 Treaty of 
Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, that ensured labour privileges 
for Syrians in Lebanon and an ‘open border’ between the countries. Since the 
1970s, vast numbers of Syrian workers have done most of the work in Leba-
non’s construction and agriculture sectors. In the years before the outbreak of 
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the Syrian War, Lebanon counted between 300,000 and 400,000 Syrian migrant 
workers (Fakhoury, 2017: 684).
Thus, apart from many forms of socio-cultural proximity and genuine hospi-
tality for refugees, in contemporary Lebanon a ‘vivid memory of humiliation, 
killings and arbitrary power over Lebanese citizens’ importantly feeds resentment 
vis-à-vis anything Syrian (Meier, 2014: 4). The sense of socio-economic and 
cultural superiority that is broadly felt among Lebanese towards Syrians, which 
was fueled by decades of associating ‘Syrians’ with menial labour, further affects 
governmental and societal engagement with them. Many Lebanese consider the 
majority of Syrians presently in the country as guest workers overstaying their 
welcome rather than ‘genuine’ refugees (Ghanem, 2016: 48).
The emergence of institutional ambiguity
In combination with the hybridity described in the previous chapter, the described 
Lebanese ambivalence towards Syria and Syrians resulted in extensive insti-
tutional ambiguity in the way in which Lebanon has governed the presence of 
Syrian refugees. This section outlines how this institutionalization of informal-
ity, liminality, and exceptionalism has emerged throughout two distinct phases – 
‘no-policy-policy’ before and ‘formal informality’ after the formulation of the 
October 2014 ‘policy’ – and how both phases were underpinned by the same fun-
damental forms of inaction and denial in terms of refugee status, refugee shelter, 
and refugee representation.
No-policy-policy
There was no plan or response mechanism in place when Syrian refugees started 
to arrive in Lebanon in 2011. In 2010, the Prime Minister’s Office had formed a 
committee to develop a framework for a national response plan to deal with emer-
gencies. But the committee’s draft plan, spearheaded by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, was never actually approved or implemented (Helou, 2014: 41). Instead, 
in 2011, the Prime Minister’s Office requested the High Relief Commission to 
deal with the Syrian refugees who were located predominantly in North Leba-
non at that time. This initiative included a joint registration process of refugees 
by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the UNHCR, but was never taken beyond 
the North and was abandoned when the refugee presence escalated to different 
regions (Helou, 2014: 114).
In 2012, after a civil society campaign that urged the government to come up 
with a ‘roadmap’ or ‘masterplan’ to deal with the refugee crisis and under increas-
ing pressure from the UNHCR, the government formed an Inter-Ministerial Com-
mittee, comprising the High Relief Commission and all relevant ministries, to 
coordinate the response to the Syrian refugee ‘crisis.’ However, according to 
a policy advisor who has worked for various ministries, the Inter-Ministerial 
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Committee was ‘not founded through any official documentation’ and ‘functions 
without a clear response strategy or a contingency plan’ (Helou, 2014: 42). In 
December 2012, for instance, then Prime Minister Mikati presented a ‘Response 
Plan to the Crisis of Displaced Families from Syria’ at a donor meeting, but this 
plan was never formally adopted (Helou, 2014: 122).
As a result, Lebanon’s initial engagement with Syrian refugees was character-
ized by what analysts have called a ‘no-policy-policy’ (see Ghaddar, 2017; Ham-
dan and Bou Khater, 2015: 35; Mencütek, 2019: 130; El Mufti, 2014; Nassar, 
2014 in Nassar and Stel, 2019). Initiatives were developed by various ministries, 
such as the Ministry of Interior’s 2013 ‘Security Plan,’ but these were not offi-
cial public policies (Mourad, 2017: 54). The 2013 ‘Lebanon Roadmap of Priority 
Interventions for Stabilization From the Syrian Conflict,’ to give another exam-
ple, provided an outline for the government to deal with the effect of the refugee 
crisis on Lebanese citizens, but it disregarded the situation of refugees and was 
mostly not implemented (Hamdan and Bou Khater, 2015: 23 in Nassar and Stel, 
2019: 47). This inaction extends to the fact that the refugee presence has not been 
addressed by the Lebanese Parliament and has been eschewed by the National 
Dialogue, the platform through which Lebanon’s main political elites seek to deal 
with ‘intractable issues’ (Fakhoury, 2017: 687).
Several intertwined factors underlie this initial no-policy-policy. First, Syrian 
refugees arrived in Lebanon when it was facing one of its decision-making stale-
mates (Hamdan and Bou Khater, 2015: 34; Janmyr, 2016: 59). In 2011, Lebanon 
faced a presidential vacuum, and its political elites were extremely divided, mak-
ing the necessary consensus on any policy formulation impossible. To further 
complicate things, this polarization was exactly about the Syrian War and its geo-
political as well as domestic implications, with some parties supporting the Syrian 
regime and others the resistance. In this context, any formulation of an approach 
towards the growing refugee crisis proved impossible. Instead, the government 
focused on proclaiming the country’s neutrality in the Syrian War and formulated 
a dissociation policy in the 2012 Baabda Declaration.
Second, this focus on dissociation from the war and the lack of engagement 
with the associated refugee crisis also stemmed from the widespread belief that 
the refugee presence would be temporary. Part of this assumption must have been 
wishful thinking from the beginning, but with the Palestinian experience of dec-
ades of contentious refugee presence in mind, acknowledging any possibility of 
yet another protracted refugee situation was a political taboo. Stressing, even 
actively ensuring, the temporary nature of the Syrians’ presence was crucial (Jan-
myr and Mourad, 2018a: 556; Yassin et al., 2015: 32).
Third, apart from a policy-making vacuum, there was also a lack of a legal 
framework on how to deal with the Syrian people fleeing to Lebanon. Leba-
non has not ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Although it has signed a 
number of relevant international human rights law instruments and the Leba-
nese constitution reinstates the country’s commitments to these human rights 
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principles, which include the right to seek and enjoy asylum, in practice this is 
not adhered to (Janmyr, 2016; Stevens, 2017). In addition, Lebanon has ratified 
regional agreements on refugee issues only with such far-reaching reservations 
that it basically constitutes non-committal, and it does not have national laws 
to regulate the presence of refugees. Instead, Syrian refugees were dealt with 
according to the 1962 law on entry and stay of foreigners, but the implementation 
of this law was, according to Helou (2014: 41), undermined by a lack of capacity 
and institutional structure.5
Formal informality
With the adoption of a ‘Policy Paper on Syrian Refugee Displacement’ in Octo-
ber 2014, the phase of ‘no-policy-policy’ apparently came to an end (Nassar and 
Stel, 2019). On 24 October 2014, the Inter-Ministerial Committee tasked with 
coordinating the response to the Syrian refugee ‘crisis’ presented a ‘policy paper’ 
that was approved by the Lebanese government and backed by a confidence vote 
of the parliament. This one-page document puts forward three main goals: first, 
to reduce the numbers of refugees (through regulating entry and encouraging 
return ‘by all means’ (Uzelac and Meester, 2018: 19)); second, to extend secu-
rity measures, including municipal registration and municipal policing capacities 
and practices; and, third, to assuage the impact of the ‘crisis’ by channeling the 
humanitarian response to host as well as refugee communities and restricting refu-
gees’ access to the labour market.
In line with these priorities, the Lebanese government also got involved in 
developing a joint framework with the United Nations (UN) to coordinate the 
state’s response with the humanitarian response. The resultant Lebanon Crisis 
Response Plan (LCRP) articulates three strategic priorities: ensuring humanitar-
ian support for Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese; building the capacity 
of the service delivery systems needed for this; and supporting Lebanon’s overall 
stability (Nassar and Stel, 2019: 47). While the LCRP has a strategic dimension 
and aims at a comprehensive approach, it remains donor-driven, and the minis-
tries involved have mostly not integrated the LCRP directives into existing policy 
and practice (Hamdan and Bou Khater, 2015: 30). Moreover, the LCRP itself 
is paradoxical because it remains unclear which laws actually underpin it and 
because it is inconsistent in terms of refugees’ status and the related obligations of 
authorities (Janmyr, 2018; Mencütek, 2019: 169).
The October 2014 policy paper was operationalized by means of a number of 
decisions and decrees that significantly reduced refugees’ eligibility for admis-
sion, residency, and regularization. With regard to entry, in the first three years of 
the crisis, if they entered Lebanon through an official border crossing, all Syrians 
received an entry coupon free of charge that could be renewed every six months 
upon payment of a fee of US$200. However, this fee, clearly unaffordable for 
most refugees, was routinely avoided by Syrians. They would return to Syria sim-
ply to cross the border again and receive another free entry coupon.
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Regulations that came into force on 5 January 2015, however, significantly 
restricted the number of refugees who are able to enter Lebanon.6 From then on, 
Syrian nationals seeking to enter Lebanon would be admitted only if they adhered 
to one of the nine new visa categories that appear to have been specifically formu-
lated to bar Syrian refugees (Nassar and Stel, 2019: 47): the one visa category that 
regards displaced people explicitly excludes those fleeing the conflict in Syria. 
All visa categories, moreover, require Syrians to produce elaborate and speci-
fied documentation, which they cannot afford and have trouble to obtain, before 
being allowed entry. The consequence of the new regulations, then, is that no new 
refugees can enter the country legally and that Syrians already present in Lebanon 
can no longer cross the border to avoid the status renewal fee (Hamdan and Bou 
Khater, 2015: 25).
For Syrians who entered Lebanon before these regulations were in place 
or who entered despite them, renewing or regularizing residency status has 
been made extremely difficult since October 2014 as well (Uzelac and Meester, 
2018: 19). Syrian refugees in Lebanon can renew their legal residency with 
the General Security through two avenues: they either present a certificate of 
UNHCR registration and a pledge not to work signed by a notary in addition 
to a demonstration of financial means or they can opt for staying under the 
auspices of a Lebanese sponsor, in which case they have to present a pledge of 
responsibility of this sponsor (Janmyr and Mourad, 2018a: 553).7 Because the 
UNHCR was forced to suspend registration in 2015, all refugees who failed to 
register with the UNHCR before that date are automatically excluded from the 
first avenue.
The new regulations put in place after October 2014 are thus extremely restric-
tive and, as discussed in further detail in the chapter’s next section, have forced 
Syrians into destitution and illegality. They are also highly ambiguous. The Leba-
nese government’s ‘unprecedented policy involvement’ after October 2014 did not 
actually produce more clarity (Mencütek, 2019: 149). Although the October 2014 
policy paper marks a departure of inaction that typified the previous period, in 
many ways it signified the consolidation of earlier uncertainty. The various deci-
sions and circulars that operationalized the policy were not transparently com-
municated to either the public or humanitarian partners. They were enforced in a 
manner that made Lebanon Support conclude that this policy in reality formalizes 
the exceptionalism that was produced under the first phase of ‘no-policy-policy’ 
(Lebanon Support, 2016 in Nassar and Stel, 2019: 47).
Lebanon’s governance of Syrian refugees is not determined by law but by 
‘ministerial decrees, orders, and circulars’ (Fakhoury, 2017: 687; Hamdan and 
Bou Khater, 2015: 34; Human Rights Watch, 2016; Janmyr, 2016: 66; see also 
Nassar and Stel, 2019: 48). In fact, the specific operational decrees that have 
put the October 2014 policy in practice are considered illegal by many experts. 
These decrees were issued by the General Security rather than by the govern-
ment itself. After a lawsuit raised by the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
Legal Agenda and Frontiers Ruwad, a Lebanese lawyer involved in the process 
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explained, the Lebanese court ruled that in issuing these regulations, ‘the General 
Security was trespassing, or transgressing over the prerogatives of the government, 
because this was a matter for the government; refugee policy is a government mat-
ter, not a security agency matter.’8 This ruling, however, has apparently remained 
without consequences. Thus, although hallowed as a fundamental shift in the gov-
ernment’s response, the October 2014 policy, Mourad (2017: 251) notes, did not 
genuinely aim to ‘render Syrians “legible” to Lebanese authorities but rather has 
served to make ambiguity and arbitrariness a central characteristic of policy.’
Legal and policy experts stress the incoherent formulation of the October 2014 
policy and its operationalizing decrees as well as the piecemeal fashion in which 
they were communicated. The criteria for specifying the ‘humanitarian cases’ that 
provide the exception under which Syrian refugees can occasionally be granted 
entry under the October 2014 policy (through the category referring to ‘displaced 
persons’), for instance, have not been made public and are thus at the complete 
discretion of specific officials if applied at all (Al-Masri, 2015: 13; Janmyr and 
Mourad, 2018a: 553). The same goes for the ‘petition for mercy’ that people who 
have irregularly entered the country can plead (Nassar and Stel, 2019: 48). This 
petition, and the accompanying fee of US$600, should regularize refugees’ status, 
but Bidinger et al. (2014: 36) note: ‘The success of such petition is entirely uncer-
tain, as there are no policies or guidelines for the exercise of discretion by the 
GSO [General Security Office], and applicants cannot be represented by counsel 
in their proceedings.’
When I asked a lawyer and legal activist how, after years of ‘no-policy-policy,’ 
the relatively straightforward October 2014 policy impacted her work with Syr-
ian refugees, she retorted my assumption of increased clarity. She explained that 
although the policy paper may have clarified some principles, the implementation 
mechanisms were far from clear. This was, for her, evident in the regulations 
that were issued by the General Security to establish specific entry and residency 
conditions. She indicated: ‘I don’t think that the regulations are clear! They’re not 
written in the form of a legal decision, it has no signature, no date. It’s just a table 
with several categories and no clear criteria. It looks quite unprofessional.’9 She 
continued: ‘Refugees are facing a lot of difficulty to understand in which category 
they fit, especially as these categories are not adapted to their situation.’
If the policies are far from clear, their implementation is even less coherent 
(Nassar and Stel, 2019; see also Frangieh, 2017; Mencütek, 2019: 154; Norwe-
gian Refugee Council and International Rescue Committee, 2015: 6; Sanyal, 
2018: 67; UNHCR, 2015: 12). Interpretations vary widely for each General Secu-
rity office and even per officer within each office, Lebanon Support’s (2016: 22) 
in-depth report on ‘the incoherence, informality, and insecurity in the renewal 
process’ concludes. A humanitarian regularly liaising with the General Security 
similarly noted that:
Everybody, every person could explain it [residency requirements] in his own 
way. So every office . . . sometimes explains the points differently. So they 
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ask from people things the other offices didn’t . . . don’t ask from the people 
renewing through the same way the same things. So they ask for different 
papers or different things.10
A lawyer working with Syrian refugees explained that refugees are routinely 
held off and their procedures are delayed until relevant documents are no longer 
valid.11 Amnesty International (2015: 15) notes that, when investigating the case 
of refugees who were turned back because their documents were only valid for 
a certain number of days after being stamped, it ‘could not find any information 
on official deadlines related to documents for renewing residency.’ Although 
denied by the General Security itself, such instances of discretionary refusal of 
residency renewal have also been extensively documented in cases where refu-
gees provided all the relevant information (Janmyr, 2016; Janmyr and Mourad, 
2018a: 553).
A Syrian interviewed by Lebanon Support (2016: 23) summarized: ‘The people 
who work at General Security don’t know anything about the laws.’ Each General 
Security officer demands a different set of documents, and the chances of any 
document being accepted depend on the ‘mood’ of the officer in question (Leba-
non Support, 2016: 23). The prevalence of such confusion, interlocutors working 
in the humanitarian field indicated, is constantly communicated to the General 
Security. But the General Security has apparently made little effort to clarify mat-
ters and systematic problems have been denied with reference to local capacity 
problems. Thus, the core tenet of the notion of a no-policy-policy – the absence 
of a coherent legal framework and a comprehensive and operationalized plan of 
action – is in essence still in place even after the October 2014 policy was issued. 
In 2015, Hamdan and Bou Khater (2015: 34) found that:
The Government of Lebanon’s response is not sufficiently clear and few 
brief documents state the policies and plans endorsed. Until now, the state 
response mainly consists of irregular decisions pertaining to different sectors 
without adequate coordination or synergies among them.
Writing in 2017, Atallah and Mahdi (2017: 38) conclude:
The lack of political will and administrative capacity to respond to the crisis 
led to the absence of a national legal and policy framework for the refugee 
response. Micro-level policies are not part of a national framework, and local 
communities have the discretion to govern refugees as they see fit. Although 
the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan frames the international response to the 
Syrian humanitarian crisis by sector, a national strategy is required to outline 
the Lebanese state’s national legislation toward Syrian refugees by defin-
ing the legal framework and jurisdiction of various actors responding to the 
crisis.
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A ‘set of nos’
Through these two distinctive phases, first a ‘no-policy-policy’ based on policy 
inaction and then a ‘formalization of informality’ that reflects policy ambiguity, 
the Lebanese government effectively leveled a regime of institutional ambiguity 
on Syrian refugees in the country. This institutional ambiguity is underpinned by 
what a senior advisor of the country’s Ministry of Interior called a ‘set of nos:’ 
no refugees, no camps, no representation (Frangieh and Barjas, 2016; Mourad, 
2017; Nassar and Stel, 2019). These ‘nos’ have served to make the status, spaces, 
and representational institutions that shape refugees’ life informal, liminal, and 
exceptional.
Considering the first ‘no,’ the Lebanese government has refused to avoid rec-
ognizing Syrian refugees as refugees. Instead, it considers them ‘displaced per-
sons,’ ‘guests,’ or ‘de facto refugees’ (Janmyr, 2016; Mourad, 2017). Indeed, the 
October 2014 policy is often referred to as the ‘Zero Refugees’ policy (Borgmann 
and Slim, 2018: 25). The convenient absence of a national and regional legal 
framework for refugees and the Lebanese state’s non-ratification of the relevant 
international conventions has allowed Lebanon to deny formal refugee status to 
Syrians fleeing war. This allowed Lebanon to avoid commitment to refugee pro-
tection – because even if Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion, however, it acknowledges that this does not absolve it from the obligations 
that host states have under international customary law (Nassar and Stel, 2019: 
47). Widening the protection gap for refugees that is created in the absence of for-
mal refugee status, the complex and arbitrary residency regime has subsequently 
stripped most ‘de facto’ refugees from legal residency status as well.
The second ‘no’ underlying Lebanon’s response to the Syrian refugee pres-
ence in the country regards the decision not to allow refugee camps. Whereas the 
UNHCR has set up camps in Jordan and the government did so in Turkey, Leba-
non prohibited the establishment of camps. There was initial covert support for 
sheltering Syrian refugees in formal camps by some political parties and humani-
tarian organizations, but the Lebanese government was too ‘traumatized’ by the 
Palestinian refugee experience to consider this option seriously (Carpi, Younes 
and AbiYaghi, 2016: 11; see also Dionigi, 2016: 22).12 Refugee camps were 
regarded as a testimony and precursor of the long-term nature of displacement. 
The government, moreover, saw them as potential terrorist safe havens (Nassar 
and Stel, 2019: 47). This refusal to allow formal camps was a way to uphold the 
increasingly delusional idea that the refugee crisis would be short-term.
A third, less distinctive but equally profound ‘no’ that dictates Lebanon’s 
governance of Syrian refugees is the credo of ‘no representation.’ This regards 
representation on the side of Syrian refugee communities. Nationally, Leba-
non’s dissociation policy ensured that the Lebanese government would not have 
to formally deal with representatives of either the Syrian regime or the opposi-
tion, which, for better or worse, left the Syrian refugee population in the country 
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without any political representative. Locally, as detailed in the next chapter, there 
has been a clear directive from the Lebanese government to prevent any form of 
political mobilization or organization among refugee communities. ‘No represen-
tation’ also concerns the Lebanese side. In the early days of the crisis, the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and the High Relief Council led the response in the North, but an 
interlocutor working for these agencies at the time explained, further leadership 
by these agencies was subsequently politically blocked.13 Instead, since then, a 
variety of agencies took on various tasks in an ad hoc fashion and without clear 
mandates, resulting in competition, overlap, and policy and implementation gaps 
and, ultimately, a lack of representation – a reality that is further discussed in the 
vignette about Lebanon’s Minister of State for Displaced Affairs in the chapter’s 
last section.
The LCRP, the formal joint approach of the Lebanese state and the humanitar-
ian community to address the Syrian refugee crisis, does not in any way include 
direct Syrian representatives. Instead, it apparently assumes that the UNHCR acts 
on behalf of the refugees it is formally not allowed to recognize as such. But 
the basis on which NGOs and the United Nations (UN) are allowed to operate 
in Lebanon is itself ambiguous. Janmyr (2018: 395) describes the UN’s pres-
ence as hardly formalized and its legal mandate as ‘largely undefined.’ UNHCR’s 
operational space in Lebanon is in fact crucially curtailed by the absence of a host 
country agreement that regulates division of tasks and responsibilities between 
the UNHCR and the Lebanese government. This absence is despite the fact that 
host country agreements are routine aspects of the UNHCR’s modus operandi in 
other countries and that the government has signed such agreements with some 
other UN agencies (Mourad, 2017: 255; Helou, 2014: 44).
There is a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the UNHCR’s opera-
tions in Lebanon. But this Memorandum was signed, in 2013, by the General 
Security, not by the government, which limits its validity. It has, moreover, been 
heavily criticized, even been called a ‘mistake’ by UNHCR staff, for adopting ‘a 
Lebanese perspective on refugees’ that securitizes refugees and legitimized and 
institutionalized the notion of Lebanon as a ‘non-asylum country’ (Janmyr, 2018: 
395, 2016: 63). In 2012, the UNHCR therefore drafted a more comprehensive 
Memorandum, stipulating specific procedures that were left undetermined in the 
2003 version (which was designed to deal with individual asylum cases but not 
with a mass arrival of refugees). This new Memorandum was to be endorsed by 
the government (rather than the General Security). So far, however, it has not been 
signed and the UNHCR, Mencütek (2019: 142) concludes, continues to operate 
on a ‘shaky legal authorization ground.’ This ambiguity turns the UNHCR into a 
‘useful tool’ for the government, which, as Uzelac and Meester (2018: 46) note, 
makes it ‘vulnerable to government policy changes, pressures limiting the reach 
of its protection mandate and opportunistic attacks by Lebanese politicians for 
short-term political gains.’
These three fundamental ‘no’s’ on behalf of the Lebanese government reveal 
that while there may be a lack of de jure policies to govern the presence of Syrian 
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refugees in Lebanon, there are clear guiding principles, de facto policies, that 
underlie the country’s engagement with refugees. These ‘many unwritten agree-
ments and unspoken rules of the game that determine the management of this cri-
sis,’ as an advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office involved in the refugee response 
called them, put a premium on inaction and ambiguity.14 As explored further in 
the next chapter, shirking formal engagement opens up room for more convenient 
informal engagement. Lebanese officials are of course well aware that there are in 
fact refugees in Lebanon, that despite the absence of formal camps there are hun-
dreds of informal refugee settlements across the country, and that there are ample 
structures through which refugees organize and mobilize even if formal political 
parties and local committees are prohibited. Officially renouncing these realities, 
however, enables authorities to govern them with far more leeway.
Manufactured vulnerability
The fundamental denial and inaction ingrained in the ‘set of nos’ that dictates Leb-
anon’s governance of Syrian refugees has distinct consequences. The institutional 
ambiguity produced by Lebanon’s ‘no-policy-policy’ and ‘formal informality’ has 
contributed to extreme precariousness among Syrians. In terms of status, Syrian 
refugees are by and large forced into illegality.15 In 2017, an estimated 74 per-
cent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon did not have valid legal residency documents 
(UNHCR, United Nations Children’s Fund and World Food Program, 2017), and 
83 percent of Syrian children born in Lebanon since 2011 have not been registered 
(Yassin, 2018: 55).
This lack of official residency status is a root cause of refugees’ vulnerability. 
Because illegally residing in the country is a criminal offense under Lebanese 
law, it makes refugees vulnerable to arrest and detainment (Atallah and Mahdi, 
2017: 25). International Alert documented that approximately 1,000 Syrian refu-
gees are arrested each month by the General Security because of ‘documentation 
issues’ and one-quarter of all Syrians held in Lebanese prisons are there on the 
basis of ‘violations related to documentation’ (Slavova, 2017: 2). This is even 
more marginalizing because the same ‘illegality’ that gets refugees arrested ham-
pers their access to justice and complaint procedures (Slavova, 2017: 2). As the 
International Crisis Group (2015: 11) notes, lack of legal status makes refugees 
‘easy prey’ for corrupt security officials and often results in forms of extortion by 
authorities, such as when refugees are forced to pay for identity cards issued by 
municipalities (see also Barjas, 2016; Uzelac and Meester, 2018: 21).
Without official residency status, refugees’ access to services is also limited. 
Refugees are, for instance, regularly denied at hospitals when they do not have a 
legal residency and are not insured. That is if they can even reach a hospital. For 
refugees who do not have legal residency status, freedom of movement is severely 
circumscribed, as there are many checkpoints, both regular and ad hoc ones, in 
place where they risk arrest (Sanyal, 2018: 68). This constrained mobility also 
blocks refugees’ access to livelihoods, with all the socio-economic implications 
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and abuse this entails (UNHCR, United Nations Children’s Fund and World Food 
Program, 2016: 1). In 2017, economic vulnerability among refugees increased, 
with over half of them living in extreme poverty (UNHCR, United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund and World Food Program, 2017: 1). Despite the high levels of finan-
cial support that Lebanon has received in the past years, more than 50 percent of 
Syrian refugees live in extreme poverty and more than 75 percent live below the 
poverty line (Uzelac and Meester, 2018: 7).
Institutional ambiguity also marginalizes refugees in terms of shelter (Nassar 
and Stel, 2019). The absence of any shelter policy resulted in an unsystematic 
assemblage of de facto settlement and residency approaches (Yassin et al., 2015: 
15). Because there are no formal refugee camps, Syrian refugees in Lebanon are 
all, as it is euphemistically called, ‘self-settled.’ The large majority of them, around 
80 percent, lives in mostly substandard housing in urban or peri-urban settings. 
The remainder live in so-called informal tented settlements. Around 2,000 unof-
ficial, mostly small-scale refugee camps are located predominantly in the Bekaa 
Valley and North Lebanon’s Akkar region. In both cases, refugees are paying for 
their residency. Considering that they are largely barred from legal employment 
and severely exploited in the informal sector, this has meant additional vulner-
ability, for instance in the form of often enormous debts that most refugees have 
been forced to accrue.
The combination of lacking refugee and residency status and an absence of 
formal refugee protection spaces in the form of camps, moreover, makes refugees 
extremely vulnerable to extortion and abuse by the landlords from which they rent 
apartments, garages, land, or tents. Approximately 82 percent of refugees do not 
have written lease agreements with their landlords and tenancy arrangements are 
unstable (Amnesty International, 2015: 16; REACH and UNHCR, 2014: 26). Ref-
ugees mostly pay excessive rent for the substandard housing they inhabit, facing 
fundamental problems with construction, safety, and sanitation – and, in informal 
settlements, floods and fires (Thorleifsson, 2016: 1075). In informal settlements, 
apart from exploitation by landlords and employers, refugees are ‘highly vulner-
able to attack and harassment from local police or host populations,’ which means 
they often hardly dare to leave these de facto camps, where they feel they are 
‘held captive’ (Clarke, 2017: 19; Shawaf and El Asmar, 2017: 22). Self-settled 
refugees, because they are spatially dispersed, are less visible and accessible to 
humanitarian organizations, which further increases their predicament (Jacobsen, 
2006 in Dorai, 2016; Janmyr and Mourad, 2018a: 554; Yassin et al., 2015: 38). 
This informal, liminal, and exceptional spatial reality that refugees in Lebanon 
face also leads to an ever imminent threat of eviction, as further explored in the 
next chapter.
The extremely curtailed and deliberately informalized forms of representation 
available to Syrian refugees in Lebanon further exacerbate their vulnerability. As 
detailed in the next chapter, lack of legal status and dispersed settlement com-
bined with the divide-and-rule approach of Lebanese authorities have fragmented, 
paralyzed, and ultimately delegitimized forms of refugee representation that 
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go beyond specific localities. The lack of representative structures and the low 
degree of organization among Syrian refugees is typical for the Lebanese situation 
(Mourad and Piron, 2016: 37). As Clarke (2017: 19) describes, in Lebanon, unlike 
in, for instance, Jordan, the informal leaders among Syrian refugee communities 
‘have not formed their own dense and hierarchical leadership networks.’ They 
have been unable to mobilize the broad following or provide the mutual support 
and protection that would allow them to act and speak in the name of refugees 
vis-à-vis authorities. This has meant that, effectively, there is no way for refu-
gees to collectively contest or mobilize against abuse. Instead, refugees are at the 
mercy of often exploitative local authorities and strongmen and rely on patron-
age networks with Lebanese and humanitarian agencies to address the many pre-
dicaments they face (Al-Masri and Altabbaa, 2016; Amnesty International, 2015; 
Lebanon Support, 2016; Mourad and Piron, 2016: 37).
Following Saghieh’s (2015) work, the term ‘manufactured’ indicates that the 
described vulnerability is more than a contingency of the messy policy-making 
that characterizes the Lebanese response to the Syrian refugee arrival (see also 
Akesson and Coupland, 2018: 21). Rather, vulnerability is used to enable control, 
expulsion, and exploitation (Nassar and Stel, 2019). As ALEF (2018) noted in its 
reflection on the Brussels II donor conference that was held in April 2018, the 
regulations and decisions put forward are ‘not only failing to patch the gaps in 
protection but often creating more of them.’ While the October 2014 policy was 
allegedly supposed to formalize the refugee presence, in reality it ‘widened the 
gap between refugees and the government’ and forced refugees to ‘live outside 
of the law’ (Ghaddar, 2017). The residency regime installed through the October 
policy was, as Uzelac and Meester (2018: 18) conclude, ‘made to be broken.’16 
Considering the implausibility of imposing high renewal fees on refugees largely 
precluded from working, it was always unlikely to produce its official objective of 
regularizing refugees in the country. Policy then becomes not only performative 
(Sanyal, 2018: 70), but, as we will see in the next sections, ‘nonperformative.’
Imposed informality, liminality, and exceptionalism serves to generate politi-
cally convenient vulnerability. Lebanon’s ‘set of no’s’ creates fear, insecurity, and 
anxiety amongst refugees not merely through the direct disempowerment it pro-
duces, but also through the exceptional complexity and arbitrariness it generates. 
The next section explores the strategic dimensions of the institutional ambiguity 
that helps produce refugees’ vulnerability.
A politics of uncertainty
In the prior section, I documented how institutional ambiguity and the mar-
ginalization it has helped produce stem from policy inaction and ambiguous 
policy-making and implementation. These forms of ambiguous (non-)policy 
often have structural causes. They are the systemic side effect of the generic 
institutionalized arbitrariness that helps to avoid responsibility and accountabil-
ity and to maximize flexibility and discretion that was the focus of Chapter 1. 
68 The governance of Syrian refugees in Lebanon
They reflect Lebanon’s paralyzed and polarized political system, especially at 
the time when the first Syrian refugees arrived, which explains why many poli-
cies and initiatives that were drafted or discussed never formally saw the light 
of day (Fakhoury, 2017: 693).
But much of the furthering of institutional ambiguity and the vulnerability it 
generates is strategic to the specific context of the Syrian refugee situation as well. 
The default institutional ambiguity that is inherent in hybridity is further utilized 
and extended to serve particular interests in governing refugees. Concerted deci-
sions were made and implemented by Lebanon’s governing elites to eliminate, 
contain, and make use of the refugee ‘crisis’ (Stevens, 2017). In some cases, then, 
the generation and extension of institutional ambiguity served to prevent refu-
gees’ mobilization, facilitate their exploitation, and encourage their return. Politi-
cal actors created or failed to redress legal and policy vacuums, thereby sowing 
confusion. The gaps that follow from such inaction and the maneuvering space 
left by such ambiguous action can then be opportunistically navigated according 
to intertwined political and socio-economic interests. As a development officer 
affiliated with an international development organization hypothesized when dis-
cussing the mass illegality of Syrian refugees in Lebanon:
I mean by essentially removing from them the status of legality you make 
them much more insecure and precarious which then also presumably means 
that they won’t do any of the things that the Lebanese government fears. For 
example, to mobilize politically as Palestinian refugees did. So, you know, 
by I guess stripping them of that legal security you create a persistent sense 
of fear and vulnerability that makes that population easier to control and 
manage.17
The three pillars of Lebanon’s initial ‘no-policy-policy’ towards Syrian refugees 
as described earlier – political division and deadlock, a conviction that the crisis 
would be short-lived, and the lack of an appropriate legal framework to guide 
decision-making – are not simply systemic. As mentioned, former ministerial rep-
resentatives and consultants and humanitarians that were involved in the early 
days of the response recall how in 2011, there was a coordinated response by the 
government (in the form of the High Relief Committee and the Ministry of Social 
Affairs) and the UN to address the arrival of refugees in North Lebanon, with the 
Ministry coordinating refugee registration. Six months into the crisis, however, 
according to these sources, a new cabinet decided not to expand this government-
led response to the Bekaa province, which was by then also facing a large influx 
of refugees. Instead, it encouraged the UNHCR to take over. When I asked for the 
rationale behind this decision, an interlocutor who was working for various min-
istries and was closely involved in the response in North Lebanon during those 
days emphasized the complexities of political antagonism, the lack of funding, 
and the lingering hope that the Syrian refugees would soon return home. Yet, the 
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government’s decision not to engage further was, according to her recollections, 
first and foremost a form of denial. She said:
When an expansion [of the government-led response from North Lebanon 
to the Bekaa] was requested it was rejected because they didn’t want to 
acknowledge that ‘yes we do have Syrians in other places and yes this might 
actually be a refugee crisis.’ It was just a matter of politics.18
Similarly, the lack of a legal framework to deal with refugee issues is not an 
inevitable given, but reflects a political position, an ‘unwillingness to host refu-
gees,’ according to Janmyr (2018: 394). Lebanon, Mencütek (2019: 34–35) con-
cludes, ‘intentionally avoid[s] developing concrete national refugee legislation 
and asylum institutions.’ No-policy-policy, formal informality, and the set of nos 
do not just reflect circumstances, but choices as well. They bring to light limited 
capacities and resources, but also allocation decisions and a fundamental political 
reluctance to act (Dionigi, 2016: 10, 17). In the following section I present three 
vignettes related to the set of nos introduced previously that serve to illustrate in 
more detail the ways in which a politics of uncertainty partly shapes the govern-
ance of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon.
Non-registration and blurred categorization:  
playing the ‘numbers game’
Knowing who is who and who is where, in other words rendering legible a popu-
lation, is usually assumed to be the basis for formulating policy. With regard to 
Syrian refugees, indeed, the Lebanese government, in the ‘Lebanon Partnership 
Paper’ that was published after the Brussels II conference, ‘acknowledges the 
importance of having accurate data and statistics on the refugees present on its 
territory.’ In practice, however, state authorities seem to have gone out of their 
way to avoid such legibility by abstaining from refugee registration. No official 
records of refugees are kept (Mencütek, 2019: 136). This is not simply due to a 
lack of capacity, but also reflects political will.
As described earlier, in 2011 there was a joint registration of Syrian refugees 
by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the UNHCR under the auspices of the High 
Relief Council. This process, however, was short-lived and only regarded North 
Lebanon. According to an advisor working for a Lebanese ministry, the Ministry 
of Social Affairs abandoned this because it was found to be too sensitive consid-
ering that registration was seen as acknowledging the potentially long-term stay 
of refugees.19 Apparently, there was another attempt at centralized registration 
of refugees by the same ministry in 2015, but this initiative was never actually 
implemented. While the relevant office in the ministry was created, a civil society 
representative who closely followed this initiative explained, it was never seri-
ously supported or capacitated.20 Since 2017, there has been persistent talk of a 
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national census of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, to be implemented by the Ministry 
of Interior, but so far this has not occurred either.
Thus, the General Security has monitored the entrance of Syrians at official 
border crossings and keeps track of Syrians’ residency status, but the many peo-
ple who entered ‘illegally’ elude these ‘registrations.’ Since 2014 municipalities 
are supposed to register the Syrian refugees present in their area, but, as the next 
chapter will show, such local registration is neither systematically controlled nor 
formally accumulated in a central database or overview. Central and official reg-
istration, instead, was left to the UNHCR. When, in 2015, UN-registered refugees 
counted more than the symbolic threshold of one million refugees, however, the 
government ordered the UNHCR to stop registration.21 The fact that the Leba-
nese state has not only refrained from registration itself, but has also barred other 
organizations from doing so shows once more that Lebanon’s non-registration of 
Syrian refugees is not merely due to resource problems, but reflects a choice for 
inaction.
Non-registration means that the Lebanese state does not have formal knowl-
edge on the Syrian refugee population on its territory: ‘Hundreds of thousands 
of people have become invisible to the authorities, absent from the state’s reg-
isters, and outside of the state’s purview’ (Frangieh, 2017). The UNHCR states 
that in early 2018 there were 995,512 Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Yet this num-
ber does not include refugees that arrived after the UNHCR was ordered to 
stop its registration.22 According to the 2017 LCRP, the country has ‘welcomed 
around 1.5 million refugees’ from Syria. Considering that the LCRP is co- 
produced by the UN and the Lebanese government, the Lebanese state thus 
admits the existence of some 500,000 non-registered refugees (Janmyr and 
Mourad, 2018a: 556).
The lack of definite and reliable statistics when it comes to the presence of Syr-
ian refugees in Lebanon was a constant in my interviews. A Lebanese consultant 
working on Lebanon’s engagement with Syrian refugees lamented:
Everyone from the officials [is] saying different numbers about the number of 
refugees. If you go to hear the ministers or to hear the President or even the 
Prime Minister, you will listen to different numbers. There is no one number 
that you can present about the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.23
Officially, then, no one knows how many Syrian refugees there are in Lebanon. 
The crux here, however, is the word ‘officially.’ My interlocutors were confident 
that an official central database was no prerequisite for state (security) agencies 
to be able to know what they needed to know about refugees. They stressed that 
regardless of the lack of official registration, information on refugees is gathered 
in various ways – ranging from registration at the border, status renewal proce-
dures with the General Security, surveillance at checkpoints and through raids by 
the State Security and police, and municipal registers. A former representative 
of the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs described this simultaneous formal 
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ignorance and informal awareness as ‘it’s like what we know and what we don’t 
know at the same time; so it’s not officially said, but it’s known.’24
This shows that registration is not about generating information but about allo-
cating entitlement. State authorities avoid formal registration not because they 
have no interest in information about refugees, but because they have an interest 
in being able to formally deny such information in order to shirk responsibility. 
Non-registration has helped to avoid any impression of the government bestowing 
formal refugee rights and status on Syrians.
As noted before, Syrian refugees in Lebanon are not recognized as official refu-
gees by the government, but they face intricate alternative classification and labe-
ling dynamics. The ‘complexities and uncertainties’ involved in these dynamics, 
Mencütek (2019: 151) notes, ‘itself serve as a means of restrictive governance in 
Lebanon.’ The multiplicity of these different labels and the overlap between the 
various categorizations means that the legal, institutional, and political status of 
refugees becomes conditional and often arbitrary. Janmyr and Mourad (2018b) 
conclude: ‘The blurring of categories makes conditions for refugees precarious.’ 
The latest LCRP, for instance, includes a statement that ‘Lebanon reserves its 
sovereign right to determine their [Syrians’] status according to Lebanese laws 
and regulations.’ As Janmyr (2018: 397) notes, however, considering the absence 
of laws and regulations for refugees in Lebanon, ‘it is unclear exactly on what 
basis . . . the government seeks to assert status determination.’ Authorities can thus 
shift between the different readings and interpretations as they please.
The political ‘utility’ of non-registration goes beyond shirking responsibility 
(Janmyr and Mourad, 2018a: 556). Not having an undisputed number of refugees 
also generates leeway for state authorities to pursue different interests vis-à-vis 
different audiences. The fact that the Lebanese government does not formally 
register refugees and does not provide stable and legally valid categories for Syr-
ian refugees allows Lebanese authorities to play a ‘numbers game.’ One former 
advisor to the Ministry of Social Affairs voiced his surprise regarding the fact that:
During all these meetings that all these ministries and agencies had [on how 
to deal with the refugee crisis] at no moment the central administration of 
statistics was invited. They were absolutely never invited to attend any of 
these meetings. And [they] never asked or any donor provided them any kind 
of money so that they can do the survey.
When I asked him why, his simple conclusion was that ‘they want to keep [things] 
fluid, for political reasons.’25 An advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office explained 
how the registration stop since 2015 and the withdrawal of UNHCR registration 
of refugees that he claimed were ‘commuting’ between Syria and Lebanon meant 
that ‘for the first time the number dropped to below one million. Registered.’26 
Only to add that: ‘We still believe there are a few hundred thousand not registered 
and unofficially present in the country.’ Such ambiguity allows state representa-
tives to point towards the official UNHCR registration when it suits them and 
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disregard these same registered numbers in favour of a much higher ‘unknown’ 
number of ‘actual’ refugees at other times.
For internal Lebanese consumption, numbers on the lower spectrum of the esti-
mate are routinely used to testify to the impact of the government’s more tough 
response since 2014. The October policy of that year, after all, made it a priority 
to decrease the number of Syrian refugees in the country by all possible means, 
and the subsequent entry and residency regimes have clearly sought to realize 
this goal. Thus, as several humanitarian experts have explained, Lebanese state 
officials use the minimal UNHCR-registered number to insist that there are fewer 
than a million refugees in the country in their public political discourse. A former 
representative of the office of the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs explained 
that the Minister, as well as other state agencies, is aware of the fact that there are 
many non-registered refugees. She said:
The reality is that there are plenty of non-registered Syrian refugees that 
entered based on a tourist visa or medical visa or any other kind of visa and 
are now either, like, without residency or illegally across the borders. So they 
are there. Yeah. We don’t see them on paper, but they are there.27
This, however, she reflected, does not stop some politicians from claiming that 
‘their policy of halting registration to decrease the number . . . showed a good 
result.’
In engagements with humanitarian agencies and donors, state officials stress 
high numbers of refugees to illustrate the need for continued aid. The same offi-
cials that claim there are fewer than a million Syrians in Lebanon when addressing 
domestic media, acknowledge that there are de facto some 1.5 million refugees in 
the closed-door planning meetings they have with the humanitarian community. 
A protection officer working for a Lebanese human rights organization explained 
that when she confronted state officials that she engaged with in inter-agency 
coordination meetings with the unlikeliness of their claim that there were as many 
as three million Syrian refugees residing in the country, they told her outright: 
‘You can’t know that.’28 Lack of solid numbers problematizes the development 
of a solid rationale for allocating aid and thus enhance the discretionary power 
of state officials (Atallah and Mahdi, 2017: 39). At a conference on ‘refugees and 
social cohesion,’ a ministerial advisor admitted that ‘yes, we exaggerate the num-
bers to get more aid as well as for politics reasons.’29
In practice, then, the government accepts the number of 1.5 million refugees 
mentioned in the latest LCRP when it comes to emphasizing the burden Syrian 
refugees constitute to Lebanon’s society and infrastructure, but denies it when 
it comes to identifying those in need of refugee protection (Janmyr, 2018). The 
utilization of such discrepancy, a development expert offered, was enabled by the 
creation of what she called an ‘ambiguous space’ in which ‘different claims could 
be made also by the government in terms of how many refugees are actually in 
the country’ that could not actually be disputed despite their contradictory and 
often unlikely nature.30 In response to my question of why no inclusive, central 
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registration system was in place, a policy advisor to the Minister of State of Dis-
placed Affairs explained that there was no political will to work towards such 
undisputed registration:
Now, let me tell you frankly. Not having one figure will open the door to 
more manipulation. At all levels. To minimize or to maximize. That’s it. It’s 
very clear. . . . It’s a game of minimization and maximization. And this is 
a manipulation. And now we’re near the election. Maybe they want this to 
manipulate more.31
Such ‘minimization and maximization’ and the strategically ambiguous numbers 
game it reflects allows the government to shirk responsibility and enables the vul-
nerability that makes refugees controllable, exploitable, and deportable.
The 2017 fee waiver for refugees’ residency status 
renewal: creating a ‘window of flexibility’
As described in the previous vignette, non-registration and vague categorization 
allow for a strategic ‘numbers game’ that demonstrates the utility of informality 
and illegality. The following vignette shows that even measures that are ostensibly 
taken to further regularization in practice often exacerbate institutional ambiguity.
In February 2017, the Lebanese government waived the US$200 fee for renew-
ing residency status in what was widely seen as an attempt to remedy the mass 
illegality of Syrian refugees. The decision was hailed as a success by humanitar-
ian organizations. Yet the scope of the fee waiver was extremely circumscribed 
from the beginning and its implementation patchy and arbitrary. Very few refu-
gees actually benefited from it (Sanyal, 2018: 71).
For state authorities, the fee waiver process has been a way to distinguish 
between ‘real’ refugees and what they see as ‘migrant workers.’ The fee waiver 
therefore specifically regarded UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees. It excluded 
Syrians who were not registered with the UNHCR (either because they entered 
irregularly or because they entered after 2015 when the UNHCR was no longer 
allowed to register refugees) as well as UNHCR-registered refugees who renewed 
their residency through the sponsorship system. This is noteworthy because ref-
ugees were in fact often told by the General Security to renew their residency 
through a sponsor (Atallah and Mahdi, 2017: 25; Janmyr and Mourad, 2018a: 
557). Stakeholders explained that ever since 2015 the General Security was quite 
unwilling to allow a renewal of residency status on the basis of UNHCR registra-
tion, even though this was formally possible. This means that in the two years 
preceding the fee waiver, many people were forced into a category that eventually 
excluded them from this waiver. As a Lebanese lawyer noted:
First, they pushed all Syrians to obtain a residency on the basis of a sponsor-
ship, a category that they created in 2015 and that was the sole option for 
most refugees who wanted to obtain legal status at the time. Then in 2017 
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they agreed to grant residencies on the basis of the UNHCR registration and 
to waive the residency fees, but only on condition that the Syrian had not 
previously obtained a sponsorship residency. This was clearly done with the 
purpose of reducing as much as possible the number of people who would 
qualify as refugees.32
In addition to limitations pertaining to the scope of the waiver, its implementation 
has been rife with problems (United Nations Development Program, 2017: 12; 
Ubels, 2019: 38). There are no organizations actually accompanying refugees in 
their encounters with the General Security as the General Security does not allow 
this. But there are a lot of NGOs working on legal protection that support refu-
gees in their attempts to renew or regularize their residency in Lebanon and these 
organizations have documented widespread arbitrariness in the application of the 
decree (Ayoub and Mahdi, 2018: 5). Different General Security offices have artic-
ulated additional requirements outside the scope of the official decision that vary 
per region and case, demanding papers and statements not formally requested by 
the decision. A protection specialist from an international NGO concluded:
In practice the additional requirements that are typically imposed by General 
Security offices further decrease the proportion of the refugee population that 
is eligible in practice for befitting from that fee waiver. And this creates con-
fusion and uncertainty in the refugee community and it also undermines cred-
ibility of humanitarian actors. Because whenever the original circulars are 
issued, we’re expected to go out in refugee communities and tell people about 
the new circulars. But then they never end up actually being implemented the 
way that they’re written.33
Such arbitrary and patchy implementation is often explained by the lack of capac-
ity of General Security offices and the enormous strain the refugee presence puts 
on this organization. The ‘Lebanon Partnership Paper’ presented after the Brus-
sels II donor conference in April 2018, for instance, recognizes the limited suc-
cess of the waiver in regularizing refugees’ stay, but sees this as the result of 
limited ‘processing capacity’ of General Security offices. An interviewee affiliated 
with the Prime Minister’s Office similarly emphasized that problems with the 
implementation of status renewal and the application of the fee waiver are of an 
‘administrative and logistical nature’ and have ‘nothing to do with the policy of 
the government.’34
Yet, as illustrated by the opening quote of this chapter, Lebanese as well as 
international civil society activists and public administration experts that I spoke 
with often reminded me of the fact that the burdensome bureaucracy that the 
General Security apparently does not have the capacity to implement is of their 
own making. It was installed through decrees that replaced a much more straight-
forward and easy-to-implement entry and residency regime. Initial information 
sessions about the fee waiver organized by some General Security offices were 
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canceled through a central-level decision (Ubels, 2019: 38). Moreover, humani-
tarian professionals stressed, the discretion employed by various General Secu-
rity offices was enabled by what they saw as the remarkably vague formulation 
of the circular. Despite extensive experience in this field and in Lebanon, these 
experts found the wording of the circular so confusing that they wondered how 
such ambiguity could have gone unnoted. In fact, some of them suggested, it 
might not have gone unnoted. Since the problematically vague formulation of 
the decree was often pointed out to relevant General Security officials through 
informal liaisons but never remedied, they suggested it must have been kept in 
place for a reason. A protection officer with a legal background working for an 
international NGO reflected:
The way that they [General Security circulars regarding the fee waiver] are 
written is ridiculous; this is not the way you would write a circular that you 
wanted people to understand. . . . They are written in a sort of confusing 
fashion. I mean it’s almost as if the original circular was meant to have an 
additional sentence or additional words or clauses in it somewhere and some-
one’s read it and just said ‘no’ and just sort of like crossed bits out and left 
the remainder and no one’s bothered to check whether anything that remains 
is actually sort of coherent. . . . What happens is that these things come out, 
we all read it, we all sort of scratch our heads for a while wondering what 
exactly that’s going to mean and then we try to look at practice in order to 
understand it.35
Noting that limited capacity and resources cannot fully account for the ambiguous 
nature of the circular and the arbitrary nature of its implementation, humanitarian 
protection officers and relevant policy consultants pointed to the performative 
dimensions of these decisions and the political utility of the maneuvering space 
that ambiguous decrees generate. On the one hand, state officials can stress the 
official national decision vis-à-vis the donor community that pushed for this in the 
first place and demonstrate the goodwill required to access further aid.36
On the other hand, the actual local practice of partial implementation allows 
Lebanese authorities to by and large keep in place the reality of mass illegality 
and the related vulnerability that enables exploitation and control of the refu-
gee population. Experts and practitioners alike expressed their sense that there 
had never been an intention ‘to really make it something big, it’s a very limited 
thing.’37 Because the fee waiver is vaguely formulated, refugees and those sup-
porting them have a hard time proving eligibility. A protection officer explained 
that ‘since it’s not said clearly it’s much harder, then, for our lawyers when they 
accompany refugees: what are they supposed to point to [in the circulars]?’38 Most 
of my interlocutors from the humanitarian field were accordingly convinced that
there is no real commitment to completely removing those obstacles; there 
was a need to somehow show some good will and do something and it was 
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kind of constructed in a way that makes it look better on the surface than it 
practically will be.39
In short, then, the ambiguity that permeates the fee waiver that was supposed to 
attenuate some of the most problematic tenets of the October 2014 policy was 
arguably largely preventable and served various political purposes. As with the 
numbers game described earlier, it allowed Lebanese authorities to flexibly cater 
to various audiences and to by and large keep in place the imposed illegality 
that enables refugees’ demobilization, exploitation, and expulsion. Echoing Fak-
houry’s (2017: 687) conclusion that the General Security implements a form of 
‘discretionary governance’ through its ‘restrictive, tedious and changing’ proce-
dures, a Lebanese legal scholar consulted on the matter suggested:
We can’t know, but we can guess. Through my experience in immigration 
law, I believe the ambiguity is intended because it allows for this arbitrary 
result and to deprive Syrians of a legal status. The access to legal status will 
often depend on whether or not a Syrian has the support of someone influen-
tial in Lebanon. If you don’t have such connections, you will be lost in the 
bureaucracy and will likely end up without legal status.40
According to a representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs, ambiguity cre-
ates convenient ‘windows of flexibility’ (Amnesty International, 2015: 11). These 
windows, the prior vignette shows, are sometimes skillfully crafted.
The Minister of State for Displaced Affairs: 
institutionalizing nonperformativity
As illustrated by the previous vignettes, the strategic institutional ambiguity at 
work in Lebanon’s governance of Syrian refugees manifests itself in deliberate 
non-registration and in conveniently vague decrees. It is also evident in the elusive 
mandates of the state agencies tasked with governing Syrian refugees in Lebanon. 
This is particularly so for the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs. This third 
vignette outlines how disputed terms of reference, competing sectarian-political 
interests, and lack of resources combined to produce an agency whose responsi-
bilities with regard to refugee governance are constantly reinterpreted depending 
on the case, audience, and timing. This allows it to function as a strawman. It 
signals that something is being done about the lack of over-arching policy that has 
enabled and upheld institutional ambiguity, while what that ‘something’ actually 
is remains elusive – and according to many interlocutors was meant to be elusive.
Ministers of State fall directly under the Prime Minister’s Office. They do not 
have the institutional and administrative resources that a normal ministry has and 
have no executive power. In Lebanon, each Prime Minister can appoint Minis-
ters of State. This practice functions both as a mechanism to delegate institu-
tional capacity to areas where it is needed and to ensure the sectarian and  political 
 balance in each cabinet: when all regular ministerial posts are allocated, the 
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Ministers of State are allotted so that this balance is guaranteed. The government 
under Prime Minister Saad Hariri that was established in December 2016 had 
eight Ministers of State, including the newly established position of Minister of 
State for Displaced Affairs.41
The exact mandate of the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs is not clear, 
a spokesperson of this ‘ministry’ admitted.42 Experts working for the Minister 
explained that it was created to lead the development of an overarching policy 
that should ensure more consistent and coherent coordination between the line 
ministries involved in the LCRP and, in essence, update and extend the Octo-
ber 2014 policy paper, the only official government policy presented so far. It 
was to respond to the increasing critique of donors, humanitarian partners, and 
Lebanon’s civil society on the absence of a sophisticated government policy to 
deal with Syrian refugees and to their request for a single government interlocutor 
to engage with on a substantial policy level.
Apart from this official policy purpose, the appointment of a Minister of State 
for Displaced Affairs also served to establish a political counterweight for the Min-
istry of Social Affairs. With its position as coordinator of the LCRP, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs had become the leading ministry with regard to the refugee response 
since 2014. In the previous cabinet, the Minister of Social Affairs was officially 
independent, but closely aligned with the Prime Minister’s Future Movement. In the 
new government, however, the Ministry of Social Affairs came under the Lebanese 
Forces, a Christian party affiliated with the March 14 alliance, but with less direct 
allegiance to the Prime Minister’s Sunni Future Movement. At that point in time, the 
post of a Minister of State for Displaced Affairs was established and given to a min-
ister directly affiliated with the Future Movement (Uzelac and Meester, 2018: 23).
This appointment was seen as an attempt to avoid conflict among the various 
political parties and sectarian communities within March 14 and their differing 
stances on the refugee ‘issue.’ A previous advisor to various relevant ministries 
summarized:
They [the Ministers of Social Affairs and of Displaced Affairs] are from dif-
ferent political parties, but they were allies at the time and then the Prime 
Minister did not want to upset the head of the other political party, who was 
his ally, so they decided that . . . let’s keep things pending. And in the mean-
time everything was . . . like everything got a bit lost.43
As this citation demonstrates, installing a Minister of State for Displaced Affairs 
did little to address institutional ambiguity and fragmentation. Its implicit but evi-
dent competition with the Ministry of Social Affairs rather produced more dead-
lock and confusion (Ayoub and Mahdi, 2018: 9). A humanitarian official with a 
leading position in the coordination about the LCRP noted:
The Ministry of Social Affairs has been left in charge of the operational coor-
dination of the crisis response. However, they also created this Ministry of 
Displaced, a State Ministry of Displaced, which we thought at the beginning 
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of the year would take on . . . possibly, potentially, would take on the coor-
dination. And so did they. And so we met with them several times and pre-
sented and whatever. But eventually we said: ‘Listen, we can’t engage with 
you unless we have a formal notification from the Prime Minister’s Office 
or, you know, from the sort of highest level to say “the response has shifted 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the State Ministry of Displaced.” So 
how you guys organize that, that’s up to you to figure out, but you have to 
tell us formally.’44
Seconding the analysis of a previous advisor to the Minister of State for Displaced 
Affairs on this matter, she confided:
The Minister of Displaced does not come from the same party as the Minister 
of Social Affairs. So . . . And then they haven’t bothered, or dared, to get into 
the fight of actually sort of clearly delineating who’s doing what. So if you’re 
confused, don’t worry, everybody is confused here and there’s no . . . there’s 
no real answer to the question [of who is formally in charge of what].
Despite the detrimental effects of this ministerial turf war, some of my inter-
locutors, especially those from civil society and humanitarian agencies, have 
hailed the establishment of the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs as a major 
development, seeing the institution as a constructive partner in their attempts 
to lobby for more protection for refugees. For them, the Minister of State for 
Displaced Affairs has the ‘will,’ but ‘is kept small and lacks the resources to 
do more.’45 Despite successes in, for instance, the realm of birth registration of 
refugees, this limited capacity of the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs and 
its minimal achievements were stressed by most stakeholders. A ‘unified policy’ 
to reconsider Lebanon’s response to the crisis was allegedly drafted by the Min-
ister of State in 2017, but a Minister of State can merely advise on policy, not 
actually adopt or implement it. The policy proposal of the Minister of State for 
Displaced Affairs, moreover, clashed with an opposing policy suggested by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No consensus could be reached so neither policy 
was adopted.
In light of the fact that the Ministry ‘has no funds and no power,’ many of my 
interlocutors wondered whether – regardless of the will of its individual staff – the 
Ministry was ever really meant to make an impact (see also Zaatari, 2016).46 They 
noted that for it to be effective, the position of Minister of State for Displaced 
Affairs should have been filled by a capable Minister, rather than one who was 
seen as lacking relevant expertise. The Minister of State for Displaced Affairs, 
furthermore, could have been established as a department under an existing min-
istry or under the Prime Minister’s Office, rather than as a Ministry of State. 
A leading policy expert involved in the creation of the Minister of State for Dis-
placed Affairs indicated that he had unsuccessfully lobbied for the creation of an 
‘actual’ Ministry for Displaced that would be responsible for governing both the 
The governance of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 79
Palestinian and Syrian refugees in the country.47 The liminal nature of a Minister 
of State, which exists by the grace of a specific Prime Minister and might not last 
longer than the respective electoral term, undermines its credibility.48 A consult-
ant for the Minister indicated that this was keenly felt by the staff supporting the 
Minister, which saw the Minister of State as a ‘temporary ministry.’49
A former advisor to the Ministry of Social Affairs summarized the general 
impression on the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs I got from interlocutors 
representing ministries and international agencies, saying that it
is just for décor, it is just for him [the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs] 
to be a minister. He really did not . . . he couldn’t . . . he was not actually . . . 
in reality, he was not mandated to do anything on the Syrian refugees. He’s 
just a façade, not more than that.50
He added:
When it comes to institutional prerogatives, it was never the intention of let-
ting him [the Minister of State] do anything. . . . For the outside . . . they 
established a Minister for Displaced [to show that] they’re interested . . . it is 
on top of the agenda. But actually this is not the case, it is a fake.
The Minister of State for Displaced Affairs thus ‘has remained largely inactive’ 
(Mencütek, 2019: 145). The institution has not been able to present or get adopted 
the comprehensive policy the government allegedly wanted to have. Instead, it 
has been set up in an unsustainable and under-capacitated format and was appar-
ently squeezed between the Ministry of Social Affairs that did not care to give up 
any of its de facto policy influence and the Inter-Ministerial Committee that was 
keen to guard its direct lines with the donor community. The Minister of State 
for Displaced Affairs, it therefore seems, was created to assuage mounting cri-
tiques of Lebanon’s lack of policy towards Syrian refugees, rather than to actually 
address them.
This makes Lebanon’s Minister of State for Displaced Affairs the quintes-
sential example of producing ambiguity through formalizing inaction. It is a 
telling case of institutionalized nonperformativity, which Ahmed (2006: 105) 
describes as acts ‘that work precisely by not bringing about the effects that they 
name.’ Following this logic of nonperformativity, the very utterance of a specific 
intention, here to finally develop a proper policy to address the Syrian refugee 
crisis, has not contributed to the realization of that alleged intention, but in fact 
worked to make it less likely. For many of my interlocutors, the appointment 
of a Minister of State for Displaced Affairs undermined rather than helped the 
development of the policy that this Minister was supposed to deliver because 
it added to the already existing confusion about mandates and multiplicity of 
institutions. This has only enhanced the institutional ambiguity working to keep 
refugees down.
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Conclusions
Lebanon’s overarching response to the Syrian refugee presence in the country 
evolved from a ‘no-policy-policy’ to a form of ‘formal informality’ after the 
introduction of the October 2014 policy. Informing both of these phases of the 
response was a set of three fundamental ‘nos’ that institutionalized ambiguity 
and amounted to a form of ‘national-level evasion of responsibility’ (Atallah and 
Mahdi, 2017: 20). When it comes to status, refugees were withheld formal refugee 
status and by and large stripped from their official residency status. The no-camp 
decision meant that in terms of shelter, refugees were left to their own devices. 
Concerning representation, clear mandates and responsibilities on the Lebanese 
side were absent, and no counterparts were recognized on Syrian side. The ambi-
guity this generated importantly contributed to manufacturing the vulnerability 
that serves to demobilize refugees, exploit them, and ‘encourage’ them to leave.
This has been the effect not merely of hybrid order and resource deficits but 
also of concrete political decisions. It points to political unwillingness to produce 
laws and policies that would set clearer benchmarks for engagement with the 
‘crisis.’ Three vignettes have illustrated the political expediency of maintaining 
institutional ambiguity. They did so by outlining the utility of non-registration 
and vague classification and the advantageous ‘numbers game’ this allows. The 
vignettes also showed how measures allegedly taken to remedy institutional ambi-
guity, such as the adoption of a waiver for (some) refugees’ residency renewal fees 
and the installation of a Minister of State for Displaced Affairs, actually contribute 
to it. This, in many ways, is not a form of failure, but a manifestation of nonper-
formativity, where measures are taken not so much to actually be implemented but 
rather to stave off their implementation while keeping critics assuaged.
This chapter has outlined the characteristics, implications, and drivers of the 
institutional ambiguity that imbues Lebanon’s national response to the Syrian 
refugee ‘crisis.’ Analyzing the relevant dynamics of Lebanon’s national political 
arena, it explored how informality, liminality, and exceptionality emerged and 
the political work they do. This is further nuanced and detailed from a more local 
perspective in the next chapter.
Notes
 1 Author’s interview with Lebanese human rights lawyer working with refugees – 
Skype, 16 March 2018.
 2 The section on the emergence of institutional ambiguity draws on a joint paper with 
Jessy Nassar (Nassar and Stel, 2019). This previous analysis was complemented and 
updated with my own data.
 3 Interviews had to be conducted via Skype. They were held in English and then 
recorded and transcribed. The related citations are verbatim. Many of my interlocu-
tors, especially those associated with the state and the United Nations, did not want to 
be referred to in their official capacity and will thus be described more generically as 
‘policy’ or ‘humanitarian’ ‘experts’ or state ‘officials’ or ‘representatives.’
 4 Website consulted on 13 March 2018.
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 5 This law contains a chapter on political asylum and a related asylum process that states 
that asylum can be granted by a committee comprising the ministers of Interior, Jus-
tice, and Foreign Affairs and the director of General Security (Mencütek, 2019: 138). 
In practice, asylum has been granted through this mechanism precisely once since 
1962 (Stevens, 2017).
 6 These regulations were presented in a circular issued by General Security on 31 
December 2014 and further detailed in circulars published on 13 January and on 3 and 
23 February 2015.
 7 The sponsorship system for Syrian refugees was established in an internal memo of 
the General Security (99/2014). Sponsors have to sign a pledge of responsibility. Such 
a pledge can take the form of an individual work-related permit, a group sponsorship, 
or a family sponsorship. It contains a clause of liability for ‘any acts committed by 
the sponsored Syrian,’ though the exact form of liability is not explicated (Danish 
Refugee Council, Norwegian Refugee Council, International Refugee Committee, and 
Oxfam, 2017: 2). The sponsor also has to obtain a work permit from the Ministry of 
Labor once legal residency is issued. Since application for work permits is ‘complex 
and costly,’ only 1,500 Syrians currently hold work permits in Lebanon (Uzelac and 
Meester, 2018: 19). Because of the elaborate obligations and the related bureaucracy, 
sponsors are very difficult to find and/or demand significant ‘payback’ (Amnesty Inter-
national, 2015: 14; Janmyr, 2016: 69; Al-Masri and Altabbaa, 2016: 11). The sponsor-
ship system consequently has become extremely exploitative.
 8 Author’s interview – Skype, 16 March 2018.
 9 Author’s interview – Skype, 16 March 2018.
 10 Author’s interview – Skype, 13 April 2018.
 11 Author’s interview – Skype, 27 March 2018.
 12 Borgmann and Slim (2018: 44) dramatically but effectively summarize this sentiment 
when they note:
Whether we like it or not, in Lebanon, the word ‘camps’ represents the mother lode 
of evils, specifically, the long lasting and definitive period of Palestinian asylum in 
the country. ‘Camps’ evoke memories of areas within the state that were not under 
its control. In short, the word is ‘code’ for the country’s civil war period and the cas-
cade of painful images it still summons. Ultimately, the establishment of ‘refugee 
camps’ is an enduring example of collective Lebanese trauma.
 13 Author’s interview – Skype, 27 March 2018.
 14 Author’s interview – Skype, 30 January 2018.
 15 Not all illegality is forced. Many refugees are wary of registering themselves for fear 
this information will be shared with the Syrian regime and thus opt for staying under 
the radar themselves. Considering the dire consequences of lacking legal residency 
status, however, the large majority of refugees can be assumed to prefer legal status if 
they would be eligible for it and could afford it.
 16 According to them, it ‘deliberately created mass legal insecurity and undermined the 
living conditions of refugees in order to prompt their return.’
 17 Author’s interview – Skype, 11 December 2017.
 18 Author’s interview – Skype, 27 March 2018.
 19 Author’s interview – WhatsApp, 12 January 2018.
 20 Author’s interview – Skype, 9 February 2018.
 21 In addition to this registration stop, the government requested the UNHCR ‘to review 
the cases of all Syrians registered with the Office who had gone to Syria and returned 
to Lebanon after June 1, 2014’ (Mourad, 2017: 258). This led to the inactivation of the 
UNHCR refugee status of 16,000 Syrians previously registered with the UNHCR.
 22 Refugees who arrived after May 2015 were not registered by the UNHCR, 
but recorded – a less formal categorization that allows refugees to be registered 
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for internal UNHCR purposes but does not publicly count them as refugees. In 
June 2016, there were approximately 40,000 such recorded refugees (Janmyr and 
Mourad, 2018a: 548).
 23 Author’s interview – Skype, 9 February 2018.
 24 Author’s interview – WhatsApp, 12 January 2018.
 25 Author’s interview – Skype, 9 April 2018.
 26 Author’s interview – Skype, 30 January 2018.
 27 Author’s interview – WhatsApp, 12 January 2018.
 28 Author’s interview – Skype, 14 November 2017.
 29 Livestream of event at the American University of Beirut – 23 November 2017.
 30 Author’s interview – Skype, 11 December 2017.
 31 Author’s interview – Skype, 22 January 2018.
 32 Author’s interview – Skype, 16 March 2018.
 33 Author’s interview – Skype, 18 January 2018.
 34 Author’s interview – Skype, 30 January 2018.
 35 Author’s interview – Skype, 19 January 2018.
 36 This seems corroborated by the fact that the fee waiver was adopted as a result of 
fierce donor pressure at ‘Brussels I’ and was flaunted as a major accomplishment by 
the Lebanese Prime Minister at ‘Brussels II’ a year later – where no nuance was made 
to indicate that only a small number of refugees is eligible for the fee waiver and that 
only a small portion of those eligible have been able to actually benefit so far.
 37 Author’s interview with Lebanese lawyer working with refugees – Skype, 16 
March 2018.
 38 Author’s interview – Skype, 19 January 2018.
 39 Author’s interview with a legal assistance specialist for an international humanitarian 
organization – Skype, 30 November 2017.
 40 Author’s interview – Skype, 16 March 2018.
 41 There was a Ministry for Displaced Affairs (wizaret al muhajreen) before the arrival of 
Syrian refugees. This Ministry was tasked with addressing the issue of Lebanese peo-
ple internally displaced during the Lebanese Civil War. The new Minister of State for 
Displaced Affairs (wizaret al dawle al shu’un al naziheen) was specifically related to 
the Syrian refugee presence in the country, but – due to the fact that Lebanon officially 
does not consider Syrian refugees to be ‘refugees’ – could not be called a minister of 
refugee affairs and therefore was given a name that in Arabic denotes a different cat-
egory of displacement but in English translates as ‘displaced’ as well.
 42 Author’s interview – WhatsApp, 12 January 2018.
 43 Author’s interview – Skype, 27 March 2018.
 44 Author’s interview – Skype, 5 January 2018.
 45 Author’s interview – Skype, 12 March 2018.
 46 Author’s interview with a Lebanese international consultant – Skype, 9 February 2018.
 47 Author’s interview – Skype, 22 January 2018.
 48 The position of Minister of State for Displaced Affairs was retained after the 2018 
elections. The new Minister belongs to the opposing political alliance, however. Rather 
than trying to enhance refugee protection, he has taken a much more assertive stance 
against the refugee presence in the country, prioritizing repatriation for which he 
directly liaises with Damascus (gaining him the nickname ‘Minister of State for Return 
Affairs’).
 49 Author’s interview – WhatsApp, 12 January 2018.
 50 Author’s interview – Skype, 9 April 2018.
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There is no policy here. You deal with it [the refugees] as you think is right.1
Lebanon’s approach to governing Syrian refugees is, the previous chapter showed, 
characterized by the absence of a comprehensive, consistent formal policy on 
the national level, which is often politically convenient. In the wake of this, a 
wide array of more local informal approaches and guidelines to deal with the 
presence of refugees has emerged. This chapter explores such sub-national mani-
festations and implications of the lingering no-policy-policy and the expanding 
formal informality in Lebanon’s response to the Syrian refugee ‘crisis.’ It thereby 
enriches and nuances our understanding of how and why informality, liminality, 
and exceptionalism become institutionally entrenched and what this means for the 
stakeholders involved. Zooming in on how refugee governance works sheds new 
light on the ways in which furthering ambiguity can be strategic.
After a brief reflection on the specific research underlying this chapter, I offer 
a digested analysis of two case-studies that follows the three governance realms 
prioritized in my conceptual framework, showing how a combination of inaction 
and ambiguous action reproduces and extends uncertainty for refugees. This illus-
trates how a national politics of uncertainty is replicated locally – often because 
of opportunistic negotiation of these nationally imposed governance logics and 
sometimes despite their contestation. National state authorities either ignore ille-
gal local approaches, denounce them without actually following through with 
sanctions, or openly criticize them while encouraging them behind closed doors. 
This does not merely dissolve accountability; it also makes refugees dependent on 
local ‘strongmen’ and thereby inherently exploitable.
In the realm of representation, I investigate the rationales and operation of, 
on the one hand, the regional and local governance actors that are being made 
responsible for dealing with the presence of Syrian refugees and, on the other 
hand, the various authorities that have emerged in the Syrian communities living 
in informal tented settlements. This analysis shows that exploitative institutions 
are informally encouraged and co-opted by security agencies, but never formally 
recognized by civil authorities, while more committee-like structures emerging 
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Co-opted shawishes, elusive  
permissions, and the specter of eviction
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in Syrian settlements are systematically undermined. This crucially premises the 
paralysis and pacification of refugee communities.
In the domain of status, I engage with the forms of local registration and 
administration developed by Lebanese state authorities. Municipal engagement 
with refugees is often reluctant. The local regulation systems that are in place are 
almost entirely informal, arbitrarily applied, and subject to change, which makes 
responsibility diffuse – even more so as these systems are increasingly taken over 
by a complex and shifting assemblage of security agencies.
In terms of space, I demonstrate the ways in which settlement evictions follow 
from and shape the local governance of refugees. The constant threat of displace-
ment practically as well as psychologically reiterates the liminality and informal-
ity imposed on refugees. The arbitrary nature of recurring evictions, furthermore, 
testifies to the legal as well as political exceptionalism levelled against them. This 
further contributes to the fundamental unpredictability and insecurity that enables 
the control, exploitation, and expulsion of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.
Context and cases: studying refugee governance 
in the Central Bekaa
For the local analysis central to this chapter, I investigated regional and local 
(settlement-level) refugee governance modalities in the Central Bekaa dis-
trict, which is part of Lebanon’s Bekaa governorate. This governorate hosts 
most Syrian refugee settlements in the country, both absolutely and relatively 
(Zapater, 2018). By January 2018, there were 357,395 refugees registered by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the Bekaa 
governorate and 161,202 in the Central Bekaa district.2 The Bekaa has 540,000 
inhabitants and is known for its agricultural richness and sectarian diversity, 
with major Christian, Armenian, and Shia communities, but also various Sunni 
and Druze towns and villages. The Central Bekaa is considered the Bekaa’s 
economic hub and is the most diverse district of the province, resulting in a 
mosaic of political party affiliations and local alliances. Zahle, the main city 
in the Central Bekaa and home to a predominantly Christian population, par-
ticularly boasts a reputation of extreme autonomy and independence vis-à-vis 
national authorities.
In the Bekaa, relations with Syria have been intense in many ways. Socio-
cultural ties are strong, seasonal migration of large numbers of Syrian agricultural 
workers (and sometimes their families) has been ubiquitous, and cross-border 
trading and smuggling has always been a major source of income. Throughout 
the Syrian regime’s occupation of Lebanon, its military presence was particu-
larly strong in the Bekaa. This generated resistance and has created a pervasive 
resentment towards Syria among many in the Bekaa that has also shaped engage-
ment with refugees. This attitude is in many cases only fuelled by sectarian fears 
(Zahle’s Christians feel particularly threatened by the influx of large communities 
of Sunni Muslims, which they see as destabilizing the demographic balance in the 
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area) and economic concerns (regarding business competition, rent inflation, and 
undermining of touristic appeal) that prevail throughout the country.
The data for this chapter’s analysis was generated during a three-month field-
work period from February to April 2018 by a research partner based in Zahle.3 
During this period, 35 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted – some 
in English and some in Arabic (with the help of a translator) – with Syrian refu-
gees and their representatives; humanitarian experts affiliated with local, regional, 
and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations 
(UN) agencies; state officials (including representatives at the governorate and 
district levels, mayors, mukhtars, and regional coordinators fielded by national 
ministries); and Lebanese landlords.4 In addition, various informal meetings were 
held with relevant stakeholders, including nine field visits to the two informal 
settlements serving as case-studies, of which reflexive observational notes were 
made. Documents were collected and solicited where relevant and possible.5
Research consisted of two components. The first sought to explore the regional 
governance structure in place to govern Syrian refugees by interviewing a variety 
of state officials and humanitarians. The second research component focused on 
two case-studies. These explored the local governance dynamics in specific Syr-
ian settlements, investigating both internal dynamics and the relations between 
refugee representatives and local Lebanese authorities. The vast majority of Syr-
ian refugees in Lebanon lives dispersed in urban settings. I have nevertheless 
opted to focus on refugee communities living in so-called informal tented settle-
ments in more rural areas because the dynamics of strategic institutional ambi-
guity can be expected to be particularly relevant – and hence researchable – in 
these ‘sites of experimentation in ad hoc camp management strategies’ (Ghaddar, 
2017). Informal settlements are thus not directly representative of the broader 
refugee presence in Lebanon in spatial terms, but the analysis in the previous 
chapter indicates that the encompassing dynamics of strategic ambiguity that the 
governance processes in informal settlements render particularly visible do hold 
across the country.
Informal Syrian refugee settlements are makeshift camps of tents, often made 
of materials provided by the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations, that 
range in size from several tents to hundreds of them. The first settlement studied 
had around 500 inhabitants living in more than 90 tents and was located in a semi-
urban Sunni town that was hosting 80 different Syrian settlements. This settlement 
was established some two years prior to data generation, when the community that 
had been living in a settlement not far away was forced to relocate after a dispute 
with the previous landlord. The second settlement hosted some 400 people and 
about 70 tents and was set in a rural, tribal Christian area with 45 settlements in 
total. This settlement did not fall under a specific municipality, but came under 
the direct responsibility of the governorate. It was established in 2008 to accom-
modate Syrian agricultural workers in the region. The settlement expanded when 
relatives and associates of these workers joined them when the situation in Syria 
worsened, with the most significant influx in 2014.
Governing Syrian ‘informal tented settlements’ 89
These two examples can clearly not represent the hundreds of different settle-
ments in the Central Bekaa.6 Throughout data generation, therefore, dynamics 
for these two specific cases were always contextualized by asking for broader 
local and regional governance realities. Case-related findings were extensively 
triangulated through literature and document analysis reflecting refugee govern-
ance more generally to explore to what extent they reflected the situation in the 
Bekaa at large. Yet, even if findings are relevant to the Bekaa at large, they are 
not automatically representative for Lebanon at large. Lebanon’s various regions 
are vastly different in terms of sectarian and political affiliations, state presence, 
and socio-economic realities. They also greatly vary with regard to the number 
of refugees they are hosting relative to their original population. As Chapter 2 
has shown, however, many of the overarching governance logics outlined in this 
chapter for the Central Bekaa resonate with analyses of refugee governance for 
Lebanon’s other regions.
Preventing representation
Politicization and securitization of Lebanese  
local governance
The Lebanese governance structure in the Central Bekaa can be conceived of as 
consisting of several overlapping arenas. First, there is the civil state structure as 
represented by the various administrative levels of the Ministry of Interior. There 
is the governor (or muhafez) and his office (the muhafaza) who direct a district 
governor for each sub-region (the qaymaqam). Then, there are the municipalities 
(baladiyat), each headed by a mayor (or ‘head of municipality,’ rais al baladiye) 
presiding over a Municipal Council. An additional manifestation of the civil state 
structure in the Central Bekaa are the agencies headed by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, which has offices in each district and manages Social Development Cent-
ers in many towns (some 50 in the entire Bekaa).
In its attempt to support the Lebanese state in dealing with the Syrian refugee 
presence, the UNHCR has reinforced these state structures with several new posi-
tions that were created with the aim to better manage the ‘crisis,’ resulting in a 
humanitarian governance tier that is partly integrated with the existing state struc-
ture. The UNHCR seconded a coordinator, who is under contract of the Minister 
of Interior, to support the provincial governor. It also fielded a coordinator under 
the Ministry of Social Affairs. This latter coordinator in particular functioned as 
the hub in the regional governance network concerned with Syrian refugees, liais-
ing directly with the UNHCR and the Minister of Social Affairs, but also the pro-
vincial governor and his coordinator, all municipalities hosting significant refugee 
populations, and the humanitarian agencies working in the region.
A third set of actors relevant to understand the governance of Syrian refugees 
in the Bekaa constitutes a complicated assemblage of security agencies. It is 
extremely challenging to provide a complete and uncontested overview of the 
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mandates and institutional embedding of Lebanese security agencies because 
these are often not publicly available. Various security agencies with overlapping 
directives and duplicating practices exist in an attempt to maintain a sectarian 
balance.
The most relevant security agencies were the Lebanese Armed Forces oper-
ating under the Ministry of Defense and its Military Intelligence branch (the 
mukhabaraat), which, in relation to Syrian refugees, is mostly involved in moni-
toring the informal settlements for ‘terrorists.’ The General Security (amn el am), 
which falls under the Ministry of Interior, is predominantly concerned with the 
residency status of refugees and is in charge of detaining people on the basis 
of illegal entry or residency. The police, or Internal Security Forces, also under 
the Ministry of Interior, were mostly responsible for maintaining public order, 
for instance through checkpoints where the identity and legal status of refugees 
is controlled. The municipal police, functioning directly under the municipality, 
was regularly involved in monitoring the more daily dynamics of the informal 
settlements, checking, for instance, the number of tents and inhabitants and liais-
ing with camp representatives. Then there was the elusive State Security (amn el 
dawle), which reports to the Supreme Defense Council and is characterized by its 
‘rather unclear mandate’ (Mazzola, 2019: 7). According to its website, the State 
Security coordinates with all security agencies, local authorities, and populations 
to address the issue of displaced people (including matters related to ‘statistics’ 
and ‘settlements’).7 According to people in the field, the State Security was rou-
tinely involved in monitoring informal settlements and their residents (see also 
Ghaddar, 2017).8
There are various initiatives to delineate mandates and develop accountability 
mechanisms among security agencies (Atallah and Mahdi, 2017: 31). Yet the real-
ity is more like what Wedeen (1999: 147) has called an ‘anonymous, panoptic 
security’ field. While security agencies at times cooperate, they do not structur-
ally coordinate and often do not share information (International Alert and Leba-
non Support, 2017: 3; Nashabe, 2009; Van Veen, 2015). In the governance of 
Syrian refugee settlements, this amalgamated security assemblage often takes 
precedence over the civil state structures in charge of dealing with the refugee 
presence. This securitization, with its inherently legitimate secrecy, strategic frag-
mentation and duplication, and self-evident unaccountability, is closely related to 
institutional ambiguity. It legitimates informality, liminality, and exceptionalism 
because reference to ‘security issues’ justifies any kind of measure taken towards 
refugees and serves to firmly place refugees outside the realm of ‘normal politics’ 
(Cassani, 2018: 64).
Considering Lebanon’s sectarian consociationalism and the related politiciza-
tion of the state, it is crucial to restate that the interaction of these three govern-
ance structures is decisively shaped by the political affiliations of the relevant 
agencies and officials. A previous ministerial advisor, for instance, explained that 
local branches of political parties have given clear directives, both private and 
public, on how (not) to deal with refugees to municipal officers – directives that 
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become especially influential in light of the absence of consistent and operational-
ized guidelines from the Ministry of Interior.9 Considering Lebanon’s sectarian- 
political diversity, such politicization means fragmentation. Different mayors 
have different political affiliations, and who they coordinate with and tend to take 
orders from is determined more by these political relations than by institutional 
hierarchies. Echoing other accounts, a Lebanese humanitarian working closely 
with municipal structures explained that the extent to which mayors comply with 
or ignore regional and national directives
depends on the mayor’s party: if he [the mayor] is with the Prime Minister 
[i.e. is from the same party as the Prime Minister] he will listen to the Minis-
try of Interior, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, as they are 
all from the same party. But he is not listening to the others [to those ministers 
or state officials not affiliated with his party or parties allied with it].10
As on the national level, political fragmentation generates deadlock. The various 
Lebanese authorities involved in the regional governance of the Syrian refugee 
crisis in the Bekaa operate on different political logics and report via different insti-
tutional structures. They do not structurally coordinate and often work in parallel 
or even against each other. As a foreign humanitarian coordinator working in the 
Bekaa explained, all sectarian groups and all related parties or political alliances 
will make sure to have a stake in each major department and issue, which means 
‘you always need all of them to get anything done.’11 This, he dryly concluded, is 
mostly impossible so that often nothing gets done. The national decision-making 
paralysis regarding the governance of Syrian refugees is thus replicated locally. 
This absence of de jure local policies, however, should not obscure the de facto 
governance rationales that are at work on the municipal, district, and provincial 
levels. Such rationales often reinforce the informal, liminal, and exceptional 
nature of the Lebanese state’s engagement with Syrians. As detailed in the follow-
ing, this is potently illustrated by the way in which Lebanese authorities regulate 
representative institutions among Syrian refugee communities.
Local denunciation and co-optation of Syrian 
‘representatives’
As Ghaddar (2017) notes, since there are officially no refugee camps in Lebanon 
there is, again officially, ‘no need for a camp management strategy.’ In practice, of 
course, settlements will be governed whether they are officially acknowledged or 
not. The lack of formal acknowledgement, however, importantly shapes govern-
ance realities. Syrian refugees in Lebanon did not develop the strong leadership 
networks needed to support mobilization that have emerged in, for instance, Jor-
dan (Clarke, 2018). The ‘absence of consultation on their [refugees’] fears, needs 
and perceptions on matters of their concern,’ Atallah and Mahdi (2017: 18) note, 
is a key feature of the current Lebanese response to the refugee crisis (see also 
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Al-Saadi, 2015). This is a direct result of Lebanese authorities’ approach towards 
the organization of refugee communities.
Syrian refugees have been largely abandoned by the Syrian government, whose 
embassy in Lebanon has not attempted to help or speak for refugees. There have 
been initiatives towards political mobilization and representation by, for instance, 
the National Coordination Body for Democracy and Change and the Union of 
Syrian Democrats, a sub-division of the Syrian National Coalition, but these have 
been unsuccessful (Kullab, 2014). This is partly because Syrian refugees in Leba-
non often lack the will and capacity to organize themselves, not least because of 
their diverse background and political affiliations. But refugees also describe their 
tendency to keep a low profile as a form of ‘conforming to state policies’ (Atal-
lah and Mahdi, 2017: 19). Indeed, Lebanese authorities are ‘absolute in [their] 
opposition’ to any form of ‘empowering refugees by having dialogue with Syrian 
representatives’ (Al-Saadi, 2015). As Al-Saadi (2015) concludes:
Any project seeking to facilitate some form of political organization of the 
Syrian population is immediately nipped in the bud, because viewed from the 
prism of state security, it endangers political, social, and economic elites who 
are the main benefactors of the present state of affairs. Without representation 
from above, compounded by the various rifts within Syrian society itself, and 
the limitations of the international aid system, the Syrian populace is actively 
left without a voice, waiting in a limbo state for a change.
The lack of organization and mobilization among Syrian refugees in Lebanon thus 
at least partly results from Lebanese authorities’ concerted efforts to undermine 
community organization beyond the shawish, which they have co-opted (Al-Masri 
and Altabbaa, 2016; Carpi, Younes and AbiYaghi, 2016; Lebanon Support, 2016). 
Despite the absence of formally recognized refugee representatives, unofficially 
there is such a shawish, or Syrian superintendent, in almost each settlement. The 
role of a shawish varies from one settlement to another and is a mixture of com-
munity representative, broker, and informant. Shawishes, various stakeholders 
reported, hardly coordinate among each other (see also Clarke, 2018: 626). He – 
although there are several female shawishes as well – can thus be considered a 
local authority inside the settlement and its representative towards external actors 
but should not be seen as part of a more comprehensive representational structure.
There are reported examples of elected shawishes (REACH and UNHCR, 
2014: 13). More often shawishes are appointed by the landlord based on previous 
relations between the landlord and the leader of a specific community of Syr-
ian workers or in acknowledgement of existing power relations in Syrian com-
munities of origin. As Ghaddar (2017) importantly stresses, shawishes are often 
both exploited and exploiting. Though there are of course exceptions, shawishes 
are associated with a wide array of abuses and corruption – reportedly hijacking 
aid distribution and facilitating child labour and sexual exploitation. They benefit 
from their position economically (often receiving payment for their work from 
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the landlord or extorting refugees) and socially (being under the ‘protection’ of 
influential Lebanese).
At the same time, they are at the mercy of Lebanese landlords and security 
agencies. Shawishes almost always work in close coordination with the Lebanese 
landlord on whose property the settlement they are associated with is established 
and who also often informally employs refugees. They are, in different ways and 
to different degrees, dependent on these landlords. This dependence is only exac-
erbated by the October 2014 policy and its operationalizing decrees which have 
sought to make landlords (and sponsors) into ‘regulatory figures’ responsible for 
monitoring and controlling refugees (Barjas, 2016). An important part of the job 
description of shawishes, furthermore, is ‘being the eyes and ears’ of the State 
Security, and to a lesser extent the Military Intelligence, and to report the names, 
political affiliations, and legal status of the people living in each settlement. In 
the first case-study settlement, the shawish was detained for not pro-actively con-
tacting security services with what they considered to be relevant information to 
intimidate him into being ‘a good eye in the settlement.’12
Shawishes are thus co-opted by Lebanese security agencies. They are also 
propped up by them. While there is no formal recognition of the shawish, land-
lords as well as mayors have reported that security agencies insisted that they 
appoint a shawish in each settlement. One mayor explained that he refused to 
allow shawishes in the settlements in his municipality as he dreaded the exploi-
tation that comes with it, joking that he was ‘the only shawish in town.’13 This, 
however, reportedly got him in a fight with the local representative of the State 
Security that insisted he installed a Syrian shawish in each settlement. In the first 
settlement studied, the group of refugees that initiated the settlement in 2016 
came with an existing shawish who was accepted by the landlord. When this 
shawish was deposed after a dispute, there was no shawish for half a year, and the 
landlord collected rent and reported to the municipality. Eventually, the landlord 
appointed a shawish, he said, not because he was in need of one, but because the 
municipality insisted there should be a Syrian shawish present in the settlement. 
A similar situation apparently occurred in the second settlement we studied. For 
some time, the associated landlord de facto acted as shawish. He only appointed 
the current shawish when the provincial governorate demanded he install a Syr-
ian shawish.
Thus, shawishes are often imposed on refugee communities. This means that 
the Lebanese state enables the exploitation that shawishes engage in with the 
backing of and often under pressure of landlords. While shawishes are not rec-
ognized and often even denounced by Lebanese state authorities, in practice they 
appear to be strategically used to control Syrian communities. That this constant 
reinforcing of the informal and exceptional nature of Syrian representative struc-
tures reflects a distinct governance pattern becomes even more evident in light 
of the fact that alternative forms of representation or mobilization among Syrian 
communities, which may be less easily co-opted and subordinated, are reported to 
be systematically suppressed.
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In many Syrian settlements there are not just shawishes, but various sorts of 
local committees as well. Mostly, such committees have been installed and trained 
by NGOs. These initiatives usually aim to connect such Syrian committees with 
local authorities and other relevant Lebanese stakeholders. Yet while committees 
were sometimes partially successful in their objective to liaise with Lebanese 
communities and NGOs, relations with local authorities were more problematic 
to form (Ortmans and Madsen, 2015: 11).14 Overall, and with notable exceptions, 
attempts to establish committees as a systematic form of local representation for 
Syrian refugees living in informal settlements was broadly regarded as a failure 
by most interlocutors who were involved in such initiatives (see also Cassani, 
2018: 53).
Not all aspects of refugee representation can be explained by host country gov-
ernance. Syrian communities in informal settlements are often said to lack either 
the educational or cultural familiarity with democratic civil society structures to 
make committee-like initiatives into a success. Refugees, moreover, have clung 
to the prospect of going back to Syria as soon as possible, which is not conducive 
for investing in diaspora representation structures either. The nature of humani-
tarian involvement for committees is notoriously fragmented and short-term as 
well. The most important reason for the limited presence and functioning of com-
mittees, however, is the fact that Lebanese state authorities have communicated 
to NGOs that the facilitation of any form of Syrian organization, representation, 
or mobilization – which they explicitly mentioned included committees – was 
expressly prohibited for fear that this would suggest the permanent settlement of 
refugee communities (Ghaddar, 2017).
Reference to Syrian representation, consultation of Syrian communities, or 
even to the ‘empowerment’ of refugees, for instance, were anathema to the Leba-
non Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), a humanitarian expert involved in drafting 
the LCRP observed.15 A protection officer concluded that ‘there is a very strong 
opposition from the Lebanese authorities to anything that can be seen as political, 
socio-political empowerment of the refugees.’16 A specialist on legal assistance to 
refugees recalled humanitarian coordination meetings during which ministerial 
representatives would ‘put PowerPoint presentations on saying: “we don’t want 
committees, we don’t want representation, avoid this, avoid that.” . . . So the mes-
sage was very clear.’17 Local Lebanese state authorities have similar concerns and, 
as a political analyst active in the refugee response noted, ‘many municipalities 
refuse to have Syrians present in any form of consultation meetings with the argu-
ment that they’re not representatives of the community and the decision-making 
is a matter in the hands of the Lebanese.’18
While NGOs have not docilely accepted this de facto no-committee policy of 
the Lebanese state, it has greatly complicated their efforts to enable a more rep-
resentative alternative to the shawish. In the settlements studied, in one case an 
NGO reported to have established an active committee. No other organizations 
were aware of the existence of this committee, however, and, on the ground, only 
one member could be identified. He initially denied he was part of any committee 
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and later indicated he had no tasks but to administer the electricity fees. In the 
other case, there was no formal committee, but the wife of the shawish served as 
liaison for several NGOs. Thus, what appear to be institutionalized and coherent 
organizational structures in the discourse of the organizations supporting them, 
turn out to be elusive and implicit networks in the field.
Instead of the intended committees, which an analyst noted have now become 
‘imaginary,’ many organizations work with individual representatives – so-called 
‘focal points’ or ‘outreach volunteers’ – that receive minimal training in referrals.19 
These, however, only serve as contacts for the individual NGOs that established 
them. The more comprehensive ambition to facilitate institutional relations between 
refugee representatives and local Lebanese authorities has mostly been abandoned 
under pressure of Lebanese authorities. Instead, NGOs work with the shawish when 
distributing aid or implementing projects, further reinforcing his position.
The fact that there are no actual coherent organizational structures to represent 
Syrian refugees and that the forms of ‘representation’ that do emerge are exploit-
ative rather than consultative and serve Lebanese authorities more than Syrian 
refugees is both cause and consequence of the institutional ambiguity determining 
Lebanon’s engagement with Syrian refugees. It reflects and reinforces informal-
ity, because interactions between Lebanese and Syrian stakeholders can never be 
official. It illustrates and ensures liminality, as representation on the Syrian side 
and its relation with Lebanese power structures is always temporary and condi-
tional on Lebanese goodwill. And it demonstrates and sustains the exceptionalism 
Syrian refugees are subjected to, because it makes Lebanese engagement with 
Syrian refugees arbitrary and opportunistic.
The institutional ambiguity furthered by this particular form of Syrian camp 
governance is the result of strategic action as much as of contingent inaction. 
De jure, Lebanese authorities refuse to recognize any form of Syrian representa-
tion. De facto, they undermine the creation of relatively representative commit-
tees while ambiguously denying yet enabling – even insisting on – exploitative 
authority in the form of shawishes. This has put in place a system of indirect rule 
that allows authorities to control refugee communities in informal settlement and 
makes it possible for landlords and their political and economic patrons to benefit 
from the Syrian presence.
In the settlements studied, landlords systematically threaten refugees who do 
not pay with eviction. When refugees do pay, they are often forced to pay more 
than agreed through inflated service bills or ‘double payments.’ As a Lebanese 
manager of a local NGO working with refugees in the Bekaa noted: ‘Everybody 
knows if something happens or they fought or break the agreement, the Syrian ref-
ugee can’t do anything about it.’20 Such exploitation is facilitated by local authori-
ties. A Lebanese liaison officer with an international refugee organization who 
was working closely with refugee hosting municipalities in the Bekaa explained:
The major, most of the majors, don’t want more refugees, but you know. . . . 
When the refugee comes to a land to build a tent, the landlord . . . he is from 
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the town. So the major is like: ‘I don’t want to tell the people in my town 
“no,” because then they don’t make money and then they would think I don’t 
want them to make money.’21
Other people working in the Bekaa agreed that the Lebanese state is ‘using’ refu-
gees, as a communication officer of an international refugee organization formu-
lated it.22 The exploitation enabled through a de facto policy of marginalization 
following from imposed informality and uncertainty, in the words of a critical 
international area manager for an international NGO working in the Central 
Bekaa, allowed ‘every rich Lebanese’ – referring to ‘politicians and landlords and 
security services’ – to get richer.23
Obfuscating status
Lebanese authorities in the Central Bekaa thus impose informality, liminality, and 
exceptionalism on refugees through the parameters they set for Syrians’ repre-
sentational structures. This helps them to prevent the organization and mobiliza-
tion of refugees. The furthering of institutional ambiguity is also evident in other 
domains of governance, such as the administrative and regulatory processes that 
determine refugees’ local registration status. This section describes how such pro-
cesses look, why they take the form they do, and what their consequences are for 
the people involved. It demonstrates that initiatives to register and order refugees 
abound, but that these are not officially centrally coordinated and therefore vary 
per locality and are arbitrary and unstable. This uncertainty makes such measures 
potent as a disciplinary instrument.
The governance of Syrian refugees in the Central Bekaa as encountered dur-
ing fieldwork was probably more structured than in most other regions of Leba-
non, as interlocutors routinely emphasized. Regional representatives of national 
ministries that have been seconded by the UNHCR and its representatives in the 
region have been particularly active in trying to organize the refugee response and 
coordinate with local authorities and humanitarian organizations. These attempts 
for regulation, however, have mostly focused on structuring the humanitarian 
response and keeping in line the wild grow of humanitarian projects and programs 
and less on the conduct of state agencies.
The governance of refugees by municipalities is crucially premised by the 
national politics described in the previous chapter. Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
lack formal refugee status and a vast majority of them does not have legal resi-
dency status either. This relegates them to an informal and liminal existence in 
Lebanon. It also determines the way in which local Lebanese authorities engage 
with refugees. Municipalities have been confronted with the very real implica-
tions of the arrival of large numbers of often destitute people. Due to the initial 
absence of any national policy or approach, they have played a vanguard role in 
the de facto response to the arrival of refugees. ‘Overburdened, overstretched, and 
under-resourced’ as Lebanese municipalities are, this has been an impressive feat 
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(Atallah and Mahdi, 2017: 5). Although the central government appears to see 
municipalities as the main intermediary between them and refugee communities, 
municipalities have been excluded from any formal policy-making dynamics. 
Mayors highlighted this lack of guidance, policy, and support from the national 
level and felt abandoned, ‘forgotten,’ by what they saw as the failure and indif-
ference of the ‘national politicians.’24 Seconding the mayor cited at the opening 
of this chapter, another mayor indicated: ‘Our government doesn’t have a policy 
towards the refugees, and this is making it very hard for us to put a policy.’25
Repressive registration
The local leeway that follows from this experienced abandonment, however, is 
not total. When it comes to registering refugees, for instance, local dynamics have 
followed the national development from inaction to ambiguous repressive action 
described in Chapter 2. Municipalities have increasingly been obliged to engage 
in some form of registration of refugees. Most refugee settlements emerged in 
the first few years after the Syrian uprising, when the border between Syria and 
Lebanon was still open and the ‘no-policy-policy’ was unchallenged. When the 
October 2014 policy was issued, local authorities mostly had no clear idea how 
many camps existed or where and who was residing in them. In the October 2014 
policy, however, municipalities were made responsible for the administration of 
refugees in their territory. Yet no resources were allocated for this and no con-
crete instructions on how municipalities should actually do this were offered by 
the Ministry of Interior (Atallah and Mahdi, 2017: 22). The registration practices 
were thus not centralized and differed per municipality.
All mayors interviewed indicated that they registered refugees, but the ways 
in which this was done, the type of information that was collected, and the sub-
sequent use of this information varied. Registration entails noting the names of 
the refugees in their area of jurisdiction as well as their address or the settlement 
where they live and the related landlord and (where applicable) Lebanese sponsor 
(Janmyr and Mourad, 2018: 555). In some cases, municipalities have required 
refugees to pay a monthly fee for renewable identification cards (Barjas, 2016; 
Stel, 2015a). While most municipalities request refugees (or the landlords and 
shawishes that ‘represent’ them) to come to the municipality to report new arriv-
als, other municipalities actively check and monitor such reporting themselves, by 
sending municipal police or other municipal employees to check with the shawish.
In the first case-study settlement, the mayor indicated that he ‘monitors ninety 
percent of them [Syrian refugees]’ through the municipal police who register ‘all 
the names, who comes, who leaves.’26 The area in which the second case-study 
settlement was located, in contrast, was described as ‘the middle of chaos’ by an 
NGO fieldworker active in this settlement.27 This settlement does not fall under 
a municipality and is therefore placed directly under the jurisdiction of the gov-
ernorate. While the governor claimed that he would respond to the requests of 
Lebanese and Syrians from this area exactly like a municipality would, there did 
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not appear to be any active registration procedure. And according to a humanitar-
ian organization active in this settlement, the governor ‘does not even know where 
it [the settlement in question] is!’28
The lack of ministerial oversight of municipal registration of refugees means 
that the degree and nature and consequences of such registration vary per 
municipality. In line with the general governance landscape outlined earlier, it 
also means that municipal registration has been almost completely securitized. 
Indeed, while there appears to be no central ministerial oversight, the various 
security agencies seem to have taken up registration in a relatively coordinated 
campaign. The municipal representatives consulted all indicated that they only 
started to register refugees in 2016 when they were pressured to do so by various 
security agencies.
Mayors and municipal council members recounted how security agencies 
instructed and accompanied municipal police in an effort to map which refu-
gees lived where that lasted several weeks. After that, security agencies expected 
municipalities to keep updating such records so that the agencies could request 
this information whenever they wanted (apparently in addition to their own sepa-
rate surveillance efforts). Indeed, this seems the main reason why municipalities 
care about and engage in such registration practices at all (Janmyr and Mourad, 
2018: 12). Most of the time, apparently, municipalities only update their lists on 
Syrian refugees when confronted with security agencies’ requests for information, 
in such instances themselves calling on the shawish for an update on the current 
situation. With the exception of particularly powerful and autonomous mayors, 
municipal authorities do not seem to care about rigorously controlling refugees as 
much as they care about not getting on the wrong side of security agencies.
Thus, as one interlocutor working for a humanitarian organization noted, ‘on a 
municipal level, people generally know who is who and who is where,’ but such 
local registration is not centralized or shared systematically, particularly when it 
comes to refugees living in informal settlements. Some mayors indicated that data 
on refugees was shared with the governorate or the government. A regional state 
representative indeed insisted that:
We need to know. They [Lebanese who want to facilitate a refugee settlement 
on their land] need to tell the municipality, and the municipality has to tell 
us. If it is possible or not, if there are any problems, how they do it, if there is 
something; . . . If they arrive . . . all the logistics we need to know. . . . I rep-
resent the government with this thing [the refugee response], I am the boss on 
what happens. They need to tell me. I represent the Ministry: They need to tell 
me. I am the boss of the area, they need to tell me. All of them, any change, 
they tell me, everything. If something happened, if there are problems.29
This insistence on his authority, however, did not so much reflect a current real-
ity as it indicated frustration with a situation that did not at all correspond to 
this vision of compliant and information-providing municipalities. Most mayors 
Governing Syrian ‘informal tented settlements’ 99
indicated that they would share information on refugees with other state authori-
ties upon request. Such requests, they subsequently noted, came almost exclu-
sively from security agencies.
Refugee registration practices thus reflect and reify refugees’ exceptionalism. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Lebanese government deliberately with-
holds both refugee status and residency status from refugees. This renders refu-
gees administratively invisible to civil state authorities and creates a protection 
gap. At the same time, on a municipal level, registration of refugees is common-
place, but highly securitized. Registration is either done exclusively by security 
agencies or by municipalities who mostly act on their behalf. Refugees, in this 
way, are made explicitly visible to mostly repressive security agencies. Following 
the logic of exceptionalism, then, Syrian refugees in the Bekaa are excluded from 
the civil state’s formal purview and included in informal security scrutiny. This 
form of institutional ambiguity – inaction on the one hand; partial, fragmented, 
and informal action on the other – contributes to the vulnerability of refugees that 
makes them controllable, exploitable, and displaceable. Registration in no way 
amounts to entitlements or protection for refugees, but rather serves to intimidate 
and undermine them.
The issuing of municipal identity cards for Syrian refugees, for instance, is 
often motivated as a way to comply with the General Security’s request for infor-
mation. But, as Barjas (2016) convincingly argues, such cards are only provided 
to refugees holding legal residency, ‘leaving the pressing question of why the 
General Security would need this card, given that they have already collected all 
the information it contains through the requirements necessary to grant official 
residency.’ Just like the curfews, raids, and evictions described later, registration, 
for a local observer working for a humanitarian organization, is a way to tell refu-
gees: ‘We have an eye on you; don’t get comfortable.’30
Arbitrary permission
In October 2016 the then-governor of the Bekaa sent a memo to municipalities to 
‘remind’ them that no new tents were to be allowed in the Bekaa. This was a reit-
eration of circular 21/2014 that followed the October 2014 policy, which formally 
decided against the set-up of refugee camps (Daily Star, 2016). The translated version 
of the memo provided by a representative of a humanitarian organization states that:
Municipalities and Municipal Unions are reminded not to allow the establish-
ment and transfer of Syrian refugee camps within their jurisdictions, and to 
let us [the governorate] know about any project for setting up a camp or any 
request in this regard and not to authorize the establishment of a new tent or 
settlement.
Since – with the exception of some elusive ‘humanitarian cases’ – officially no ref-
ugees could enter Lebanon anymore since 2015 anyway, this was not a shocking 
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announcement. However, as described in the following, evictions of refugee set-
tlements take place regularly. Therefore, an exception was made for tents that had 
to be relocated after an eviction. In such cases, a specific procedure for obtaining 
permission was to be followed. This procedure, however, was never standardized, 
regularized, or clearly communicated to the actors involved. Rather, its logics 
were contextual and contingent and developed over time. Regional humanitarian 
experts explained that a landlord, on behalf of the refugee seeking to install a new 
tent, needs to contact the municipality. Then the municipality applies for permis-
sion with the provincial governor, who would consult with the State Security and 
Military Intelligence. If these found no trouble with the request, the provincial 
governor would send his approval to the municipality, who would communi-
cate it to the landlord and refugee. In most cases, permission would be verbal. In 
some cases, written notices or files following various formats were processed and 
signed by the landlord, the municipality, or the provincial governor.
These regional ordering mechanisms, however, are entirely informal, in that 
they are not officially documented and are dependent on the agreement and 
commitment of specific individuals rather than official regulations or mandates. 
The permission procedure for relocating tents came about in a completely ‘un- 
systematic’ way, according to a refugee response coordinator.31 Personal contacts, 
he reflected, are ‘the key to everything you asked about. I am talking to everyone; 
it is all our personal contacts – the military, the ISF [Internal Security Forces], 
my minister, other ministers, we solve our problems through our contacts.’32 As 
another key stakeholder in the regional coordination of the refugee response sum-
marized: ‘I don’t think we have a system, I just know everyone.’33
Such informality makes the permission ‘system’ complicated to navigate for 
refugees. While it appears relatively logical to humanitarian agencies, for most 
refugees it is unclear whom they need permission from if they seek to rebuild 
their tents after being evicted and how to get such permission. Even if they follow 
the steps outlined by humanitarian agencies, it is tenuous what such permission 
exactly entails and under which conditions it is extended, so that a sense of per-
petual anxiety remains. Despite this situation, refugees have little choice but to try 
and comply with such de facto regulations. Because when permission – however 
interpreted – is not sought, interlocutors indicated, there is a fair chance that the 
‘illegal’ tents are indeed demolished by security agencies. This, as a humanitarian 
coordinator put it, ‘is not a law, it is day-to-day reality.’34 It is a day-to-day reality 
that leaves refugees at the mercy of landlords and local authorities and, as dis-
cussed in the section on the spatial dimensions of governance, works to disperse 
refugees and facilitate their return to Syria. The unpredictability and obscurity of 
local registration, reporting, and permission practices make refugees more vulner-
able and easier to contain.
‘Permissions’ are used to call into question rather than validate refugees’ pres-
ence on the ground. This is well-illustrated by the appointment of a new gover-
nor in December 2017. Apparently, in April 2018, this new governor internally 
announced a plan for a complete overhaul of the aforementioned permission 
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‘system.’ Well-informed interlocutors discussed this development as a ‘policy’ 
rather than as a mere ‘decision’ and suggested it was backed up by the Council of 
Ministers.35 At the time of research it was unclear whether the plan would actually 
be implemented, but its very nature is indicative for the way in which institutional 
ambiguity works. As with the nonperformativity of the Minister of State for Dis-
placed Affairs discussed in Chapter 2, it reveals how even processes that (appear 
to) attempt to regularize – which may or may not be ‘genuine’ – end up further 
fueling uncertainty and how the strategic utilization of ambiguity and its contin-
gent extension are intricately intertwined.
The Bekaa’s new governor wanted to see the de facto procedure in place to 
obtain permission for the establishment of new tents (as an exception to the over-
all decree that no new tents are allowed in the Bekaa region) changed signifi-
cantly. The existing protocol had refugees who were evicted in the Bekaa seek 
permission to relocate elsewhere by having the respective landlord send a request 
to the governor’s office. The governor subsequently consulted the relevant secu-
rity services and then sent his decision to the municipality in question, a process 
that could be entirely verbal. The newly suggested procedure, instead, was to 
be completely in writing, stakeholders stressed. It allegedly stipulated that land-
lords should approach their municipality and the municipality should file a written 
request to the regional coordinator for the Ministry of Social Affairs. This coordi-
nator would then need to assess whether the settlement to which the tent is to be 
added meets the humanitarian standards to host more people and, if this is found 
to be the case, forward the request to the governor. The governor would then seek 
to obtain the formal permission of the Ministry of Social Affairs as well as the 
informal go-ahead of the security agencies, based on which he should make the 
final decision on the request. This decision, I was told, was to be reported back to 
the regional Social Affairs coordinator, who communicates it to the municipality 
that filed the request, who was supposed to inform the relevant landlord, who was 
expected to brief the refugees in question.
The drive for formalization, regularization, and centralization of the regional 
refugee response apparent in this plan was in principle warmly welcomed by 
many stakeholders involved in regional refugee governance. It can be read as an 
attempt to work against the very institutional ambiguity described earlier. Inter-
locutors, however, were not only skeptical about the viability of ‘following rules 
in a country without rules’ but even more about the genuineness of the initiative.36 
In theory, the plan would improve the situation. In practice, a humanitarian coor-
dinating with state agencies on a daily basis pointed out, it was easy to predict 
for anyone with experience in the region that it would make matters far worse for 
refugees.
Some of the people consulted, who worked for either humanitarian organiza-
tions or state agencies involved in addressing the refugee presence in the Bekaa, 
suspected that the plan for the new ‘policy’ was the result of the new governor’s 
obliviousness of the situation on the ground. Others saw in it a strategic move. 
They suspected that the governor aimed to be publicly heralded for claiming more 
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leadership for the Lebanese state while counting on the inevitable failure of his 
over-ambitious plans, which would directly contribute to the government’s stated 
goal to push for refugee return. The eventual failure of the presented plan would, 
they predicted, generate further chaos and, hence, increase the vulnerability of 
refugees and accelerate their return. Considering the well-known lack of capaci-
ties and resources of the ministries involved at the regional level and the lack 
of initiatives to remedy this, the new guidelines that allegedly aimed to ensure 
more regularization and formalization would in reality unsurprisingly amount to 
passing the buck and stalling, thereby producing a large caseload of unresolved 
requests and elongating refugees’ liminality. A Lebanese humanitarian coordina-
tor observed that while evictions were increasing, permission to relocate tents 
became almost impossible to obtain due to the new demands. Several critical 
humanitarian field officers and coordinators, including some seconded to state 
agencies, thus read the appointment of the new governor as a way to pressure 
refugees in the area to leave.
It is impossible to determine the ‘actual’ intentions of the governor for floating 
this new approach, which are probably multiple and convoluted and circumstan-
tial, but the predictable outcomes of the plan – if it would be implemented – sug-
gest further limbo and marginalization. These expected outcomes also show how, 
in the context of hybrid order outlined in Chapter 1, individual initiatives towards 
regularization go against dominant governmentalities and tend to eventually suc-
cumb to them – which may or may not be intended. They would help to incentiv-
ize refugee return, which has emerged as the key priority of Lebanese engagement 
with Syrian refugees. This intention to incentivize refugee returns, as the next sec-
tion shows, is also evident in local authorities’ attempts to govern refugee spaces 
through the implementation of curfews, the prevalence of raids, and the threat of 
eviction.
Undermining spaces
As noted in the previous chapter, Lebanon has refused the establishment of Syr-
ian refugee camps. This ‘no-camp policy’ has been the outcome of the inability to 
make any decision in the early days of the refugee crisis. But refusing to establish 
official camps for Syrian refugees and forbidding the UN to do so also signalled 
and ensured the temporary nature, the liminality, of the refugee crisis. Foregoing 
the establishment of formal camps did not prevent de facto camps from emerging. 
The uncontrolled spread of informal settlements that occurred under the ‘no-camp 
policy,’ Sanyal (2017: 120, 122) suggests, can be seen as having occurred with the 
‘tacit approval of the state’ to combine the ‘confinement that is a key feature of 
camps with the precariousness of informality.’
That Lebanon has sought to retain the apparent temporary nature of the crisis 
is evident in its stance towards the material and infrastructural aspects of refugee 
settlement. When it comes to refugee shelter, Achilli, Yassin, and Erdoǧan (2018: 
27) conclude, ‘any kind of built structure was instructed by the government to 
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be temporary.’ Utility service provision in Syrian refugee settlements is deliber-
ately kept disconnected. Drinking water, for instance, is provided to settlements 
through water trucking by private companies sometimes paid for by humanitarian 
agencies. This is because authorities prohibit the connection of the settlements to 
local water piping systems or sewage infrastructure, which, they argue, would sig-
nal the permanence of the settlements. Analysts affiliated with the UN explained:
When it comes to electricity and water and so on, as you know, there is no 
appetite whatsoever to have anything that’s even medium-term in terms of 
infrastructure for refugees. So there is very little connecting places to exist-
ing water and electricity infrastructure, etc. So on that front there’s very little 
that’s being done and that is not by accident, that is because it’s not wanted.37
A spokesperson of an international NGO working in the region reflected on her 
failed lobbying with local authorities and the Ministry of Energy and Water to 
convince them that the rehabilitation of local service infrastructures and the con-
comitant connection of Syrian settlements to these structures would be a ‘win-win 
situation.’ The unwavering message, she said, was ‘if you connect them, they 
will stay.’38 This experience came up in many other interviews with humanitarian 
actors as well, who confirmed this stance as a ‘policy’ to ‘reject local integration’ 
(see also Zapater, 2018).39
Curfews and raids
Local authorities go out of their way to avoid such integration not just because of 
a principled political commitment to ensuring the temporariness of refugee settle-
ments. Lack of national guidance, sectarian concerns, and the pressure that infor-
mal settlements put on local communities and infrastructures have made local 
authorities and communities consider refugees a threat (Ghanem, 2016). One of 
the most obvious ways in which municipalities have reacted to this perceived 
threat has been to impose curfews on refugees. Municipal curfews are illegal if 
they are not sanctioned by the High Military Command, but they have neverthe-
less been installed throughout the country without such sanctioning (Al-Saadi, 
2014). Curfews are declared through either personal or public announcements, 
using, for instance, banners or local WhatsApp groups. These declare that Syr-
ians (sometimes referred to as ‘displaced’ or ‘foreigners’) are not to leave their 
shelters after a particular time. Their scope is often unclear: sometimes curfews 
only regard single men or specific age groups or, for instance, refer to refugees 
with motorized transportation specifically. They are upheld by municipal police 
or local militias, vigilantes, and ‘neighborhood watches,’ which are regularly con-
doned by the police and operate with support of local political parties (Human 
Rights Watch, 2018: 52; see also Sanyal, 2018: 73). In short, as Al-Saadi (2014) 
notes, exactly because ‘there are no rules or regulations governing the procedure’ 
regarding curfews, their implementation ‘is left to the discretion of these forces.’
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This means that both refugees and citizens are often not fully aware whether 
or not curfews are enacted and by whom and what the consequences of violating 
them actually are (these can range from fines to arrests and molestation) (Inter-
national Alert and Lebanon Support, 2017: 6). In the settlement that constituted 
the second case-study that this chapter draws on, for instance, refugees referred 
to a municipal curfew despite the absence of a municipality in that particular 
village. A local representative of a humanitarian organization who worked with 
this community explained that this perceived ‘municipal’ curfew was in fact an 
‘unofficial’ curfew installed by the local Lebanese community.40 The owner of the 
land on which the settlement was built clarified that this curfew only regarded 
‘unknown’ Syrians, saying that each Syrian was free to go wherever whenever 
as long as she or he was ‘known’ by ‘the locals’ and could indicate with which 
Lebanese landlord (s)he was affiliated.41 The disciplinary workings of measures 
such as curfews, then, are not produced simply through the social and spatial 
restrictions that they entail, as these are often difficult to enforce. Rather, they 
importantly operate through the uncertainty that surrounds such curfews, which 
leads to self-policing. Curfew practices thus illustrate how ambiguity is a crucial 
component of governance and control when authorities lack material and politi-
cal resources.
This is further illustrated by the occurrence of raids of informal settlements, 
a second measure to spatially control refugee communities. As described prior, 
security agencies sometimes rely on municipal registration and monitoring, but 
they gather their own intelligence as well. As noted earlier, the shawish asso-
ciated with the first case-study settlement explained that security agencies ask 
their informants for reports on names, legal status, political affiliations, previous 
‘trouble’ with Lebanese or Syrian authorities (ranging from outstanding fines to 
earlier arrests) of all residents of the settlement and any incidents involving drugs 
or weapons that might have occurred (see also REACH and UNHCR, 2014: 25).42 
Other shawishes consulted similarly insisted that they had no choice but to tell 
the security agencies what they wanted to know, because they would suffer severe 
consequences if they were found to withhold information. Withholding informa-
tion, moreover, is further complicated because surveillance is often unpredictable 
and violent.
In the first case-study, settlement raids reportedly happened every three to 
six months by various security agencies. The landlord indicated that once over 
40 residents of the settlement were taken by the Military Intelligence and held 
for a day. In the second settlement, in contrast, after several raids, the landlord 
pulled his strings with the security agencies and arranged for them to call him to 
request any information, rather than to come into the settlement unannounced. 
This reflects other interlocutors’ remarks that security agencies tend to disen-
gage from settlements that are under protection of influential local ‘bosses.’43 It 
further demonstrates the emergence of what Ghaddar (2017) has called ‘strong, 
illegal, and hybrid security networks,’ which she defines as ‘unnoticed arrange-
ments between formal security agencies and informal security actors backed by 
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powerful landowning families, tribes, and political party bosses’ that developed in 
the absence of a comprehensive refugee policy.
As with curfews, it is not simply the restrictions or violence that raids impose 
that make them effective disciplinary measures. It is their unpredictability and the 
unaccountability of the often unspecified actors involved in them that crucially 
add to the potency of these measures to undermine not just refugees’ safety and 
wellbeing but their ability for concerted collective action. Refugees and humani-
tarian organizations working with them, tellingly, saw raids not so much as ways 
for security agencies to obtain information, which, they pointed out, agencies 
could easily obtain in less violent ways. Instead, they suspected that these prac-
tices were part of a campaign to ‘let them know they are being watched,’ to con-
tain refugees and ‘encourage’ them to leave.44
Evictions
A similar logic underlies the endemic evictions of Syrian refugee settlements that 
reflect and reproduce the informal, liminal, and exceptional position of Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon and that demonstrate how such institutional ambiguity works 
to marginalize and expel. Eviction of refugee settlements is widespread, as care-
fully documented by Human Rights Watch (2018). In 2014, more than 11,000 
people were evicted from informal settlements and other forms of collective shel-
ters (UNHCR, 2015: 6). Since then, numbers have only increased. Eviction is 
by now the main reason refugees report for leaving a specific locality (UNHCR, 
United Nations Children’s Fund and World Food Program, 2017: 28). In 2017, 
43 percent of respondents in a study conducted by Oxfam (2017: 4) had been 
displaced more than once since their arrival in Lebanon. State agencies – mostly 
municipalities and security agencies – are involved in the vast majority of these 
evictions (Human Rights Watch, 2018: 17; UNHCR, United Nations Children’s 
Fund and World Food Program, 2017: 28).
Municipal evictions can best be understood in the context of municipalities’ 
attempts to maintain local order that were discussed earlier. Municipalities, for 
example, often claim that evictions follow refugees’ breaches of housing regu-
lation, for instance when rent contracts are not registered. Such violations are 
routine among Lebanese citizens as well, however, and these are not targeted in 
evictions. Violations of labour or visa regulations are also often used as a pretext 
for evictions despite the fact that, as crucially stressed by Human Rights Watch 
(2018: 4), these do not constitute a legal basis for eviction under Lebanese law. In 
practice, then, municipal evictions are often a form of collective punishment for 
alleged crimes conducted by individual Syrians. This makes almost all municipal 
evictions illegal.
Municipal evictions are characterized by an absence of uniformity and consist-
ency, varying from municipality to municipality. In some cases, refugees were 
coerced to sign written eviction orders (which were sometimes pinned to people’s 
doors), Human Rights Watch (2018: 26) chronicles. In other cases, orders were 
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only communicated verbally. The actors implementing evictions are different 
in different localities as well, often reflecting hybrid arrangements of municipal 
police, Internal Security Forces, and local ‘thugs,’ regularly affiliated with specific 
political parties. At times, those enforcing evictions were extremely aggressive, 
whereas in other locations they were more civilized.
The process of eviction is equally arbitrary, with vastly different time spans 
given to refugees to leave and large variations in the severity with which orders 
were followed up, with extensive violence characterizing some, but not all, evic-
tion cases. When receiving a notice of eviction, 70 percent of Oxfam’s (2017: 4) 
respondents for a study on the implications of eviction were given fewer than 15 
days to leave their place of residence, and 20 percent of those were told to leave 
immediately. Such short notices have contributed to the fact that only one-quarter 
of the evicted people were able to find a new accommodation right away, turning 
refugee families to the streets (Oxfam, 2017: 4). Thus, apart from the illegality of 
their grounds, the process of eviction was consistently illegal as well, lacking any 
form of proper consultation, information, or compensation.
In addition to evictions ordered by municipalities, Syrian refugee settlements 
are sometimes evicted through orders of various security agencies. Such evictions 
are often legitimized with reference to a circular issued by the Military Intel-
ligence that settlements are not allowed in the vicinity of ‘security areas,’ check-
points, and major roads and waterways. This circular was referred to routinely 
by many people in the field, but it could not be obtained formally or provided by 
them. They, however, noted that the circular is quite vague and applied arbitrar-
ily. What exactly counts as a ‘security area,’ for instance, is not specified. Which 
roads and waterways would be ‘major’ is not either. Because checkpoints are 
mostly established and relocated ad hoc, moreover, it is quite likely that they 
are erected near existing settlements rather than settlements being built next to 
checkpoints. The interpretation of the decision seems to have become increas-
ingly expansive since 2014 as well. Settlements along ‘vital supply lines and bor-
der areas’ are now being included in evictions where these did not appear to be 
a problem earlier (UNHCR, 2015: 6). The circular thus produces arbitrariness 
and legitimizes almost any eviction that any security agency deems necessary. 
It probably also underlies the series of eviction notices that the Lebanese Armed 
Forces issued in the Bekaa in 2015 and which affected some 9,000 refugees living 
in settlements close to the border (UNHCR, 2015: 3). Thus, Atallah and Mahdi 
(2017: 33) conclude, ‘legal frameworks are neither useful nor relevant’ to assess 
evictions, which security agencies enforce solely on grounds of non-specified 
‘security concerns.’
Evictions of refugees by municipalities and security agencies reflect the log-
ics of institutional ambiguity in terms of process as well as outcomes. Eviction 
processes are unpredictable: Displacement mostly lacks legal grounds, does not 
follow due process, and instigators and implementers are mostly not clearly iden-
tifiable or accountable. The outcome of these processes is uncertainty for refugees 
and the organizations trying to help them: They do not – and cannot – know how 
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to prevent, challenge, or manage evictions and are left with no guidelines and few 
alternatives for relocation after eviction. Evictions thus illustrate well the ways 
in which Lebanon’s approach to dealing with Syrian refugees is characterized by 
informality, liminality, and exceptionalism and how it helps to generate a situation 
of permanent uncertainty and existential ambiguity for refugees. They contribute 
to refugees’ marginalization, which enables their pacification and exploitation, 
and they constitute a push factor for refugees’ return to Syria.
Evicted refugees are forced to leave behind property and lose already paid rent 
and deposits. They almost always have to incur debts to finance their relocation, 
often including bribes for ‘permission’ to relocate. Evictions severely undermine 
refugees’ income-generating strategies and disrupt education. They undercut their 
informal protection mechanisms dependent on the local networks they are cut off 
from by eviction. Evictions, moreover, hamper the operation of NGOs that seek to 
help refugees. For them, too, investments previously made in evicted settlements 
are lost. A large amount of staff time and resources that cannot be allocated to the 
purposes they were initially meant for are needed when NGOs organize reloca-
tions (Limoges, 2017).
The perpetual nature of the eviction threat that Syrian refugees living in infor-
mal settlements face deepens this marginalization. It produces, as Sanyal (2017: 
123) has also noted, ‘a sense of emotional insecurity that can limit the activities of 
people’ and undermine their agency. An affected refugee tellingly spoke about his 
constant ‘restlessness’ due to fear that ‘it will happen again’ (Domat, 2017). The 
fact that evictions are always possible but never predictable also affects humani-
tarian organizations. An NGO worker explained that one of the reasons why there 
were relatively few NGOs currently working in the area in which the second case-
study settlement was located – which was in the vicinity of Riyak, where one of 
the largest evictions of Syrian refugee settlements has taken place so far (Stel and 
Van der Meijden, 2018) – was because there were rumors that further evictions 
would happen, meaning that investing in the settlements there was a risk for the 
NGOs in question.
Evictions, enabled by the informal nature of the affected settlements, also cor-
relate with mounting hostility and discrimination against refugees and politicians’ 
increasingly explicit calls for refugees to return to Syria. Human Rights Watch 
(2018: 2) reports empirical evidence that while written eviction orders merely 
tell refugees to leave the specific locality, these are often accompanied by ver-
bal orders to ‘go back to Syria.’ Other organizations, too, have noted how the 
increasing number of evictions conspicuously corresponds with the ‘growing 
political discourse calling for the return of refugees to Syria’ (Oxfam, 2017a: 3; 
see also Limoges, 2017). In the context of the Bekaa’s Syrian refugee settlements, 
a humanitarian field officer recalled that the shawish and landlord who had been 
in charge of a settlement that had been evicted applied for permission with the 
governorate to relocate. They were told they would not get the permission to relo-
cate but had to leave the country. If they would consider going back to Syria, 
they would receive help to do so. Instead of granting permission to relocate, the 
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governorate offered them assistance in safely crossing the border and promised to 
waive any exit fees or outstanding fines if they did so.45 This resonates with the 
comments made by an informed interlocutor who indicated that internal directives 
inside the governorate on how to deal with the files that request relocation of tents 
after evictions emphasize the importance of ‘letting the number [of Syrian refu-
gees in Lebanon] decrease, letting them go home.’46 Such directives, he explained, 
follow from the assumption that not giving permission or delaying permission to 
reestablish tents after evictions will encourage refugees to return to Syria.
Evictions have thus become a means to enforce ‘voluntary’ return. NGOs con-
sider evictions as ‘closely linked to the new government’s strategy to push people 
to go back to Syria.’47 Several families have indeed been reported to have left Leb-
anon as a direct result of their (often repeated) forced evictions (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018: 4). Thus, while Human Rights Watch (2018: 17) rightfully notes that 
the increasingly frequent evictions of Syrian refugee settlements are not the result 
of a ‘coherent, national plan,’ they do reflect and contribute to the precarity that 
has emerged in the context of institutional ambiguity.
The national-local ‘role play:’ encouraging, 
condoning, denying
Lebanon’s response to the Syrian refugee presence in the country has been dis-
cussed in two separate chapters, focusing on the national and local levels, respec-
tively. It should be clear, however, that such ‘levels’ are by no means separate 
arenas of policy and politics. National and local governance are evidently linked, 
but because there is no comprehensive official policy to engage with the pres-
ence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, such linkages are either unofficial or lim-
ited to specific sectors and projects. National directives never simply dictate local 
dynamics, but they do influence them. The same goes for the nigh total absence of 
such directives. The Lebanese government has not provided municipalities with 
an official overarching policy guideline that instructs local authorities on how to 
engage in the governance realms of representation, status, and space. As a result, 
Achilli, Yassin, and Erdoǧan (2018: 32) conclude: ‘there is no official communi-
cation channel that currently exists between the national government and local 
authorities to respond to the crisis.’
Even in the probably exceptional cases where municipalities explicitly ask 
national authorities for clarity, they are kept in the dark. A municipal council 
member from Zgharta-Ehden in North Lebanon interviewed by Legal Agenda, 
for instance, said his municipality had repeatedly asked the General Security and 
‘all parties involved with the issue of refugees’ to ‘define the nature of our author-
ity, and the procedures we can undertake in the matter,’ for instance, wondering 
whether the municipality should arrest refugees without legal residency status 
(Barjas, 2016). The municipality did not receive any reply.
Supra-local governance actors either ignore or condone local responses to the 
refugee presence. In fact, local measures are often nationally encouraged while 
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they are publicly denied or disowned at the same time. Interlocutors suggested 
that national state officials officially do not want to know what is going on locally 
so that they cannot be held responsible. Unofficially, however, these same offi-
cials are often well aware of local realities through information they receive via 
political party or security agency channels. This paradox of national pretend-
ing not to know was characterized as a ‘role-play’ by a Lebanese human rights 
analyst. As Sanyal (2017: 117) showed, such role-plays function as a ‘system of 
deregulation [which] is enabling refugee spaces to emerge that are visible, yet 
unrecognized.’
This informal deregulation functions as a form of outsourcing. The Inter-
national Crisis Group (2015: 11) found that ‘central authorities have partially 
relinquished their responsibility to maintain law and order, allowing local coun-
cils and communities to impose their own abusive, discriminatory measures and 
even violence against the refugees.’ When local authorities ask for national sup-
port, a security analyst explained, their superior will often tell them to find a 
solution without explicating how to do so or providing any form of support to 
realize this goal. Then, ‘he hangs up the phone in his face and the officer has to 
find his way [and] actually apply it.’48 In the words of one of the key humanitar-
ian coordinators on the Bekaa level, all successful coordination in the region 
is the result of the ‘green light’ he got from Beirut to ‘solve problems without 
reporting back.’49 
Denying the existence and resisting the formalization of national influence 
on and knowledge of local refugee governance creates and cements institutional 
ambiguity. It undermines local as well as national accountability since local state 
officials know they will not face national sanctions and national state leaders know 
they will not be held responsible for local transgressions. Simultaneous informal 
directing and formal distancing of the national state agencies vis-à-vis the local 
level also furthers insecurity for refugees and aid organizations. This is evident 
when it comes to representation – national state officials de facto undermine the 
emergence of refugee committees and then look away when local authorities 
legitimize repressive alternatives – but also with regard to practices related to reg-
istration and regulation as national authorities routinely disregard blatantly illegal 
local ‘security’ measures.
National attempts to keep local misbehaviour in check do occur and can be suc-
cessful. A Lebanese human rights lawyer indicated that any instance of munici-
palities imposing taxes on refugees was nipped in the bud by the Ministry of 
Interior. In the first case-study settlement, the mayor indicated that he had once 
issued a curfew, but he withdrew the decision after the Minister of Interior pointed 
out the illegality and inhumanity of this measure to him. Upon request of the 
UNHCR and a regional coordinator supporting the provincial governor, to give 
yet another example, the then governor reluctantly but effectively ordered a spe-
cific mayor in the Bekaa to stop issuing ID cards to refugees (playing on the sen-
timent that this would enable integration). There have also been other examples 
of the Ministry of Interior ‘cracking down’ on such practices, as evident with 
110 Governing Syrian ‘informal tented settlements’
the arrest of municipal police officers involved in an incident where Syrian men 
were detained in the central square of a village while policemen confiscated their 
identification documents.50
Mostly, however, local transgressions occur without facing much national con-
straint. It is often assumed that this is because national authorities do not have 
the means to keep local authorities in line. Since the national level does not 
offer municipalities many carrots because municipalities cannot count on much 
resources from the national level, national authorities often lack credible sticks 
as well. Many mayors, moreover, in practice have considerable power that goes 
far beyond their official prerogative and which grants them significant leeway in 
handling their local affairs, especially when national policy is lacking. Mayors in 
the Bekaa often have strong tribal ties. They are also regularly successful busi-
nessmen and consequently have considerable economic and, therefore, political 
power so that, as one humanitarian coordinator explained, the ministry will never 
force them to do something against their will, and therefore the governor will 
not either.51 Ministers, he noted, adhere to a policy of ‘live and let live’ vis-à-vis 
municipalities. Even more important, in Lebanon’s clientelist sectarian system, 
mayors are important ‘vote banks’ for the national politicians who decide on min-
isterial positions (Stel, 2015b). Electoral logics as such often grant them consider-
able local autonomy.
It might thus very well be that in some cases a minister genuinely fails in 
attempts to restrain local authorities. What is more likely, however, is that such 
attempts are rather half-hearted to begin with. ‘Failure’ to keep local authorities 
in check is not only the result of limited means but also of limited political will to 
do so. Mayors are mostly not shy to announce their restrictive policies vis-à-vis 
refugees publicly, as these can often count on considerable public support. This 
flagrant nature of local order maintenance means that it is hardly credible for 
national authorities to maintain that they are not aware of such realities. National 
looking away can be considered a form of excusing or even encouraging rather 
than simply ignoring. Municipalities, Barjas (2016) has established, have adopted 
repressive measures knowing that the Ministry knows about them. Simply put, 
‘the central government is aware that municipalities are surpassing their legal 
jurisdiction,’ but ‘local level policies have been tolerated’ (Atallah and Mahdi, 
2017: 31).
In fact, despite such formal denouncements of municipal practices, the same 
practices have been informally encouraged behind the scenes by the same national 
authorities. Municipal curfews, for instance, are regularly coordinated with the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (International Alert and Lebanon Support, 2017: 6). 
Mourad (2017: 263) provides evidence that district-level security cells issued 
internal statements that recommended curfews. Considering that these security 
cells should include the district governor as well as representatives from all state 
security institutions and report directly to the National Security Council, the com-
plicity of national authorities in the local practices they formally denounce as 
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illegal seems evident. In fact, this is where the role-playing alluded to before 
comes in. As the analyst in question reflected:
I strongly think that’s kind of an interplay between the ministry and the 
municipalities. It just cannot be that in different areas and in different regions 
of the country . . . municipalities are forcing restrictions that the ministry 
doesn’t know of. It can’t be that municipalities enforce restrictions and the 
ministry doesn’t react or does not take itself to be accountable for those. 
So that’s a role play. The Minister of Interior would deny his knowledge of 
something. And then a municipality would be holding up big signs for every-
one to see that refugees cannot move after six in the evening.52
A ministerial advisor similarly considered national attempts to reign in munici-
palities a form of ritualism, saying that the minister will call a municipality know-
ing full well that his call will not have any effect, in fact counting on this, just to 
be able to say that he did what he could. As a result, such illegal local practices 
are allowed to continue and spread. Atallah and Mahdi (2017: 263) report a ‘ripple 
effect’ of municipal curfews, which increased from 25 municipalities at the begin-
ning of 2014 to 45 municipalities at the end of the same year. By 2017, they could 
be considered the ‘status quo.’
These findings concur with Mourad’s (2017) conclusion that evictions, cur-
fews, and other local ordering mechanisms should be considered a systemic state 
practice and not be disregarded as simply a local-level phenomenon. National 
authorities’ publicly ‘distancing’ themselves from local practices they actually 
support or allow should be considered an attempt to evade responsibility. When it 
comes to restrictive local policies such as curfews, municipalities do not so much 
diverge from national guidelines, but rather are ‘a front for the will of the central 
authorities, [whose official] decisions do not necessarily reflect their true disposi-
tions’ (Barjas, 2016).
This interplay between wanting capacity and limited political will facilitates 
national ignorance – whether real or pretense – of local governance realities, as 
is further illustrated by the evolution of the Ministry of Interior’s ‘Security Plan.’ 
As early as September 2013, after meeting with more than 800 municipalities and 
municipal unions, the Ministry of Interior developed a security plan that was to 
increase the role of municipalities in ensuring local security (Ghaddar, 2017). Part 
of this plan was to centralize the data collected on Syrians locally through a sys-
tem of security cells, whereby regional security cells were supposed to report to 
a National Security Council (Janmyr and Mourad, 2018: 558). Although accord-
ing to the website of the Ministry of Interior, the regional security cells are to 
provide the central cell with periodic statistics based on a unified template,53 cells 
in practice meet only when there is a concrete occasion. Even then, apparently, 
while information was shared, approaches were not actually coordinated, let alone 
integrated.
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National authorities provided neither financial or material support for the secu-
rity cells nor guidance and oversight, instead refraining ‘from pursuing municipal 
police or guards for actions related to the performance of their duties’ (Mencütek, 
2019: 173). This essentially provided local security actors with immunity and insti-
tutionalized impunity. It encouraged ‘the continuation of ad hoc security measures 
by municipalities’ and left ‘security at the discretion of elected local governments’ 
(Mourad, 2017: 264). These, as we have seen, have subsequently apparently by 
and large relegated this to security agencies. At the time of research, surveil-
lance and intelligence collection was apparently back to the ‘normal’ Lebanese 
routine of various individual security agencies all running their own operations 
in an apparently uncoordinated manner. Several people working for humanitarian 
organizations indicated that security agencies have abandoned the attempt to set up 
municipal monitoring structures. Instead, there has been a decision, allegedly com-
municated by the Ministry of Social Affairs during an inter-sectoral working group 
at the national level, to let go of the October 2014 policy’s insistence on municipal 
registration, which was seen as a failed attempt, and leave registration and moni-
toring to the security agencies that had de facto already taken over the initiative.
Thus, the security plan that at first sight appeared to put forward cooperation 
between municipalities and security agencies ended up further cementing the pri-
macy of security agencies over civil state structures. Similarly, while the original 
plan prioritized centralized data generation, its eventual implementation resulted 
in further local discretion as its hierarchical elements were left largely unimple-
mented while its legitimation of local securitization simultaneously took flight. 
In this context, local processes to register and regulate Syrian refugees by civil 
state structures do not reflect national planning. Instead, these processes generate 
informal, volatile, and unequal governance – forms of institutional ambiguity that 
effectively make refugees ‘invisible to the central state, except if they are detained 
by one of the state security services’ (Janmyr and Mourad, 2018: 558).
Policy inaction and ambiguous formulation and implementation of political 
decisions by national authorities enable and incentivize the measures that local 
authorities take to govern the ways in which Syrian refugees organize themselves, 
how they are to register and obtain permissions, and the manner in which their 
settlements are spatially ordered. The local governance of Syrian refugees in the 
Bekaa thus entrenches refugees’ informality, liminality, and exceptionalism. Ref-
ugees’ representation is fragmented and undermined. Municipal registration is 
reluctant and incomplete, and permission to relocate tents unofficial and highly 
arbitrary. Spatial instruments to maintain order, such as curfews, raids, and evic-
tions, are illegal and inconsistent. That all these dynamics, moreover, happen 
under the auspices of an elusive and nationally supported security assemblage 
only extends the resultant uncertainty and insecurity for refugees. Unpredictabil-
ity, arbitrariness, and unaccountability are not local exceptions. They are systemic 
in that they are produced by politically convenient national abandonment and 
serve the government’s stated aims of controlling refugees and encouraging their 
return.
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Conclusions
Ambiguity permeated research experiences. That paper realities and the situa-
tion ‘on the ground’ do not neatly coincide is no surprise, but that paper realities 
often do not even exist and that the situation on the ground is represented so 
vastly differently by various stakeholders is indicative of an institutional ambigu-
ity that goes beyond the regular challenges of making sense of ‘the field.’ The 
most basic concerns regarding the informal Syrian refugee settlements studied 
proved remarkably difficult to pinpoint or verify. Establishing the actual geo-
graphical location of specific settlements based on the contrasting mapping 
systems of humanitarian organizations routinely led to the ‘wrong’ settlement, 
suggesting the complexity of even communicating about specific settlements. 
Identifying who (claimed to) operate as shawish took several visits in some set-
tlements. Determining if and how committees, peer groups, outreach volunteers, 
or focal points actually functioned in specific settlements was rife with problems 
even when seemingly straightforward lists of committee members were pro-
vided by humanitarian organizations. Ascertaining who was formally in charge 
of overseeing Syrian settlements on the side of the Lebanese state in the second 
case-study settlement, where no municipal jurisdiction was in place, revealed a 
tangle of vague mandates, eschewed responsibilities, and an overall tendency of 
indifference and abandonment. In short, the very difficulty of establishing ‘how 
things work’ points to the complexity, changeability, and multiplicity of local 
governance.
Much of this institutional ambiguity that pervades local responses to the refugee 
crisis in Lebanon stems from the absence of national policy. Yet, no policy does 
not mean no governance. When it comes to shelter, for instance, while Lebanon 
formerly upholds its ‘no-camp’ policy, on a sub-national level, state institutions 
are engaged in an intricate system to regulate encampment, sometimes verbally, 
but at other times actually signing off on varying formats of permissions for tents. 
As alluded to throughout the chapter, our interlocutors referred to several notices 
by state institutions that were announced in the media or through personal meet-
ings with representatives of the relevant organizations, but were not made public 
in their original written form. This regards, for example, the provincial governor’s 
decision to no longer allow any new tents in the area and the related notification 
duty of municipalities in this regard; the army’s circular about where refugee set-
tlements should not be allowed; the decisions that no permanent structures are 
allowed, either regarding shelter or concerning services, and that no Syrian rep-
resentative committees are to be permitted; and the development of a security 
plan in which national security agencies support municipalities in registration, 
monitoring, and keeping order.
The Lebanese approach to the refugee presence in the Bekaa is thus definitely 
ordered in some ways. Such ordering, however, is mostly informal, irregular, 
securitized, and politicized. What decisions – either in the form of public direc-
tives, internal circulars, or verbal notifications – do exist are often vague and 
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interpreted or represented differently by different authorities. This chapter has 
accordingly demonstrated how the regional and municipal governance of Syrian 
refugee settlements in the Bekaa are overwhelmingly informal, as they are based 
on personal initiatives, not institutionalized, and politicized. They are liminal, 
meaning they are organized in an ad hoc, short-term fashion with the overarching 
aim to prevent structural solutions that might suggest longer-term settlement, and 
they are exceptional, largely determined by a securitization process that precludes 
any form of transparency and accountability. All this is partly inherent in any form 
of governance, especially when it concerns sensitive issues and takes place in a 
context of hybrid order. Many local authorities and aid organizations do whatever 
they can with the sparse means they have to help the Syrian refugees who found 
themselves stranded in the Bekaa among Lebanese communities that often face 
socio-economic hardship themselves and have a complicated history with Syria 
and Syrians.
That does not, however, depreciate that informality, liminality, and exceptional-
ism serve various interests, locally and nationally. The governance processes and 
practices central to this chapter are not just informal, liminal, and exceptional 
themselves, but they also impose such informality, liminality, and exceptionalism 
on refugees, who are deprived of an official representative, kept in limbo through 
Kafkaesque registration and permission procedures and constant displacement, 
and placed outside ‘normal’ Lebanese society through illegal curfews and raids 
that are leveled against them with impunity. Such effects may be partly or even 
largely contingent, but they have strategic components as well. In the end, ambi-
guity helps to marginalize refugees, which undermines their basis for collective 
action, allows for their exploitation, and functions as an implicit incentive for 
premature return. This political convenience of ambiguity becomes evident in 
the way in which ambiguity is upheld and incentivized in the role-play between 
national and local authorities.
Notes
 1 Interview with a mayor – Central Bekaa, 6 March 2018.
 2 Which, as noted in Chapter 2, only captures part of the actual refugee population as 
many do not have such UNHCR registration.
 3 I am incredibly grateful to Anke van der Meijden for conducting the fieldwork underly-
ing this chapter and reviewing the text in previous stages.
 4 These meetings were recorded and transcribed where participants agreed, and exten-
sive notes were taken when participants preferred this over recordings. Citations pro-
vided are (translations) of verbatim transcriptions unless indicated otherwise. In some 
instances, the chapter also turns to the national-level interviews described in the previ-
ous chapter.
 5 This provided several internal governmental directives; more than 30 different exam-
ples of ‘permissions’ for relocating tents; the card of a shawish indicating the settle-
ment’s location code; and a copy of a rental contract between Syrian refugees and a 
Lebanese landlord that was brokered by an international NGO.
 6 Selected settlements had more than 50 tents and were located in different municipali-
ties, with a varied socio-economic and sectarian background. The settlements that were 
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eventually selected were chosen after careful consultation with humanitarian field-
workers and researchers working in and on the area as well as visits to eight ‘short-
listed’ settlements in the two municipalities chosen.
 7 See: www.state-security.gov.lb/.
 8 Interestingly, and highlighting its informal role, references to the presence of the State 
Security were rife among field-level interlocutors, whereas regional coordinators 
appeared much less aware of the work of this agency.
 9 Author’s interview – Skype, 9 April 2018.
 10 Interview – Zahle, 28 February 2018.
 11 Notes from interview – Zahle, 10 April 2018.
 12 Interview with former humanitarian field officer – Zahle, 27 February 2018.
 13 Interview – Central Bekaa, 6 March 2018.
 14 With the exception of South Lebanon, where municipalities were more active in sup-
porting these committees.
 15 Author’s interview – Skype, 11 December 2017.
 16 Author’s interview – Skype, 19 December 2017.
 17 Author’s interview – Skype, 30 November 2017.
 18 Author’s interview – Skype, 19 December 2017.
 19 Author’s interview – Skype, 15 January 2018.
 20 Interview – Zahle, 14 March 2018.
 21 Interview – Zahle, 27 February 2018.
 22 Notes from interview – Zahle, 29 March 2018.
 23 Notes from interview – Zahle, 4 April 2018.
 24 Interview – Central Bekaa, 12 March 2018.
 25 Interview – Central Bekaa, 12 March 2018.
 26 Interview – Central Bekaa, 16 March 2018.
 27 Notes from interview – Zahle, 4 April 2018.
 28 Notes from interview – Zahle, 4 April 2018.
 29 Interview – Beirut, 16 April 2018.
 30 Notes from interview – Zahle, 7 March 2018.
 31 Interview – Zahle, 20 March 2018.
 32 Interview – Zahle, 20 March 2018.
 33 Notes from interview – Zahle, 23 April 2018.
 34 Interview – Zahle, 14 March 2018.
 35 This could not be verified, but the very assumption seems significant.
 36 Notes from interview with humanitarian coordinator – Zahle, 23 April 2018.
 37 Author’s group interview – Skype, 3 January 2018.
 38 Notes from interview – Beirut, 1 March 2018.
 39 Notes from interview – Zahle, 29 March 2018.
 40 Notes from interview – Zahle, 23 April 2018.
 41 Notes from interview – Central Bekaa, 25 April 2018.
 42 Notes from interview – Central Bekaa, 15 March 2018.
 43 Interview with Lebanese representative of an international NGO – Zahle, 27 
February 2018.
 44 Notes from interview with local humanitarian officer – Zahle, 23 April 2018.
 45 Notes from interview – Zahle, 23 April 2018.
 46 Notes from interview – Zahle, 20 April 2018.
 47 Rouba Mhaissen, founder and director of the Sawa for Development and Aid group, 
cited in Limoges (2017).
 48 Author’s interview – Skype, 19 February 2018.
 49 Interview – Zahle, 20 March 2018. Unofficial national support for local practices 
that are officially denied or criticized is also a form of experimentation, one develop-
ment analyst suggested: ‘In Lebanon the local is used as a way of testing the water 
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or testing the strength of different political factions.’ (Author’s interview – Skype, 
11 December 2017)
 50 Although the heavily publicized arrests of the policemen was followed by their prompt, 
and silent, release (Mourad, 2017: 265).
 51 Notes from interview – Zahle, 10 April 2018.
 52 Author’s interview – Skype, 17 January 2018.
 53 www.interior.gov.lb/AdsDetails.aspx?ida=45.
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Summer 2013, long before I have come across academic concepts like institu-
tional ambiguity. Sitting in his make-shift office in Beirut’s Mar Elias refugee 
camp, a Palestinian legal analyst smiles at me in a way that I interpret as being 
a mixture of sympathy and mocking when I share my frustrations in linking 
the de facto local governance realities in Palestinian refugee settlements to 
national policies or laws. He confirms that ‘all Lebanese-Palestinian relations 
are vague,’ almost off-handedly adding: ‘And it is intended to be vague.’ When 
I ask, puzzled, how such vagueness might be beneficial, he elucidates that his 
decades of study and activism have led him to believe that the fact that the Leba-
nese state does not want any formal responsibility ‘is the heart of the matter.’1
The Syrian and Palestinian refugee crises in Lebanon are very different in both a 
qualitative and a quantitative sense and so is the country’s response to them. But 
there are also remarkable parallels between the way Lebanon has dealt with the 
Syrian refugee presence and the way it approached the Palestinian refugee situa-
tion. Indeed, Lebanon’s engagement with Syrian refugees is determined by noth-
ing so much as the country’s Palestinian ‘trauma.’
As this chapter will further describe, the Palestinian refugees who fled to Leba-
non in 1948 (and after) went through a process of political emancipation and 
mobilization that, according to the Lebanese narrative, turned them into revolu-
tionaries that operated a state-within-the-state – a situation that eventually helped 
instigate the infamous Lebanese Civil War. This experience has contributed to the 
almost automatic securitization of any issue related to refugees. Faced with a new 
influx of refugees in the wake of the Syrian War, Lebanon’s priority has been to 
avert such a protracted and politicized refugee presence this time around.
The ‘set of nos’ that defined Lebanon’s response to the Syrian ‘crisis’ was 
explicitly meant to avoid replicating the problems associated with the Palestinian 
‘issue,’ which loomed like a ‘scarecrow’ over the Syrian situation (Yassin et al., 
2015: 46). Refusing to recognize Syrians seeking refuge in Lebanon as refugees 
was meant to prevent a protracted presence like that of the Palestinian refugees in 
the country. Tawteen, the fear of naturalization and its demographic consequences 
that has been explicitly acknowledged in the Lebanese constitution, originated 
Chapter 4
The governance of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon
Permanent temporariness and the 
state of exception
The governance of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 119
from Lebanon’s experience with Palestinian refugees. Lebanese political actors 
now explicitly link it to Syrian refugees (Janmyr, 2017: 4536; see also Atallah and 
Mahdi, 2017: 16). Forbidding official camps for Syrians was meant to avoid the 
emergence of ‘security islands’ from which Lebanese sovereignty could be threat-
ened, as had happened with the Palestinian camps throughout the 1970s. And 
undermining Syrian refugees’ political and organizational mobilization was an 
attempt to evade the rise of an organization like the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO) that might challenge the Lebanese status quo and the socio-economic 
interests of the related political elites. In the words of an international develop-
ment analyst working with Syrian refugees in Lebanon: ‘There are quite explicit 
efforts on the part of the Lebanese government to avoid any structures of political 
representation from developing because of what they see as the lessons learned 
from the Palestinian presence.’2
Considering these explicit efforts that Lebanese authorities made to avoid what 
Carpi (2017: 127) has called the ‘Palestinization’ of the Syrian situation, one 
would assume that their response to the Syrian refugee ‘crisis’ would be diametri-
cally opposed to the governance of Palestinian refugees. This is only partially the 
case, however. The current Lebanese response to the mass arrival of Syrian refu-
gees is indeed in many ways almost the opposite of the country’s initial engage-
ment with the Palestinian refugees and their representatives. However, it closely 
resembles Lebanon’s post–Civil War approach to governing the Palestinian refu-
gees. After the Civil War, Lebanon systematically marginalized and politically 
demobilized Palestinian refugees in an attempt to prevent them from regaining 
their former political potency and military might. Such marginalization was effec-
tuated through outright repression, but also through institutional ambiguity.
Although Palestinians have the refugee status that Lebanon now denies Syr-
ians, the precarious legal status of Syrian refugees is a replication of the deliber-
ate legal protection gaps that Palestinian refugees face.3 There is a panoply of 
Palestinian political parties with which Lebanese authorities liaise. Yet, as with 
Syrian refugees, their settlement-level leaders are systematically disregarded and 
formally unrecognized by Lebanese state agencies. And although the no-camp 
policy regarding Syrian refugees at first sight seems to be the opposite of the 
camp-oriented governance of Palestinian refugees, this disregards the fact that the 
majority of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon does not live in formal camps either. 
The Syrian refugees’ ‘informal tented settlements’ and the hybrid governance and 
ambiguous sovereignty arrangements that define them in fact resemble the unof-
ficial settlements in which over one-third of Lebanon’s Palestinians live.
The informality, liminality, and exceptionalism that are shaping the fate of Leb-
anon’s Syrian refugees, in short, have similarly governed the lives of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon over the last three decades. Lebanon’s experience with Pal-
estinian refugees led Lebanese to perceive Syrian refugees as primarily a threat. 
But the same post–Civil War Palestinian experience provided many of the govern-
ance modalities that are used to deal with this new ‘threat.’ The similarities in the 
governance regimes that Syrians and Palestinians face are evident in the ways in 
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which Palestinians teach Syrians how to deal with Lebanon’s institutional ambi-
guity, with which they have such extensive experience. As Parkinson (2014) doc-
uments, Palestinian refugees ‘have come to serve as an informal social database’ 
for Syrian refugees in terms of coping with the Lebanese institutional environ-
ment. Their accumulated experience in Lebanon, she notes, has taught Palestinian 
refugees how to navigate the ‘maze’ of opaque bureaucracies and informal rules 
that defines displacement in Lebanon (Parkinson, 2014).
The parallels between Syrian and Palestinian refugee governance in Lebanon 
are not just evident for refugees. They are further illustrated by ministerial advis-
ers who have argued for the establishment of a generic department or ministry of 
refugee affairs that would be responsible for addressing both refugee populations. 
Because, as a public policy expert consulting for a relevant ministry noted: ‘Even 
if there is some divergence in how we can deal with these crises, [there are] of 
course a lot of similarities in the governance.’4 Highlighting this commonality, 
representatives of the Minister of State for Displaced Affairs that is tasked with 
addressing the Syrian refugee presence have informally approached people work-
ing for the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) to ask for advice 
on issues relating to registration and political dialogue.5
The strategic furthering of institutional ambiguity that characterizes the Leb-
anese engagement with Syrian refugees in many ways thus finds its precedent in 
Lebanon’s handling of Palestinian refugees. Lebanese authorities subject Syr-
ian refugees to a state of exception, Cassani (2018: 65) shows, because the Pal-
estinian experience has conditioned them to see the presence of refugees as an 
almost inevitable challenge to Lebanese sovereignty. The critical inaction that 
defined Lebanon’s initial response to the Syrian refugee influx, Mourad (2017: 
266) similarly argues, mirrors the state’s ‘standoffishness’ towards Palestinian 
refugees.
This premise, that Lebanon’s governance of Syrian refugees is crucially deter-
mined by the country’s experience with Palestinian refugees, is the starting point 
for this chapter. While the fateful connection between these two refugee experi-
ences is routinely asserted by scholars, a conceptual analysis of the ways in which 
Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee situation institutionally prefigures the country’s 
response to the Syrian predicament is unique to this book. The chapter traces the 
emergence and strategic reproduction of institutional ambiguity over the seven 
decades that Palestinian refugees have lived in Lebanon. This exercise sheds new 
light on the current forms of refugee governance that Lebanon employs to deal 
with Syrians. Taking on board Syrian refugees’ experiences also enables me to 
revisit our understanding of the politics and policies that Lebanon has leveled 
against Palestinian refugees and offers new insights into the different ways in 
which Lebanese repression and marginalization of Palestinian refugees operates.
It has been well-established that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon face ‘chronic 
uncertainty’ (Afifi et al., 2019; see also Sayigh, 1995). It has been similarly agreed 
upon that Lebanon has leveled severe repression against Palestinians living in 
the country. This chapter links these two key characteristics of the governance of 
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Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, demonstrating that uncertainty is not merely an 
outcome of repression, but an instrument of it.
The data on which this chapter draws were collected during fieldwork in 2012, 
2013, and 2014 and regard specific local case-studies as well as a more generic 
national contextualization of these cases that had the objective to explore the for-
mal as well as informal governance interactions between Lebanese and Palestin-
ian authorities. The body of data entails more than 270 semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews and informal meetings, five focus groups, extensive field observations, 
and various documents. Where the next chapter predominantly builds on the case-
study data, this chapter is based primarily on a review of documents and academic 
and ‘grey’ literature as well as conversations and interviews with Lebanese and 
Palestinian political authorities, scholars, and activists. These interviews were 
conducted in English or in Arabic, in which case I was assisted by a local research 
partner who helped with translation.6
The chapter first offers a brief narration of the historical presence of Pales-
tinians in Lebanon. The next section lays down how institutional ambiguity has 
been a constant throughout these different historical phases. It demonstrates the 
ways in which informality, liminality, and exceptionalism run through Lebanese 
elites’ approaches to governing Palestinian refugees in terms of space, status, and 
representation. This, the subsequent section shows, has contributed to the emer-
gence of what is presented as ‘benign strangulation’ of refugees: making refugees’ 
lives unliveable under the pretense that this will increase their chance to return. 
As with Syrian refugees, institutional ambiguity and the marginalization it helps 
produce serve intertwined political and socio-economic interests and are therefore 
often maintained or reproduced. Two related vignettes that explore the apparent 
breakthroughs that have recently been made by the LPDC show how informality, 
liminality, and exceptionalism have been challenged but are also protected by the 
behaviour of politicians and state officials – signaling both the contentious and the 
persistent nature of institutional ambiguity.
Context and history
In 1948 approximately 700,000 people were forcefully displaced from Mandatory 
Palestine during the Nakba (‘catastrophe’ in Arabic), a campaign of ethnic cleans-
ing committed by Zionist armed groups (such as Haganah, Irgun, and Stern) in 
the process of the establishment of the state of Israel. Approximately 100,000 of 
them sought refuge in Lebanon. There are currently around 200,000 Palestinian 
refugees residing in the country.
Lebanon’s approach to and relation with these refugees has known several 
phases. Not anticipating the eventually protracted nature of the Palestinians’ stay 
in the country, Lebanon initially warmly welcomed Palestinians. This first decade 
of ‘adaptation and hope’ saw Palestinians as victimized brethren and, not unim-
portantly, a much-needed cheap labour force during a boom in the Lebanese econ-
omy (Suleiman, 2006). Freedom of expression and organization for the refugees 
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was overall ensured. In 1950, the Central Committee for Refugee Affairs was 
established to deal with the administrative implications of hosting such a large 
refugee population. Despite political, social, material, and administrative support, 
however, it was clear from the outset that the Lebanese saw the Palestinian pres-
ence as temporary. Lebanon emphasized the Palestinian’s right to return to their 
homes in the land that was by then declared Israel, a right that was recognized by 
the United Nations (UN’s) General Assembly’s Resolution 194. Responsibility 
for the refugees was placed in the hands of the newly developed UN agency for 
Palestine refugees, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Those refugees who could not provide for 
themselves were sheltered in 16 camps that were run by UNRWA.7
This relatively benign phase, however, ended with the increasingly independent 
organization of the Palestinians’ struggle for self-determination and the liberation 
of Palestine, which was epitomized by the establishment of the PLO in 1964 and 
its progressive autonomy vis-à-vis Arab states. In the wake of this growing Pales-
tinian political emancipation and military activity, Lebanese-Palestinian relations 
entered what became known as the ‘phase of the Deuxième Bureau,’ after the 
army intelligence agency that implemented an ever-more restrictive regime on 
Palestinian communities in coordination with the police and UNRWA-appointed 
leaders. The Lebanese government under General Fouad Chehab started to crack 
down on Palestinian organization and subjected the settlements to strict control. 
The standoff between the Lebanese state and the increasingly powerful PLO even-
tually resulted in the ‘intifada of the camps,’ an uprising against this increasing 
oppression. This, in turn, led to what Ramadan and Fregonese (2017: 8) describe 
as ‘a fundamental rearrangement of sovereignty and of the relation of exception 
between the camp and the state.’ This rearrangement was reflected in the 1969 
Cairo Agreement that initiated the Palestinians’ ‘golden era’ in Lebanon, which 
lasted until the Israeli army expulsed the PLO from Lebanon in 1982.
The Cairo Agreement was brokered in secret by Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and signed by the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, and the com-
mander of the Lebanese army, Emile Boustani. It formalized the parameters of the 
Palestinian armed activity in Lebanon by supporting the PLO’s resistance against 
Israel; acknowledged the right to residency, employment, and movement of all 
Palestinians in Lebanon; and allowed for the formation of local governance com-
mittees as well as the presence of weapons within the camps. As such, the agree-
ment postulated the relation between the Lebanese state and the PLO, now the 
primary representative of the Palestinian people, as an equal one. It has therefore 
often been seen as undermining state sovereignty. Despite such concerns, in 1973, 
the Cairo Agreement was reinforced and updated through the ‘Melkart Protocol.’ 
In 1976, at an Arab Summit meeting, the Lebanese President formally validated 
the agreement once more.
Under these arrangements, the 1970s saw the PLO’s institutional heyday in 
Lebanon, now nostalgically referred to by Palestinians as the ‘days of the rev-
olution’ (Stel, 2017). The PLO initially organized its resistance against Israel’s 
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occupation of Palestine from Jordan, but was ousted from the country in ‘Black 
September’ 1970. It then relocated to Lebanon which, from 1970 until 1982, 
served as ‘the political and military centre of gravity of the Palestinian move-
ment,’ providing a logistical base for military and civilian activities (Brynen, 
1989: 48 in Stel, 2017: 353). Palestinian political and military organization in 
Lebanon and the related bureaucracy and taxation systems were extensive. The 
PLO’s military forces encompassed the Palestine Liberation Army, counting over 
10,000 fighters, and various militias (Rubenberg, 1983: 55). The PLO’s National 
Council, the Central Council, and the Executive Committee provided a legislative 
and executive infrastructure. The Palestine National Fund managed the financial 
component of the PLO’s governance operations, and the Revolutionary Council 
maintained order among the organization’s different factions. The PLO created 
a range of trade unions and social institutions. Through its Department of Mass 
Organizations, it encompassed ten national unions. These representative institu-
tions were closely related to an elaborate structure of welfare organizations that 
included hospitals, clinics, factories, cultural bureaus, art galleries, orphanages, 
schools, and a research centre that published various media outlets.
Throughout this institutional and political zenith of the PLO, however, the 
Palestinian liberation struggle became ever more entangled with the Lebanese 
internal conflicts that eventually culminated in the Lebanese Civil War (1975–
1990). The dilemma of whether the PLO should be allowed to launch its resist-
ance against Israel from Lebanese soil, with all the ensuing retaliations that would 
entail, was one of the instigators of the war. Many Lebanese hold the PLO and 
its struggle against Israel responsible for the breakdown of the Lebanese state 
throughout the war. The ‘Palestinian Revolution’ that the PLO represented was 
initially welcomed with enthusiasm by many Lebanese. Its pan-Arab, socialist, 
and secular ideology combined with militant resistance against Israeli occupation 
appealed to Lebanese from different classes and sects. A decade later, however, 
little was left of this solidarity. This was the result of both an effective Israeli 
divide-and-rule strategy – retaliation for Palestinian attacks launched from South 
Lebanon was systematically directed at Lebanese civilian targets so as to alienate 
the population from the PLO – as well as increasing misconduct by Palestinian 
militias (Beydoun, 1992: 36; Brynen, 1989: 54; Siklawi, 2010: 602). Due to the 
weakness of the Lebanese state, the professionally institutionalized Palestinian 
public authority was perceived as fundamentally undermining its sovereignty. The 
PLO, and eventually the broader Palestinian community in Lebanon, was consid-
ered a ‘fifth column,’ a ‘cuckoo’ or ‘Trojan horse’ that ‘superseded’ the state and 
held Lebanon ‘hostage’ (Hirst, 2010: 91; Knudsen, 2010: 102, Sayigh, 1997a: 
675, 49, 551).
In 1982, the PLO was expelled from Lebanon by Israel. Officially, operation 
‘Peace for Galilee’ had the objective to end Palestinian attacks on Israel from 
Lebanon, but underlying that was the unstated yet evident aim to dismantle the 
PLO’s governance project in Lebanon (Brynen, 1989: 60; Rubenberg, 1983: 54). 
The vast majority of the PLO’s armed forces as well as a large segment of its 
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political leadership were forced to leave Lebanon and relocated to Tunisia. The 
expulsion of the PLO leadership from Lebanon and the subsequent Sabra and 
Shatila massacres – when, under the auspices of the Israeli army, Lebanese Chris-
tian right-wing militias killed thousands of Palestinian civilians – heralded a new 
period for Lebanon’s Palestinians. The PLO’s institutions collapsed. During the 
1985–1988 ‘War of the Camps,’ Palestinian settlements were assaulted by the 
Amal militia in a widely supported campaign to prevent the resurfacing of any 
form of armed Palestinian organization in Lebanon. In 1987 the Cairo Agreement 
was unilaterally abrogated.
The Lebanese Civil War ended with the 1989 Ta’if Agreement that made offi-
cial the country’s commitment to avoid any form of integration or settlement of 
non-nationals, a hardly veiled reference to the Palestinian community. In fact, as 
elaborated on later, the issue of tawteen has been one of the few pieces of common 
ground that the various sectarian-political communities in Lebanon have been 
able to reach since the war: Palestinians would no longer be a political factor of 
influence in the ‘new Lebanon’ (Hanafi, 2008: 16). Under the flag of preventing 
integration, or steps towards it, Palestinians in post-war Lebanon have been dis-
enfranchised politically as well as socio-economically. This was to punish them 
for their role during the war but also to prevent them from interfering in future 
intra-Lebanese conflict. Palestinian refugees are not simply withheld citizenship, 
which would suffice to prevent their feared integration, but are legally discrimi-
nated against in the labour market and cannot own real estate.
This initial post-war phase under the so-called Pax Syriana, the de facto occu-
pation and political control of Lebanon by Syria that lasted until 2005, was char-
acterized by what Suleiman (2006: 21) has called ‘deliberate neglect.’ Mirroring 
its general management of the Lebanese political arena, the Syrian regime imple-
mented a policy of institutional and political multiplicity towards Palestinian 
refugees, gradually bringing the Palestinians in Beirut and the north of the coun-
try under their influence through proxy factions in the Palestinian settlements. 
As Rougier (2007: 11) documented, the Syrian intelligence services controlling 
Lebanon systematically encouraged inter-Palestinian rifts and blocked ‘any pos-
sibility of direct negotiation between the Lebanese government and the local rep-
resentatives’ of Palestinian communities.
In the early 1990s, political dialogue between Lebanese and Palestinian repre-
sentatives was cautiously resumed, but policies remained extremely restrictive. 
With the end of the Syrian dominance in Lebanon in 2005, increasing Lebanese-
Palestinian engagement has been noted. A formal Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue 
committee was established in 2005 to further both intra-Lebanese consensus on 
how to deal with the Palestinian issue and Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue on how 
to structure the resurfacing institutional relations. In 2006, the PLO reopened its 
representative office in Beirut that had been closed since 1982. In 2011, the Pales-
tinian Authority opened an Embassy in Lebanon.
Yet, as the next section shows, the national governance of the ‘Palestinian issue’ 
in Lebanon remains crucially affected by the country’s sectarian logic and the role 
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of the Palestinians in its conflicted history. Thus, Long and Hanafi (2010: 678) 
conclude, the ‘deep-seated prejudice that many Lebanese hold for Palestinians, 
which is in favour of keeping the Palestinians socially, politically and economi-
cally marginalized’ remains (see also Sfeir, 2010). Institutional ambiguity, this 
chapter will demonstrate, helps produce this marginalization.
The roots of institutional ambiguity: balancing 
the taboo of integration and the impossibility  
of return
Informality, liminality, and exceptionalism are manifest in the Lebanese govern-
ance of Palestinian spaces, status, and representatives. This section outlines how 
the institutional ambiguity that this amounts to is rooted in the fundamental and 
existential paradox of Palestinian life in Lebanon: Palestinian refugees cannot 
return, yet are not allowed to settle.
According to the official Lebanese discourse, integration of Palestinian refugees 
is to be avoided because it would undermine the Palestinians’ right to return. Many 
Lebanese see the protracted Palestinian presence as the result of an international 
wish to have Lebanon function as a de facto substitute homeland for Palestinians 
so that Israel would not have to worry about the refugees’ return. In addition, the 
fear that settlement would eventually result in naturalization and thereby upset 
the carefully maintained illusion8 of sectarian balance and the related status quo 
is a crucial driver to uphold the marginalization and segregation of refugees in the 
country. Considering the existential implications of demographics for the division 
of political power in Lebanon’s peculiar consociational system, the possibility of 
nationalizing Palestinian refugees has always been seen as an existential threat 
that would decisively upturn the country’s precarious confessional parity – even 
more so after the PLO, according to many Lebanese, had played the role of a 
‘Sunni army’ during the Lebanese Civil War.
The result is a widely recognized ‘permanent temporariness’ (El Ali, 2011: 18; 
Doraï and Puig, 2008; Hanafi, 2008: 9). This refers to the Lebanese tendency to 
never acknowledge the protracted and long-term nature of the Palestinians’ exist-
ence in Lebanon, but rather to keep all engagements – legal, political, institutional – 
effectively short-term and under probation. This form of ‘existential impasse,’ as 
Allan (2014: 174) defined it, has at times served as an excuse not to make any 
laws or policies at all (for instance, as explored in more detail later, when it comes 
to recognizing Palestinian representatives or regulating Palestinian refugee camps 
and other forms of shelter). As documented by Klaus (2000: 42), Lebanon’s gov-
ernance of Palestinian refugees is effectively ‘prevented by a complete absence of 
any clearly defined programmatic state guidelines for dealing with the refugees.’ 
Those decisions that were formally stated revolve around avoiding any measure 
that might reek of integration. As a result, Palestinian refugees, as Allan (2014: 
10) describes, ‘hover in an ill-defined space, out of place and between states, as 
Lebanon denies their naturalization and Israel rejects their return.’
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The pivotal work by Hanafi (2008, 2010, 2011, 2014) acutely demonstrates 
the practical impossibility of ‘permanent temporariness.’ The governance of and 
within Palestinian communities in Lebanon is dictated by a ‘state of exception’ 
that instates crisis as the status quo and reproduces instability and vulnerabil-
ity. The governance of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees, Hanafi (2008: 10) argues, 
reproduces a situation in which ‘nothing is legally defined [and] everything is sus-
pended but upheld without written documents concerning this suspension.’ This 
generates a legal and often institutional void that can be filled in an ad hoc and 
arbitrary way when it comes to the spatial, representational, and administrative 
aspects of governing Lebanon’s Palestinians.
Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee settlements and  
the ‘art of inclusive exclusion’
Nothing embodies permanent temporariness like the semi-formal and informal 
spatial arrangements in which Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees are made to live. As 
further described in the next chapter, they are the material manifestation of limi-
nality, signifying the alleged temporary nature of the Palestinian presence, and 
are governed through extreme exceptionalism. In their influential analysis of life 
in Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, Hanafi and Long (2010: 135) declared 
an ‘endemic crisis of governance’ in and of Palestinian settlements which, they 
found, are characterized by ‘rampant factionalism, clientelism, sectarian strife, 
oppressive Lebanese security and surveillance, and a lack of central administra-
tive and juridical Palestinian authority.’ A decade later, not much has changed. In 
contrast to the situation in other regional host countries, generations after their 
expulsion from Mandatory Palestine, the large majority of Palestinians in Leba-
non lives in one of several varieties of refugee settlements.
There are currently 12 official UN-administered camps for Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon. In addition to these formal settlements, there are two types of informal 
settlements. ‘Adjacent areas’ are basically illegal extensions of the formal camps 
(Hilal, 2010). The close to 50 ‘gatherings’ are autonomous unofficial settlements 
that are not connected to the UN camps.9 According to the most recent census of 
Palestinians living in refugee settlements in Lebanon, 45 percent of them reside 
in the official camps and 55 percent live in adjacent areas and gatherings. There 
are important differences between formal and informal settlements (Stel, 2017), 
but both are de facto excluded from Lebanese governance responsibilities (most 
importantly the provision of services and security) while included in the state’s 
punitive and disciplinary reach. The uncertain legal status following this ‘art of 
inclusive exclusions’ (Hanafi, 2010: 29) results in endemic housing and tenure 
insecurity for refugees, who are not allowed to maintain or extend their dwellings 
and, as illustrated in more detail in the next chapter, face an ever-present threat 
of eviction.10
With the 1969 Cairo Agreement, Palestinian camps in Lebanon have been for-
mally excluded from the normal legal order. This suspension is kept in place even 
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though officially the Cairo Agreement is no longer in force. Considering this, the 
Lebanese government could, and perhaps legally should, treat the camps as being 
under its sovereignty again, but it has chosen not to. Yet while it has put on hold 
its own responsibility for these places indefinitely, it has not officially recognized 
any other actor as responsible for the camps. Instead, as Ramadan and Fregonese 
(2017: 10) conclude, ‘The camps are simply treated as extraterritorial spaces – 
outside the state’s sphere of control and responsibility, present absences.’
The state’s de facto abandonment of sovereignty and the resultant outsourc-
ing of governance is thus never made official. This means that it can always be 
denied or withdrawn. The Palestinian informal settlements are not officially put 
under the auspices of either the UN or the PLO, even if they are in practice ‘left’ 
to them. Regarding the formal camps, the Cairo Agreement was officially abro-
gated to claim back the possibility to intervene in the camps, yet unofficially 
continues to be referred to as a reason not to interfere. In governing through 
such, as Oesch (2015: 2) has called it, ‘constitutive ambivalence,’ Lebanese 
authorities can have their cake and eat it too; they can use the same agreement 
as a legitimation of their action (referring to the de jure abrogated status of the 
agreement) or inaction (referring to its de facto potent legacy). This manipula-
tion generates unpredictability, inconsistency, and instability for the residents 
of these settlements and for those actors that try to provide welfare or regulate 
security there.
The status of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees: legal  
limbo and protection gaps
The spatial ambiguity evident in the informal and liminal nature of Lebanon’s Pal-
estinian refugee settlements and their governance through exceptionalism reflects 
the broader uncertainty related to their ‘status ambiguity’ (Sayigh, 1988; see also 
Al-Natour, 1997). The institutional environment that Palestinians in Lebanon 
face, consequently, is routinely characterized in terms of ‘arbitrariness,’ ‘disor-
der,’ ‘chaos,’ and ‘unruliness’ (Hanafi, 2010: 17, 29).
As established before, Lebanon does not adhere to international refugee law. 
Other international covenants potentially relevant to the Palestinian case, such 
as the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1954 Convention 
Regarding Stateless Persons, the 1966 International Covenant for Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, and the 1996 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights, are not acknowledged by Lebanon either. Yet the ‘legal limbo’ that 
Palestinian refugees face is not exclusively Lebanon’s doing (Al-Natour, 1997; 
Knudsen, 2007). Rather than facilitating their actual return, the 1948 UN’s Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 194 that puts forwards the Palestinian refugees’ right 
to return to the homes they were expelled from has served to withhold from them 
the legal protection extended to all other refugees in the world. In anticipation of 
an ever-more-implausible return, Palestinian refugees merely receive ‘assistance’ 
from UNRWA.
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In creating UNRWA, Arab states, Lebanon among them, excluded the Palestini-
ans from the broader UNHCR mandate and the associated Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees with the specific objective to maintain their unique status. 
This deliberate exceptionalism was meant to keep pressure on Israel and to pro-
tect neighboring countries from shouldering costs for hosting refugees. UNRWA, 
however, has suffered from ambiguous and seemingly contradictory objectives, 
as well as wanting resources, since its inception. It lacks the explicit mandate to 
provide legal and political protection that the UNHCR operates under. This means 
that, unlike other refugees, Palestinian refugees do not receive legal protection 
that can help them claim their rights. In many ways, humanitarian assistance has 
been presented as a substitute for rights (Weighill, 1997: 294).
Considering Lebanon’s retreat from international law in this domain, regional 
arrangements would increase in significance for the Palestinian community in the 
country. However, the 1965 Casablanca Protocol, which called on Arab countries 
to grant Palestinian refugees the rights of work, travel, and residency, was signed 
by Lebanon with such far-reaching reservations that it could practically disregard 
the protocol’s main objectives. This was even more blatant after the protocol was 
further watered down in September 1991 as a response to the Palestinian support 
for Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf War. The protocol was amended with a 
‘highly ambiguous formulation’ to relegate the issue of refugee rights a national 
rather than a collective Arab responsibility (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2005), creating a 
situation in which, as Hanafi and Long (2010: 144) point out, these rights ‘could 
be revoked with little ceremony and without justification.’ In political agreements 
such as the Oslo Accords, Palestinian refugees are dealt ‘with intentional ambi-
guity’ as well, which consigns the refugee issue to the discretion of host states 
(Al-Natour, 1997: 360).
In Lebanon, however, the state never took up this responsibility to legally 
regulate the refugee presence. There is no specific legislation in Lebanon that 
addresses Palestinians’ unique situation as stateless refugees. Palestinian refu-
gees in Lebanon, as a result, ‘fall through the cracks:’ They are not governed 
through relevant laws, but mostly through ‘informally adopted regulations that 
in some cases were never formally published,’ which allows for tremendous dis-
cretion (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2005: 9). This is even more pronounced considering 
the fact that there has never been a comprehensive agreement that regulates the 
institutional relation between the Lebanese state and UNRWA. Thus, responsibil-
ity for the refugees is largely transferred to the UN’s surrogate state, without any 
accommodating framework to define that responsibility, establish its scope, and 
ground it in existing international or national law (Kagan, 2011; Ramadan and 
Fregonese, 2017).
Unlike Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees are recognized by the Lebanese 
state as refugees, but because there is no relevant national or regional refugee 
law and Lebanon does not subscribe to international refugee law, it is not alto-
gether clear what that recognition means. In practice, Palestinians in Lebanon 
are treated as foreigners. To avoid tawteen, moreover, in a particularly blatant 
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streak of exceptionalism, they are designated as a special category of foreign-
ers. Ordinance No. 319 (issued by the Ministry of Interior in 1962) regulates the 
situation of foreigners in Lebanon and classifies Palestinian refugees in a special 
category of
Foreigners who do not carry documentation from their countries of origin, 
and reside in Lebanon on the basis of resident cards issued by the Directorate 
of Public Security, or identity cards issued by the General Directorate of the 
Department of Affairs of the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon. (see Suleiman, 
2006: 14)
In short, Palestinians in Lebanon enjoy neither the rights of citizens nor those of 
refugees or ‘normal’ foreigners. This has produced a ‘protection gap’ (Knudsen, 
2009). Palestinians’ legal exclusion is a direct result of inaction by Lebanese gov-
ernments regarding the creation or ratification of relevant national, regional, and 
international laws. It has been used to legitimize the suspension of regularization, 
recognition, or formalization. Over the years, subsequent Lebanese governments 
have used legal ambiguity to make the refugee file subservient to their domestic 
power struggles and patronage dynamics. This is particularly evident with regard 
to the question of Palestinian representation.
Dividing and ruling Palestinian representatives
Historically, various Lebanese state institutions have been tasked with admin-
istering the Palestinian refugee presence. In 1950, under Decree No. 11657, the 
Lebanese President created a Central Committee for Refugee Affairs to admin-
ister Palestinian refugees. In 1959, a new Department of Affairs of Palestinian 
Refugees was established through Presidential Decree No. 42. Its tasks were 
defined in the accompanying Decree No. 927, ‘the first bits of Lebanese legisla-
tion’ to provide an institutional framework for the Palestinian presence in Leba-
non (Suleiman, 2006: 12).11 Many of the provisions in the Department of Affairs 
of Palestinian Refugees’ framework, however, ‘lack clear definitions and crite-
ria’ (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2005: 68). The decree left undefined who could register 
as a refugee in Lebanon. More fundamentally, it remains ‘unclear whether the 
1959 Decree recognizes that the refugees have rights that the Ministry of Inte-
rior should facilitate, or whether it gives the ministry unrestricted authority’ over 
them (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2005: 68). Beyond these ambiguous administrative tasks, 
the Department of Affairs of Palestinian Refugees has a quite unambiguous sur-
veillance function. An additional decree (No. 2867) establishes regional ‘liaison 
officers’ for the department that were supposed to monitor ‘refugees’ political 
activities and report on political and social unrest that may be caused by them.’12 
Thus, the Lebanese state has developed an elaborate system of control and sur-
veillance to deal with the Palestinian refugee population. Lebanon’s governing 
authorities have access to elaborate intelligence and informant networks. These 
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agencies, however, do not in any way officially engage with Palestinian politi-
cal authorities, a task that is instead undertaken by Lebanese political parties. As 
shown in Chapter 5, these all have their own relationships with Palestinian parties.
Both the surveillance by Lebanese state institutions and the political relations 
between Lebanese and Palestinian parties are fundamentally securitized. Ever 
since the PLO’s militarization – and despite its subsequent demilitarization – Pal-
estinians in Lebanon are considered an existential threat to Lebanon’s political 
status quo. Security concerns form the dominant prism through which Lebanese 
authorities perceive anything related to Palestinian refugees, and this has legiti-
mized much of the extra-legality and exceptionalism discussed previously. Such 
securitization also means that all Palestinian political organization is inherently 
considered a threat to the Lebanese state. This, in turn, forecloses the possibil-
ity of actual Palestinian self-governance – something Lebanese authorities have 
claimed they want for Palestinians, but have simultaneously made impossible 
through their dealings with them.
The question of who can speak for and act on behalf of Palestinian refugees 
becomes inherently complicated in such a context. This question is already con-
tested due to several factors, most importantly the undefined institutional status 
of the Palestinian state and the internal political divisions among Palestinians. 
These complexities are not of Lebanon’s making. Yet, consecutive Lebanese gov-
ernments have gone out of their way to aggravate such existing ambiguities and 
intra-Palestinian divisions through an implicit divide-and-rule-strategy so as to 
maintain the absence of a unified Palestinian authority in Lebanon. A Lebanese 
consultant on refugee affairs to the Prime Minister’s Office was of the opinion that 
in this regard there is a ‘tendency to keep it informal, because this is good for eve-
ryone, it’s convenient.’13 This is evident in dealings with the Palestinian Embassy, 
the PLO, individual political parties, and, as will be the focus in the next chapter, 
local Palestinian authorities.
The government of Lebanon regularly engages with the Embassy of the Pal-
estinian Authority and often appears to treat it as the de facto spokesperson for 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This does not amount to formal recognition or 
engagement with Lebanon’s Palestinian authorities, however, because officially 
the embassy represents the Palestinian citizens under the Palestinian Authority 
in Gaza and the West Bank, but not the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who are 
not citizens of this Palestinian state. Far more encompassing than the Palestinian 
Authority and its Embassy, the PLO has traditionally fulfilled the role of the offi-
cial political representative of all Palestinians worldwide. It has long functioned as 
the dominant ‘institutional embodiment’ of the dispersed Palestinian community 
(Sayigh, 1997b: 20). In Lebanon it has historically embraced this role both dip-
lomatically, in its dealings with the Lebanese government, and institutionally, by 
operating its state in exile in Lebanon in the long 1970s. These institutional rela-
tions between the PLO and the Lebanese state were widespread and culminated 
in the Cairo Agreement. They were, however, shattered with the PLO’s expulsion 
from Lebanon. By the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, the PLO had started 
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to gradually rebuild some of its institutional structures and political presence in 
Lebanon, but it never recaptured the power position it held in the 1970s.
The PLO, moreover, has always been an internally divided organization that 
hosts various, often opposing, factions. A significant number of important Pales-
tinian political parties now operates outside the framework of the PLO. In addi-
tion, there is an ever-growing fatigue among Palestinians with the democratic 
and performative deficits of the PLO. The PLO can thus no longer be taken as 
the unilateral or undisputed representative of Palestinians in Lebanon. This has 
been especially true since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, after which 
the PLO has increasingly focused its political activities and resources on the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip at the expense of the refugees in the diaspora. The envi-
sioned rebuilding of the PLO on an inclusive, transnational foundation that was 
attempted repeatedly since the 1990s has so far failed.
This leaves the Lebanese state free to deal with the individual Palestinian politi-
cal parties – of which Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and 
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine are the leading ones within 
the PLO and Hamas and Islamic Jihad are most important within the Alliance 
(Tahaluf)14 that is now the PLO’s main rival. At various occasions, Lebanese poli-
ticians and officials meet with representatives of the leading Palestinian parties to 
discuss the issues of the day. Since 2005, these dispersed and ad hoc dialogue ses-
sions with various Palestinian structures (the Palestinian Authority, the PLO, and 
individual parties) have become institutionalized in the LPDC. The LPDC, oper-
ating under the office of the presidency of the Council of Ministers, has the stated 
aim to improve ‘the relations between the Lebanese government and all Palestin-
ian parties,’ but, as I discuss later, so far this has predominantly been a diplomatic 
endeavour with few structural or tangible results (Knudsen, 2011: 102).
Although the LPDC officially recognizes the parties related to the PLO and 
Tahaluf as political counterparts, these parties do not operate on the basis of popu-
lar membership, and their leaders are in no way elected or mandated by the refu-
gees they purport to represent. Rather, many of them are self-appointed political 
elites clinging to their power positions. As discussed in the next chapter, local 
initiatives to develop more genuine representative structures have been under-
mined by both Lebanese and Palestinian authorities. Palestinian political parties, 
moreover, even while officially organized under two broad coalitions (the PLO 
and Tahaluf), operate autonomously, also in the context of the LPDC. A previ-
ous LPDC spokesperson lamented that: ‘They never act as one. I told them at the 
beginning that if they wanted to be effective in the dialogue with the Lebanese, 
they would have to shrink their number; choose six representatives and rotate. 
They refused.’15
Added to this political fragmentation are the continuous institutional tensions 
stemming from the rivalry between the Embassy and the PLO leadership that were 
described earlier. All of this means that the question of Palestinian representation 
in Lebanon is rife with pertinent but unanswered questions. It is entirely unclear, 
as Suleiman (2017: 31–32) chronicles, whether there is a distinct embodiment 
132 The governance of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
of the PLO in Lebanon in addition to the Embassy in Lebanon which represents 
the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah or whether the Embassy has taken over the 
representative functions of the PLO in Lebanon; what the official role of the PLO 
(and its main institution, the Department of Refugee Affairs) in Lebanon is; and 
how we should see the status of the unilateral dealings of various Lebanese state 
institutions and political and religious officials with Palestinian parties. The only 
thing that is clear is that since the stillborn Higher Political Committee for the 
Palestinians in Lebanon, which was formed after the signing of the Cairo Agree-
ment and was supposed to be a referential authority for the Palestinians’ relation-
ship with the Lebanese state, there has been no single Palestinian representation 
in Lebanon in an institutional sense, and there is no unified political leadership.
Lebanon’s political elites and the state institutions at their disposal have not 
single-handedly created this fragmentation and delegitimation of Palestinian 
authority in their country, but they have certainly helped to produce and maintain 
it. After the Lebanese Civil War, a general amnesty allowed Lebanese warlords 
to transform their military authority into political power. Palestinians, however, 
were excluded from the amnesty law, allowing Lebanese authorities (and, until 
2005, their Syrian overlords) to decimate the ranks of the Palestinian leadership, 
jailing or exiling any Palestinian leader who withstood them.
An equally divisive approach was apparent in post-Syria Lebanon. In 2005, 
the PLO sent an envoy to Lebanon to manage the effects of the Syrian with-
drawal on Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees. In his capacity as ‘PLO ambassador,’ 
this delegate simultaneously represented the PLO and the Palestinian Authority 
and was tasked by them to ‘bridge the divide between Palestinian and Leba-
nese institutions’ (Hanafi and Long, 2010: 143). Yet, analysts soon concluded, 
his authority to do so was so circumscribed by discriminatory Lebanese laws 
towards Palestinians that he was unable to implement his mission. He was met by 
the Lebanese state with, on the one hand, a significant curtailing of his resources 
and authority and, on the other hand, the expectation of ‘him to exercise absolute 
control over the Palestinians in Lebanon, to keep the refugees quiet, subdued’ 
(Hanafi and Long, 2010: 144). These contradicting expectations essentially set 
him up for failure.
In addition to fragmenting the political representation of Palestinians in the 
country, Lebanon’s ruling elites have forced non-political forms of Palestinian 
representation underground by prohibiting the establishment of associations by 
non-Lebanese. This has crippled Palestinian non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and civil society organizations in Lebanon that might offer substitutes for 
direct political representation in the form of social organization.16 Various Leba-
nese parties, in fact, clung to this stance in the consultation sessions organized by 
the LPDC that eventually led to the LPDC’s Vision Document that is discussed 
later. A facilitator of these sessions noted that ‘enabling Palestinian NGOs to oper-
ate’ was ‘the key thing that they were rejecting’ to be included in the eventual 
document.17
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Lebanese governments, themselves divided, have often contributed to rather 
than assuaged Palestinian strife and division. This culminated in the Civil War, 
but has continued in many ways in the post-war era under Syrian tutelage and 
after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, with Lebanese politicians and officials 
demanding Palestinian self-governance but withholding local Palestinian govern-
ance recognition and thereby undermining it at the same time. Lebanon’s hybrid 
political order and the behaviour of the Lebanese ‘twilight’ parties operating in it 
have exacerbated institutional ambiguity in terms of refugees’ organizational and 
representational structures. Lebanese political elites have co-created and main-
tained the vagueness about representational responsibilities that shape decisions 
on how to organize the life of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
Benign strangulation18
The governance of the spaces where Palestinians in Lebanon live, their legal sta-
tus, and the mandates of those actors claiming or aiming to represent them are all 
fundamentally defined by informality, liminality, and exceptionalism. This insti-
tutional ambiguity has very real consequences for Palestinian refugees.
The most recent survey on the socio-economic situation of Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon paints a bleak picture (Chaaban et al., 2016). Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon face higher poverty rates than Palestinians in all other UNRWA areas 
of operation, including Gaza: in 2015, 65 percent of them lived in poverty and 
62.2 percent of refugees faced food insecurity. Despite relatively high educational 
enrollment rates, in 2015, the unemployment rate among Lebanon’s Palestinian 
refugees was 23.2 percent. Due to labour market restrictions, even those Palestin-
ians who are employed in Lebanon have low-paid, low-skilled jobs characterized 
by harsh, insecure, and exploitative working conditions, with half of them liv-
ing in poverty despite being employed. The health of Lebanon’s Palestinians is 
precarious, with over 81.3 percent of them reporting at least one family member 
suffering from chronic illness and the vast majority having at least one household 
member who was acutely ill. Palestinian dwellings in Lebanon are often in a bad 
condition. Leakages, dampness, pollution by waste, poor ventilation, and precari-
ous electricity constructions are the rule rather than the exception.
This situation certainly cannot be solely blamed on Lebanon. The international 
community that allows UNRWA’s budget to shrink progressively each year and 
the Palestinian Authority and the PLO that increasingly disregard the Palestinians 
in the diaspora both contribute to this political and economic marginalization. But 
the situation of Palestinian refugees being more dire in Lebanon than anywhere 
else is also the result of evident inaction and ambiguity on the side of Lebanese 
authorities.
In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees’ socio-economic rights are systematically cir-
cumscribed. At first instance, such discrimination may appear to have little to do 
with institutional ambiguity. Restrictive policies are, after all, there. And they may 
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be repressive, but they are unambiguously so. But such unambiguous repression 
is enabled by ambiguous legislation. ‘Intentional delays’ in the introduction of 
comprehensive policies (Mencütek, 2019: 137) and the deliberate absence of a 
tailored legal framework, Al-Natour (1997: 360) documents, has made Palestinian 
refugees particularly vulnerable to marginalization in Lebanon.19 Due to the legal 
limbo and the absence of laws that accommodate Palestinians’ statelessness that 
were outlined earlier, what ‘rights’ Palestinians are allocated in terms of residence, 
property, and labour can be withdrawn at any time.20 This, as Knudsen (2007: 12) 
contends, makes them privileges rather than rights, whose actual implementation 
is extremely arbitrary.
Palestinians’ ‘right’ to work in Lebanon reveals much of this dynamic. Since 
Palestinians are stateless foreigners in Lebanon, their labour rights have since 1962 
been regulated by Decree No. 17561 that revolves around three core principles: the 
logic of national preference; the need to obtain a work permit; and the doctrine of 
national reciprocity. With reference to the idea of ‘national preference,’ the decree 
provides a list, to be updated annually, with jobs restricted to Lebanese nationals. 
This creates room for extending and amending the categories of labour that are off 
limits to refugees as respective governments see fit. Since 1964, Palestinians are 
excluded from joining syndicates, which is a prerequisite for professional work, 
relegating them to do menial labour or work on the black market. For those jobs 
that are open to Palestinians, they have to get a work permit, making them unat-
tractive in the competition with other foreigners who do not need such a permit. 
In 2016, less than 3.3 percent of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees had the kind of 
official employment contract by a public notary that is required to apply for a work 
permit in the first place (Chaaban et al., 2016: 7). In 2010, the amendment of the 
Labour Law waived the fee for working permits for Palestinians in various job 
categories (excluding, however, the so-called liberal professions). But regardless 
of the related fee, the allocation of permits is conditional and, Suleiman (2006: 16) 
points out, thereby dependent on ‘the personal attitude and goodwill of the minis-
ter himself.’ In practice, work permits are hardly ever provided to Palestinians. In 
2012, the number of Palestinians with work permits was less than 2 percent (Helou, 
2014: 85). Recent research suggests that of the 210,000 work permits granted to 
foreigners since 2010, only several hundred went to Palestinians.21
The issue of property rights for Palestinians in Lebanon similarly shows how 
restrictive and fickle legislation and arbitrary implementation work to marginal-
ize refugees and enable their exploitation. Until 2001, Palestinians in Lebanon 
could own land and real estate. To do so, they had to register the ownership with 
both a notary and the relevant government agency. Because they did not under-
stand the relevant legal frameworks or were not willing or able to pay the high 
taxes involved, however, Palestinians often failed to register their property with 
the state cadaster. To resolve this, in 2000, Palestinian civil society organizations 
petitioned to be allowed the same tax rate as Lebanese, rather than the higher tax 
rate leveled against foreigners.22
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Instead of being granted their request, however, the government negated their 
right to purchase land and real estate altogether. The law specifically targeted 
Palestinians, stating:
All forms of real estate rights are forbidden to any person who is not hold-
ing a nationality of a recognized state, or any person in general – should the 
ownership be nonconforming to the provisions of the Constitution in terms of 
rejecting permanent settlement.23
This meant that Palestinians could no longer buy land or real estate. Moreover, 
if they were in the process of buying property through installments or could not 
provide cadastral registration in addition to the ownership papers provided by 
the notary, they lost the right to property they already owned. Palestinians with-
out such cadastral registration, a renowned Palestinian lawyer working on this 
issue explained, became entirely dependent on the goodwill of the Lebanese per-
son from which they originally bought the land as these could – and often did – 
reclaim the land they previously sold if the transaction had not been registered in 
the cadaster.24
Legislation on Palestinians’ social rights in practice thus generates dispropor-
tionate discretionary power. In Lebanon, the legislature and judiciary are ‘tools in 
the legal discrimination against refugees’; discrimination that operates in the form 
of repression through discretion (Knudsen, 2009: 69). This concerns state officials 
in charge of deciding on work permits and Lebanese landowners, who are often 
part of the economic elite that constitutes Lebanon’s ruling class, dealing with 
Palestinian property. The need to constantly underscore the liminality of the Pal-
estinian presence in Lebanon, the legal and institutional exceptionalism that this 
need produces, and the informal arrangements that then determine the interpreta-
tion and implementation of these exceptional decisions characterize Lebanon’s 
dealing with Palestinian refugees.
This institutionalized ambiguity helps to produce socio-economic marginaliza-
tion, a form of vulnerability that, as with Syrian refugees, can be considered man-
ufactured because it is the evident result of specific political actions and inactions 
in the realms of status, space, and representation. Legal limbo has enabled the 
imposition of labour and ownership restrictions on refugees that have contributed 
to their poverty and made them vulnerable to exploitation. Refugees’ encampment 
came with bans on shelter rehabilitation and extension and has made refugees 
dependent on an ever-more-depleted UNRWA and unaccountable Palestinian par-
ties. Divided political representation has undermined refugees’ agency to structur-
ally challenge these conditions. Thus, while Lebanese and Palestinians appear to 
entirely agree on what they want (for Palestinians to return to Palestine) and do 
not want (for Palestinians to stay in Lebanon indefinitely), the improbability of 
realizing this shared desire has resulted in marginalization of the Palestinian com-
munity in Lebanon.
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Such vulnerability is not merely largely avoidable and thereby partially manu-
factured. It is, remarkably, construed as being in the best interest of Palestinians 
themselves. Their continuing misery supposedly keeps the pressure on the inter-
national community to make Israel honor the Palestinian refugees’ right to return 
and is meant to lend credence to the Palestinians’ claim that their presence in 
exile is temporary and their will to return unwavering. This logic, that improve-
ment of socio-economic parameters would undermine Palestinians’ willingness 
to return and Israel’s willingness to let them, holds little empirical or analytical 
value considering that Israel is adamant in its stance that there is no possibility 
for the Palestinians to return, regardless of either their misery or their prosperity, 
and the international community’s acquiescence to this stance. But it has great 
political value in the Lebanese context, where such ‘benign’ strangulation – which 
purports that any form of civil or socio-economic rights for Palestinians inevi-
tably leads to political rights and permanent settlement and hence threatens the 
sectarian status quo – helps to reconcile support for the Palestinian cause on the 
one hand and preservation of the fiction of sectarian balance on the other (Peteet, 
2005: 174). It allows Lebanon to be ‘with Palestine, but against the Palestinians’ 
(Raffonelli, 2004).
A politics of uncertainty
So far, the chapter has established that institutional ambiguity is prevalent in Leb-
anon’s governance of Palestinian refugees and that, together with outright repres-
sion, it results in extreme socio-economic and political marginalization. This 
section will demonstrate that such institutional ambiguity closely resonates with 
the political interests of Lebanese authorities and follows from their sometimes 
strategic inaction and ambiguous action.
As with Syrian refugees, much of the institutional ambiguity described pre-
viously stems from Lebanon’s hybrid political order. This regards the extreme 
political polarization across Lebanon’s sects and political alliances regarding the 
‘Palestinian issue.’ It also concerns the severe lack of governance capacities that 
have Lebanese authorities struggling to provide a fraction of security, welfare, and 
representation that they would want to offer even to citizens. Yet more explicitly 
than with the Syrian refugee ‘crisis,’ institutional ambiguity in the case of Leba-
non’s Palestinians also has a significant ideological component. Producing long-
term informality, liminality, and exceptionalism is a way for the Lebanese state to 
reinstate its conviction that the international community should be responsible for 
taking care of the Palestinians and, however perverse, to signal its commitment to 
the Palestinians’ right of return. But institutional ambiguity is strategic not merely 
in an ideological or geopolitical manner, but also in a more opportunistic sense. 
Informality, liminality, and exceptionalism produce effects that are in line with the 
stated interests of Lebanon’s governing elites: as further evidenced in Chapter 6, 
they help prevent the (re-)mobilization of refugees, enable economic and political 
exploitation, and ‘encourage’ refugees to leave.
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Institutional ambiguity is neither complete nor uncontested. The political 
actions that create or keep in place informality, liminality, and exceptionalism are 
often specifically apparent when existing forms of institutional ambiguity are chal-
lenged. It is in these instances that the strategic elements of ambiguous action and 
inaction become particularly visible. As noted in Chapter 1, there is no such thing 
as the Lebanese state or the Lebanese authorities. Political division and competi-
tion are omnipresent. This is also evident in the vignettes presented in this section. 
These illustrate how some actors seek to partially remedy institutional ambiguity, 
whereas others seek to maintain it. Challenges to informal, liminal, and excep-
tional forms of governance often partially or completely fail, due to institutional 
complications as well as resistance. The vignettes explored here certainly do not 
suggest that all attempts to formalize and regularize are strategically undermined 
or set up to fail. Often, they are genuine and at least partially successful. But the 
vignettes do reveal the efforts made to keep ambiguity in place, which offers a 
unique window on the incentives that (re-)produce institutional ambiguity.
The two vignettes analyze, first, the creation of the LPDC and, second, its cen-
sus of Lebanon’s Palestinian population. They show how this unprecedented insti-
tutionalization and formalization of Lebanese-Palestinian relations in the country 
has brought real change, but also faced curtailed mandates, resources, and follow-
up that were, according to officials and analysts involved in the process, the result 
of political sabotage. Similarly, the LPDC’s revolutionary attempt to address the 
absence of formal state statistics regarding Palestinians in the country was co-
opted to the extent that this census provided further ammunition for the ongoing 
‘numbers game’ rather than once and for all concluding this game as it allegedly 
set out to do.
Contested formalization: crippling the Lebanese-
Palestinian Dialogue Committee and preventing  
the High Commission for Palestinian Affairs
Lebanon’s institutional parameters for governing Palestinians were long limited 
to administration and surveillance by the Department of Affairs of the Palestinian 
Refugees and a set of restrictions on labour, education, property ownership, and 
social security. These were in line with the shared conviction of Lebanon’s rul-
ing elite that any engagement with the Palestinian refugees should have the sole 
purpose to underscore the temporariness of their presence. The ‘policy,’ in a way, 
was to limit formal political decision-making in this realm to restrictions only. 
The informal arrangements that subsequently emerged to deal with refugee spaces 
and representatives in practice were not to be recognized or coordinated upon 
officially. This deliberate inaction in many policy realms has led to a discrepancy 
between de jure and de facto realities that steeped the lives of Palestinian refugees 
in informality, liminality, and exceptionalism. As the then spokesperson of the 
LPDC concluded without much ado in 2014: ‘There is no official or clear state 
policy concerning the Palestinians.’25
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But over the last decade, there have been significant changes in Lebanon’s 
engagement with Palestinian refugees. These developments have been heralded as 
a potential paradigm shift in the way the Lebanese state and the political factions 
running it approach the Palestinian ‘question.’ Cautious suggestions are increas-
ingly being made about ‘rapprochement’ (Knudsen, 2009: 66), ‘normalization’ 
(Doraï, 2011: 71), and a possible ‘new era’ (Suleiman, 2006: 23) of Lebanese-
Palestinian relations that would be characterized by a tendency towards ‘a more 
conciliatory relationship between Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese state 
and the latter’s interest in a partial regularization of Palestinian refugee presence’ 
(Czajka, 2012: 239).
The institutional environment for refugee governance started to change after 
the Nahr al-Bared crisis. In 2007, the Lebanese army destroyed large parts of the 
Nahr al-Bared camp in North Lebanon to eliminate militants hiding the camp. The 
camp’s reconstruction process subsequently encompassed a controversial new 
model for camp governance that was implicitly launched as a blueprint for other 
camps as well. Knudsen and Hanafi (2011: 7) therefore describe this calamity as a 
starting point for redefining the ‘political relations between refugees, their politi-
cal representatives and the state.’ The Nahr al-Bared crisis, moreover, boosted the 
LPDC’s relevance and mandate and provided the impetus for the installation of a 
Palestinian embassy in Lebanon in 2011.26 In short, it generated an unprecedented 
awareness of the need for Lebanese-Palestinian coordination on governance in 
Palestinian camps.
Under the stewardship of an increasingly emboldened LPDC, the Lebanese 
Working Group on Palestinian Refugee Affairs has, over the last few years, 
engaged in an extensive consultation process that resulted in a document titled ‘A 
Unified Lebanese Vision for the Palestinian Refugees Affairs in Lebanon.’ This 
Vision claims to have the objective to ‘provide the Lebanese State and its insti-
tutions with stable national guidelines regarding refugees and their cause’ and 
‘recommends the Lebanese government to launch the development of an inte-
grated and consistent national policy on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon’ (LPDC, 
2016: 2, 16).27 In doing so, the working group, and thereby presumably the entire 
Lebanese political elite it officially represented, explicitly recognized the previous 
‘strategy of neglect’ and ‘absence of a coherent government policy’ (Suleiman, 
2017: 14). Indeed, the LPDC was created to be ‘filling a void in the Lebanese gov-
ernment dealing with the issue of refugees’ (LPDC, 2013: 8) – and was to function 
as the delineated agency to propose much-needed policies.
To remedy policy inconsistency and instability, the Unified Vision document 
suggests that rather than seeking to accrue sovereignty through securitization and 
segregation as in the past, it should be guaranteed through extensive interaction 
with Palestinian representatives on all levels. In essence this means lifting the 
current exceptionalism. It, for instance, suggests to ‘facilitate interaction between 
the refugees, public service administrations, and surrounding municipalities’ and 
to unify ‘the Lebanese and Palestinian administrative authorities and organizing 
their collaboration based on sound principles’ (LPDC, 2016: 10–11). Indeed, with 
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the LPDC there now is, for the first time in history, a formal interaction channel 
between Lebanese and Palestinian authorities in the country. This is revolutionary 
in itself. And in addition to its mere existence, the LPDC can boast some remark-
able achievements such as the May 2008 decision to issue special identity cards to 
undocumented Palestinians and, first and foremost, its Unified Vision.
Yet, so far, the LPDC itself recognizes, these formal diplomatic breakthroughs 
have not seen any executive or practical implications. The LPDC’s various stud-
ies and important recommendations on previous taboo topics such as the right 
to work, right to study, right to association, and living conditions in Palestinian 
settlements have not (yet) been translated into action. The 2017 Unified Vision 
calls for a ‘Lebanese public policy regarding the issues of Palestinian refugees’ 
and the establishment of ‘an official framework for the Lebanese State to address 
Palestinian issues and ensuring the appropriate relevant structures,’ but it does not 
function as such a policy or framework in and of itself.
This might, of course, still happen. The developments discussed are, after all, 
very recent. Limited capacities and resources, the paralysis associated with hybrid 
order, and the urgency of more pressing political developments – foremost among 
them the Syrian refugee situation – hamper further policy development and imple-
mentation. However, people involved in the LPDC’s endeavours as well as ana-
lysts closely observing the process also suggest that the bulk of the LPDC’s new 
vision will never be implemented because the officials that mandated the LPDC 
never meant it to be implemented.
As one observer notes, ‘the slow and disruptive pace’ of Lebanese procedures, 
even those few that are agreed upon, ‘characterises the situation of Palestin-
ian refuge in Lebanon’ (Saleh, 2019; see also Yan, 2017). Apparently banking 
on their twilight nature, Lebanon’s political parties can count on their ability 
to obstruct ratification and implementation even of those initiatives they have 
officially embraced. They know that ‘crystallising procedures into laws and the 
unequivocal drafting of legislations is very important to prevent the use of ambi-
guity or loopholes’ on which they depend and thus work to avert such crystal-
lization (Saleh, 2019). In advising me on my research, one consultant who has 
been involved in the initiation and early days of the LPDC emphasized that 
I would need to look beyond what people say and scrutinize their actual behav-
iour, urging me to ‘read between the lines and try and see the benefits of main-
taining the status quo.’28
Taking this to heart and bearing in mind the history of Lebanon’s tendency 
towards institutional ambiguity when it comes to the Palestinians, the current 
developments can be read as a form of nonperformativity. As with the Minister 
of State for Displaced Affairs that was put in charge of the Syrian refugee file 
without being granted sufficient mandate and resources, discussed in Chapter 2, 
the LPDC and its new approach might signal a process of stalling actual change 
by proclaiming paper change. This is not to say that all implementation challenges 
are indications of strategic ambiguity. It is to explore the extent to which imple-
mentation challenges (also) follow from deliberate ‘footdragging.’
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The limited institutional follow-up of the LPDC’s studies, recommendations, 
and vision, Lebanese policy analysts explained, are importantly related to the 
LPDC’s mandate. The limited executive powers of the LPDC are a continuing 
frustration of its technical team. These limited powers, however, are likely to be no 
coincidence. They appear to reflect a deliberate outcome of political elites’ lack of 
political will to change the governance of Palestinian refugees and their concomi-
tant need for a toothless tiger. Attempts by the LPDC to enhance its implementa-
tion capacity have been in vain. In 2013, the previous LPDC president drafted a 
‘future vision’ for the LPDC. To have an actual impact, this document states, the 
LPDC would require further institutionalization and a new structure and mandate. 
The document stresses the necessity to establish a ‘government institution that 
would fulfill the executive functions necessary to deal with the Palestinian refugee 
issue in Lebanon in all its dimensions’ (LPDC, 2013: 9).
After exploring various options – such as turning the LPDC into a ministry or 
refashioning it as a General Directorate or a Minister of State – through broad 
consultation with relevant officials and experts, the then president of the LPDC 
concluded it would be most efficient to turn the committee into a High Com-
mission. The High Commission would have the ‘purpose to set up frameworks 
for managing the state’s relationship with the refugees’ and ‘design mechanisms 
to implement the decisions taken’ with the aim to ‘better organize this file and 
start developing future plans for its management’ – frameworks, mechanisms, and 
organization that were apparently inexistent at the time of writing (LPDC, 2013: 4). 
Indeed, a fully developed draft law for the creation of this High Commission of 
Palestinian Affairs that outlines its mandate and organizational structure – to ‘be 
referred to Parliament through a decree that is issued by the Council of Ministers’ – 
was proposed by the LPDC in 2013 (LPDC, 2013: 9). The structure of this High 
Commission of Palestinian Refugee Affairs is laid down in detail in the document 
in question. It would have a planning and an executive department made up of 
ministers ‘with a specific mandate defined by legislation’ (LPDC, 2013: 9). Its 
article 1 proposed that the High Commission would enjoy an ‘independent legal 
framework as well as financial and administrative autonomy’ and would supervise 
‘all the issues related to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon’ (LPDC, 2013: 10).
This essential institutional reorganization, however, was never followed 
through, and the president of the LPDC who had proposed it resigned. Thus, 
while the dependence, vulnerability, and limited authority of the LPDC have 
been recognized explicitly and practical solutions for these shortcomings have 
been identified, they have not been addressed. This, a former representative of 
the LPDC suggested, allows Lebanese governments its cherished ‘position of 
denial,’ hiding behind good intentions without following these through or hav-
ing others see them through.29 In 2014, leading facilitators of the LPDC noted 
that the fact that the LPDC falls directly under the Prime Minister’s office means 
that it cannot function independently and is deliberately limited to an advisory 
function.30 This view was seconded by a member of the LPDC’s technical team, 
who observed that ‘what we’re doing is not leading to major changes, not even 
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in the long term,’31 and later concluded: ‘We don’t have a lot of authority to do 
things right now.’32
The LPDC thus explicitly recognizes the informality, liminality, and excep-
tionalism that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon face and works to remedy some 
of this ambiguity. These attempts are partly successful. They are also extremely 
contested. This is evident in the limited mandate of the LPDC and its lack of 
executive power and the fact that these are recognized as problematic but not 
adjusted. Inaction – not solving the recognized institutional deficiencies of the 
LPDC – thereby results in ambiguous action, with ambitious policy recommenda-
tions on the one hand, but lagging policy decisions and implementations on the 
other. For refugees and those seeking to represent and help them, this makes it 
even more unclear what they may count on and hope for.
This dynamic is well-illustrated by what is often presented as the LPDC’s 
most significant achievement: The execution of a census of the inhabitants of the 
country’s formal and informal refugee settlements. Heralded as an effort to once 
and for all settle the contested issue of the number of Palestinian refugees in the 
country and to provide a starting point for evidence-based policy-making regard-
ing the Palestinian refugee issue, the outcome of the census was disputed to the 
extent that it amplified rather than solved existing demographic and statistical 
uncertainties.
The LPDC’s groundbreaking census: disputed surveying 
and the existential numbers game
Refugees are often ambivalent about registration. It is a way to validate their 
existence, explicate their presence, draw attention to their plight, access rights, 
and claim entitlements. But it also carries risks. Syrian refugees are wary of any 
form of registration in light of the dictatorial state surveillance they have been 
subjected to in their home country. With strategic processes of (partisan) map-
ping, counting, and documenting lying at the heart of Israel’s project of colonial 
dispossession, Palestinian refugees are apprehensive about registration as well. 
Registration is highly contentious for states too, specifically so in Lebanon.
Just like the number of Syrian refugees in the country is continuously contested 
yet simultaneously kept vague, the question of how many Palestinians Lebanon 
actually hosts is ‘obviously at the heart of the Palestinian refugee problem’ (Sulei-
man, 2006: 6). In Lebanon’s sectarian political arena, demographics are sensitive. 
Because the great majority of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon that has not been 
naturalized is of a Sunni Muslim denomination,33 their mere presence is assumed 
to undermine the brittle sectarian equilibrium of the country – even if this is a 
presence without formal rights or political power. The downplaying or exacerbat-
ing of the number of Palestinians living in Lebanon therefore has acute political 
implications.
As with the figure of Syrian refugees, the number of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon is disputed. This confusion is the result of different categorizations of 
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refugees, with most refugees being registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese 
state, but some with only one of the two and some with neither one. Both the state’s 
and UNRWA’s registration, moreover, have their complications. As Frontiers- 
Ruwad (2005: 69) notes, there is an ‘ambiguity surrounding the registration of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanese law,’ with the definition of who constitutes a 
Palestinian refugee being disputed and some refugees, most notably those who 
arrived after 1948, facing obstacles to state registration. UNRWA registration is 
similarly inaccurate. As is the case with the UNHCR, UNRWA faces many ‘regis-
tration gaps,’ which are often the result of attempts to ‘accommodate government 
demands and restrictions’ (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2005: 11).
Then there is the discrepancy between those people registered in Lebanon and 
those actually residing in the country (with the latter number being significantly 
lower than the former). In addition, numbers vary based on whether they include 
only those Palestinians living in the formal and informal refugee camps or all Pal-
estinians in the country. Thus, while there are 469,331 Palestinians registered with 
UNRWA in Lebanon, studies suggested that the number of Palestinians living in 
the country would not exceed 270,000 people (UNRWA, 2019). Until recently 
it was often routinely stated that Palestinian refugees made up approximately 
10 percent of the Lebanese population, some 400,000 people (Khalidi and Riske-
dahl, 2010: 1).
The LPDC has acknowledged ‘the absence of official, comprehensive and 
accurate data’ on the Palestinian presence in the country, which it saw as a key 
factor that ‘limits the ability of the Government of Lebanon to base sound policies 
affecting the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees on solid grounds.’34 To 
remedy this situation, in 2017 it conducted the first Lebanese census of Palestin-
ian refugees in Lebanon. The LPDC census established that the number of Pales-
tinian refugees living in Lebanon’s camps and gatherings is 174,422. Even if this 
excludes some 10 percent of self-settled Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who do 
not live in either the camps or the gatherings,35 the actual number of Palestinians 
in Lebanon would be far less than the number previously customarily cited.
While the LPDC presented this new number as the first reliable statistic in this 
realm and a historical breakthrough, the outcomes of the census are widely ques-
tioned. The most important concern, a senior Palestinian scholar working with the 
LPDC explained, was that the census only included those Palestinians living in 
Palestinian camps and gatherings and that the number of Palestinians living outside 
of these spaces is much larger than the 10 percent estimated by the LPDC.36 In 
addition, the census only captured the people residing there at the moment, exclud-
ing those Palestinians who are temporarily abroad for various reasons. A signifi-
cant number of refugees, moreover, was seen to have evaded the survey, as Halkort 
(2019: 322) alludes to, refusing to participate and even actively obstructing it.
As a Lebanese civil society expert involved in the LPDC dialogue process sum-
marized the general sentiment:
They came up with a number that. . ., let me say . . . it confused everyone in 
the country . . . yeah, it confused everyone. And if you ask the people they 
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will say ‘no, no, no, this is not correct, this number.’ No one, no one, you 
know, can believe that this is the right number of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon.37
This means that whether or not the new number produced by the 2017 census is 
correct or not, the perception that it is not actually known how many Palestinian 
refugees there are in Lebanon remains. As a senior Lebanese journalist concluded: 
‘The numbers are important but what is more important is their exploitation.’38 
The remaining ambiguity, whether real or perceived, is convenient to Lebanese 
politicians as it aligns well with the Janus-faced nature of Lebanon’s approach to 
the Palestinian community residing in the country. From the perspective of keep-
ing alive the Palestinians’ right to return and the related responsibility of the inter-
national community, it is important to stress the significance of the ‘problem’ and 
hence to have as high as possible a number of (registered) refugees. On the other 
hand, bearing in mind the undesirability of settlement and the Lebanese popula-
tion’s resentment of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon since the Civil War, for 
domestic purposes a low number of ‘actually residing refugees’ is more expedi-
ent. To be able to simultaneously downplay and magnify the Palestinian presence 
depending on the issue at stake and the audience to be addressed, the absence 
of an undisputed number remains opportune.39 As an LPDC analyst involved in 
the census lamented, ‘nobody wants to look at empirical data.’40 The ‘laziness to 
correctly understand’ the various figures available that one expert on Palestin-
ian refugees in Lebanon identified among Lebanese politicians is, he concluded, 
‘convenient.’41
But the fact that vague numbers serve interests does not have to mean they are 
produced or maintained deliberately. The absence of reliable statistics importantly 
results from limited capacity. As the LPDC notes on its website, ‘the Lebanese 
Public Institutions mandated with the registry of the Palestinian refugees heavily 
suffer from outdated operational systems and limited human resources.’42 In fact, 
if there ever was a credible claim that ambiguous statistics were at least partly the 
result of a lack of political will to produce unambiguous ones, the recent census, 
which, after all, was carried out by a Lebanese state agency, should do away with 
this idea. The celebration of empirical evidence and hard data as the foundation 
for policy that the census exemplified was publicly embraced by the government. 
The Prime Minister, in his speech at the event that was organized to present the 
census outcomes, stated that the data ‘leave no room for ambiguity’ and contribute 
to the formulation of projects and plans.43
This public celebration of the census and its implications by the powers that 
be, however, seems to have been premature, or perhaps even hypocritical. Experts 
representing the LPDC and involved in the census process emphasized that the 
census never aimed or claimed to establish the total number of Palestinians in 
the country and focused merely on those living in the camps and gatherings. 
It was thus never mandated to answer the question of how many Palestin-
ian refugees Lebanon counts. This limited mandate, according to a senior offi-
cial involved in the census project, was not coincidental. In fact, he reflected, 
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the census was never taken seriously at all by the advisory and steering commit-
tees that were overseeing it and that included representatives from all relevant 
ministries. He said: ‘I imagine that there were a lot of people who expected that 
this exercise would fall in the middle or would not have the impact it had.’44 This 
would suggest that the very officials who agreed on the census silently counted on 
its failure. An LPDC analyst cynically and only half-jokingly concluded:
I do believe it may be the last census ever in Lebanon. . . . I think there is a 
lot of lessons learned from this that politicians will draw. And most probably 
they will avoid such . . . being cornered at a certain point.45
Interlocutors seemed adamant that despite the valid and reliable method underly-
ing the census, it would not actually upturn the dominant Lebanese tendency to 
keep alive a multitude of contested statistics instead of a single consensus number 
(see also Yan, 2017). I was reminded time and again that such statistical contesta-
tion was central to Lebanese politics, as the last national census in Lebanon was 
held in 1932, and would remain defining for both Palestinian and Lebanese refu-
gee populations. The stakes of ‘manipulation,’ a Lebanese public policy expert 
working on refugee issues concluded, were just too high.46 Speaking on the impli-
cations of the 2017 LPDC census, the director of Lebanon’s leading research insti-
tute on public policy predicted that regardless of the scientific rigor of the census 
and despite its ambition to put an end to such schemes,47 ‘the number of Palestin-
ian refugees in Lebanon continues to be a contentious issue wielded to advance 
political agendas’ (Yan, 2018).
Reflecting on the backlash the LPDC has faced during and after the census, an 
analyst who was involved concluded that, apparently, ‘there are entire structures 
that also are counting on this misinformation about the Palestinians.’48 In present-
ing the census’ key findings, the president of the LPDC (2018: 3) noted that ‘the 
numbers of refugees estimated by different agencies were used to drive inaccurate 
and sometimes falsely [sic] understandings of the Palestinian refugees’ popula-
tion presence in the country.’ The political interests underlying such manipulation 
mean that rather than being accepted as the final and undisputable number, the 
LPDC count will inevitably become yet another option from the varied menu of 
available numbers of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
Conclusions
These vignettes about the creation and increasing significance of the LPDC 
and the impact of its census illustrate several key aspects of the functioning of 
institutional ambiguity in governing Lebanon’s Palestinians. First, through the 
LPDC’s promotion of future policy consistency and comprehension, Lebanese 
state officials have, for the first time, explicitly recognized the previous absence 
of policy. The objectives of the LPDC confirmed Lebanon’s long-standing de 
facto no-policy-policy vis-à-vis not just Syrians but also Palestinians. Second, the 
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LPDC’s mandate and activities suggest that genuine initiatives to remedy institu-
tional ambiguity can easily be co-opted by forms of nonperformativity, whereby 
they are publicly embraced but privately undermined by preventing actual imple-
mentation. As the LPDC’s census shows, third, in situations of hybrid order with 
powerful precedents of institutional ambiguity, there is a major risk that attempts 
to remedy confusion end up adding to it. None of this diminishes the relevance 
or possibility of genuine change to lift maleficent forms of informality, liminality, 
and exceptionalism. But it does document the tenacity of institutional ambiguity. 
Withholding any executive power from the LPDC despite the existence of draft 
laws to remedy this agreed-upon deficiency and maintaining controversies around 
numbers despite having solicited a survey to allegedly remedy such contention 
keep in place the institutional ambiguity through which Lebanon’s Palestinian ref-
ugees are governed and that facilitates their control, exploitation, and expulsion.
This chapter, then, has chronicled how the institutional ambiguity that deter-
mines Lebanon’s response to the Syrian refugee presence as described in Chap-
ters 2 and 3 is not merely rooted in its hybrid political order, but also finds its 
precedent in the country’s post–Civil War engagement with Palestinian refugees. 
The relentless emphasis on Palestinians’ return, fueled by geopolitical as well 
as internal Lebanese political considerations, put Palestinian refugees under the 
curse of permanent temporariness. This obsession with institutionally upholding 
liminality manifests itself in forms of hybrid encampment, legal limbo, and infor-
malized political interaction that produce exceptionalism, excluding Palestinian 
refugees from state responsibilities and including them in state surveillance and 
control mechanisms. The socio-economic marginalization that this institutional 
ambiguity produces further undermines refugees’ ability to contest the chronic 
uncertainty that they face. Ambiguity helps create vulnerability and vulnerability 
furthers ambiguity.
The next chapter will further delve into exactly how informality, liminality, and 
exceptionalism operate in the governance of refugee spaces, status, and represen-
tation. Exploring these dynamics in the context of specific refugee settlements, 
Chapter 5 interrogates both the mechanisms and the effects of institutional ambi-
guity as a form of governance. It thereby further studies what it actually means 
that ‘state-level vacillation and confusion’ is a common factor in the Lebanese 
management of Palestinian affairs (Borgmann and Slim, 2018: 32).
Notes
 1 Author’s interview – Beirut, 6 June 2013.
 2 Author’s interview with development specialist – Skype, 11 December 2017.
 3 Reflecting on the legal marginalization of Syrian refugees, a humanitarian representa-
tive mused, ‘Lebanese authorities have treated the Palestinians in exactly the same 
way’ (Author’s group interview – Skype, 3 January 2018).
 4 Author’s interview – Skype, 22 January 2018.
 5 Author’s interview – Skype, 10 January 2018.
 6 They were not recorded due to the sensitive nature of the ‘Palestinian issue’ in Leba-
non; the citations provided are based on extensive notes.
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   Some of the interviews that underlie the vignettes in the last section of the chapter 
were conducted more recently (in 2017 and 2018) via Skype. These interviews were 
recorded and transcribed, and citations are verbatim.
 7 Three of which were destroyed during the Lebanese Civil War. Another camp was 
evacuated.
 8 Sectarian balance is an illusion because recent estimates indicate that the 1932 census on 
which the current confessional allocation of state positions depends is blatantly outdated and 
no longer reflects the actual demographic situation in the country (Mencütek, 2019: 131).
 9 In my analysis, I will speak of settlements as an overarching category to refer to all of 
these types of encampment. To refer to the UNRWA-run camps, I will use ‘camps’ or 
‘formal camps.’ The term ‘gatherings’ is used to refer to the settlements not formally 
recognized by the Lebanese state.
 10 Those in formal camps less than those in informal settlements, but the specter of dis-
placement is present in both types of settings, as explicated by the nearly complete 
destruction of the Nahr el-Bared camp in 2017.
 11 These tasks included coordination with UNRWA; handling applications for identifica-
tion and residency cards and travel documents in coordination with the General Secu-
rity; managing personal documentation (birth, residence, marriage, divorce, death); 
dealing with family reunification requests; and handling the lease arrangements of the 
formal camps (Suleiman, 2006: 12). The department also has the discretionary power 
to accept or refuse any foreign aid for Palestinians in the country (Mencütek, 2019: 
140).
 12 In 1960, a Higher Authority of Palestinian Affairs was established (via Presidential 
Decree No. 3909). It was supposed to operate under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. This Higher Authority was never actually activated, but it clearly 
testifies to the political and security priorities that drive the Lebanese state’s engage-
ment with Palestinian refugees (Suleiman, 2006: 13). It included a wide array of secu-
rity authorities (the Director General of the Ministry of National Defense, officers of 
‘Deuxieme Bureau,’ the General Director of the Department of Affairs of Palestinian 
Refugees, the Chief of the Israel Boycott office in the Ministry of National Economy 
and Tourism, and the Chief of the Palestine Division in the Ministry of Foreign and 
Repatriate Affairs) and was to have the following tasks: ‘Gathering all information 
pertaining to political, military, economic, and other aspects of the Palestinian cause; 
studying all aspects of the Palestine Question, monitoring its developments and draft-
ing solutions in response to it; and confronting the Zionist propaganda abroad’ (unpub-
lished document cited by Suleiman, 2006: 13).
 13 Author’s interview – Beirut, 11 March 2011. An analyst related to the Lebanese- 
Palestinian dialogue sessions reflected on my long but fruitless search for documenta-
tion on previous political interactions between Lebanese and Palestinian authorities 
in the country with the offhand remark that I would not find such documents because, 
simply, ‘they’re not there’ (Author’s interview – Beirut, 11 March 2011). All engage-
ment of Lebanese governments with Palestinian representatives has been informal, her 
colleague noted: ‘No reports or archives or minutes’ (Author’s interview – Beirut, 28 
May 2013).
 14 Tahaluf al-Qiwa al-Falastiniyya (Alliance of Palestinian Forces, or Tahaluf/Alliance 
in short).
 15 Author’s interview – Beirut, 22 July 2013.
 16 Palestinians in Lebanon do not have the right to establish associations. Technically 
speaking there are therefore no ‘Palestinian’ NGOs. Many organizations are, however, 
established and ran by Palestinians but under the formal name of a Lebanese pen-
holder. I refer to these as ‘Palestinian.’
 17 Author’s interview – Skype, 10 January 2018.
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 18 I came across this term years ago in a newspaper article which I was unable to find 
again when writing the book. I am thankful to the person who came up with this 
notion that so aptly captures the perverse paradox of discrimination of Palestinians in 
Lebanon.
 19 In 1991, an attempt to formalize the rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was 
stillborn when the Ministerial Committee appointed to ‘formulate an understanding on 
rights, duties and forms of mutual relations’ was suspended without having achieved 
any results (Al-Natour, 1997: 361).
 20 For more details, please refer to Akram (2002), El Natour (2012), Suleiman (2006), 
and Ugland (2003).
 21 Author’s interview with a Palestinian scholar associated with the LPDC – Skype, 18 
January 2018.
 22 Author’s interview with Palestinian lawyer – Beirut, 21 March 2013.
 23 Law 296/2001 issued on April 3, 2001, containing an amendment to the law imple-
mented as per decree no. 11614 issued on January 4, 1969 (www.lpdc.gov.lb/
property-ownership/the-palestinian-refugee-and-the-property-ownership/56/en).
 24 Author’s interview with Palestinian lawyer – Beirut, 28 June 2014.
 25 Author’s interview – Beirut, 17 September 2014.
 26 These improved relations with the Palestinian Authority have helped some Palestinians 
in Lebanon: In July 2006, passports issued by the Palestinian Authority were recog-
nized by Lebanon, and in November 2011, further status documents were as well. 
Overall, however, it has not really benefited Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as they 
do not fall under the authority of the Palestinian Authority, which is limited to Palestine 
proper, but defer to the PLO – which has been further marginalized at the expense of 
the Palestinian Authority.
 27 The document is signed by all of Lebanon’s major political parties, which is a feat in 
its own right. It puts forward a unique consensus on narrowly defining settlement (or 
tawteen) as
granting Palestinian refugees in Lebanon the Lebanese nationality collectively, to 
all or some, outside the legal context by virtue of a political decision imposed in 
the context of a regional or international settlement and contrary to the Constitu-
tion, whether done all at once or gradually.
(LPDC unified vision, 2016: 7)
  This definition importantly departs from the previous, deliberately broad, understand-
ing of resettlement or integration as implicated in any form of improving the social, 
economic, or legal conditions of Palestinian refugees that had stood at the root of so 
much of the Palestinians’ marginalization in Lebanon (LPDC, 2016: 2).
 28 Author’s informal meeting – Beirut, 11 March 2011.
 29 Author’s interview – Beirut, 22 July 2013.
 30 Author’s interview – Beirut, 17 September 2014.
 31 Author’s informal meeting – Beirut, 26 March 2013.
 32 Author’s interview – Beirut, 17 September 2014.
 33 Most of the minority of Christian Palestinians that fled to Lebanon had an urban, middle- 
class background and were eventually granted citizenship (Stel, 2015).
 34 www.lpdc.gov.lb/strategic-planning/8/en
 35 As explained in personal email correspondence with an LPDC expert.
 36 The sum of individuals attending UNRWA’s schools and vocational centres, obtaining 
health care, and receiving food assistance, for instance, amounts to 259,000 refugees 
in Lebanon (Yan, 2018). This would mean that on top of the 174,422 Palestinians 
counted in the LDPC census, there are approximately an additional 84,000 people 
using UNRWA services.
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 37 Author’s interview – Skype, 9 February 2018.
 38 www.memri.org/reports/after-census-finds-174422-palestinian-refugees-lebanon-
some-lebanese-fear-they-will-be
 39 Importantly, statistical ambiguity serves the Palestinian political leadership as well. 
A lower number of refugees can be cited in the Lebanese arena to indicate that refugees 
are not a significant threat to Lebanon and that lifting some of the country’s marginal-
izing measures should therefore be considered. A higher number of refugees is impor-
tant in the Palestinian political arena, when Lebanon’s Palestinian leadership seeks to 
remind the Palestinian Authority that the Palestinian diaspora is of significant size and 
should not be disregarded politically or ‘sold out’ in a peace deal between the Palestin-
ian Authority and Israel.
 40 Author’s interview – Skype, 10 January 2018.




 44 Author’s interview – Skype, 10 January 2018.
 45 Author’s interview – Skype, 10 January 2018.
 46 Author’s interview – Skype, 22 January 2018.
 47 In the introduction to the LPDC report presenting the census’s key findings, the 
LPDC’s president states:
The census, in the making and afterwards, has caused controversy and skepti-
cism around its objectives and timing. Some consider it a step towards settlement 
(tawte’en) of Palestinian refugees, while others were concerned by the political 
implications that may result from it. Though we understand the backgrounds of 
such concerns, the lack of trust as well as the negative historical backdrop, we 
still believe that this fact-based approach is the optimum approach that can lead 
to public policy reform. Creating the climate for developing public policies based 
on reliable data and facts in parallel to the consensual political processes, on even 
the most sensitive files, is today, an absolute necessity.
(LPDC, 2018: 4)
 48 Author’s interview – Skype, 10 January 2018.
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Spring 2013. A Lebanese major in South Lebanon tells me about his commit-
ment to building a ‘state of institutions’ in Lebanon, where rules and regula-
tions instead of connections and capital govern public administration. I ask him 
about the Palestinian gathering under his jurisdiction. He emphasizes the illegal 
nature of the settlement, suggesting the Palestinians should have just bought 
the land they built on. When I remind him Palestinians are legally prohibited 
from doing so, he shrugs this off as not his responsibility and reiterates his 
dedication to following the law.
 Roughly one year later. I am in another municipal office less than ten kilom-
eters down the road. About the refugees in his area, the mayor here matter-of-
factly concludes that ‘you have to do some things illegally’ if they are to have 
their basic needs met. He is happy to help them where he can, he assures me, 
but doing so ‘in an illegal way, without writing.’ Giving voice to my thoughts, 
he concludes that the quality of life in the gatherings to a large extent ‘depends 
on the mayor.’1
The previous chapter demonstrated that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon face 
a chronic uncertainty that contributes to their systematic marginalization. This 
uncertainty can be traced back to the legal limbo and the spatial discrimination 
they are subjected to and the fragmentation of their representative organizations. 
Such institutional ambiguity is legitimized with reference to the desirability of 
permanent temporariness that would facilitate the Palestinians’ right to return and 
prevent their dreaded ‘implantation’ into Lebanon’s sectarian society. While insti-
tutional ambiguity is at times successfully contested, it remains entrenched. This 
chapter moves from a focus on national decision-making – or the lack of it – to 
the local manifestations and implications of inaction and ambiguous action. It 
explores the political functions of informality, liminality, and exceptionalism by 
analyzing governance in and of two unofficial Palestinian refugee settlements in 
Lebanon.
To this aim, I first introduce the specifics of the research context and cases and 
the data that underlies my analysis. The subsequent section brings to the fore the 




Forsaken settlements, disowned 
committees, and looming 
displacement
Governing Lebanon’s Palestinian ‘gatherings’ 153
the consequences this has for residents’ welfare. Building on this, the chapter 
proceeds with an investigation of the ways in which authority and responsibil-
ity are structured in Palestinian refugee settlements. This section highlights how 
Lebanese local state agencies undermine the authority of the Palestinian govern-
ance structures in these settlements by the de facto legitimation but simultaneous 
de jure disowning of Palestinian local governance committees that operate in the 
gatherings. The ramifications of such uncertainty in terms of status and represen-
tation are further examined in the consecutive section that presents three vignettes 
that focus on the spatial governance of the settlements. It looks into the contested 
building practices in these settlements and investigates the relentless threats of 
eviction that the Palestinian refugees who live there face. Highlighting the arbi-
trary governance that occurs in situations where the status of refugee communi-
ties and their rights and the position of those representing them is ambiguous, 
these vignettes reveal the disciplinary power of institutionalized uncertainty and 
its political and socio-economic expediency.
Context and cases: studying refugee governance 
in South Lebanon
The two settlements that provide the empirical heart of this chapter are located 
in South Lebanon. This region hosts five of the twelve camps run by the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) and more than half of the country’s informal settlements (Chabaan, 
2014). The area of South Lebanon in which these case-studies are located has 
been inhabited primarily by Shia and Christian communities. Despite the trade 
and fishery around the once wealthy coastal town of Tyre, the region’s recent his-
tory has been one of marginalization. Disregarded by the political elites in Beirut 
that for long did not include significant Shia representation, the area was economi-
cally discriminated against by the Lebanese state. South Lebanon was also hard 
hit by the Lebanese Civil War, facing the retaliation of Israel against the Palestin-
ian guerillas that operated from the border area and undergoing the devastating 
effects of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent occupation 
by Israel of the region’s southernmost areas until 2000. In 2006, Israel targeted 
South Lebanon in the war it waged against Hezbollah.
The history of South Lebanon is thus closely intertwined with that of the Pal-
estinians. It was characterized by extensive mutual trade and social ties forged by 
inter-marriage and cultural proximity. Musa Sadr’s Shia political emancipation 
movement of the 1970s closely aligned with the liberation struggle waged by 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) both politically and organization-
ally. The polarizing effect of the Civil War, however, complicated Lebanese-
Palestinian relations in the South. The impression that Lebanese villages were 
sacrificed for the Palestinian cause and the increasing power and arrogance of the 
Palestinian revolutionaries undercut sympathy and support for Palestinians. This 
was only amplified by the renewed premium that the Civil War put on sectarian 
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sensitivities, which further complicated the relations between the mostly Shia 
Lebanese and the predominantly Sunni Palestinians in South Lebanon. These ten-
sions culminated in the War of the Camps during which the Amal militia besieged 
Palestinian settlements in Beirut and the South. In the post-war era and with the 
rise of Hezbollah, championed as a vanguard in resisting Israel, relations have 
normalized. Historical traumas, however, have never been resolved. The region’s 
ambivalence towards the Palestinians – veering between socio-cultural closeness 
and sectarian strain – thus remains.2
The two Palestinian settlements that this chapter focuses on are among the larg-
est in the country. The first of the two gatherings is located predominantly on pub-
lic land owned by the neighboring municipality. This settlement now counts more 
than 4,000 inhabitants, including a large population of refugees, Syrian as well 
as Palestinian, from Syria. It is located right next to a Lebanese village. The sec-
ond gathering hosts some 5,000 refugees, including refugees from Syria. Around 
20 percent of the land on which the gathering is built is public land and the rest 
is owned privately by various Lebanese citizens. This settlement does not border 
directly on a Lebanese village and has less intensive relations with the municipal-
ity on whose land it is located.
These settlements were created in the early 1950s by Bedouin tribes, mostly 
from the Akka and Safad regions of North Palestine, that found the official 
UNRWA camps unsuitable places to accommodate their cattle and preferred to 
settle near the orchards where they had found work (Stel, 2016a). The gatherings’ 
main source of income now is through agricultural work, but residents are also 
highly dependent on remittances from Europe. Both gatherings have an UNRWA 
health clinic that is open a few days a week, in one case complemented by a first 
aid service run by a non-governmental organization (NGO). They also have an 
UNRWA primary school and a kindergarten run by the PLO’s General Union of 
Palestinian Women. Each gathering has a youth centre and a soccer court. Elec-
tricity is provided by national electricity provider Électricité du Liban. Water is 
obtained through a well dug by the PLO and operated by the respective Popular 
Committees (which are introduced in more detail later in this chapter). Waste is 
collected by a local NGO.
The data underlying the analysis in this chapter are based on 12 months of 
fieldwork in 2012, 2013, and 2014, eight months of which were spent living in the 
gatherings in question. They consist of more than 270 semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews3 and informal expert meetings with Lebanese as well as Palestinian 
communal and political leaders, state representatives, residents, NGO staff, and 
analysts targeted via purposive and snowball sampling. I also conducted five focus 
groups. Where possible, I collected and analyzed documents as well. A significant 
part of the data, finally, regarded field observations. These were not limited to the 
two gatherings constituting my case-study, but also encompassed field visits to 
eight of Lebanon’s 12 Palestinian refugee camps and visits to almost all of South 
Lebanon’s Palestinian gatherings. In both cases, data were generated with the help 
of a local research partner from the respective gathering. Insights from these two 
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specific settlements are inevitably particular, but they have been systematically 
contextualized through a broader regional analysis and literature review. They can 
thus serve to elucidate the broader governance logics outlined in Chapter 3 that 
operate throughout the country and across formal as well as informal settlements.
Producing and ordering ‘gray spaces’: the status 
of the gatherings
Chapter 4 conceptualized Palestinian refugee settlements in Lebanon as the materi-
alization of informality, liminality, and exceptionalism. The camps are a foundation 
of the notion of permanent temporariness. Their provisional and transitory living 
environment potently symbolizes the assumed transient nature of Palestinians’ stay. 
At the same time, the camps loom large in the Lebanese public’s imagination as 
‘states-within-the-state,’ ‘security islands,’ or ‘zones of outlaw’ and are central in 
the depiction of the Palestinian refugee presence as a sovereignty threat. Following 
such securitized discourses, Palestinian camps and their inhabitants are simulta-
neously included in Lebanese state governance, when it comes to security, and 
excluded from it, when it comes to service provision – a duality that is legitimized 
with reference to the officially abrogated yet practically observed Cairo Agreement. 
Such ambiguous responsibility allows Lebanese state agencies – and Palestinian 
authorities, for that matter – to claim and deny authority as they see fit.
Thus, as Hanafi and Long (2010: 147) have concluded, rather than contend-
ing for power over the camps, as happened in the years before the Cairo Agree-
ment, or agreeing on sharing power, Lebanese and Palestinian authorities have 
together endorsed ‘the suspension of all sovereign authority over the camp and, 
in its place, the implementation of other “temporary” or “emergency” powers.’ 
These temporary informal arrangements, however, ‘often exist in mutual contra-
diction, and rather than order the camp, they leave it in a state of void, of chaos 
and anomie’ (Hanafi and Long, 2010: 147). But despite such evident institutional 
ambiguity, these 12 official camps have at least some sort of status. Their exist-
ence has been recognized by the Lebanese state, and the land they are built on is 
formally leased by UNRWA.
Yet less than half of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon currently live in these 
UNRWA camps. The majority of Lebanon’s Palestinians, an estimated 90,862 peo-
ple, lives in some 40-plus informal settlements, so-called gatherings (tajamu’aat 
in Arabic) (Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), 2018). The Dan-
ish Refugee Council (2005: 4–5), one of the first organizations to work in the 
gatherings, defines a gathering as a settlement that:
1. Has a population of Palestinian refugees. . . . 2. Has no official UNRWA 
camp status or any other legal authority identified with responsibility for camp 
management. 3. Is expected to have clearly defined humanitarian and protec-
tion needs, or have a minimum of 25 households. 4. Has a population with a 
sense of being a distinct group living in a geographically identifiable area.
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In many ways the gatherings face a similar regime of institutionalized temporari-
ness and exceptionalism as the camps, but for the gatherings, ambiguity goes even 
further. These informal settlements are not acknowledged as Palestinian spaces by 
the Lebanese state,4 and they are illegally built on Lebanese land, which prevents 
UNRWA from extending its mandate there in many ways. As with Syrian ‘infor-
mal tented settlements,’ no agreement or decision to regulate them, not even one 
to designate them to the non-state authority of the PLO or UNRWA, exists for the 
gatherings.
The gatherings were never part of the Cairo Agreement and are thus not included 
in its lingering influence. For residents of the informal settlements, this means 
that ‘the gatherings are under the Lebanese authorities, not under the Palestinian 
authorities; this is the difference with camps.’5 Yet this is not fully recognized by 
the Lebanese state. In fact, the gatherings even more pertinently illustrate the way 
in which the Lebanese state simultaneously includes Palestinian spaces in their 
control and excludes them from their responsibility than the UNRWA camps do: 
state agencies, including security institutions, can and do enter the gatherings, but 
civil authorities mostly do not make themselves responsible for them. Lebanese 
municipalities by and large do not consider the gatherings their responsibility, 
even when they are located on municipal land, as residents are neither citizens nor 
taxpayers. UNRWA’s territorial mandate is largely limited to the official camps as 
well. While residents of the gatherings make use of UNRWA schools and clinics, 
UNRWA does not provide utility services such as electricity, waste management, 
and infrastructure maintenance to them as it does in the camps.
In addition to this partial disregard by the Lebanese state and UNRWA, the 
gatherings are also to some extent abandoned by NGOs and Palestinian authori-
ties. Because of the gatherings’ relatively smaller population, NGOs are less active 
in the gatherings, where their projects will serve fewer beneficiaries than in the 
infamous camps that are well-known by donors. Their impact is more precarious 
in the gatherings, moreover, due to the uncertain tenancy status of these spaces. 
Palestinian political parties, finally, tend to concentrate their projects and pres-
ence in the camps, and they have the largest constituency, most significant power 
(due to their armed status there), and biggest symbolic resonance there. Someone 
working for an NGO active in the gatherings concluded: ‘The gatherings are not 
worth fighting over for the Palestinian factions.’6
Regularizing crisis
In the gatherings, the Palestinians’ ambiguous legal status and their lack of cit-
izenship and socio-economic rights coalesces with the undefined status of the 
settlements they live in. The result is amplified uncertainty and poverty. Socio-
economic marginalization in the gatherings is rampant. Two-thirds of the residents 
of the gatherings live below the poverty line (Chabaan, 2014: 59). While poverty 
is not more extreme in the gatherings than it is in the camps, in the gatherings it is 
exacerbated by uncertain access to services. According to national Lebanese law, 
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people living in ‘informal settlements’ have no right to public services. Law 7279, 
which was issued in 1961, states that ‘it is forbidden to connect property owners 
or residents of a lot with a phone, service or electricity if s/he does not provide a 
residency permit’ (Yassin, Stel and Rassi, 2016: 8). While suspended in 1967, this 
provision was reinstated in 1971 through a new Lebanese building code.
Residents of Palestinian gatherings are excluded from public services, which 
are minimal in Lebanon to begin with, and from part of the UNRWA mandate. 
They also face impediments to private solutions due to the illegal nature of their 
residence in the gatherings. Thus, to access services they resort to complex and 
diverse strategies. With regard to electricity, for instance, in many gatherings 
there is an informal grid inside the settlement that illegally taps electricity from 
the public network. Such collective illegal hooking is supervised by the commit-
tees operating in the gatherings. This arrangement depends on informal taxation 
as well as efforts of Palestinian authorities to mobilize funding for maintenance 
through their political networks. The water infrastructure in the gatherings is built 
and maintained without the approval of Lebanese local water authorities or the 
relevant ministry. It functions under the auspices of the PLO, which relies on 
informal and voluntary taxation as well as support from NGOs to raise the neces-
sary funds to operate the local wells. The gatherings are mostly not connected to 
the Lebanese water network nor to the public sewage system.
Access to services, consequently, is irregular. It depends on personal relations 
between Palestinian and Lebanese authorities and the latter’s occasional good-
will towards the former. A waste management crisis in the gatherings in the sum-
mer of 2013 shows this well (Stel and Van der Molen, 2015). For a long time, a 
local NGO collected solid waste from Palestinian gatherings and discarded it on 
municipal waste dump sites. When the capacity of these sites was saturated, a new 
recycling factory was opened by the Union of Municipalities, but this recycling 
plant had a limited capacity as well. It was therefore decided that it would only 
treat waste collected by municipal operators. Upon protest by UNRWA, waste 
collected by UNRWA from the formal Palestinian camps was accepted as well. 
Garbage from the Palestinian gatherings, serviced by neither the municipalities 
nor UNRWA, however, could not be disposed of in the new facility.
Only after extensive lobbying by UNRWA was the situation resolved, but the 
‘solution’ here, an UNRWA employee anonymously explained, is unstable and 
precarious. In convincing the Municipal Union’s waste recycling factory to accept 
waste collected in the Palestinian gatherings, UNRWA had to operate extremely 
carefully:
The factory is a municipal constellation. The whole situation is very sensi-
tive. . . . Because some agreements aren’t exactly official, but rather depend 
on personal relations. The municipalities involved might be concerned this 
arrangement gets public. We fought really hard for this deal and I don’t want 
to endanger it. We talked a lot with the mayors and the municipalities. A lot 
of wasta7 went into this.
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Thus, as my interlocutors noted, because the official legal and institutional 
arrangements were not changed, this resolution would only hold until the next 
crisis. Indeed, the continuity of ‘crisis’ and the omnipresence of ‘chaos’ in the 
daily life in the gatherings were a constant in the accounts of people living in the 
gatherings (Stel and Van der Molen, 2015). In discussing these problems with 
waste collection, for instance, a communal representative from one of the gather-
ings replied: ‘It lasted long, but because we’re used to crises, maybe it didn’t feel 
so long.’8
The distinction between ‘crises’ and ‘normal times’ is misleading when it 
comes to the governance of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. A key character-
istic of the Palestinian life in Lebanon, as Chapter 4 laid down, is that there are 
no regular processes. There are certain informal modus operandi that hold over 
longer periods of time, and the governance dynamics in the gatherings accord-
ingly reflect chains of ad hoc crisis management. Describing life in the gatherings, 
a participant in a focus group stated:
We live in a situation of chaos. No one is ruling on the ground, each one 
has its own laws that he applies according to his benefits. No one cares for 
the people; they are living; they are suffering; this is not important for them 
[Lebanese and Palestinian authorities]. You are in Lebanon and you must 
know this – we’re in the jungle, not in a state. . . . We have no court, we have 
no law, we have no state, we’re discriminated, we’re animals to them; we 
resemble everything but people to them.9
Preventing formalization, reiterating liminality
Service provision arrangements in the gatherings, as the Common Space Ini-
tiative (2011) noted, remain personal and occasional, ‘lacking the institutional 
framework that ensures its continuity and sustainability.’ Written documentation 
about the provision and regulation of services is non-existent for the gatherings. 
This is due to strong traditions of oral communication in much of the govern-
ance institutions involved, including state agencies, but is clearly increased by 
the lack of a formal status for the gatherings. As a Palestinian analyst explained: 
‘Written things imply commitments; not to write something down is to escape 
responsibility. If someone is just paying lip service, it is preferable if it isn’t 
documented.’10
Marginalization and deprivation are thus directly related to the informal nature 
of the gatherings, the non-status of which continues to be upheld. Most of the 
gatherings have been there since the early days of the Palestinian refugee presence 
in Lebanon, yet their status has never been resolved. The possibility of formalizing 
the gatherings was a recurrent theme in my interviews, especially in light of the 
eviction threats discussed later. Some inhabitants from the gatherings or people 
working there suggested that the gatherings could be allocated formal camp status. 
This, however, was without exception followed by stressing the absolute taboo in 
Governing Lebanon’s Palestinian ‘gatherings’ 159
Lebanon to recognize new camps. While at least three formal camps have been 
destroyed or closed since the 1950s, it is anathema for the Lebanese state to allow 
for new camps to be recognized. With reference to the annihilation of the Nahr 
el-Bared camp and the perpetual delays in its reconstruction, many of the people 
I spoke with suggested that the Lebanese state was out to minimize the number of 
formal camps, not allow for new ones. As one UNRWA representative in South 
Lebanon agitatedly noted: ‘Do you think the Lebanese would accept to go from 
12 to 24 camps?!11 They [the people who suggest camp status for the gatherings 
would be possible] are crazy!’12
In fact, the gatherings’ uncertain status seems to serve to underscore Lebanon’s 
institutionalization of permanent temporariness, as discussed in Chapter 4. The 
very term ‘gathering’ projects a transience that does not reflect reality. The word 
‘gathering’ suggests a ‘simplistic, even atomistic and haphazard assembly of peo-
ple’ that is illusory (Knudsen, 2018: 9). Like the camps, the gatherings constitute 
clearly bounded and relatively stable spatial, social, and political communities. 
Yet due to such associations with fleetingness and insignificance, many residents 
of the gatherings, I was told by my interlocutors, ‘prefer to call gatherings camps 
because this makes them sound more important; “gathering” has associations 
with randomness, with “a group of people gathered together,” whereas the word 
“camp” signifies joint relations.’13 The temporariness that the notion of ‘gath-
ering’ suggests, however, is perfectly in line with the anti-tawteen discourse of 
Lebanese authorities discussed in the previous chapter.
Lack of formal status for the gatherings and the absence of formal service deliv-
ery arrangements allow authorities to ignore the gatherings. A former spokes-
person of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) confided in me 
that he ‘knew everything about the Palestinian cause, as I have always been a 
supporter of Palestine, but very little about Palestinian-Lebanese relations on the 
ground.’14 Even formalization of service delivery practices in the gatherings – a 
far cry from actual formalization of the status of gatherings as such – was a taboo 
for Lebanese authorities. While they routinely deal with the gatherings, they have 
neither the resources nor the political will to take actual responsibility. And, in the 
current informal set-up, they do not have to.
Thus, the informal status of the gatherings allows for what Allan (2014: 104) 
has called ‘malign neglect.’ This resonates closely with Yiftachel’s (2009) work 
on ‘gray spacing,’ with which he refers to the production of spatially confined 
informalities and the indefinite positioning of populations between legality and 
illegality as a method of control. Such spaces that are neither integrated nor elimi-
nated, as also shown by the prior account of the status of the gatherings, serve 
variegated purposes. This functionality ensures that such uncertainty is kept in 
place. The largely informal status of the gatherings has pragmatic considerations, 
allowing various governance actors to shirk responsibility, as well as political 
ones, in that it allows for upholding the illusion of temporariness. It is thereby 
a core foundation of institutional ambiguity that governs the life of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon.
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Representation and the Palestinian ‘Popular 
Committees:’ withholding recognition,  
dictating responsibility
It is not just the status of Palestinian settlements itself that is ambiguous. The same 
goes for the status of representative organizations in these settlements. Chapter 4 
outlined that Lebanese authorities recognize the Palestinian Authority and the Pal-
estinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as well as individual Palestinian political 
parties (both those inside and outside the PLO). Due to the complexities of the 
transnationally fragmented and politically polarized Palestinian polity, there is no 
clear-cut representative for the Palestinian community in Lebanon. This situation 
is convenient with an eye to the Lebanese post–Civil War objective of marginal-
izing Palestinian refugees and, therefore, is exacerbated by Lebanese divide-and-
rule tactics. Governance in the gatherings extends this logic: the organizational 
bodies that claim to represent specific Palestinian settlement communities have 
no formal status. But while they are not officially recognized as counterparts by 
Lebanese authorities, these same Lebanese state agencies routinely deal with 
them. This simultaneous de facto validation and de jure disownment undermines 
the capacity and legitimacy of Palestinian committees and prevents coordinated 
political grassroots organization of Palestinian communities.
Drawing on the previously introduced case-studies, this section presents how 
local governance in and of Palestinian settlements operates under these condi-
tions, and it explains how official denial and unofficial engagement serves Leba-
nese and Palestinian authorities. Lebanese state agencies can keep the upper hand 
in any encounter with Palestinian communities through dependent and therefore 
dependable local Palestinian counterparts. The Lebanese political parties that 
run state agencies reinforce their power as indispensable brokers between offi-
cially illegal committees and state agencies formally precluded to deal with them. 
This arrangement allows Palestinian political authorities to maintain their own 
resented leadership positions, as the current status of the committees enables 
Palestinian political parties to capture local structures and ignore calls for more 
accountability.
Whose popularity, whose committees?
Lebanon’s camps and gatherings are governed by a hybrid, dynamic arrange-
ment of various state and non-state actors. As Hanafi (2011: 32) describes, rather 
than being controlled by a single sovereign, since the expulsion and subsequent 
marginalization of the PLO Lebanon’s Palestinian settlements are governed by 
‘a multi-layered tapestry’ of ‘groups, individuals and factions’ that compete for 
power. This ‘web of complex power structures’ includes local governance com-
mittees, related security committees, networks of notables, political factions, reli-
gious structures, NGOs, and UNRWA representatives (Hanafi, 2008: 10). While 
all of these fulfil crucial functions in arrangements for services, security, justice, 
Governing Lebanon’s Palestinian ‘gatherings’ 161
and consultation, my argument here will focus on the role of the committees in 
the settlements, as these are – in one way or another – recognized by most other 
actors as the closest thing to an overarching public representative body for these 
localities.
In the 1960s, the PLO installed so-called Popular Committees as civil bodies 
to provide services, security, and political representation in the camps. They were 
described in article two of the Cairo Agreement as ‘local governance commit-
tees’ (Suleiman, 2017: 27). The Popular Committees, in a nutshell, are the PLO’s 
instrument to organize local governance, including coordination with Lebanese 
authorities. In 70 percent of the settlements, Popular Committees are the main 
coordinating body within the community (Ugland, 2003: 185, see also Danish 
Refugee Council, 2005: 155; Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017: 11). They are often 
referred to as municipality-like bodies in the sense that they oversee service 
provision and the related informal taxation, operate as a land registry, serve as 
intermediaries in judicial matters and social conflict, and have a related security 
committee that polices the settlements.
The Palestinian Popular Committees in Lebanon fall under the Lebanese office 
of the PLO’s Department of Refugee Affairs that oversees a Central Follow-Up 
Committee on the national level, five regional Popular Committee offices, and a 
Popular Committee in each settlement (Stel, 2016b). The statutes for the Popular 
Committees outline detailed procedures for the creation and operation of the com-
mittees and its monthly magazine aims to convey the image of a structured organi-
zation that is governed through a formal hierarchy, meets on a regular basis, and 
whose functioning is formally documented. All of this, however, is a far cry from 
reality. Although the statutes prescribe elections, these almost never take place, 
and allocation of the different positions in each committee rather reflects the cur-
rent power balance among the various Palestinian parties within the PLO (and the 
current dominance of Fatah).15 This also means that while the Popular Commit-
tees are officially civil bodies, they are heavily politicized and are perceived by 
Palestinians as party structures rather than public, communal bodies.
Committee members are appointed by the political leadership based on party 
loyalty rather than skills or popular support. And while they should officially step 
down after several years, this hardly ever happens. While committees should have 
13 members – one for each PLO faction – with demarcated and specialized posi-
tions, in practice it is often just the president of the committee and the secretary 
that have an active role. Overall then, Popular Committees face a severe crisis 
of capacity and legitimacy. They lack the capabilities and resources to govern as 
their official mandate dictates and have very little support from the communities 
they claim to represent, who widely lament their corruption.
The wane of the Palestinian Committees started with the expulsion of the 
PLO from Lebanon. After 1982, PLO-related institutions were almost entirely 
dismantled by the Syrian-Lebanese military intelligence apparatus. Alternative, 
pro-Syrian committees were established, but these suffered from wanting legiti-
macy and resources. After the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon in 2005, these 
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alternative committees have continued to exist, becoming more closely tied to the 
institutional structures of the anti-PLO Islamist Palestinian parties joined under 
the alliance led by Hamas. Inside the settlements, these ‘Family Committees’ 
duplicate much of the work and mandate of the Popular Committees, and there 
is fierce competition between them, but Family Committees overall take less of 
a representative position to actors external to the settlements, mostly deferring to 
the PLO’s Popular Committees in this regard.
Although facing many problems and deficits, the Popular Committees are 
thus present in each Palestinian settlement and have a long institutional history 
and broad social reach. In the last decade, moreover, there have been extensive 
attempts – varying in their degree of success – to professionalize the committees. 
The most recent initiative regards a series of consultative meetings in August 2017 
in which, according to the legal scholar and activist who initiated it, all relevant 
factions and representatives agreed to work towards ‘uniting, rehabilitating and 
activating the Popular Committees’ (Suleiman, 2017: 26). In theory, then, Popular 
Committees are a logical focal point for governance in the gatherings, especially 
when it comes to the relations with Lebanese state agencies.
They are part of a clear institutional structure that is not undisputed but comes 
closest to what the Palestinians have in terms of a representative authority. Their 
mandate gives them a suitable framework to operate as municipality-like struc-
tures and provides instructions for linking this Palestinian local representation 
to the structures of the Lebanese state. Indeed, in many ways, Palestinian Popu-
lar Committees style themselves as such and in some regards prioritize their 
role as interlocutor for the Lebanese state over their position as representative 
of Palestinian communities (Stel, 2016b). The importance of coordination with 
the Lebanese state for these Palestinian committees is also evident in the vision 
of the Central Follow-Up Committee for the Popular Committees in Lebanon 
that commands its regional offices to ‘work towards the activation and improve-
ment of the relations with the neighbourhood, especially with the municipali-
ties in the cities and the surrounding Lebanese villages.’16 Popular Committees 
in some instances institutionally mirror Lebanese state authorities in terms of 
structure and operation. In 2010, for instance, the PLO’s Department for Refu-
gee Affairs has amended the previous statutes of the Popular Committees. This 
was partly done to align the organizational hierarchy of the Popular Committees 
with the administrative echelons of the Lebanese state to thereby enable closer 
coordination.
Yet this will to coordinate does not seem to be reciprocated on the Lebanese 
side – at least not formally. In day-to-day governance, the Popular Committees 
feature as the main reference point for Lebanese authorities if and when they 
engage with Palestinian communities. Local Lebanese state agencies – such 
as provincial and district governors, municipalities, and mukhtars – in many 
instances cannot avoid dealing with the informal Palestinian settlements within 
their areas. Residents of the Palestinian gatherings generally saw service provi-
sion and socio-political life in the gatherings as crucially dependent on relations 
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with Lebanese authorities. As one Popular Committee member rhetorically asked 
me: ‘How would you solve issues if you don’t sit together?’17
As Suleiman (2017: 27) concludes after decades of studying this issue, many 
municipalities have long-term engagements with both camps and gatherings with 
regard to matters of waste collection, maintenance of electricity supply equipment, 
and permits to repair and build houses. This is also illustrated by the vignettes in 
this chapter’s next section. Municipalities, mukhtars, and utility companies rou-
tinely work with Popular Committees (Stel, 2015a). A regional manager of Élec-
ticité du Liban, for instance, explained:
There is a Popular Committee present in all gatherings. . . . There is coordina-
tion between us. . . . It’s true the Lebanese state doesn’t consider it as official, 
but if there are problems in the gathering as a whole, the Popular Committee 
is responsible. We cooperate with them as a reality on the ground, but not 
official. . . . And for us it’s better if the Popular Committee comes to apply 
than if twenty people all come by themselves.18
A state representative in a village in the vicinity of a Palestinian gathering said 
it was ‘natural’ for him to work with the Popular Committee there since, he 
explained, ‘it’s just me and the Popular Committee who do the local governance 
here.’19 Even representatives of the LPDC, whose policy vision does not so 
much as mention the Popular Committees (see LPDC, 2013), matter-of-factly 
explained that on ‘construction, infrastructure, electricity, water, sewage . . . we 
call them directly.’20
But despite routine engagement with Popular Committees by a wide range of 
local Lebanese state agencies, they are not officially recognized by the Lebanese 
state as relevant official representatives. This is evident in a lack of documented 
acknowledgement and is reinstated regularly on the ground. The non-status of the 
Popular Committees became acutely obvious, for instance, in the aftermath of 
the Nahr el-Bared crisis, when the new model for camp governance presented at 
the Vienna conference completely disregarded any existing governance structures 
and authorities in the camp. In fact, as the director of a leading Palestinian NGO 
in Lebanon explained, Nahr el-Bared’s Popular Committees were sidelined by the 
Lebanese state by means of a circular from the Ministry of Interior that stated the Leb-
anese state would not work with ‘illegal bodies’ in the areas surrounding the camp 
and which included the Popular Committees operating there as an example of 
such illegal bodies.21 The lack of formal status of the Popular Committees was 
also a constant in my interviews with Lebanese authorities in South Lebanon, 
where one mayor referred to the Popular Committee in a neighboring gathering as 
a ‘delegation of tribal spokesmen.’22
Locally, then, there is no formal representative of Palestinian communities. 
On a national level, the LPDC does meet with PLO representatives who fulfil 
functions in the national tier of the Popular Committee structure. But even then 
Popular Committees, referred to by the LPDC (2012) as ‘quasi local authorities,’ 
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are not acknowledged as formal partners, a legal officer working for the LDPC 
confirmed.23 In the words of an LPDC representative:
Apart from the embassy, the government also recognized the PLO and 
Hamas. Hamas because Hamas now has a government in Gaza. And it rec-
ognizes all Palestinian factions as entities. But the PLO is the representative, 
Abu Mazen [Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas]. And not just the PLO 
now, we’re talking about Palestine, about the PA [the Palestinian National 
Authority in Palestine]. If there’re dealings, they’re between the PLO and the 
government of Lebanon. The government of Lebanon doesn’t care about the 
Popular Committees; it doesn’t have to recognize them, they’re not important 
for the government of Lebanon.24
This means that the local bodies that, despite their immense limitations in terms of 
capacity and legitimacy, have the most potential to directly represent the Palestinian 
communities in Lebanon are sidelined by the Lebanese state – even if in their own 
local practical engagements with these committees Lebanese authorities seem to cor-
roborate the committees’ relevance. This makes the delegitimation that follows from 
lack of formal status and recognition, in Hanafi’s (2011: 36) words, ‘purposeful.’
When discussing Lebanese authorities’ balancing act – dealing with and mak-
ing use of the committees while withholding any form of official status from 
them – with one of the main facilitators of the dialogue sessions organized by the 
LPDC, she reflected:
At this moment, I don’t think it’s wise to push for a law that recognizes the 
Popular Committees or anything. Because on a political level this isn’t going 
anywhere. For some, if not most, if not all Lebanese parties, this is really a 
big red line; anything that has to do with a legal status for the Popular Com-
mittees is.25
But she then added: ‘But they expressed a national consensus to look at the Popu-
lar Committees as a representative of the camp and of camp services.’ In her 
answer to my question as to what exactly was the difference between formal rec-
ognition of the Popular Committees as representatives and ‘looking at the Popular 
Committees as a representative,’ the creation of institutional ambiguity becomes 
apparent. She explained:
The question is how to move from total ad hocness to some sort of adminis-
trative status that would recognize them, but without giving them a legal sta-
tus. . . . This would be something in between; formalizing their way of work, 
this is a grey area, so to say. We have to look into this grey area.
Not giving the Popular Committees official status is tied up with historical sensi-
tivities. Many Lebanese parties are haunted by the legacy of the Cairo Agreement. 
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The local ‘self-governance’ legitimized under the Cairo Agreement, for them, pre-
ceded and enabled the PLO’s eventual state-within-the-state, going far beyond the 
parameters defined in the agreement that stipulated, according to Suleiman (2017: 
27), that such self-governance should happen ‘in cooperation with the local Leba-
nese authorities and within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty.’ The echoes 
of such self-governance that would be implicit in recognizing Palestinian Popular 
Committees make Lebanese politicians uncomfortable to say the least.
Local non-recognition is thus legitimated by and simultaneously extends the 
divide-and-rule approach that the Lebanese state takes vis-à-vis Palestinian rep-
resentatives nationally. As Knudsen (2009: 67) carefully documents, because the 
Popular Committees are affiliated with the PLO and the PLO no longer represents 
the entirety of the Palestinian political spectrum, the Lebanese state refuses to 
acknowledge it as a formal representative, fearing this would sideline Tahaluf and 
the related Family Committees. It is allegedly unwilling to take sides in what it 
considers to be an internal Palestinian issue. But while this political and institu-
tional divide between the PLO and the Tahaluf, between the Popular Committees 
and the Family Committees, is lamented by Lebanese authorities, it is facilitated 
by the Lebanese political parties that staff these state authorities, who, accord-
ing to Borgmann and Slim (2018: 30), ‘manage Palestinian infighting to impose 
their will on the camps.’ Moreover, since the Popular Committees are affiliated 
with the PLO’s Department of Refugee Affairs, which is formally recognized by 
the Lebanese state as the representative of the Palestinian people, withholding 
this recognition from their local organizational tier appears inconsistent since the 
desire to avoid partiality in the PLO-Tahaluf strife apparently does not impede the 
PLO’s recognition nationally.
Propping up the middlemen
But why would this de jure recognition matter at all if the reality on the ground is 
characterized by extensive de facto engagement of the state with Popular Com-
mittees anyway? It matters because non-recognition of the Popular Committees – 
especially in combination with the vague status of refugee settlements – has acute 
consequences (Stel, 2017). The absence of formal recognition is certainly not the 
only impediment for the Popular Committees to carry out their official responsi-
bilities, but it is a major one. It makes engagement with the Lebanese authorities, 
and by extension the entire governance situation in the gatherings, informal. It 
renders governance irregular, because Popular Committees cannot count on their 
relations with local authorities and because Popular Committees do not have the 
mandate or right to speak for and act on behalf of their communities, but rather 
have to be granted, allowed, this position on a case-by-case basis. And it results 
in indirect forms of rule, because the unofficial nature of the Popular Committees 
makes them dependent on a wide array of political brokers and middlemen that, 
in Suleiman’s (2017: 24) words, ‘control the channels of municipal support for the 
Popular Committees.’
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Ultimately, as long as Popular Committees lack an official status, it is always 
up to the discretion of the Lebanese state to either deal with them as the repre-
sentative of the Palestinian community and hold them responsible for it when 
this suits them or disown them as such and treat them as a ‘a delegation of tribal 
spokesmen’ when this is more convenient. This does not mean that there are no 
local Lebanese state representatives who work constructively with the Popular 
Committees, but – as the opening vignette to this chapter illustrates – it does mean 
that such engagement is always conditional and temporary, always depending on 
the mercy and personal goodwill of the Lebanese authority in question, making 
governance unpredictable. When I asked him about the many Lebanese officials 
that do occasionally help Palestinian authorities, an interlocutor associated with 
the Palestinian Embassy in Lebanon reflected: ‘This is about “I woke up in a good 
mood today and I’m going to help you.” It happens from time to time. But we 
need a system; we need things done properly, not depending on moods.’26
Non-recognition does not merely have national political expediency. It also 
works as a practical local governance strategy. State authorities in South Lebanon 
have little means to govern, but they do need to control. The crippled nature of 
the Popular Committees that stems from their non-recognition helps local Leba-
nese authorities – themselves struggling with vast capacity deficits and legitimacy 
problems – to maintain the upper hand in their engagements with Palestinian com-
munities. This is relevant specifically in light of the violent history of the Palestin-
ian political presence in South Lebanon.
It helps Lebanese local governance actors to have the committees work for 
them rather than for the Palestinian people they theoretically represent. When 
discussing the relations between local Lebanese authorities and Palestinian Popu-
lar Committees, a Palestinian analyst bluntly concluded: ‘The Popular Commit-
tees are not in power. They are delegalized and unrecognized. [But] . . . they 
are sometimes used by the security apparatus to get them to hand people over.’27 
The informal status of the committees makes their relations with Lebanese state 
agencies conditional upon, for instance, their policing of their communities for 
the Lebanese state. As Hanafi (2010: 28) concludes, the co-option of the Popular 
Committees by the Lebanese state, which is enabled by its delegitimation of these 
same committees, ensures that Palestinian settlements are ‘perfectly under the 
control of the Lebanese state.’ Delegitimized and under-capacitated Popular Com-
mittees are an element of indirect rule. In its attempt to control refugee spaces 
without taking direct responsibility for them, Lebanese state authorities need a 
client authority, a role that the Popular Committees now regularly fulfil. Martin 
(2011: 160) has previously noted that the Lebanese government has a history of 
exercising control over Palestinian settlements ‘through the PLO.’ Indeed, a local 
PLO official went so far as to claim that ‘we help the Lebanese government to 
control.’28
The lack of formal status of the committees is also arguably convenient for 
Lebanese political parties. Because state authorities are limited in some ways in 
their engagement with the committees exactly because of the committees’ lack 
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of legal status, interactions between Popular Committees and state agencies are 
often mediated by Lebanese politicians. In the gatherings I studied, this mediated 
form of governance was the result of the fact that the Popular Committees ulti-
mately needed something – such as permission for construction, coordination on 
infrastructural services, or authorization of events – from the municipality (Stel, 
2015a). But since they did not have the formal authority to demand or request 
this from state agencies directly, they often had to turn to brokers. These brokers 
included NGOs and UNRWA, but most importantly consisted of Lebanese and 
Palestinian politicians.
As described in Chapter 1, Lebanon’s political parties operate a vast institu-
tional network outside the framework of the formal state. This makes them par-
ticularly well-suited to function as a broker between the Palestinian communities 
and their representatives on the one hand and the official institutions of the Leba-
nese state on the other. Residents from one of the gatherings I studied explained 
that the Popular Committee alerts the local PLO/Fatah representative if it needs 
anything from the state. This person would then either contact the relevant Leba-
nese political representative in Tyre or pass the request on to his superiors in 
Beirut, who would then liaise with their relative Lebanese counterparts. The Leb-
anese politician would subsequently contact his ‘people within the state institu-
tions,’ whether ministers, mayors, or employees, to get the job done (Stel, 2015a: 
81). A representative of the national Union of Popular Committees explained to 
me: ‘We cannot talk with state employees directly. Our direct relations are with 
the political leaders who can affect these employees.’29 NGOs similarly found that 
‘political parties remain more important than municipalities. Palestinian bodies 
will lobby with political parties that will then pressure the relevant functionary 
in the municipality.’30 Even the LPDC follows this logic. According to a former 
spokesperson, it always goes ‘through the political parties: . . . You have to see 
who is supporting this municipality, Amal or Hezbollah, and go to them.’31
In fact, the two dominant parties in South Lebanon have liaison committees 
or officers to strengthen their ties with Palestinian groups (Stel, 2015a). A rep-
resentative of Hezbollah found that his party operated as ‘the channel between 
the Palestinians and the state.’32 A person introduced as a ‘liaison’ with the Pal-
estinians in South Lebanon for Amal similarly explained how his party employs 
its ‘presence in the government’ to facilitate communication between Palestinian 
parties and state institutions.33 This logic of political mediation was compellingly 
explained to me by a leading figure within the Popular Committee hierarchy in 
the Tyre region:
The Lebanese structure is different. If I talk to the district governor, he frankly 
says he’s not the suitable person to talk to. We all know where to go. If we 
need an electricity transmitter and we have a problem with the manager of 
the company in Sidon, we search for a manager affiliated with either Bahia 
or Osama [the leaders of the two major competing Lebanese parties in Sidon] 
who can pressure him and we go directly to this person and convince him to 
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give the transformer. Here [in Tyre], we have to know if the manager in ques-
tion is from Amal or Hezbollah and then we can go to talk to the leadership 
directly. If we go the long way, the official way, you don’t get anything like 
you do when you take the shortest way. The question is: Who can influence 
this person? Before we talk. . ., we have to ask this question. This is the struc-
ture of the country.34
The same Lebanese political parties that are represented in the national govern-
ment that is unable and unwilling to recognize the Palestinian Popular Committees 
that local state agencies deal with on a daily basis, play a crucial role in mediating 
between the committees and state agencies locally. This brokerage confirms their 
political relevance in Lebanon’s hybrid political order, which works through the 
informal lubricant constituted by these parties that are simultaneously part of and 
separate from the state system. Were the Popular Committees to be regularized and 
recognized, Lebanon’s political parties would lose much of their informal political 
power in the local governance of Palestinian communities – and, with that, grip 
on an ‘issue’ or ‘file’ that is historically, politically, and militarily salient to them.35
The absence of formal status does not exclusively serve Lebanese politi-
cal actors. Palestinian political leaders are implicated in the current governance 
arrangements as well. On the one hand, Palestinian authorities are keenly aware 
of the importance of formal acknowledgement of the Lebanese state for their local 
structures. In the Mar Elias meeting of August 2017, the adopted recommendation 
explicitly calls upon the Lebanese state ‘to recognize the committees as a ser-
vice and municipal authority in the Palestinian camps and gatherings’ (Suleiman, 
2017: 26). On the other hand, the Palestinian political parties that have basically 
captured the Popular Committees and run them without most of the consultation 
and accountability measures that the committees should formally respect arguably 
benefit from the informal status of the committees as well.
By now, any power the Popular Committees may have depends on the good-
will of Lebanese authorities more than on the support of Palestinian refugees. 
Lebanon’s Palestinians broadly feel that their leaders care more about ‘political 
relations’ with Lebanese than about the ‘lives of ordinary Palestinian refugees’ 
(Ramadan, 2008: 673). Recognition from the Lebanese state might come with 
strings attached, such as the demand to actually implement the committees’ stat-
utes, whereas now the Palestinian communities that the Popular Committees 
claim to represent have few means to hold the committees accountable. Formal 
status, then, risks severely undermining the current modus operandi of the widely 
unpopular Palestinian ‘factions’ that is characterized by repression and impunity.
Thus, as an LPDC analyst concluded, in Palestinian settlements ‘the reality 
on the ground, the current situation, is a consequence of mutual interests.’36 This 
resonates with other evidence of ‘the tacit complicity between institutional stake-
holders on the Palestinian political scene and the Lebanese government in main-
taining the status quo’ (Allan, 2014: 203). Popular Committees are propped up 
and undermined at the same time and encouraged in a deliberately informal guise 
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that makes their operation unstable and liminal and their interaction with the Leb-
anese state exceptional and conditional. This aligns with the unpopular and unac-
countable power positions of Lebanese as well as Palestinian political parties.
Life in suspended spaces: ever-imminent 
destruction and eviction
Informality, liminality, and exceptionalism are institutionalized through the non-
status of Palestinian refugee settlements and Palestinian refugee representatives. 
The implications of this institutional ambiguity for the governance of Lebanon’s 
Palestinian refugees are, as documented previously, evident across the board, 
impacting access to services and justice, prospects for collective action, and the 
accountability of Palestinian leadership. This section zooms in on one of the most 
existential aspects of life in the gatherings to explore how the different effects of 
institutional ambiguity intersect. By looking at the legal, temporal, and material 
precarity of the houses that make up Palestinian gatherings, it shows the spatial 
implications of institutional ambiguity. The section presents three vignettes that 
revolve around the spatial domain of governance: one concerning a short and 
demarcated period of unprecedented building and renovation activity and two 
regarding pending eviction threats.37
The issue of building and housing in Palestinian communities and spaces is 
extremely sensitive because it is so closely related to the notion of permanence. 
As Ramadan and Fregonese (2017: 5) conclude, the Lebanese state has ‘consist-
ently sought to maintain the transience of the Palestinian presence through intense 
restrictions on construction . . . and on property rights.’ This is, for instance, why 
Lebanese authorities fret over apparently inconsequential issues like roofing 
material: New buildings are more likely to be condoned if they have a zinc roof 
than if they have a cement one, because the latter would enable eventual vertical 
expansion and would make destruction harder. It also explains the widespread 
reluctance of Lebanese authorities to allow gatherings to connect to physical 
infrastructure such as sewage networks or water provision, as these – just as with 
Syrian informal settlements – are seen to acknowledge or encourage the normali-
zation of the refugees’ presence.
Since 2001, Palestinians are legally prohibited from owning land or real estate, 
because, according to Lebanese authorities, allowing Palestinian refugees to own 
a home encourages them to envision their future in Lebanon rather than in a pro-
spective Palestinian state. The 2001 law has had relatively little consequences 
for refugees living in formal camps, as these have their own internal renting and 
ownership dynamics within the closed-off perimeters of the UNRWA-leased land. 
It has, however, severely impacted all Palestinians outside the recognized refu-
gee camps, who generally do not hold official titles for the land they are living 
on. Unsurprisingly, consequently, residents of the ‘gray spaces’ that the gather-
ings represent identify housing, land, and tenure issues as their most pressing 
problem (Chabaan, 2014: 35).38 Unpublished documentation provided to me by 
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a representative of the Popular Committee structure in the Tyre region went as far 
as to identify the risk of eviction as a definitional feature of a gathering.39
Legally speaking, Palestinians living in the gatherings do so illicitly. This 
means they cannot fulfil the criteria to obtain the necessary permissions to build, 
extend, or rehabilitate houses. Initially, this was hardly problematic. Most fami-
lies living in the two gatherings studied built their houses in the 1950s. At that 
time, construction was not an issue if the landowner consented. In the 1960s, 
residents described their building activities in a way that resembles Bayat’s (1997) 
‘quiet encroachment.’ Throughout the Lebanese Civil War, under the tutelage of 
the PLO, this encroachment became considerably less quiet and took place virtu-
ally unchecked (Stel, 2015b). Only with the post-war reinstallation of the munici-
palities from the mid-1990s onward did local authorities start to exercise control 
over construction.
In the gatherings, then, building new houses and even repairing existing ones 
is prohibited. With the help of an informant network, the police closely monitor 
building activity and, in principle, destroy nascent construction. As a result of these 
restrictions, shelter in the gatherings is currently of poor quality, lacking proper 
water and sanitary services. Other infrastructure and services are affected, too. To 
do basic reparations on electricity lines, for example, specific permits from Leba-
nese authorities are required (Yassin, Stel and Rassi, 2016). Obtaining these per-
mits is often impossible, because they can only be requested by a person holding 
legal title to the land. Yet during my stay in the gatherings, it was obvious that con-
struction and renovation was continuously taking place. This gap between official 
regulations and reality followed from the residents’ creative strategies to enhance 
their living situations. In many cases, people built in secret, often under cover of 
night, and hoped the police would not discover their building activity until it consti-
tuted a ‘fact on the ground’ (Stel, 2015b). Then they would try to prevent the police 
from destroying their house either through bribes or wasta with authorities able to 
pressure the police to, as they described it, ‘look the other way.’40
More often, though, residents would ask the municipality for permission to 
build, which in many cases would be given. This permission, however, was 
widely described as ‘humanitarian’ or ‘illegal,’ meaning it was in principle condi-
tional and temporary and could always be withdrawn without notice or explana-
tion.41 This is partly because municipalities cannot in fact give permission to build 
on privately owned land, which constitutes large parts of the gatherings. Even on 
public land, moreover, permission is a two-step procedure that entails not merely 
municipal consent but also approval from the Association of Engineers (which 
would be given only to the landowner). Municipal ‘permission’ here thus entails 
the exchange of money for a verbal promise that the police will not show up.42 In 
the words of one resident:
We get an illegal permission; it’s a permission just to keep the police away. 
For a legal permission you have to be the owner and bring papers from the 
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police and from different departments. The kind of permission we get is just 
to cover the eyes of the police.43
Thus, despite legal obstacles, financial costs, and social anxiety, residents of the 
gatherings have found a way to tend to their houses. The municipality plays a 
crucial gatekeeper role in this situation: without it, residents are at the mercy of 
the police and the landowners. Describing the realization of a soccer field in one 
of the gatherings, a resident explained:
The mayor agreed with us. He said he couldn’t give us a paper as it wasn’t his 
land, but he said ‘go ahead’ even if he couldn’t do so officially. And neither 
the state nor the police came. When we were finished, the police came and we 
told them to go see the mayor.44
The conduct of the municipality is to some extent informed by compassion. The 
municipality’s incentive to go against official state laws in ‘covering’ residents of 
the gatherings, however, also lies in the political ties between Palestinian parties 
and the dominant political party in the municipality in question. A senior Pal-
estinian political cadre living in one of the gatherings commented that regional 
Members of Parliament encourage the municipality to condone the Palestinians’ 
construction. The municipality is clearly also driven by economic incentives. As 
Beer (2011: 7) construes:
The willingness of the municipality and the police to intervene to prevent 
construction, rehabilitation, and extension of property should be viewed as an 
effort, primarily, to protect an income source rather than an attempt to fully 
uphold Lebanese HLP [housing, land, and property] law.
The institutional ambiguity and the arbitrary power that this ambiguity allots to 
local state agencies are evident in the ‘normal’ housing dynamics in the gather-
ings, as described earlier, but they were even more obvious during a development 
that residents of the gatherings have come to call the ‘building revolution.’
The win-win of looking the other way: constructing a 
window of opportunity
The ‘illegal permissions’ and the ‘looking the other way’ described in the prior 
section allow for basic renovations, but throughout my stay in the gatherings, 
I also saw a host of entirely new homes. These, it turned out, mostly originated 
from 2011, when many households in the gatherings in the South added rooms, 
or even entire floors, to their houses (Stel, 2014). Here, I will relay the specific 
dynamics of this ‘building revolution’ in one specific gathering, exploring how 
these dynamics were shaped by institutional ambiguity.
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Through rumours, media reports, and their own observations, people in the 
gathering knew that Lebanese people in their region were building without per-
missions. Following this observation, residents of the gathering took their chances 
and started construction work on their own houses. After a few weeks, the police 
installed a blockade of checkpoints around the settlement to prevent the entering 
of construction materials. Despite the region-wide precedents, the municipality 
on whose land this gathering was built repeatedly reinstated the illegality of con-
struction. Municipal representatives emphasized this in meetings with representa-
tives of the gatherings that took place at the municipality as well as during visits 
to the gathering. In the beginning of the building episode and towards the end of 
it, the municipal police entered the gathering several times to demolish nascent 
construction.
But where one state authority, the municipality, was vehemently opposed to the 
building, another local state authority, the mukhtar of a neighbouring Lebanese 
village, was more sympathetic of Palestinian construction activities. Arrange-
ments to facilitate construction were entirely informal and largely secretive. The 
bribing of policemen manning the checkpoints to smuggle in building materials 
happened through a double-blind system wherein Palestinians from the gathering 
had a contact who met with a representative of the policemen at the checkpoints:
The bribes reached the checkpoints indirectly, through two or three people 
who are close to the police. We cannot go to the policemen directly to pay 
them. These two or three people are relatives of the policemen and they have 
secret relations between them. The policemen can’t take from the people 
directly; they were afraid someone might take pictures and send them to their 
leadership. . . . These three or two persons they deal with us directly, but they 
pay a secret person who has the relations with the policemen and we didn’t 
talk with that person. The policemen don’t deal with these three or two; they 
deal only with the one.45
Other important ‘facilitators’ were the Lebanese political parties holding sway 
in the region. Political leaders and their local representatives condoned the 
building, creating an implicit obstacle for local state representatives to directly 
go against the building. Someone working for a Palestinian NGO in the region 
explained:
During this period, some two months during summer, each party supported 
their own followers to do whatever they wanted without repercussions in 
order to pressure their political adversaries. It was an internal Lebanese polit-
ical problem. They message was ‘do what you want and no one will prevent 
this.’ Under the table each party let their followers know to go ahead. And 
then in some instances the police would come to stop them, but someone 
would intervene to tell the police to look the other way.46
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The building revolution was ultimately a manifestation of a political showdown 
between Lebanon’s two political blocks at the time, March 8 and March 14. 
A national politician confirmed this:
This happened between two governments, after the fall of the government 
two and a half years ago. There was a great political conflict between the 
Lebanese political forces. And in such periods, the security forces are weak, 
because they can’t fight one and not the other. And during election times there 
is an understanding between all political leaders to let people build, this is a 
kind of facilitation for people. The political leaders can affect the police and 
the army and make them squeeze their eyes.47
In the gathering in question, the implicit support that political figures gave to the 
building activity was widely considered the main enabling factor for construction. 
The absence of national state control and the overt discrepancy between national 
political leaders and local state authorities provided people with a unique oppor-
tunity. In light of this, a local state representative described the construction spree, 
which was not permitted but not hindered either, as the way the ‘system works’ or 
even the ‘state’s will.’48
These events acutely illustrate the ways in which institutional ambiguity func-
tions in the gatherings. They were of course welcomed by residents as a great 
opportunity, but this should not obscure the structural conditions of the gatherings 
that dictate that such unpredictable and conditional ‘opportunities’ are the only 
option that people have to realize some form of decent housing. The informality 
of the gatherings’ institutional status and the Popular Committees’ representative 
position runs throughout the episode. The Popular Committees were relegated to 
a marginal position. People in the gathering emphasized that they operated on an 
individual basis and that no one represented them or arranged building permis-
sions. They said no one would want to take the collective responsibility for such 
an overtly illegal project. The Popular Committee, I was told, ‘couldn’t interfere, 
they don’t have the authority.’49 According to one contractor facilitating the build-
ing in the gatherings, the Popular Committee did not play a significant role in the 
building, because ‘the police don’t respect the Popular Committee.’50 Instead of 
operating collectively under Palestinian leadership, the gathering’s residents were 
made dependent on indirect relations with Lebanese state and political authorities 
for what was paradoxically called ‘illegal permission.’
Residents as well as their representatives were overall at the mercy of Lebanese 
political parties and their inclination to ‘look the other way.’ Rather than receiving 
official or unequivocal permission, their actions were illegal but condoned. For 
the residents of the gatherings, tending to their housing needs was an exceptional 
and implicit favour, never a right. The construction episode was a trial-and-error 
process, testing the water to see how far they could go. Opposing state agencies 
were seen to play a role that was ritualistic: announcing building restrictions but 
174 Governing Lebanon’s Palestinian ‘gatherings’
ignoring transgressions; installing checkpoints but allowing these to be circum-
vented. But, Palestinians from the gatherings were keen to stress, these rituals 
always carried the potential to be implemented ‘for real.’
Eviction as a continually adjourned but  
never abating threat
If exceptional opportunities to build are the carrots that Lebanese authorities 
can extend to those living in ‘gray spaces,’ evictions are the concomitant stick. 
Together, they demonstrate how institutional ambiguity dictates the fickle pos-
sibilities and impossibilities of living in the gatherings.
In one of the gatherings I studied, one specific area has long been threatened 
with eviction. This part of the settlement is located on municipal land that is sup-
posed to be used for the construction of a national highway (Stel, 2016a). The 
precise number of houses affected is disputed, but the engineer in charge of the 
construction project estimated that some 50 houses would be destroyed. These 
belonged to both Palestinian families from the gathering and Lebanese residents 
of a neighbouring village. The first stages of the project started in the mid-1990s, 
and residents have been aware of the eviction threats ever since. Some ten years 
later, they heard that the land on which they built their houses would be expropri-
ated in the highway construction process. A court case was opened, during which 
the municipality was informed about the procedure. However, follow-up hearings 
were required to sort out compensation issues. Partly because of these delays, the 
affected residents hoped or expected that the highway plan would be altered or 
cancelled and their houses might be spared, but in 2007 residents reported engi-
neers who came to mark houses. A few years later, construction started with more 
houses added to the eviction list. The subsequent arrival of engineering teams 
made it clear that the construction of the highway was imminent.
The Council for Development and Reconstruction, a national inter-ministerial 
body with the aim to efficiently implement construction projects, was in charge 
of the highway construction. It hired a consulting company to manage the actual 
construction and contracted various construction companies to implement the 
building. After the government published a decree in which it announced the 
highway’s final route and the affected land plots, an expropriation file was sent 
to a legal committee headed by a judge. As the municipality is the landowner 
in question, its lawyer was the main interlocutor for this legal committee. The 
legal committee, a lawyer of the Council for Development and Reconstruction 
explained to me, was aware of the fact that there are people living illegally on the 
municipal land, but could not take these people into consideration because of the 
gatherings’ lack of legal status. Thus, the committee relied on the municipality – 
as the legal landowner – to help them deal with the residents of the land. Both the 
Council for Development and Reconstruction and the legal committee assumed 
that the municipality would represent and inform the residents, facilitate their 
exit and relocation, and arrange compensation on their behalf.51 The municipality, 
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however, refused to do so. A municipal officer explained: ‘When they built, these 
families didn’t take permission and now they want us to bear responsibility.’52
The affected households could not count on the Popular Committee either, 
which would not or could not intervene on their behalf against the municipality. 
Instead, residents eventually established what they called a ‘highway committee,’ 
which consisted of communal leaders from the affected neighbourhoods in both 
the Palestinian gathering and the Lebanese village. This committee, however, 
had trouble representing the residents vis-à-vis the Council for Development and 
Reconstruction, which did not consider them an official party in the procedure, 
and the municipality, which was not interested in liaising with the residents in the 
first place. Interactions between the Council for Development and Reconstruction 
and the highway committee, tellingly, were all coincidental and occasional and 
depended on the impromptu presence of engineers sent by the Council. As the 
relevant Council for Development and Reconstruction project manager observed:
They didn’t get any letter or anything. We see them in the field when we 
pass by. We asked the municipality what they were doing there and he [the 
representative of the municipality] told us that they live there illegally. There 
is no communication with them, not official and not unofficial. We saw them 
and we know there is a problem, but legally there is no relation between us 
and them.53
The ‘highway committee’ then sought support from political parties. Lebanese 
members of the highway committee tried to arrange meetings with Lebanese 
Members of Parliament. Palestinian members contacted representatives of Pal-
estinian political parties, in the hope that these would subsequently address their 
Lebanese counterparts, who might then take up the matter with their ministers 
or the Council for Development and Reconstruction. When asked whether his 
organization talked to the Council or the court, someone working for an NGO that 
sought to help the affected people explained:
No. We made a plan, but we didn’t reach this step. Because when we met with 
[the representatives of the relevant political parties], all said it would stop and 
there was no need any more to meet the CDR [Council for Development and 
Reconstruction] and the engineers. And they get their orders from the politi-
cians anyway. . . . There are no legal solutions; it’s about political interference 
here and there. . . . It’s about relations here and there.54
Lebanese political parties confirmed this reading. A spokesperson for a Lebanese 
party said: ‘Via our Members of Parliament and ministers we make communica-
tion with the Council for Development and Reconstruction.’55
It appeared to genuinely frustrate some of the people working for the Council 
for Development and Reconstruction and the municipality that they could not fit 
the Palestinian residents within their legal and formal system and were therefore 
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forced to ‘leave them to the politicians,’ as a municipal spokesperson put it.56 
Yet, there appears to have been little effort from their side to adjust these legal 
and formal systems. This ambivalence, the coexistence of legal impossibility and 
political possibility, was repeatedly invoked. The legal representative in charge 
of the case said: ‘We’re looking for a practical solution, not a legal one. Because 
legally, they don’t have any rights. But they’re here and we have to deal with the 
reality.’57 A political representative in the region similarly noted: ‘When we do it 
according to the law, the situation will be bad for them. So we have to find a solu-
tion with the state to give them a better alternative.’58 The ‘solution’ that the vari-
ous political interventions managed to broker was delay and postponement. For 
a long time, the eviction was not implemented, even as the highway neared the 
gathering. Eventually, however, all people were forced to leave, with only some 
of them getting minimal compensation.
Many of the dynamics that shaped this eviction were also evident in the threats 
of displacement facing the other gathering. Here, the danger of eviction did not 
come from a public infrastructure project, but from private landowners reclaim-
ing their property (Stel, 2016a). In this gathering, only approximately 20 percent 
of the land is public (municipal) land, and the rest is held by various Lebanese 
private owners. In the 1950s, most of these landowners gave the Palestinians who 
worked on their land as field laborers permission to live there. Their heirs, fac-
ing ever-expanding construction by Palestinian residents and encouraged by ris-
ing property prices, however, no longer feel bound by the promises their (grand)
fathers made (Stel, 2016a: 174). In the absence of legal title to land, Palestinian 
refugees can face criminal prosecution for use and occupation of land. This issue 
affects almost all gatherings. In the gathering in question, at least four different 
lawsuits are currently pending. Here, I will focus on the largest and most pertinent 
case.
In the late 1990s, the residents of approximately 50 houses in a specific neigh-
borhood of the gathering were accused of illegally residing and building on pri-
vate land and summoned to court. The prosecutors demanded that the residents 
leave their property, pay for the immediate removal of the illegal structures, and 
compensate them for the use of the land since the 1970s. After almost a decade 
of recurrent court sessions, the judge ruled in favour of the landowner in 2006. 
In 2010, the residents’ appeal was rejected as well. One year later, the residents 
received a warrant from the police that informed them they had five days to leave. 
The people I spoke with, however, lacking any alternative residence, refused to 
leave. Nor did the police come to physically evict them. An impasse commenced. 
The landowner finally had her eviction warrant, but it somehow would not be 
executed. Thus, for now the situation is, as residents said, ‘frozen.’59
But how can such a legally indisputable case be put ‘in the fridge’?60 For the 
affected inhabitants, the answer was straightforward: politics! (Stel, 2016a) As 
in the other case, interference of political parties was essential to deal with the 
eviction threat. Indeed, the failure to implement the court decision appears to be 
the effect of high-profile political intervention. Residents here were represented 
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by a communal authority figure, whose house was also on the land threatened 
with eviction. Together with several other communal leaders affected by the court 
case, including the then head of the Popular Committee, he formed a committee 
to deal with the eviction threat. This committee raised the issue with what they 
called the ‘political leadership,’ mostly meaning the PLO. The PLO leadership, 
in turn, together with the Palestinian embassy, discussed the matter with those 
Lebanese politicians and officials with the power to prevent implementation of 
the court order.
Concerned with the political sensitivity of displacing Palestinians, these Leba-
nese leaders agreed with the Palestinian political leadership that it would not be 
acceptable to ‘have people say that in the South they destroy Palestinian houses.’61 
Thus, with an eye to Lebanon’s volatile political situation, the police charged 
with implementing the eviction order was instructed to refrain from doing so for 
the sake of preserving the calm in the region. This, however, does not settle the 
issue. The ‘solution’ is widely felt to be temporary. A resident explained that the 
court case might be halted, but it was not concluded and might be reopened at 
any time. A communal leader added: ‘They stopped it; it was postponed. But we 
didn’t solve anything; it’s just suspended.’62
Residents threatened with eviction are very much aware that they are at the 
mercy of what they call ‘the political situation.’ They keenly understand that 
the court’s ruling has not been reconsidered and the eviction order has not been 
retracted (Stel, 2016a: 181). They perceive the current non-implementation of the 
eviction as explicitly conditional and temporary, noting that political decisions 
can be withdrawn at any time. Reflecting on the volatile relationship between the 
PLO and Lebanese political parties, a Popular Committee member worried:
Politics controls everything here. Now he [the main political authority in 
South Lebanon] helps us and our relationship with him is very good. But if 
there is a change in the situation or his opinion, this stops. Before, they were 
killing us!63
Others voiced similar sentiments. A communal leader had no illusions when he 
explained to me that:
Now, the landowner can’t do much because the situation with the Palestin-
ians would be too sensitive. But in the future there may be a change in the 
political situation in Lebanon, in the sectarian relations. And maybe then the 
landowner will refer to certain people to kick them out. The political situation 
in Lebanon isn’t stable, you know; it varies.64
Building ambiguity into the gatherings
These vignettes about the negotiated nature of Palestinian living spaces and shel-
ters show how ambiguity is produced by the clash between formal procedures and 
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informal realities, by the carefully protected ‘temporariness’ of the gatherings, 
and by the legal and representational exceptionalism that marks these spaces.
State agencies insist on following official regulations that excluded or were 
inapplicable to the Palestinians gatherings – and were meant to be so, because the 
same state, albeit embodied by different agencies, generated and maintained this 
legal-institutional exclusion in the first place. Residents of the gatherings are first 
excluded from formal residential status and then punished for this imposed ille-
gality. The Council for Development and Reconstruction, for instance, insists that 
it can only deal with the residents based on legal papers of ownership and defends 
the state’s right to expropriate land for development projects with reference to the 
law. Palestinians, however, are keenly aware that they have little to expect from 
‘the law’, and when authorities refer to the law they consider this particularly 
unfair and extremely ironic. The same ambivalence extends to the issue of repre-
sentation. Palestinian refugees are withheld a formal local representative by the 
very political parties that then locally interfere on their behalf. Paradoxically, in 
eviction cases, Lebanese political parties position themselves as representatives 
of the Palestinians against the government. This ignores the fact that their own 
representation in the government means that they could have prevented much of 
the tenure problems that Palestinian refugees face from arising in the first place or 
could solve these issues more structurally.
This institutionalized informality, liminality, and exceptionalism undermines 
agency and options for collective action. In the form of a continually suspended 
but never lifted threat of displacement, liminality and informality become instru-
ments of discipline. Crucially, Palestinian refugees themselves become implicated 
in these disciplining structures. Because what the vignettes illustrate too is the 
ways in which Palestinian residents inevitably reinforce the very informality, 
irregularity, and politicization that produced their problems in the first place (Stel, 
2017). As the first vignette illustrated, they do this by grasping the few opportuni-
ties they do have to build, making them further indebted to local politicians and 
rendering them more vulnerable to accusations of deliberate squatting. But they 
also do this through the coping mechanisms they devise to deal with eviction 
threats. As the last two vignettes showed, people living in gatherings seek solace 
in politicized facts on the ground that ultimately risk further undermining their 
claims for legal status and formal representation in the long run.
The informal status of their living situation and representational structures 
crucially affect the access to information and hence the agency of the residents 
of the gatherings and their representatives. Not being informed about the pro-
cess and not having a right to information that directly affects them produces 
passivity and seems to give people few alternatives to stalling. In the gather-
ings, institutional ambiguity functions in a two-step fashion. First, it compli-
cates construction and exposes residents to eviction. Second, it determines the 
coping mechanisms available to residents to then deal with these predicaments. 
In the absence of formal entitlements related to citizenship or land ownership, 
rights that are deliberately withheld from them, inhabitants of the gatherings 
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are forced to rely on informal and politicized strategies geared towards foot-
dragging instead of actual problem-solving.
Conclusions
Palestinians in Lebanon continue to face the most uncertain fate of all Palestin-
ian refugees (Suleiman, 2006: 28). In Lebanon, their exile is, in Khalili’s (2005) 
words, a ‘landscape of uncertainty.’ Yet while the day-to-day implications of the 
socio-economic strangulation and legal discrimination that Palestinians in Leba-
non face have been documented exhaustively, the drivers, dynamics, and conse-
quences of uncertainty have not been explicitly studied. This chapter has therefore 
explored how informality, liminality, and exceptionalism emerge and function in 
the governance of Palestinian refugee settlements in Lebanon.
The informal administrative status of Palestinian gatherings – and, albeit in a 
different way, the formal camps as well – is meant to underwrite the liminality 
of the Palestinian presence in the country and produces exceptionalism in that it 
allows Lebanese and Palestinian authorities to address or disregard certain issues 
in an arbitrary fashion. In practice, it allows for abandonment of the refugee com-
munities living there by Lebanese, Palestinian, and international organizations. 
Representation of the Palestinians living in South Lebanon’s gatherings is deter-
mined by exceptionalism. The lack of formal recognition of Popular Commit-
tees enables Lebanese authorities to include them in their unofficial governance 
arrangements – and use them as instruments to maintain order – while excluding 
them from official governance.
The spatial governance of the gatherings reveals the disciplinary effect of insti-
tutionalized informality, liminality, and exceptionalism particularly well. The 
status and representation of refugees remains unofficial, temporary, and simulta-
neously deniable and enforceable. Palestinian refugees and the organizations that 
claim or aim to represent or help them consequently depend on the goodwill of 
Lebanese authorities to look away, interpret favourably, or condone. This regards 
Lebanese state agencies, but also, crucially, the Lebanese political authorities that 
both control these state agencies and operate in parallel to them.
As the next chapter will think through more systematically, institutional ambi-
guity works as a governance strategy through the logic of potenza: the creation 
of a situation in which everything is simultaneously prohibited and allowed, 
renounced yet encouraged, deniable and enforceable. Crucially, strategic insti-
tutional ambiguity is not about straightforward discrimination, which is a form 
of ‘inclusion through exclusion,’ but rather about the unpredictability of what is 
included and what is excluded in the governance practices of specific authori-
ties. Ambiguity is located in the arbitrary alternation and seeming simultaneity 
of inclusion and exclusion (Oesch, 2017: 110). The vignettes on construction and 
eviction illustrate that the gatherings are governed, that solutions can be reached. 
Houses are renovated despite the official ban on construction and evictions are 
‘frozen’ or postponed despite clear court orders. But such ‘solutions’ are always 
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temporary and conditional. They can, and are, withdrawn when this suits the Leb-
anese authorities that have brokered them.
The ad hoc and politicized nature of such ‘deals’ – whether it comes to halting 
evictions, operating informal service networks, or the ability of local committees 
to speak for these communities – thus essentially reinforces the parameters of the 
institutional ambiguity that caused residents’ precarity and uncertainty in the first 
place. This demonstrates that institutional ambiguity is an expression as well as an 
instrument of power. Chapter 6 further conceptualizes how this power is wielded 
and whom it serves.
Notes
 1 Author’s interview – 14 July 2014.
 2 For more specifics on the history of the Palestinian presence in South Lebanon, please 
refer to Beydoun (1992), Brynen (1990), Doraï (2006), Puig (2013), Ramadan (2008), 
Sayigh (1997a, 1997b), and Stel (2015c, 2017).
 3 Most of the interviews referred to in this chapter were conducted in Arabic, which 
was made possible through the support with translation provided by my research part-
ners. The other interviews were done in English. Considering the sensitivity of doing 
research in a context rife with surveillance by foreign intelligence agencies and Leba-
nese and Palestinian security agencies, these interviews were not recorded. The cita-
tions provided are based on extensive notes. For more reflections on data generation 
and analysis, please refer to Stel (2017).
 4 They are included in, for instance, the census discussed in Chapter 4 and other studies, 
but without clear status as either Lebanese villages or Palestinian camps.
 5 Author’s interview with a communal leader in one of the gatherings – South Lebanon, 
21 May 2013.
 6 Author’s interview – Beirut, 13 September 2012.
 7 The Arabic word for socio-political capital or ‘connections’ that allow one to ‘get 
things done.’
 8 Author’s interview – 19 July 2013.
 9 Author’s focus group – South Lebanon, 14 June 2013.
 10 Author’s interview – Sidon, 8 June 2013.
 11 The number of 24 seems random, referring to a duplication of the number of camps. It 
would refer to recognizing just some of the larger gatherings, not all gatherings.
 12 Author’s interview – Tyre, 21 August 2014.
 13 Author’s interview – Sidon, 25 July 2013.
 14 Author’s interview – Beirut, 22 July 2013.
 15 There have been some exceptions where Popular Committees have been elected. 
Examples from Shatila have been well-documented by Khalili (2005) and Kortam 
(2011).
 16 Unpublished document produced by the Central Follow-Up Committee for Popular 
Committees in Lebanon in 2013, which was provided to me in hard copy by a repre-
sentative of the Central Follow-Up Committee on 29 September 2014. The document 
consists of various sub-documents and was translated from Arabic by my research 
partner.
 17 Author’s interview – Tyre, 13 June 2013.
 18 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 15 October 2014.
 19 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 3 April 2013.
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 20 Author’s interview – Beirut, 22 July 2013.
 21 Author’s interview – Sidon, 13 July 2012.
 22 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 10 June 2013.
 23 Author’s interview – Beirut, 20 June 2013.
 24 Author’s interview – Beirut, 22 July 2013.
 25 Author’s interview – Beirut, 26 June 2014.
 26 Author’s interview – Beirut, 22 September 2014.
 27 Author’s interview – Sidon, 12 July 2012
 28 Author’s interview – Tyre, Rashidiye camp, 14 May 2013.
 29 Author’s interview – Tyre, Bourj el-Shemali camp, 25 July 2013.
 30 Author’s interview with NGO representative – Beirut, 13 September 2012.
 31 Author’s interview – Beirut, 22 July 2013.
 32 Author’s interview – Beirut, 26 June 2013.
 33 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 29 June 2013.
 34 Author’s interview – Tyre, Bourj al-Shemali camp, 25 July 2013.
 35 Some Lebanese parties are interested in gaining votes from the small minority of 
naturalized Palestinians (Stel, 2015c). They also care about the support of Palestin-
ian armed groups in Lebanon’s ever-anticipated war (Bou Akar, 2019; Khalili, 2007; 
Knudsen, 2011). Overall, positioning themselves as a crucial element in any engage-
ment between Palestinians and the Lebanese state is a way of showcasing control 
over ‘their’ region of south Lebanon and reinstating their central position in Lebanese 
governance.
 36 Author’s interview – Beirut, 9 June 2014.
 37 These vignettes are also featured in previous papers (Stel, 2014, 2015b, 2016a). For 
more information on housing in the gatherings, please refer to Beer (2011), Chabaan 
(2014), Hilal (2010), Knudsen (2018), Rasul (2013), Saghieh and Saghieh (2008), and 
Williams (2011).
 38 Then why would people live in the gatherings in the first place? As I explained in Stel 
(2016a), the simple answer is that for most of them, there is no realistic alternative. 
They cannot buy a house, even if they somehow had the money for it, because Palestin-
ians are not allowed to own and register real estate. Their exclusion from some 70 job 
categories also makes it extremely difficult for them to rent an apartment considering 
Lebanon’s relatively high rents. Relocating to an official refugee camp is mostly out of 
the question, too. Formal Palestinian camps are notoriously overcrowded and cannot 
possibly absorb more people since they are not allowed to extend their geographical 
boundaries set in the 1950s.
 39 It states:
Definition of a gathering: A geographic area that is not demarcated and not offi-
cially recognized by the Lebanese state and UNRWA because the refugees live on 
the land owned by the Lebanese state or private owners illegally. The people who 
live there always face the insecurity of being displaced.
(translated from Arabic by my research partner)
 40 Author’s interview with Popular Committee member – South Lebanon, 4 June 2014.
 41 Author’s interviews with PLO official (South Lebanon, 9 October 2014) and Pales-
tinian analyst (South Lebanon, 20 June 2014) and focus group (South Lebanon, 30 
September 2014).
 42 Interlocutors living in the gatherings indicated they paid an amount ranging from 
US$500 to US$5,000 depending on their request and connections. Rasul (2013: 54) 
found bribes varying between US$1,000 and US$2,000, and Beer (2011: 35) between 
US$100 and US$1,000.
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 43 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 13 September 2014.
 44 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 11 July 2014.
 45 Participant of author’s focus group – South Lebanon, 28 July 2013.
 46 Author’s interview – Tyre, 22 March 2013.
 47 Author’s interview – Beirut, 26 June 2013.
 48 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 29 April 2013.
 49 Participant of author’s focus group – South Lebanon, 28 July 2013.
 50 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 20 May 2013.
 51 Author’s interviews with a representative of the consultancy company (Beirut, 20 
June 2013) and a lawyer of the Council for Development and Reconstruction (Beirut, 
3 July 2013).
 52 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 1 July 2013.
 53 Author’s interview – Beirut, 3 July 2013.
 54 Author’s interview – Beirut, 21 June 2013.
 55 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 29 June 2013.
 56 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 11 April 2013.
 57 Author’s interview – Baabda, 17 July 2013.
 58 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 27 July 2013.
 59 Author’s interviews with Popular Committee members (South Lebanon, 4 June and 
24 July 2014), a Lebanese Member of Parliament (Tyre, 24 October 2014), an NGO 
employee (South Lebanon, 7 July 2014), and residents of the gatherings (South Leba-
non, 3 July and 13 September 2014).
 60 Author’s interview with UNRWA representative – Tyre, 21 August 2014.
 61 Author’s interview with a communal authority – South Lebanon, 11 April 2013.
 62 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 16 July 2014.
 63 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 2 September 2014. He refers to the War of the 
Camps.
 64 Author’s interview – South Lebanon, 11 July 2014.
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The margin for maneuver is everywhere, ok? Be sure. We are trying to maneu-
ver everything and to manipulate everything.1
Palestinians in Lebanon have over the last three decades experienced a steady 
development ‘from autonomy to ambiguity’ (Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017: 10). 
The country’s Syrian refugees face a ‘fickle and ambiguous’ institutional environ-
ment that traps them in a ‘bureaucratic maze’ (Al-Masri and Altabbaa, 2016: 11).
This situation is routinely explained with reference to the unprecedented nature 
of these ‘crises,’ Lebanon’s still precarious recovery from a range of devastating 
wars, its ailing economy, wanting international support, and the fragile nature of 
Lebanon’s political system that generates paralysis and polarization – in short, by 
a lack of capacity to ‘properly’ deal with refugee ‘crises.’ But such structural and 
contextual explanations, crucial though they are, do not convey the functionality 
and resilience of institutional ambiguity in its entirety. They largely obscure the 
behaviour and decisions of authorities governing in hybrid orders. To get at these 
strategic dimensions of institutional ambiguity, I introduced the idea of a politics 
of uncertainty. Through a combination of inaction and ambiguous action, govern-
ance actors can reproduce institutional ambiguity for various purposes. Revis-
iting the cases presented in the empirical chapters, this chapter brings together 
the explanatory power of the hybrid political order, central to Chapter 1, and the 
politics of uncertainty, developed in the book’s Introduction, by considering their 
interplay from the perspective of ignorance studies.
Governance through uncertainty is a form of epistemic politics (Aradau, 2014). 
It assumes that power can derive from controlling and withholding knowledge. 
Tracing agency in this process means establishing who knows and does not know 
or could (not) have known what at particular instances. This is the domain of 
ignorance studies, an emerging school of thought concerned with the political 
functionality of not-knowing. Ignorance studies proposes that if political power 
revolves around information, it will be crucially shaped through cultivating, simu-
lating, and inflicting not-knowing. The politics of uncertainty operates through 
authorities’ imposing uncertainty or ‘not-knowing’ on others – refugees and their 
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representatives, civil society organizations and humanitarian ‘partners,’ and other 
state agencies – but also through authorities’ maintaining and feigning their own 
lack of knowledge. This dissection of the relevant ‘knowledge economies’ (Van 
der Haar, Heijmans and Hilhorst, 2013) that constitute Lebanon’s refugee govern-
ance sheds light on how political authorities not only navigate but also actively 
utilize structural forms of institutional ambiguity.
The chapter has three main sections. It starts out with an introduction on igno-
rance studies, showing that it provides further insight into the operation and the 
rationalities of institutional ambiguity. The subsequent two sections respectively 
explore the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of institutional ambiguity. The chapter’s second sec-
tion reveals how considering inaction and ambiguous action as ways to main-
tain, feign, and impose ignorance indicates the agency at work in the politics 
of uncertainty while doing justice to its structural dimensions. The third section 
delves into the interests underpinning institutional ambiguity. It demonstrates that 
these are not limited to amassing the generic political capital inherent in creating 
leeway, but also encompass more specific objectives that revolve around control-
ling, expelling, and exploiting refugees. The concluding section reflects on the 
relations between capacity and political will in understanding how institutional 
ambiguity emerges and functions.
Ignorance studies
The field of ignorance studies is concerned with what social and political actors 
do not know, claim not to know, and aspire not to know (Gross and McGoey, 
2015; McGoey, 2019; Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008; Smithson, 2015). By think-
ing through governance actors’ behaviour as potential ways to feign or maintain 
their own ignorance and impose ignorance on others, this perspective helps to 
construe institutional ambiguity as a governmentality, rather than as only or pre-
dominantly a convenient contingency. The Foucauldian idea of governmentality 
sees power as working through implicitly invasive and internalized regulation. 
Authority is then fundamentally mediated through knowledge. Ignorance studies 
crucially complements this reading of governance through its focus on the subver-
sion, denial, and evasion of knowledge. It explores what Aradau (2017: 331) has 
called the socio-political ‘assemblages generative of non-knowledge.’
‘Splattered across disciplines’ and taking inspiration from critical feminist and 
postcolonial studies, ignorance studies shows how the instrumentalization and 
institutionalization of not-knowing, in the form of silences, gaps, uncertainties, 
and ambiguities, affects all governance (Smithson, 2015: 385).2 Ignorance, here, 
is decoupled from popular normative connotations and simply refers to ‘not-
knowing’ – which can be ‘real’ or ‘pretence,’ absolute or partial. Ignorance stud-
ies has a specific interest in the forms of not-knowing that follow from practices 
through which knowledge ‘is obscured, silenced or deflected’ (Aradau, 2014: 76).
The study of such ‘agnogenesis,’ the process of generating or maintaining 
ignorance, has been specifically pursued by scholars working in the realm of 
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agnotology (Christensen, 2008). Agnotology is concerned with ‘strategic’ (Bai-
ley, 2007; Mallard and McGoey, 2018; McGoey, 2007, 2012; Pénet and Mallard, 
2014) or ‘wilful’ (Tuana, 2006) ignorance. It aims to ‘explore how ignorance is 
produced or maintained in diverse settings, through mechanisms such as delib-
erate or inadvertent neglect, secrecy, and suppression, document destruction, 
unquestioned tradition, and myriad forms of inherent (or avoidable) culturopo-
litical selectivity’ (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008: vii). Resonating with a critical 
anthropology of ignorance, it focuses on ‘the production and the productivity’ of 
not-knowing (Mair, Kelly and High, 2012: 16).
Smithson’s (2008: 209) social theory of ignorance is based on three core 
premises: that ignorance is pervasive; that it is socially constructed; and that it 
can be advantageous. Agnotology, then, proposes an explicitly political read-
ing of not-knowing (Code, 2014: 48; Slater, 2012: 951). Ignorance is ‘not 
just a natural consequence of the ever-shifting boundary between the known 
and the unknown but a political consequence of decisions concerning how to 
approach (or neglect) what could be and should be done’ (Proctor, 1995: 13). It 
is in this attempt to locate power in governance modalities that ignorance stud-
ies and my central concepts of institutional ambiguity, hybrid political order, 
and a politics of uncertainty come together. By construing the not-knowing 
that is feigned and imposed through institutional ambiguity as a ‘construc-
tive, agentive space’ (Chua, 2015: 253), ignorance studies helps to locate the 
interests and motivations behind forms of governance and power characterized 
by uncertainty. Not-knowing is ‘made, maintained, and manipulated’ (Proctor, 
2008: 8; see also Alcoff, 2007: 39). The premise of agnotology, then, is that, 
like knowledge, not-knowing can be a ‘tool of governance and usurpation’ 
(McGoey, 2012: 10).
Institutional ambiguity is not the same as ignorance, but it is a way to simulta-
neously profess and dictate ignorance; a form of ‘agnotological power’ (Davies, 
Isakjee and Dhesi, 2017) that allows for shirking formal responsibility while 
accumulating informal control and enabling the disciplining, exploitation, and 
expulsion of certain societal groups. By approaching the two components of the 
politics of uncertainty – inaction and ambiguous action – from an ignorance stud-
ies perspective, they can be understood as strategically claiming and imposing 
‘unknowledge’ (McGoey, 2019). Authorities feign and maintain their own not-
knowing by hiding behind informal, temporary, and exceptional measures in the 
realm of status, shelter, and representation – for instance, through practices of 
non-recording, cultivating limited capacities, generating diffuse mandates and 
hierarchies, and by actively ‘looking away.’
These same measures impose ignorance on the people that authorities seek to 
govern by excluding them from legal frameworks and subjecting them to vague 
policies and directives, incomplete and arbitrary implementation, and unstable 
representation structures. This has crucial implications for the knowledge econo-
mies in which people operate, which become ‘fundamentally structured by uncer-
tainty’ (Whyte, 2011), and ensures that official as well as tacit and experiential 
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information available to people is ‘minimal, contradictory or erroneous’ (Grif-
fiths, 2013: 268).
Feigning and maintaining ignorance
So how does ‘governing by ignoring’ work in Lebanon? (Dedieu, Jouzel and Prête, 
2015: 297) The first component of the politics of uncertainty regards the strategic 
ignorance of state agencies; the tendency to, in order to protect interests, resist 
rather than pursue knowledge (McGoey, 2019: 28). This concerns both feigned 
or professed ignorance, where agencies are aware of specific issues but deny it, 
as well as maintained ignorance, where actors keep in place their not-knowing 
(Luhmann, 1998; McGoey, 2007; Spelman, 2007). These overlap. Mostly, gov-
ernance actors know a bit about something and choose not to know more, as such 
knowledge would be inconvenient. Or, similarly protecting their ‘ignorance ali-
bis,’ they do know more but find it advantageous not to admit as much (McGoey, 
2019: 56, 315).
This speaks to the assembled nature of state systems. As Eule et al. (2018: 
237) show for the European migration regime, there is often a ‘tacit ignorance’ 
among policy-makers in the sense that ‘the “head” prefers not to know what the 
“hands” are doing.’ Lebanese authorities involved in the governance of refugees 
indeed in many instances maintain not-knowing, by ‘looking away’ or ‘squeezing 
their eyes,’ so as not having to deal with particular issues. This also regards the 
limited information-production of the Lebanese state. As noted by Hamdan and 
Bou Khater (2015: 10), Lebanese government institutions hardly engage in or 
commission public knowledge-production in the realm of refugee governance. 
This once more demonstrates that power does not just work through legibility, but 
also through the strategic avoidance of datafication or its purposefully ambiguous 
nature.
There are many civil society organizations, think tanks, journalists, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in studying refugees. They produce 
a wealth of information that is actively brought to the attention of state repre-
sentatives. Interviewees associated with such organizations recounted how they 
routinely brief state agencies and officials and provide them with tailored policy 
recommendations, a claim that is backed up by the bounty of relevant reports. 
There are, moreover, various donor initiatives to map and share information 
across regions, sectors, and levels that further undermine the idea that state agen-
cies cannot know what is going on, even if they lack the capacity to generate such 
information themselves.
Yet, Lebanese state agencies often disregard or discard such information. As 
Halkort (2019: 321) notes, in Lebanon refugee data is ‘a highly unpredictable 
and ambivalent force, something knowingly unknowable.’ Local exploitation of 
refugees is part of a system that, Ghaddar (2017) claims, ‘is reinforced by State 
Security actors, ignored by the ministry of interior and local municipalities, con-
venient for landowners, and problematic for aid organizations and refugees.’ The 
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presence and functioning of governance institutions inside Syrian settlements is 
often ignored and/or denied by mayors even though other actors structurally brief 
them on these institutions. Such professed ignorance is replicated higher up in 
the state hierarchy. The main advisor on refugee issues of the Minister of Interior 
claims the ministry is not aware of the governing structures in informal refugee 
settlements (Ghaddar, 2017). This is unlikely since these structures are public 
knowledge among humanitarians and are discussed during the monthly meetings 
of the Central Security Council, which are presided over by the Minister of Inte-
rior himself.
Throughout my research on Palestinian gatherings, local Lebanese state repre-
sentatives were often ignorant – or pretended to be ignorant – about the gather-
ings, reproducing the image of Lebanon’s Palestinian spaces as ‘impenetrable and 
closed, unknowable, foreign’ (Ramadan, 2009: 157). Officials, for instance, said 
they were not aware of a Palestinian gathering in the village that constituted one 
of my cases. This while representatives of this gathering routinely engaged with 
politicians represented in the municipal council and civil servants. Such absence 
of knowledge is often actively protected. One mayor told me: ‘Don’t tell me how 
things are arranged [in the gathering]; I don’t want to know!’3 Another mayor 
similarly advised me to ‘not get into this; to only dig on the surface.’4
Governance actors do not merely level such professed ignorance at researchers. 
As one protection officer working for an international NGO recounted:
I remember one of the representatives of the interior ministry telling me 
‘yeah, we don’t know what they [refugees] are doing, I mean, we don’t know 
about this whole shawish thing.’ I’m sure he’s lying to me. . . . Pretending 
that ‘I don’t know what’s going on in another agency that doesn’t have to fall 
under my jurisdiction’ is a kind of way of saying ‘I don’t want to answer your 
question.’ So ‘I don’t know’ is like a better answer than ‘let me explain to you 
the problem on the side of the government.’5
Maintained and feigned ignorance regards individual considerations, but also 
takes collective forms. These are connected by ‘ignorance pathways’ through 
which individual, ‘micro-ignorance’ and societal, ‘macro-ignorance’ reinforce 
and legitimate each other (McGoey, 2019: 168). This, for instance, regards the 
performative nature of the constantly reinforced temporariness of refugees’ stay, 
while state representatives privately acknowledge that return is highly unlikely. 
It is similarly evident when refugees are systematically not registered or not 
granted a legally defined status so that authorities do not have a comprehen-
sive overview of the scope and nature of the refugee population. The ‘num-
bers games’ discussed in earlier chapters show how the Lebanese state instructs 
the United Nations (UN) to stop registering refugees to then claim it does not 
know the number of refugees, which allows it to subsequently politically uti-
lize this ignorance to ‘play’ various audiences. This helps to appreciate how the 
maintenance of not-knowing becomes inherent to bureaucratic structures, with 
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governance actors reproducing this state of not-knowing by not asking questions 
or not wanting to hear answers (Borrelli, 2018).
Not-knowing, a Lebanese lawyer working with refugees reflected, is closely 
related to passivity: ‘Because you can do what you want with the ambiguity. When 
it’s clear, you are committing yourself.’6 Janmyr points out that Lebanese authori-
ties legitimize their refusal to ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention by saying that 
they are ‘uncertain’ about the commitments such ratification would entail. She 
shows, however, that they need not be, and are not actually, uncertain about the 
obligations involved, as experts have repeatedly clearly outlined these to them. 
Authorities’ apparent uncertainty about the Convention is a form of ‘politically 
expedient’ not-knowing (Janmyr, 2017: 449). It is ‘a strategic misconception’ that 
allows them to abstain from ratification to protect the leeway they currently enjoy 
without having to bear the consequences of outright rejecting the Convention’s 
principles (Janmyr, 2017: 453).
Institutional ambiguity allows states to abandon unwanted populations (Agier, 
2008, 2011). This is no different in Lebanon. The vagueness of the mandates of 
various state agencies is indicative of this approach. Throughout fieldwork, it was 
often remarkably complicated to establish who was responsible for which aspects 
of refugee governance, for instance where it concerned obtaining permits for 
installing tents in Syrian settlements, the responsibility for which was allocated to 
a vast array of different actors by different interlocutors. The result, the UNHCR 
noted in his speech during a donor conference on ‘Supporting the Future of Syria 
and the Region,’ is a form of ‘blurred’ responsibility that inhibits accountability.7 
Professed not-knowing, whether real and maintained or whether feigned, then 
legitimates, even necessitates, inaction. If one does not know about something, 
after all, how can one be expected to deal with it?
Imposing ignorance
If given the choice, people often prefer to act on the basis of ignorance rather than 
knowledge (Gigerenzer and Garcia-Retamero, 2017 in McGoey, 2019: 39). What 
my politics of uncertainty demands attention for, however, are those instances 
where people’s ignorance is not a choice. Institutional ambiguity is part of a poli-
tics of uncertainty when it allows political elites to govern refugees by imposing 
ignorance on them and those supporting them. The opacity and apparent random-
ness of decisions, and thereby their unpredictability, undermines stakeholders’ 
agency, as they will find it almost impossible to plan or strategize for the infinite 
range of scenarios opened up under extreme uncertainty (Eule et al., 2018: 121). 
The production of ignorance, Slater (2016: 23) shows, carves out ‘economic and 
political paths’ for exploitation that are particularly difficult to map and hence to 
counter. As Griffiths (2013: 279) demonstrates, governments can exert ‘extreme 
control over people . . . through systemic uncertainty and disorder, through which 
individuals are made powerless, hopeless.’ Tapscott (2017) similarly shows that 
when populations cannot find a predictable pattern or regularity in the behaviour 
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of state agencies, they cannot establish shared expectations for state behaviour, 
which hampers collective action. The paralyzing quality of uncertainty works by 
undermining the organizational capacity of those suffering under it and by diffus-
ing targets for contention through the blurred responsibilities it produces (Rodg-
ers, 2019).
The book’s empirical chapters showed that the destabilization of expectations 
and imposition of uncertainty through institutionalizing informality, liminality, 
and exceptionalism is not merely a contingency of capacity deficits, but also 
reflects political will. With regard to the Syrian refugee crisis, Atallah and Mahdi 
(2017: 8, emphasis added) unequivocally state that ‘as the crisis has entered its 
seventh year, the Lebanese state does not intend to formalize a national response 
toward the humanitarian crisis unless it is focused on the repatriation of Syrian 
refugees to Syria.’ Fakhoury (2017: 688, emphasis added) considers the institu-
tional ambiguity central to my analysis a deliberate choice as well:
Lebanon’s incoherent policy frame over the issue of Syrian displacement 
has established itself over the years as the desired state of affairs. Behind its 
facade of incongruity, it reveals a deliberate choice to avoid the adoption of 
a well-articulated refugee regime. This has led to a widening gap between 
international actors’ plea for an improved legal framework and the Lebanese 
state’s preferences.
In the Palestinian case the lack of formal status of the gatherings and the absence 
of de jure recognition of refugees’ local governance actors, which produce insti-
tutional ambiguity, are political choices too. In theory, nothing stops the Lebanese 
government from recognizing the gatherings as formal camps and granting Popu-
lar Committees the status of refugee representatives. Institutional ambiguity may 
then not have been the direct objective of these political decisions, which were 
primarily related to the geopolitical sensitivities of the Palestinian ‘issue,’ but can-
not be relegated to a side effect either.
Imposing ignorance can work through not acting (formally) at all. Not engag-
ing is often ‘the simplest manner’ of dealing with a difficult issue and a good way 
to ‘buy time’ (Mathews, 2008: 490). This is intuitively evident in refugee govern-
ance, where the default approach is often to wish refugee realities away (Agier, 
2008: 40). This was apparent in the ‘no-policy-policy’ initially levelled against 
Syrian refugees. Laws and policies are then simply not developed or adopted: it is 
not accidental that Lebanon has no refugee law.
Ambiguity does not stem only from inaction, but also from proliferous action: 
a multitude of constantly shifting and inconsistent regulations and their arbitrary 
implementation (Parkinson, 2014). Those policies that are adopted are imple-
mented in an incomplete and inconsistent fashion that amounts to ambiguous 
action. Both the absence of policies and the arbitrary implementation of poli-
cies creates political maneuvering space. Ambiguous action entails the generation 
of confusion around legal categories, resulting in an avoidable situation of mass 
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illegality for Syrian refugees. It concerns numbers and statistics, when there is a 
tacit political agreement towards non-recording. It relates to shelter, producing 
ambiguous refugee spaces that fall outside state responsibility but under state con-
trol, and it has to do with mandates and responsibilities, with emerging refugee 
representation structures simultaneously being co-opted and disowned.
Uncertainty is not the same as not-knowing. Rather, it can be regarded as a 
category of ignorance that amounts to doubt, ‘not knowing for sure.’ ‘Potenza’ 
is central in imposing uncertainty (Minca, 2005 in Martin, 2011: 195). Follow-
ing a Gramscian take on ‘laissez faire as a disciplinary strategy,’ potenza locates 
power in capacity, rather than the exercise of that capacity; in the discretionary 
‘potentiality to-act or not-to-act, to-control or not-to-control’ (Lukes, 2005: 12; 
Davies, 2012: 2692). It refers to epistemic regimes in which ‘events are always 
emergent and potential’ (Aradau, 2014: 77). Potenza denotes a situation where 
the institutional environment is so ambiguous, so open to multiple interpretations, 
that governance implementation is almost entirely dependent on the discretionary 
power of the authority at hand, which can opt for repression or abandonment or 
compassion, seemingly at will. The project manager of a European NGO working 
with Syrian refugees described potenza as follows:
I like to define this country [Lebanon] as a country with like ten thousand 
problems, but in theory there are a hundred thousand solutions. . . . In theory 
everything is possible. . . . In terms of law enforcement it’s so blurred, that 
just depends on the municipalities or the police units etc. In some areas they 
just don’t stop them [refugees]. In some areas they raid houses or homes or 
informal settlements and they arrest people and bring them to another town.8
This idea of potenza resonates with the sentiment that ‘everything is possible 
in Lebanon.’9 This importantly relates to the rule of law. Refugees are actively 
encouraged or expected to behave against the law. Yet while refugees are often 
‘forced to commit . . . the slew of transgressions’ they are accused of, state- 
produced and condoned transgression can nevertheless always be held against 
them (Cullen Dunn and Cons, 2014: 101).
Life in informal refugee settlements shows this well. Palestinian gatherings and 
Syrian informal tented settlements are condoned but never formally permitted, 
always allowing for evictions and arrests. The same logic applies to the illegal 
residency status of the great majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, which is 
routinely overlooked but never formally pardoned. Illegal stay in the country is a 
criminal offense under Lebanese law. Yet, such illegality is created and accepted 
by the state. Lack of legal status has repercussions for refugees’ mobility and 
access to services (Atallah and Mahdi, 2017: 25; Janmyr, 2016: 72), but, at the 
time of fieldwork, it did not lead to actual deportation. Yet the threat of deporta-
tion perpetually hovers over Syrian refugees. Refugees, those organizations seek-
ing to help them, and expert observers insist that imposed illegality should be seen 
as opening up possibilities for the Lebanese state. Following De Genova (2002, 
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2016), refugees were not (yet) deported, but rather made deportable. As one Syr-
ian refugee (illegally) working for an internationally registered NGO in Lebanon 
explained:
Until now nothing happened with those who don’t have residency. . . . But, 
also, we don’t know, because also they write in the passport that you have to 
leave within one month. And if the Lebanese government suddenly decided 
to practice this law maybe most of the Syrians . . . they will kick out most 
of the Syrians to go back to Syria or force them to leave Lebanon. . . . If the 
Lebanese government decided to implement this law, yes, 70% of the Syrians 
will have to leave Lebanon.10 
Potenza, in a nutshell, illustrates how institutional ambiguity produces the discre-
tion to, with equal legitimacy, act or not act. This enables a constant threat that 
importantly produces pliancy and enables control.
Reproducing ignorance
Incomplete and unstable knowledge economies follow from inaction and ambigu-
ous action, which produce informality, liminality and exceptionalism, so as to 
amount to a distinct governmentality: a politics of uncertainty. The main aim of 
this book has been to show how various agencies that constitute the Lebanese 
state feign and maintain ignorance and thereby force it on others. The ways in 
which those ‘others’ respond to this, however, are often an integral part of the 
governmentality at stake. In the following section, I briefly outline the role of 
crucial ‘non-state’ stakeholders in the reproduction of the politics of uncertainty.
Refugees: coping with and replicating ambiguity
One response to institutional ambiguity is to push for the ‘hardening’ of insti-
tutions, which increases predictability (Yassin, Stel and Rassi, 2016). Refugees 
in Lebanon, however, often have no official representative, few socio-economic 
assets, and little political clout. Producing regularization, consequently, is mostly 
not within their ability. Situational adjustment, the exploitation of the ‘soft’ sta-
tus of institutions, then becomes the default response to institutional ambiguity 
(Cleaver, 2002: 15). Rather than resisting ambiguity, refugees cope with it to the 
best of their abilities. But in doing so they often replicate the politics of uncer-
tainty imposed on them (Stel, 2015, 2016).
Marginalized groups are well-known for exploiting ‘inconsistency, contradic-
tion, conflict, [and] ambiguity’ (Razzaz, 1994: 11). Residents of Palestinian infor-
mal settlements use indirect, informal, and politicized social networks and relations 
to access services, ensure shelter, and negotiate security. To avoid evictions they 
actively utilize the liminality of their protracted refugeeness and their exception-
ality within the Lebanese polity. They generate deliberate disinformation, employ 
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stalling tactics, and invoke ignorance about their predicament. Syrian refugees’ 
accounts, too, are rife with the notion that their lives are deliberately made impos-
sible through informality, liminality, and exceptionalism. And they push back 
against this reality. Cassani (2018) shows how Syrians resist imposed refugee 
identities by refusing to be held collectively responsible by Lebanese authorities. 
Institutional invisibility, remaining under the radar through non-registration, has 
been a routine coping mechanism for them too. Refugee communities in Lebanon 
have to some extent mastered the ‘art of not being governed’ (Scott, 2009; Stel, 
2015).
Ignorance can be constructive and strategic for refugees as well as for author-
ities (Bailey, 2007; Mair, Kelly and High, 2012; Brun, 2015; Scheel, 2019; 
Scott, 1985, 1990). In line with this, over the last decades the field of refugee 
studies has made a productive move from seeing refugees predominantly as vic-
tims and recipients towards considering them active political agents (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh et al., 2014; Griffiths, 2013; Harrell-Bond, 1986; Richter-Devroe, 
2013). Refugees’ alternative knowledges, or ‘counter-apodemics,’ and coping 
mechanisms, however, often invoke and reinforce the very institutional ambi-
guity that marginalizes them (Walters, 2015; see also Ansems de Vries, 2016). 
The ‘ignorance’ of refugee communities is itself ambiguous. It is both imposed 
on refugees as well as strategically coveted as a protection mechanism against 
the arbitrariness they face. Ambiguity is a response to power and a way of 
exercising power.
The steadfastness and defiance of refugees and their sometimes creative appro-
priation of ambiguity is remarkable. But while the informality, liminality, and 
exceptionalism that refugees are forced to embrace might serve as short-term 
survival mechanisms, they further entrench the governmentality that victimizes 
refugees in the long run. Ultimately, ‘some people are better positioned to exploit 
their own and other peoples’ ignorance’ (McGoey, 2019: 47) and these are usually 
not ‘those living at the bottom of the class structure’ (Slater, 2012: 951). Without 
succumbing to the view of refugees as victims only, then, refugees’ part in the 
production and enactment of a politics of uncertainty should be seen as a coping 
mechanism, rather than resistance. As a Palestinian youth leader sarcastically sur-
mised: ‘We’re normalizing the abnormal. I think this is what one calls a negative 
coping mechanism.’11
Refugee ‘representatives:’ indirect rule between 
impotency and complicity
The actors who claim to represent refugees play a crucial role in these negative 
coping mechanisms. Syrian shawishes and Palestinian Popular Committee mem-
bers are themselves refugees and residents of informal settlements. Their strate-
gies reflect the broader coping mechanisms of refugees. Yet these ‘representatives’ 
also have their own interests that are often aligned with those of Lebanese (local) 
elites and thereby the current status quo of ambiguity and uncertainty.
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Refugee representatives operate as an informal link between refugee popula-
tions and Lebanese state representatives and political elites. As such they are an 
essential component of the politics of uncertainty. Their role is a form of indirect 
rule. Shawishes and Popular Committee members hold their positions of relative 
power by the grace of Lebanese authorities. The authority of shawishes is seen as 
‘given to them by State Security’ (Ghaddar, 2017). The same goes for Palestin-
ian refugee authorities, who are instrumentalized by security agencies to gather 
intelligence and monitor wanted persons (Hanafi and Long, 2010). According to 
a leader in the regional popular committee structure, Popular Committees were 
‘created to officially work with the government.’12
This is not merely boasting, wishful thinking, or attempted legitimization from 
the side of refugee representatives. State institutions routinely deal with shawishes 
and Popular Committees and make them de facto responsible for controlling refu-
gees. They do so without ever formally acknowledging these representatives or 
allowing them to develop sufficient capacity to do the things they are held respon-
sible for. Such indirect rule reflects and entrenches institutional ambiguity through 
state actors’ unpredictable giving and withdrawing assent to actors on the ground 
(Lamontagne, 2018: 9).
The work of Ramadan and Fregonese (2017) on the hybrid governance of Pal-
estinian refugee communities in Lebanon reveals how such ambiguous indirect 
rule is a crucial component of imposing uncertainty on refugees. They note that 
Lebanese elites govern refugee populations through ‘hybrid arrangement between 
the Lebanese authorities and Palestinian (non-)authorities,’ which implicates Pal-
estinian authorities in the informality, liminality, and exceptionalism that refugees 
struggle with (Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017: 11). Ensuring the informal nature 
of their ‘partners in crime’ is a crucial way for Lebanese political authorities to 
maintain the upper hand in such dynamics.
To keep their relative power positions, refugee ‘representatives’ thus depend 
on Lebanese authorities more than on their ‘constituencies.’ They accrue a vested 
interest in the politics of uncertainty that have put them in place. Their informal 
and politicized engagements with Lebanese political elites and the related state 
agencies inevitably further entrench institutional ambiguity. In the Palestinian 
gatherings, according to an analyst involved in Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue ses-
sions, ‘the reality on the ground, the current situation, is a consequence of mutual 
interests.’13 A Palestinian lawyer summarized a widely prevalent impression 
among refugees when he concluded that ‘after sixty-six years of refuge, I know 
the problems won’t be solved, because they don’t want them to be solved’ – the 
‘they’ referring to Palestinian as much as Lebanese ‘leaders.’14
Humanitarian organizations: frustration,  
resignation, reproduction
The funding conditionalities of the international donors for which humanitarian 
organizations work reflect the interest to keep refugees in ‘the region’ and away 
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from Europe. This clearly enables Lebanon’s current institutional ambiguity. 
The meta-logics of the humanitarian regime itself are fundamentally shaped by 
‘adhocracy,’ the paralyzing arbitrariness and unpredictability that follows from 
the fragmented and short-term perspectives ingrained in humanitarianism (Cullen 
Dunn, 2012: 2; see also Ferguson, 1994; Agier, 2008: 70). International devel-
opment logics are infused with what Hilhorst (2016) has called ‘ignorancy,’ the 
expression of a wilful naivety in the face of evident political economies and the 
stubborn insistence on technocratic approaches. Humanitarianism thus produces 
ambiguities of its own, through for example the non-transfer of knowledge among 
humanitarians or by keeping eligibility criteria vague to avoid beneficiaries’ antic-
ipating on them (Atme, 2019).
The fragmented nature of the response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Leba-
non does not just follow from the project-based and funding-dependent nature of 
the humanitarian regime, however. It also results from the restrictions imposed 
on humanitarian organizations by the Lebanese state, whose obsession with tem-
porariness entrenches humanitarianism to the detriment of development (Ubels, 
2019). The ban on supporting grassroots refugee organizations severely limits the 
counterparts with which organizations can work. The imposed illegality and the 
related arbitrary arrests of Syrian refugees, to give another example, make NGOs 
hesitant to refer refugees seeking to legalize their stay to the General Security. 
A Lebanese lawyer working in refugee protection noted that the changeability of 
the regulations around refugees’ entry and stay was undermining her work to such 
an extent that she tended to avoid related cases altogether.15 This suggests that 
institutional ambiguity discourages organizations committed to refugee protec-
tion from doing their job.
Instead, a major focus for such organizations becomes their provision of ‘infor-
mation services’ to help explain the complexities of the Lebanese refugee regime 
to refugees. This, one interlocutor representing an international refugee organiza-
tion explained, constitutes a major demand of refugees, who
always say ‘lack of information! lack of information is the biggest obsta-
cle,’ so sometimes they would have some basic information, sometimes they 
would have conflicting information, sometimes they’ve heard something but 
they’re not confident that they know exactly what to do now.16
She explained this crucially drains resources:
You have forty-two General Security offices across the country and each of 
them has a slightly different practice. So for us a lot of our time and energy 
goes into mapping those local practices and making sure that our teams and 
our lawyers know exactly what works how in which location.
Despite these efforts, however, information services are compromised because 
these organizations often do not fully understand the highly volatile and 
198 Knowledge and power revisited
ambiguous policies in place either (Ubels, 2019: 53). Refugees nevertheless hold 
them responsible for the information they provide, leaving protection officers to 
bear the brunt of state-imposed ambiguity.
This particularly affects the UN. Occasional efforts to ‘take back control’ not-
withstanding, Lebanese political elites have conveniently outsourced the care 
for refugees to UN agencies without clarifying their exact legal standing (Nor-
man, 2019). This has prevented the UN from pressing the government for policy 
reform or more commitment to international refugee law (Janmyr, 2017). The 
very documents that at first glance confirm the Lebanese state’s commitment to 
donor demands are often characterized by what Uzelac and Meester (2018: 52) 
identify as a ‘lack of explicit discussion of Lebanon’s obligations towards refu-
gees’ that stems from a ‘shared understanding that the ambiguity was essential for 
maintaining any form of political acceptance’ on the side of Lebanon’s political 
elites. Humanitarian interlocutors were keenly aware that many of the govern-
ment’s regularization attempts – such as the 2017 residency fee waiver for Syrian 
refugees and decisions to make available more work permits and avoid state-
lessness through facilitating birth registration – were little more than lip service 
that would be undone through paralyzed and arbitrary implementation. They were 
very frustrated about this issue, but also resigned to working around and adapting 
to these facts on the ground.
In a context of institutional ambiguity, denial and looking away might become 
the best way for humanitarian organizations to ‘do no harm.’ An NGO working 
with Palestinian residents of a gathering threatened with eviction constitutes a 
telling example. When I asked if they could explain to me what was going on, 
legal experts working for this organization told me that they were careful not to 
harm refugees’ ‘coping mechanisms that are based on discretion and not making 
noise.’17 They added: ‘we could have all the information that you’re asking for, 
but we don’t want to have it – for their sake.’ NGOs supporting Syrian refugees 
report similar concerns. When asked if they aim to rectify incomplete or faulty 
government statistics with their own, possibly more accurate, information, a field 
officer of an international NGO responded that her organization does not want to 
‘raise red flags’ by coming up with numbers, which always risks having ‘implica-
tions’ for refugees.18 Humanitarian organizations thereby reluctantly but inevita-
bly become implicated in the ambiguity they lament.
Local Lebanese authorities: ‘stove piping’ and  
‘role-playing’
There is a vast gap between the aloof stalling, denial, and non-engagement in 
national policy-making and local level dealings with the actual refugee presence 
on the ground under such institutional ambiguity. But local authorities neverthe-
less often replicate informality, liminality, and exceptionalism, either as a last-
resort coping mechanism or as a more strategic governance device in keeping 
with their national superiors.
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Local authorities are left hanging by national state representatives. They do not 
have the resources to properly deal with the challenges they face. More impor-
tantly for my central thesis, however, they often fundamentally lack the informa-
tion and instructions to handle the refugee presence well. Municipalities do not 
know what is expected of them in terms of, for instance, shelter management, 
registration and residency practices, and maintaining order. They hardly receive 
guidance on these issues and what direction is offered is conflicting – with dif-
ferent ministries giving different orders, political parties internally contradicting 
public governmental decisions, and civil and security agencies insisting on dif-
ferent priorities. Administrative procedures and regulations are communicated in 
a piecemeal fashion, subject to constant changes, and not monitored. The local 
interpretation of vague directives and circulars is crucially determined by diverg-
ing contextual policy legacies, which further fragments policy.
This illustrates the intricate links between professed and maintained ignorance 
and imposed ignorance. It shows, as also recognized by the literature on ‘street-
level bureaucracy’ (Lipsky, 1980), how ignorance is built into bureaucratic sys-
tems. State institutions become ‘unreadable’ not just to the outside but even to 
many of their own officials (Lindberg and Borrelli, 2019; Borrelli, 2018; Das 
and Poole, 2004; Eule et al., 2018; Gupta, 2012). This is so not merely because 
of their inevitable complexity, but also because it is politically convenient. It is 
partly genuine and partly, as detailed in Chapter 3, a role-play in which national 
state agencies enact denial of local realities and local authorities profess ignorance 
of national realities.
The perils of potenza loom large for local authorities: If they are not sure 
about how their decisions will be evaluated by their local peers and national 
superiors – and how can they know if no proper course of action is outlined? – 
then openly making any unambiguous decision on even seemingly minor local 
issues is a risk that can have serious political consequences. This fear of mak-
ing decisions manifests itself in what Hanafi (2010: 34) has called ‘stove pip-
ing:’ wiring everything back to higher echelons of power, where issues often 
get stalled. Thus, if authorities lack the wasta that will protect them from the 
unpredictable consequences of operating under ambiguity, inaction is clearly 
the wisest course of action.
The behaviour of local state representatives under a regime of institutional 
ambiguity imposed by national authorities is thus paradoxical. On the one hand, 
local authorities sometimes resist the policy vacuum in which they operate. The 
feeling of being abandoned by the very state system they are officially part of 
themselves was a recurring theme in the narratives of local authorities. On the 
other hand, many mayors, through their tight personal and political connections 
to national elites, are complicit in the inconsistencies created or complacent in 
the face of institutional ambiguity, embracing the combined lack of resources and 
guidance as an excuse not to act. In either case, local authorities’ responses to 
institutional ambiguity end up contributing to it and extending confusion, frag-
mentation, instability, and arbitrariness.
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The utility of ambiguity
Through detailing the dynamics of protected and pretended not-knowing on the 
one hand and imposed not-knowing on the other, I explored how the institutional 
ambiguity that follows from inaction and ambiguous action works as a govern-
mentality. This, however, leaves the question of why Lebanese authorities would 
want to pursue such a governmentality. I argue that this goes beyond the generic 
convenience of institutional ambiguity as an instrument to avoid responsibility 
and liability and maximize leeway. In governing Lebanon’s refugees, institutional 
ambiguity serves more specific purposes.
Lebanon today has a refugee trauma. Its experience with the historically politi-
cized and militarized Palestinian refugee presence in combination with its extreme 
demographic sensitivities means that the general public as well as political elites 
fear nothing as much as a politically mobilized refugee community. As a result, 
and despite Lebanon’s polarized political landscape, when it comes to refugees 
the country’s political parties have the same stated objective to prevent integra-
tion. Controlling refugees is a shared priority. Lebanon’s political authorities 
agree on the importance of discouraging refugees to come to Lebanon and encour-
aging those that are there to return or move on. In addition to these stated aims 
of control and expulsion, Lebanon’s governing elites share an unstated interest in 
the exploitation of refugees. Most of them directly or indirectly benefit from the 
‘refugee economy’ (Anderson, 2014; Cranston, Schapendonk and Spaan, 2018; 
Dyke, 2015 in Mencütek, 2019: 154; Franck, 2018) that revolves around cheap 
labour, increased demand for services and goods, black markets for all kinds of 
documentation, and peaking donor funding. Institutional ambiguity facilitates all 
three objectives.
These overarching interests that institutional ambiguity serves are mostly those of 
the people that I described in Chapter 1 as the country’s ruling elite. Through Leba-
non’s political parties, which act as twilight institutions that work inside and beyond 
the state system, these elites determine national (no-)policy-making dynamics. 
Institutional ambiguity, however, also crucially emerges through the more diffuse 
operations of bureaucratic actors that operationalize and implement these decisions. 
These are not always directly managed by national political elites, but they are not 
separated from them either. Lebanon’s sectarian patronage system ensures close 
ties among various levels and domains of governance and dissolves any imagined 
differentiation between politics and public administration. More generic benefits of 
ambiguity that operate on bureaucratic levels – maximizing leeway and minimizing 
responsibilities – accrue to more strategic benefits politically – enabling the control, 
exploitation, and expulsion of refugees.
Control
Following the generic logic outlined in the book’s Introduction, this chapter so far 
has described how institutional ambiguity helps authorities to discipline refugees 
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through existential unpredictability and confusion. Since the experience with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, there is hardly anything Lebanese elites fear 
more than mobilized refugee collectives. Institutional ambiguity helps prevent 
such mobilization. Informality, liminality, and exceptionalism create potenza for 
authorities. This paralyzes refugees and undermines their agency and capacity to 
organize, plan, and act collectively. Control is also furthered through the overall 
marginalization of refugees. People focused on survival and figuring out how to 
navigate the unpredictable institutional landscape of their host country will be less 
concerned with political organization.
Expel
While nominally adhering to the internationally sacred principle of non-refoulement, 
Lebanese politicians and officials appear to be doing everything in their power 
to ‘encourage’ refugees to leave the country. Institutional ambiguity serves as a 
crucial instrument towards this end.
Expulsion through the strangulation that is enabled by institutional ambiguity 
has been a key feature of the Palestinian experience in Lebanon (Sayigh, 2001). 
Although Palestinians are officially recognized as refugees by the Lebanese state 
and have been in Lebanon for generations, they have been subjected to various 
strategies of encouraged departure (Serhan, 2019: 246; Stevens, 2017). Palestinians 
registered in Lebanon but working abroad face arbitrary but severe restrictions on 
their (re-)entry to Lebanon (Suleiman, 2006: 15). An estimated 100,000 Palestinians 
have left the country over the last decades (Tiltnes, 2005 in Suleiman, 2006: 6), flee-
ing Israeli invasions and Lebanese conflict, but also social exclusion and protracted 
uncertainty (Hanafi, 2008; Knudsen, 2009, 2018). Support for Palestinians’ ‘right 
of return,’ Khalili (2005: 35) concludes, ‘is less about principle than about eviction 
of Palestinians from Lebanon.’ The legal limbo, spatial exceptionalism, and non-
recognition of local governance structures that constitutes the ambiguous reality of 
Lebanon’s Palestinians’ status, shelter, and representation is a root cause for the lack 
of perspective that is meant to ‘push’ Palestinians to leave the country (Yan, 2017).
That working towards return is by now the only consistent element in the 
Lebanese approach towards Syrian refugees is undisputed. The October 2014 
policy calls for encouraging refugees to leave Lebanon ‘by all possible means’ 
(UNHCR, 2015: 4). This was put into practice by subsequent measures of the 
General Security to, according to Frangieh (2014), turn ‘refugees into outlaws 
bereft of legal protection in order to drive them out of Lebanon.’ Since then, the 
discourse of all political parties is increasingly infused with the call for refugees 
to return home now that the war in Syria is considered over. After the General 
Security’s May 2019 decision to deport Syrian refugees who irregularly entered 
Lebanon after 24 April 2019, thousands of refugees have been forcibly returned, 
often instantaneously, without due process.
In addition to these deportations, the General Security claims that its regis-
tration centres have voluntarily returned 170,000 Syrians (Fakhoury and Ozkul, 
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2019: 27). The Minister of State for Displaced Affairs openly liaises with Damas-
cus to enable such returns. This ‘voluntary’ return, however, is at least partly a 
result of the uncertainty generated by the institutional ambiguity refugees face. 
An associate of a Lebanese human rights organization explained that some years 
ago already Syrian refugees she worked with indicated that they considered going 
back to the ‘evil they know’ in Syria. They told her: ‘however horrible it is and 
however much I disagree with the situation, at least I know how it works and what 
I can expect.’19 
This reading is backed up by Amnesty International (2015: 26), which con-
cludes that the ‘onerous requirements introduced by Lebanon appear to be part 
of a deliberate policy to deny refuge to people fleeing Syria and to reduce the 
number of refugees in Lebanon by making life there next to impossible.’ Ghanem 
(2016: 55), too, understands the ‘selectivity and nebulousness’ that characterize 
the application of the categories for entry established by the October 2014 policy 
as a tactical approach to force refugees out of the country through creating a ‘hos-
tile environment’ (Sanyal, 2018: 73). Enab Baladi (2017) reports how the General 
Security confiscates passports and gives them back only after people sign a com-
pulsory deportation paper, which it sees as indicative of ‘a policy of unjustified 
and systematic disregard in order to make immigrants leave.’
‘Encouraged’ return is not only closely linked with imposed informality, but 
also with inflicted liminality. NGOs report that the seeming arbitrariness of the 
evictions of informal settlements creates anxiety and confusion among refugees. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that evictions often serve to expel Syrian refugees not 
just from specific refugee localities, but from the country altogether. Lebanon’s 
Foreign Minister argued that ‘the demolition drive would prevent refugees from 
permanently settling in Lebanon’ (Chehayeb, 2019 in Ubels, 2019: 40). This 
liminality-return nexus reflects a self-fulfilling prophecy. At first, assumptions that 
conflict would be short-lived and refugee crises would be resolved soon lessen 
the urgency of comprehensive responses. Later, this absence of policy becomes 
symbolic ‘proof’ of refugees’ enduring temporariness. The more clearly refugee 
crises become protracted, the more explicit the attempts to signal their illusory 
temporariness.
Exploit
The informality, liminality, and exceptionalism that determine how Lebanon has 
approached the status, shelter, and representation of refugee communities con-
tributed to manufactured vulnerability, the avoidable precarity of refugees. Such 
vulnerability allows widespread exploitation. When navigating Lebanon’s ambig-
uous institutional landscape, Syrian refugees are largely at the mercy of Lebanese 
landlords, sponsors, notaries, and (local) state authorities to obtain documenta-
tion. The ‘no-camp-policy’ has made refugees vulnerable to raids and evictions 
and exploitation by landowners and shawishes, who, for instance, face no restric-
tion on setting rent prices. Sponsors also hold tremendous power over refugees, 
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who are caught in a relation that Janmyr (2016: 76) describes as analogous to 
‘master and slave.’ Such dynamics have become even more entrenched by the 
increasing implication of landlords and sponsors in the surveillance of refugees 
(Al-Masri and Altabbaa, 2016; Ghaddar, 2017).
As a result, and notwithstanding genuine hospitality and support from Leba-
nese individuals and associations, exploitation in terms of residency and labour 
is omnipresent and human rights violations are widespread. Extortion and abuse, 
also by security services and municipal police who ‘rob refugees’ through imple-
menting costly registration systems, are routine (Barjas, 2016). This also affects 
humanitarian aid, which in the wake of the refugee crisis has become a significant 
source of revenue for the Lebanese state and thus, following sectarian clientelism, 
for the country’s political elite (Meier, 2014; Saghieh, 2015; Uzelac and Meester, 
2018). Lebanese middlemen are reported to highjack development projects, take 
shares of the assistance distributed to refugees to sell such aid for an inflated price, 
and take commission fees on services they provide to refugees and NGOs (Nassar 
and Stel, 2019).
This economy of refugee exploitation that various Lebanese middlemen ben-
efit from is not only an issue of individual abuse. Local strongmen benefiting 
from exploiting refugees are structurally linked to national politicians and state 
officials. The refugee economy has become part of existing systems of political 
clientelism and socio-economic patronage. Refugee eviction cases, for instance, 
are often part of political feuds between powerful families vying for economic 
and political power. Businessmen informally employing refugees are usually con-
nected to municipal power blocks, which in turn are backed by a political party or 
operate under the auspices of security services that ‘sell’ sponsorships to refugees 
(Atme, 2019: 91). Mayors turn a blind eye to illegal refugee markets hosted by 
local Lebanese entrepreneurs, look away from security agencies extorting refugee 
populations, or allow local landlords to host refugee settlements while abstaining 
from establishing a maximum rent. For this, they will likely get political or elec-
toral support, considering that security agencies are closely allied with political 
parties and businessmen and landowners are often affiliated with strong families 
that command large voting blocks.20 In many cases, mayors are themselves influ-
ential businessmen with interests in the refugee economy.
The protracted Palestinian case further illustrates how exploitation goes beyond 
individual landlords, sponsors, or authorities and is systematically related to the 
country’s political system. Lebanese businessmen economically benefit from the 
consequences of institutional ambiguity. Because Palestinians can only work 
informally in most sectors, employers can determine work conditions almost uni-
laterally. Since Palestinians do not have the right to establish associations, fur-
thermore, the Lebanese that officially head Palestinian NGOs and companies have 
unchecked power over these organizations. Similarly, ever since Palestinians are 
no longer allowed to own real estate, the Lebanese frontmen they are forced to use 
to ‘own’ property have unprecedented possibilities to extort them or ‘legally’ steal 
their property (El Natour, 2012).
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It is, however, not only the private Lebanese middlemen who (do not) allow 
Palestinians to work, organize, and own property that reveal the systematic nature 
of the exploitation allowed by institutional ambiguity. This is also apparent in the 
political mediation that enables such practices. Both nationally and locally, Leba-
nese authorities claim crucial gatekeeper functions in the adjustment strategies of 
the Palestinians aiming to navigate institutional ambiguity. Residents of Palestin-
ian gatherings are dependent on Popular Committees that they find overwhelm-
ingly illegitimate and incapable. Yet they cannot bypass them because these 
committees broker the ties with Lebanese political parties that in turn determine 
access to the state representatives that dictate whether or not an eviction order is 
implemented, whether or not an electricity transformer is installed, or whether or 
not garbage is collected.
Repressive Palestinian governance institutions are in this way propped up by 
the political logic of Lebanon’s hybrid order. Lebanese parties aptly positioned 
themselves between Palestinian actors caught in illegality and a state at least 
nominally bound by the law. As such, it is fair to assume, as Sheikh-Hassan and 
Hanafi (2010: 27, 42) do, that political parties’ behavior within and beyond the 
state system will be inclined to protect institutional ambiguity so as to maintain 
this niche. Ultimately, after all, it is political parties that make – or prevent, or 
unmake – government policy.
Controlling knowledge, managing ignorance
Institutional ambiguity serves important stated and unstated interests of Leba-
non’s governing elite, but that does not mean it is strategically produced. In 
fact, the default explanation for the emergence of institutional ambiguity of 
many authorities and most analysts would be the country’s limited governance 
capacities. My point is not that there are no resource-related drivers of insti-
tutional ambiguity, but that those cannot be meaningfully separated from its 
strategic drivers. Capacity does not ‘in and of itself’ determine states’ engage-
ment with refugees (Norman, 2017: 31). State inaction or ambiguity, Mourad 
(2017: 250) reminds us, reflects state appetites, and not just state capacities, 
to govern.
Capacity and political will, ultimately, are crucially interlinked. One can have 
the will not to have more capacity. State officials, for instance, on the one hand 
refer to local capacity problems to explain instances of inconsistency, while on 
the other hand they obstruct the decentralization that would remedy this problem. 
The absence of central state registration of Syrian refugees, to give another exam-
ple, is routinely considered a result of lack of resources. But the current reality in 
which registration and monitoring is both fragmented and duplicated by a wide 
array of state institutions in the end logically demands much more state capacity 
than equipping and training one designated institution. Building state capacity to 
deal with refugees has been a cornerstone of the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan, 
moreover. As Uzelac and Meester (2018) demonstrate, however, this investment 
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has had very limited effects so far. Many of my interlocutors accordingly con-
cluded that state agencies often hide behind capacity problems.
But if capacity and will are entangled, how to identify the strategic dimensions 
of institutional ambiguity? As Wedeen (1999: 6) has compellingly demonstrated 
in her seminal work on ‘ambiguities of domination,’ it may be ‘impossible to get 
into policymakers’ heads and come away with exact knowledge of why they do 
what they do.’ Political decision-makers are unlikely to see their own approach as 
promoting institutional ambiguity and, even if they do, would have little incen-
tive to admit as much. The ‘bugbear’ with strategic ignorance, after all, is that it 
is ‘most successful when it is least detectable’ (McGoey, 2019: 229). Simplis-
tic ideas of singularly masterminded chaos are evidently unhelpful: There is ‘no 
shadowy puppeteer working the strings’ (Whyte, 2011: 19). But seeing institu-
tional ambiguity as a ‘strategy without strategists’ is equally unsatisfying concep-
tually as well as politically (Wedeen, 1999: 153). I have shown that institutional 
ambiguity, like any other institutional arrangement, ‘is not a matter of inertia or 
self-sustaining equilibria,’ but the product of political decision-making (Schedler, 
2013: 28).
Institutional ambiguity is a structural aspect of Lebanon’s political order that is 
reproduced by specific governance decisions and practices. Crucially, in line with 
structuration theory, while Lebanon’s specific hybrid order may put a premium 
on the reproduction of ambiguity, it does not preclude its contestation. Actors are 
importantly ‘situated’ and their agency is ‘bounded,’ but they are purposive (Jabri, 
1996 in Demmers, 2017: 114). This is especially so for Lebanon’s oligopolistic 
political elites. Power, in the end, is relative agency – the comparative capacity 
to change structures. That Lebanon’s generic ambiguity is overwhelmingly kept 
in place in the realm of refugee governance thus suggests that this reproduction, 
overall, is in line with the interests of those with the power to initiate or prevent 
change.
In Lebanon, institutional ambiguity is a default logic. It would take active defi-
ance to counterbalance it, and its reproduction will often be passive. Much of the 
inaction and ambiguous action that entrench institutional ambiguity evolve along 
the lines of status quo interests served by ‘muddling through,’ and in this way 
become cemented institutionally (Lindblom, 1959; see also Mencütek, 2019: 135). 
Mostly, ambiguity is not actively created as much as its existence is embraced, 
made use of, and thereby extended. But although the behaviour that keeps uncer-
tainty in place will often be unintentional, state authorities ‘also actively take part 
in the production of misunderstandings and fogginess’ (Eule et al., 2018: 128). 
As my empirical chapters have shown, there are instances in which the produc-
tion of informality, liminality, and/or exceptionalism can be linked to a specific 
political subject and a particular decision-making process. At crucial governance 
junctures, authorities opt to keep things undecided and vague, maximizing their 
options, which include disciplining, exploiting, and expelling refugees.
This chapter has brought the different drivers of institutional ambiguity together. 
It outlined how capacity and will and contingency and strategy co-constitute each 
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other to produce and entrench institutional ambiguity. My agnotological read-
ing of Lebanon’s refugee governance thereby offers an innovative inroad into 
the dialectic between agency and structure in the process of governing refugees 
by showing how Lebanese authorities ‘govern ambiguity’ and are ‘governing 
through ambiguity’ at the same time (Best, 2008; see also Pinker and Harvey, 
2015). Coping with or navigating institutional ambiguity and reproducing it are 
often two sides of the same coin, which is exactly why institutional ambiguity 
is so persistent. Ultimately, what makes institutional ambiguity strategic is its 
recurrent and systematic nature and the fact that it serves interests. Even if the 
often discrete individual actions of state authorities lack an explicitly coordinated 
shared logic, taken together they produce a form of institutional ambiguity that 
operates as a governmentality.
This conclusion demands a reflection on the famous dictum that knowledge is 
power. Approaching the many empirical paradoxes, inconsistencies, and surprises 
in my case-studies of Lebanon’s governance of Palestinian and Syrian refugees from 
an ignorance studies perspective reveals that there is considerable power in being or 
pretending to be ignorant and in undermining others’ access to clear and complete 
information and knowledge. This power overwhelmingly works for Lebanon’s rul-
ing regime and against refugees. Thus, while the wisdom conveyed through ‘Han-
lon’s razor’ alerts us to not attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by 
ignorance, there might be instances in which ‘ignorance’ is part of ‘malice.’
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political decision.
(Interview – 26 March 2018)
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  This is now validated by the increasing deportations enabled by a decision to deport 
people who have irregularly entered Lebanon after 24 April 2019 – also of ‘irregular 
entries’ before that date.
 11 Author’s interview – Tyre, 6 July 2014.
 12 Author’s interview – 7 May 2013, emphasis added.
 13 Author’s interview – Beirut, June 9 2014.
 14 Author’s interview – Mar Elias camp, Beirut, 28 June 2014.
 15 Author’s interview – Skype, 27 March 2018.
 16 Author’s interview – Skype, 30 November 2017.
 17 Author’s interview – Tyre, 14 August 2014.
 18 Notes from interview – Zahle, 7 March 2018.
 19 Author’s interview – Skype, 14 November 2017. Refugees may not know the evil 
back home as well as they think they do. Research among refugees who have returned 
to Syria reveals that most returnees regret this decision, which they feel they made 
based on misleading information about the situation in Syria (Syrian Association for 
Citizens’ Dignity, 2019: 14).
 20 Does the exploitation of refugees clash with the stated interest in refugee return? My 
interlocutors explained that the politicians and officials calling for refugees to leave the 
country know full well that mass return is unlikely. They can thus safely support this 
position publicly, tapping into the popular support for it, while simultaneously protect-
ing their interests in the presence of refugees and the exploitation this allows.
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I think again that in one way or another [uncertainty] is something that’s used 
across our region by governments to control whether it is associations or 
whether it is to control migrants or whether it is people. Like, to put you in a 
place where, like, you don’t really know; it’s neither black nor white, you don’t 
know, it’s a grey area where they . . . whereby they can come at one point and 
say ‘ah, you’re not registered, get out of the country.’ So it can play in different 
ways. Being in a way in an illegal situation or under an illegal entry would in 
the power balance shift against you.1
This concluding chapter has three main objectives. It starts out with explicating 
the book’s empirical contributions and exploring how the insights produced for 
refugee governance in Lebanon and the role of strategic ambiguity in it resonate 
more broadly. It then proceeds to outline the conceptual contributions of the book, 
reflecting on the implications of my core argument for debates in the fields of ref-
ugee studies, policy and governance studies, and ignorance studies. My analysis, 
on the one hand, brings the idea of institutionalized ambiguity as a governmental-
ity to the field of refugee studies to help explain the systemic uncertainty that refu-
gees often face. On the other hand, it develops thinking on strategic institutional 
ambiguity through the empirical insights yielded by the extreme case of refugees. 
In putting into conversation relevant schools of thought from refugee studies, 
governance and policy studies, and ignorance studies, the book analytically links 
the epistemic, operational, and political dimensions of institutional ambiguity.
The core thesis of this book is that the endemic informality, liminality, and 
exceptionalism that characterize Lebanese refugee governance have crucial stra-
tegic dimensions. Institutional ambiguity is not merely the consequence of the 
inevitable crisis modality of large-scale refugee arrivals or the reflection of inher-
ent leeway built into any form of political decision-making and policy implemen-
tation. Nor is it simply the result of capacity or resource deficits characteristic 
of ‘fragile’ states. Rather, institutional ambiguity is the result of the interplay 
between the systemic features of hybrid order and the strategic operation of 
political authorities within such hybridity. Inaction and arbitrary action in terms 
of policy-making as well as implementation define Lebanon’s engagement with 
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refugees. This behaviour reproduces but also enhances existing unpredictability 
and uncertainty. Such utilization and extension of institutional ambiguity at times 
amounts to a politics of uncertainty that serves to bolster positions of power vis-
à-vis political competitors, as well as to discipline, exploit, and expel specific 
populations.
In explicating the contributions that this argument makes, two crucial dis-
claimers that have featured throughout the book merit reiteration: Institutional 
ambiguity is not total and it is not always detrimental. First, institutional ambigu-
ity is neither omnipresent, nor complete. Not-knowing is routinely strategically 
upheld, professed, or imposed, but this is never uncontested. I have sought to 
identify the manifestations and workings of institutional ambiguity and tease out 
their strategic dimensions, but this does not mean that any action and decision of 
authorities dealing with refugees will produce or reflect informality, liminality, 
and exceptionalism. There are ample examples of state officials, local authori-
ties, and refugee representatives who work to defy and counter the vagueness 
and unpredictability that shape refugee life in Lebanon. As we have seen with the 
Palestinian case, recent developments promise a more explicit acknowledgement, 
regulation, and engagement with Palestinians living in Lebanon. For Syrians, too, 
the importance of the watershed moments in 2014 and 2015, when the govern-
ment shifted from denial to repression and thereby left no-policy-policy behind, 
should not be downplayed.
I have focused on the policy realms of status, shelter, and representation spe-
cifically, where ambiguity has been particularly prone and which thus serve as 
helpful cases to explore the work that uncertainty does as a governmentality. In 
other sectors, such as service provision and the labour market, regularization by 
the relevant national line ministries has been less opaque, at least with regard 
to Syrian refugees. The distribution of institutional ambiguity can vary across 
sectors, populations, and regions. Indeed, it is exactly the fact that ambiguity is 
not omnipresent that denotes its strategic nature. That the Lebanese government 
now extensively organizes and plans the so-desired return of Syrian refugees, for 
instance, highlights that previous inactivity in different governance realms has 
been a matter of choice as much as capacity. There is sufficient ability to restrict, 
but not enough resources to protect.
Institutional ambiguity is thus always partial. And it need not be problematic. 
‘Unknowing’ has emancipatory potential (McGoey, 2019). Institutional ambigu-
ity is also simply indispensable from an opportunistic point of view. Any form of 
governance and policy-making requires a dose of ambiguity to operate beyond 
theory and ideology, regardless of the issue or setting. When it comes to refugee 
governance, ambivalent policies can, for instance, help integrate refugees (Nor-
man, 2019). Although this is arguably not the case in Lebanon, the fact that Leba-
non alone for a long time hosted more Syrian refugees than the entire European 
Union, many have argued, was only possible because of the ambiguity that was 
enabled by the absence of ‘parameters governing migration and refugee policy’ 
(Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous, n.d.).
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My own cases also show that ambiguity may sometimes be the best possible 
option under restrictive circumstances. Reflecting on the prospective regulariza-
tion of provincial refugee governance in the Syrian case, a humanitarian profes-
sional lamented the overturning of the previous, more informal, system, which 
‘had its flaws,’ but at least was faster.2 Non-implementation, too, was at times 
heralded as something positive. A lawyer working for a Lebanese human rights 
organization noted that in the face of restrictive policies, ‘it is a good thing not to 
practice the official policy.’3 The stance of local authorities looking away in the 
face of refugee ‘transgressions’ such as electricity hooking was similarly consid-
ered a form of ambiguity that was sympathetic rather than repressive. But while 
institutional ambiguity in principle also allows for constructive or subversive 
forms of (self-)governance, this, as detailed in Chapter 6, is not how it plays out 
overall when it comes to refugee governance in Lebanon. The appropriation of 
ignorance that underlies the politics of uncertainty is overwhelmingly a privilege 
of the powerful.
Empirical contributions: Lebanon and its refugees
This book has been one of the first to offer an analysis of Lebanon’s response to the 
Syrian refugee crisis that is comprehensive in that it regards multiple fundamental 
domains of governance and considers both policy and practice on a national as 
well as a local level. It has gone beyond description and offered a specific read-
ing of Lebanon’s response to the arrival of Syrian refugees through the lens of 
strategic ambiguity. Bringing Lebanon’s historical experiences with Palestinian 
refugees into the analysis of the more recent Syrian refugee crisis and exploring 
the parallels between these cases in terms of the constitutive role of institutional 
ambiguity, moreover, reveals how the Lebanese engagement with Syrians may be 
determined by the attempt to avoid another Palestinian conundrum, but in many 
ways nevertheless replicates it. These new analytical vantage points show that 
many of the apparent contradictions in Lebanon’s response to the Syrian refugee 
presence – simultaneous paralysis and repression, denial and securitization, ben-
efiting and suffering from – are often mutually constitutive.
Lebanon’s protracted Palestinian refugee presence has logically been scruti-
nized longer and more extensively than the more recent presence of Syrian refu-
gees. What my analysis adds to this plethora of existing studies of Palestinians in 
Lebanon is an encompassing perspective that brings together historical accounts 
and contemporary case-studies. As with the Syrian case, the innovative vantage 
point of a politics of uncertainty sheds new light on some of the central paradoxes 
in previous work on Lebanon’s Palestinians. The insights facilitated by the notion 
of strategic institutional ambiguity can help understand how Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon have been tightly controlled and largely abandoned at the same time, 
politically integrated into Lebanon’s sectarian oligopolistic logics on the one 
hand while institutionally excluded on the other. Juxtaposing the Palestinian case 
with the more recent dealings with Syrian refugees, furthermore, reminds us that 
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no-policy-policies and formal informalities do not just historically emerge but are 
actively produced. This foregrounds the strategic dimensions of the protracted 
status quo that Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees face.
My analysis does not just help us to better understand Lebanon’s engagement 
with refugees. In many ways, Lebanese authorities’ engagement with refugees 
is an extreme version of the manner in which they consolidate power over their 
Lebanese constituencies (Al-Masri, Altabaa and Abla, 2016: 5; International Alert 
and Lebanon Support, 2017: 5). A refugee expert who has worked for several 
Lebanese ministries linked what she called a politics of evasion to the specificities 
of Lebanon’s political order that is characterized by veto-power:
Anything that is problematic and that might not get a consensus gets evaded, 
any kind of topic. So if this is something there is no agreement on among the 
political parties, instead of dealing with it, we just live in denial and we evade 
it, put it on the side. So it’s this policy of evasion throughout, where you just 
start accumulating all these problems on the side because you don’t want to 
deal with them. And when you don’t want to deal with your problems, you’re 
just leaving them to sort themselves out. If some of these decisions were 
against, like . . . the conviction or the opinion of some political party in the 
Council of Ministers, then these kinds of decisions would get vetoed because 
our Council of Ministers has the veto power. So anyone . . . all the decisions 
need to come out with consensus. And if that’s not the case, it’s always easier 
to get consensus on not doing anything.4
There are more parallels. Deliberate ambiguity regarding, or the flagrant absence 
of, numbers and statistics is a common Lebanese feature, too. It is not just refu-
gees who are not registered in Lebanon, which has carefully avoided any national 
census since 1932 and is renowned for its lack of governmental statistics. One 
analyst pointedly noted that: ‘I think there is a certain history here in terms of 
not counting things very clearly.’5 Similarly, Lebanese policy that has nothing 
to do with refugees is hardly clear-cut in its formulation, communication, and 
implementation either. It routinely exhibits a ‘high degree of vagueness,’ which 
prevents relevant stakeholders from holding state agencies accountable (Atallah, 
Dagher and Mahmalat, 2019: 1). The forms of indirect rule that Lebanese authori-
ties impose on refugee communities and their representatives reflect the mediated 
forms of stateness that characterize the country at large. The use of informal bro-
kers that are co-opted as security agents reflects the tactics that Lebanon’s sectarian 
bosses use to ‘police their political enclaves’ (Ghaddar, 2017). Through studying 
Lebanon’s ambiguous governance of refugees, this book thus breaks new ground 
in understanding Lebanese governance in general. Specifically, it offers food for 
thought regarding two dominant debates on the contemporary Lebanese state.
This first regards the never-abating discussion on state fragility and state absence 
referred to in Chapter 1. Using refugee governance as an entry point towards 
revealing the centrality of strategic ambiguity in the operations of Lebanese state 
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agencies, my book construes the Lebanese state as not so much weak, fragmented, 
or failed, but rather as mediated and hybrid. Lebanon’s refugee governance offers 
an inroad into the ‘multifarious landscape of fractured and hybrid sovereignties’ 
(Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017: 2). Exploring hybrid order as the systemic reflec-
tion of a constantly reproduced politics of uncertainty allows for a constructive 
rather than pathological understanding of its ‘quasischizophrenic’ concurrent 
weakness and menace (Kosmatopoulos, 2011; Obeid, 2010).
Borgmann and Slim (2018: 10) have provocatively pointed out that when the 
informality, liminality, and exceptionalism that shape the Lebanese approach to 
refugees are explained away as a contingency of asylum-specific capacity deficits, 
crucial questions remain unanswered. Taking stock of the country’s ambivalent 
policy towards refugees, they wonder: ‘Is the absence of Lebanese public policy 
and widespread contentment with both the litany of rhetorical statements and the 
oppressive silence on this important topic the most genuine example of targeted 
Lebanese policy?’ (Borgmann and Slim, 2018: 10–11). This book has demon-
strated that – with the usual collection of nuances and disclaimers – the answer 
would be ‘yes.’
The second key debate about the nature of the post–Civil War Lebanese state 
that the book speaks to is that of consensus versus polarization. Lebanon’s 
consociational system puts a premium on elite consensus as sectarian-political 
leaders depend on each other as much as on their constituencies to maintain 
their power positions. But the extreme polarization between different political 
alliances in terms of geopolitical positioning, most strikingly so with regard to 
the Syrian tutelage over Lebanon until 2005 and the Syrian War since 2011, 
has been a defining feature of modern Lebanon. The governance of refugees – 
although it displays significant variation across Lebanon’s regions and the 
respective local political-sectarian regimes – overall underscores that the basic 
elite consensus that is at the heart of the country’s formal consociational system 
and informal oligopolistic logic remains an essential foundation of post–Civil 
War Lebanon. It confirms Mazzola’s (2019: 14) reading of Lebanon’s hybrid 
order as an ‘intentional product of institutional engineering’ to facilitate sectar-
ian clientelism.
As crucially validated by the events of the 2019 ‘October Revolution,’ no mat-
ter how antagonistic they may be with regard to regional politics, domestically 
Lebanon’s elites share crucial stakes in the status quo. These stakes include the 
minimization and pacification of refugee populations. According to Lebanese 
advisors and consultants that have worked inside various ministries, this com-
mon interest in the status quo extends beyond refugee governance. Institutional 
ambiguity allows Lebanon’s elites to agree to disagree politically without having 
to resolve such disagreements through actual policies and to protect their mutually 
dependent power positions accordingly.
Beyond these empirical contributions to discussions centred on Lebanon, my 
case-studies offer conceptual insights in terms of our understanding of forced dis-
placement, of power and authority, and of knowledge and ignorance. The next 
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section accordingly engages with critical scholarly debates in the respective fields 
of refugee studies, governance and policy studies, and ignorance studies.
Conceptual contributions: implications for 
studying strategic institutional ambiguity
Refugee studies
Lebanon featured as the central case in this book for a reason, But that the idea 
of a politics of uncertainty isespecially relevant there, does not mean it is only 
relevant there. Although the Lebanese state is particularly fragmented in terms of 
policy-making, Mencütek (2019: 244, 2, 252) notes that institutionally ambigu-
ous refugee governance emerged not just in Lebanon, but in Turkey and Jordan 
as well, particularly around the demarcation of mandates, but also with regard to 
registration practices (see also Fakhoury, 2017: 694; Norman, 2019). In Turkey, 
Ilcan, Rygiel, and Baban (2018) demonstrate, precarity is produced through ambi-
guity in registration status (see also Memişoğlu and Ilgit, 2017; Öner and Genç, 
2015). In Jordan, ambiguity is the defining feature of refugee spaces (Achilli and 
Oesch, 2016; Oesch, 2017). Inconsistent and volatile policies (Schmidt, 2019) and 
the political utilization of discrepant refugee figures (Lenner, 2019) are indicative 
of wider institutional ambiguity in Jordan as well. These parallels mean that by 
further conceptualizing the political productivity of ambiguity, the book enhances 
our understanding of refugee governance in the Middle East, a region usually 
underappreciated in migration studies (Mencütek, 2019: 5).
The reach of the argument that strategic institutional ambiguity can be a key 
feature of refugee governance does not stop with the Middle East. It can be 
extended to European governance. In fact, the idea of a politics of uncertainty 
could help undercut one of the most problematic assumptions in the refugee stud-
ies field, namely that ‘regional’ refugee governance in the Global South is fun-
damentally different from ‘third country’ refugee governance in the Global North 
(Chimni, 1998; see also Sanyal, 2018: 70). This dominant idea that, as Nawyn 
(2016: 164 in Mencütek, 2019: 31) suggests, ‘migration in the Global South con-
stitutes something that is consistently and starkly distinct from what we see in the 
Global North’ may be true on many accounts, but there are also crucial similarities 
in the migration regimes of regional host countries and Europe. The centrality of 
strategic ambiguity is one of those (Stel, 2018).
A full exploration of the parallels between regional and European refugee gov-
ernance in terms of governing through uncertainty is beyond the scope of the 
current book. However, as illustrated in the references to literature based on Euro-
pean case-studies throughout my analysis, there is ample evidence that strategic 
inaction and ambiguity and the feigning, maintaining, and imposing of ignorance 
are a central aspect of the European migration regime (Ansems de Vries and 
Guild, 2019; Oomen et al., 2019; Borrelli, 2018; De Genova, 2017; Eule et al., 
2018; Scheel, 2019; Scheel and Ustek-Spilda, 2019; Schuster, 2011; Slominski 
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and Trauner, 2018; Tekin, 2019; Vianelli, 2017) – with striking examples avail-
able from, for instance, the Balkans (Minca, Šantić and Umek, 2019), Denmark 
(Suárez-Krabbe and Lindberg, 2019; Whyte, 2011), France (Davies, Isakjee and 
Dhesi, 2017; Hagan, 2018, 2020), Malta (Lemaire, 2014, 2019), Sweden (Qvist, 
2017), the Netherlands (Kalir, 2017), the United Kingdom (Canning, 2018; Dar-
ling, 2017a, 2017b; Hughes, 2019), and Greece (Franck, 2019; Rozakou, 2017), 
Italy (Caprioglio, Ferri and Gennari, 2018; Heyer, 2019; Pinelli, 2018; Tuckett, 
2019), and the broader Mediterranean hotspot system.
Investigating these similarities in terms of ambiguity is important because it 
helps us to better understand the entirety of modern governmentalities of forced 
migration, but also because it crucially interrogates the moral exceptionalism 
often bestowed on the assumed rational and rule of law–based approach of West-
ern states. The conceptual vocabulary used to explore refugee governance ‘in the 
region’ can shine a new, more critical light on refugee governance closer to home. 
As the first account to explicitly and comprehensively theorize strategic institu-
tional ambiguity as a central governmentality in state approaches to refugees, the 
book has sought to open up an analytical arena to juxtapose accounts of refugee 
governance from what so far have usually been considered essentially different 
contexts.
Beyond putting into conversation the often geographically siloed accounts of 
refugee governance through reflecting on the commonality of institutional ambi-
guity, my argument resonates with various elemental debates in the refugee stud-
ies field. The first of these regards ambiguity specifically, more precisely the fact 
that the focus of refugee scholars is still predominantly on the destabilizing effect 
of displacement. This book lends further credibility to the emerging work that 
poses that host state policy is at least as important in creating and upholding the 
institutional ambiguity that refugees experience. My book has traced the political 
‘production of doubt’ and placed it squarely at the centre of refugee governance 
(Aradau, 2017: 330). Bringing insights from scholars working on hybrid order and 
strategic ignorance to refugee studies, it suggests handles to not just acknowledge 
uncertainty as a governmentality, but to actually study it as such. This underpins 
critical refugee studies’ mission to go beyond the traditional focus on the humani-
tarian conditions of displaced people and put their political conditions centre stage 
(Chimni, 1998; Hanafi, 2008). If the foundational mission of refugee studies is 
to make experiences of forced displacement, the ‘placeless spaces’ and ‘chaotic 
socio-political states’ of people ‘left waiting,’ understandable, then the idea of a 
politics of uncertainty is my contribution towards furthering such understanding 
(Agier, 2008: vii).
A second core theme of refugee studies that this book links to concerns the 
interplay between protracted and recent refugee ‘crises’ and related questions of 
policy legacies and institutional learning (Lenner, 2016). I analyzed the world’s 
most drawn-out refugee experience in tandem with a more recently created refu-
gee situation. This uniquely illustrates how states’ attempts to prevent the replica-
tion of previous episodes of refugee governance often generate different forms 
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of ambiguity but at the same time reinstate its centrality. Lebanon’s Palestinian 
and Syrian refugees importantly differ in terms of status (Palestinians are recog-
nized as refugees, Syrians are not), shelter (Palestinians mostly live in formal and 
informal camps, Syrians are largely ‘self-settled’), and representation (Palestin-
ians have established political institutions, Syrians are precluded from any such 
political organization). But both communities face legal, spatial, temporal, and 
political ambiguities that determine much of their lives in Lebanon and that render 
them controllable, exploitable, and expellable. Authorities’ institutional learning 
and institutional entrapment thus go hand-in-hand. The crucial tenet of strategic 
institutional ambiguity to keep refugee presences informal, temporary, and excep-
tional shows how refugeeness can be almost indefinitely reproduced as a result of 
not merely enduring displacement but also enduring uncertainty.
My conceptualization of strategic institutional ambiguity as a governmental-
ity also takes the scholarship on the constituent parts of refugee governance that 
I have focused on – status, shelter, and representation – further. It does so by 
conceptually linking them, demonstrating that precarious legal status, informal 
encampment, and impediments to political mobilization do not come alone but 
tend to be part of a more intricately related governmentality. This makes their 
marginalizing power more profound and the need to determine the political econ-
omies behind them more pressing. The absence of legal frameworks for asylum is 
not a given but a choice of ruling elites. Formal camps are not ‘machines of order-
ing,’ but in reality are as ‘ambiguous, undetermined, and unfulfilled’ as informal 
settlements or self-settlement modalities (Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 17 in Katz, 
2016: 146; Agier, 2008: 65). Lack of refugee organization, ‘voice,’ or ‘ownership’ 
is the result of refugees’ personal considerations and the ad-hocish committee 
obsession of many humanitarian actors, but it also stems from authorities’ frag-
mentation, co-optation, and divide-and-rule tactics that keep in place informality, 
liminality, and exceptionalism.
These conclusions help account for why, despite far-reaching socio-economic 
inclusion, institutional exclusion of refugees can remain firmly in place. They also 
demand a reconsideration of the (un)voluntary nature of refugee returns. While 
the prevention of refoulement has been the cornerstone of international refugee 
law, critical scholars have long since shown how deportation (Kalir, 2014, 2019), 
deportability (De Genova, 2002), and enforced mobility (Tazzioli, 2017) in prac-
tice often result in de facto refoulement or even a ‘deadly refoulement industry’ 
(Stierl, 2019). As my cases have shown, uncertainty can be such a profoundly 
undermining and unsettling state that precludes wellbeing to such an extent that 
the voluntary nature of returns that occur as the result of a politics of uncertainty 
should be considered with extreme skepticism.
Governance and policy studies
My central argument draws on emerging insights in critical refugee studies and 
builds on empirical cases of refugee governance. The insights that this analysis 
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yields, however, are not limited to the governance of refugees. On the one hand, 
scholars assume that the way refugees are treated can tell us something about 
broader dynamics of state power because refugees are construed as the antithesis 
of citizens, the exception that sheds light on the rule. This particularly regards 
questions of order and disorder since refugees are routinely considered a threat to 
the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki, 1995). On the other hand, it is often argued 
that the governance of refugees can elucidate governance at large not because it 
reveals the opposite of the ways in which political authorities govern citizens but 
because it exposes extreme versions of such ‘normal’ governance.
It is evident that refugees are discursively produced as the ultimate ‘other.’ 
This has been amply demonstrated for Palestinians (Czajka, 2012; Hanafi, 2008; 
Peteet, 2005; Serhan, 2019) as well as Syrians (Atallah and Mahdi, 2017; Ghad-
dar, 2017) in Lebanon. These political realities notwithstanding, analytically this 
book validates the second perspective. Refugee governance can be read as an 
extreme case of governance at large and offers a unique window on, or ‘weath-
ervane’ for, power dynamics more broadly (Bakewell, 2014: 135; Bully, 2014: 
76; Edwards and Van Waas, 2014: 290; Eule et al., 2018: 56; Gibney, 2014: 54; 
Oesch, 2015: 3; Stepputat and Nyberg Sørensen, 2014: 88; Biehl, 2015: 68).
Some aspects of the politics of uncertainty leveled against refugees are spe-
cific to their situation as displaced people. Subjecting them to institutional ambi-
guity might be easier to legitimate because of their limited political capital as 
non-citizens. Refugees face even more informality (due to lack of citizenship 
and residency status), more extreme liminality (due to temporary stay), and more 
exceptionalism (due to distinct and often patchy legal frameworks). But the ways 
in which institutional ambiguity is utilized in governing refugees reveals logics of 
rule that are equally pertinent to understand the governance of citizens. This is the 
case because while those being governed might differ, those doing the governing 
do not. The governance repertoires developed to control one population affect the 
strategies of governance adopted to deal with other populations.
In this sense, refugees reflect a broader category of those considered ‘undesir-
able’ by political elites, ranging from the poor to the foreign (Agier, 2008: viii; 
Bayat, 1997: 55–56; Malkki, 1995: 495; Sanyal, 2014: 559). As recognized in 
Chomsky’s (2012) notion of the ‘precariat,’ a class deemed expendable and kept 
perpetually on the edge of subsistence by dominant economic and political elites, 
for many rulers undesirables include citizens as well. In contexts where the civil 
and political rights that set citizens apart from refugees are notoriously provi-
sional in reality, the very distinction between these different populations might be 
questioned. In political orders, whether authoritarian or democratic, where those 
in charge regard citizens – or certain groups of citizens – as an obstacle to rather 
than a legitimation for their power, the strategic use of institutional ambiguity will 
be a relevant modality of governance.
Then what exactly does the institutional engagement with refugees tell us about 
the organization of public goods and collective representation and the workings 
of power at large? Synthesizing refugee studies and ignorance studies, this book 
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suggests it says two fundamental things. First, that policies and practices of rule 
do not emerge or prevail only despite of or in opposition to ambiguity, but func-
tion through it. Institutional ambiguity is not an anomaly; it is constitutive of gov-
ernance. Informality, liminality, and exceptionalism do not just happen, but are 
made to happen – sometimes unconsciously and indirectly, sometimes quite delib-
erately. The complication and disturbance of knowledge economies occasionally 
stems from concrete inactions and arbitrary actions that can and should be iden-
tified, explored, and, where possible, attributed. Doing so has implications for 
how we might conceive of power. Further sophisticating potential applications of 
Foucauldian governmentality, the idea of strategic institutional ambiguity allows 
for a reconsideration of what we regard as reasons, techniques, and subjects of 
government. It further substantiates the potential rationality of illegibility; con-
strues inaction and ambiguity as a possible mechanism of governance; and allows 
for the consideration of strategically produced ‘ambiguous subjects’ (Atme, 2019: 
107). Power is the capacity to set agendas for what is not known and to exploit the 
uncertainty that follows from this capacity (McGoey, 2019: 40).
Second, the twin notions of institutional ambiguity and the politics of uncer-
tainty allow us to take our analysis of the strategic nature of ambiguity further 
than the general claim that it serves governing actors to accumulate power. That 
policy paradoxes follow from inter- and intra-organizational conflicts and ten-
sions is usually well-recognized. What my analysis shows, however, is that in 
some cases the political utilization of uncertainty is not just an instrument in inter-
elite competition for power and resources, but can also function as a more con-
certed governmentality to undermine and fragment the organization of specific 
‘problematic’ groups. It thereby reveals logics of rule that tie together elites who 
are often perceived as predominantly antagonistic.
These points particularly resonate with academic debates on state hybridity. 
The hybrid nature of specific state systems, shaped by colonial legacies and neo-
colonial geopolitics, is in policy circles often still considered a form of fragility 
or failure. Yet hybridity can only be understood when looking into the productive 
aspects of chaos, disorder, and uncertainty. The ‘renewed sociology of govern-
ance’ that hybrid settings demand requires a recognition of the strategic as well as 
the contingent components of institutional ambiguity (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus 
and Vlassenroot, 2008: 9). As I further detail in the next section, the occurrence 
of institutional ambiguity need not signal a ‘breakdown in rationality,’ but points 
towards different, more complex, rationalities (McGoey, 2007: 228, 2019; see 
also Hull, 2012: 25). The fluidity of the boundaries between categories that politi-
cal scientists prefer to project as binaries – the legal and the illegal, the public and 
the private, state weakness and strength – serves political purposes (Migdal, 2001; 
Tapscott, 2017).
This conclusion revitalizes key insights produced by the anthropology of the 
state, specifically on how stateness might be generated in hybrid orders. My find-
ings add empirical substance to work that shows that ideas of stateness are pro-
duced through the inaction or absence of state systems (Eule et al., 2018: 230; 
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Lund, 2006; Nielsen, 2007: 695). Ambiguity or illegibility can define the state 
not as a failing but as a potent assemblage of actors (Das and Poole, 2004). State 
authority is not just conjured through performances and claims of expert knowl-
edge and official legibility (Boswell, 2009). The uncertainty that follows from the 
unpredictability and arbitrariness facilitated by institutional ambiguity is a power-
ful ‘state effect’ as well (Mitchell, 1990: 94).
As acknowledged in my conceptual framework and evident throughout my 
empirical analysis, the linkages between the practices of particular state repre-
sentatives and the strategies of state agencies, or even ‘the state’ as such, are 
inherently complicated, even more so in hybrid political orders where the state 
idea and the state system are only loosely aligned, but particular knowledge pat-
terns or styles can be associated with governance by particular organizations 
(Freeman and Sturdy, 2014 in Sedlacko and Dahlvik, 2017). This is no different 
for patterns or styles of not-knowing. As my case-studies showed, this might be 
demonstrated by juxtaposing the experiences and practices of state representa-
tives at different bureaucratic levels and investigating their ‘role-play’ of denying 
or ignoring information that is evidently exchanged between them (see also Eule 
et al., 2018; Kalir and Rozakou, 2016: 9). Studying the production, protection, 
and amplification of institutional ambiguity helps account for the persistence of 
mediated and negotiated forms of stateness that encompass strategic forms of 
indirect rule (Blundo, 2006; Hagmann and Péclard, 2010; Menkhaus, 2006; Stel, 
2015, 2016, 2017).
The ‘real’ governance that takes place in defiance of Weberian ideal types is, 
unsurprisingly, most often captured in studies that focus on non-Western settings 
(Blundo and Le Meur, 2009; Gupta, 1995; Olivier de Sardan, 2008). The insights 
produced by these studies, however, are also relevant to the Western countries 
whose aspirations these classical political science concepts reflect. Like scholars 
of migration, scholars of governance, policy, and politics would do well to shed 
the assumptions that logics of rule and modalities of governing are inherently or 
inevitably different in the South and the North. Synthesizing insights on strategic 
uncertainty from refugee, governance, and ignorance studies reveals the univer-
sality of institutional ambiguity and its political utilization. It shows that institu-
tional ambiguity is more prevalent in some places at some times for some people 
and that its strategic uses are highly contextual, but it also discards the idea that 
governance through uncertainty is a phenomenon that is typical for or limited to 
‘weak’ or hybrid states. The ‘troubling relationship between (mis)information and 
state power’ is evident everywhere (Slater, 2012: 948).
This book reiterates the relevance of studying the state even, or especially, 
when it is deemed absent and despite the humanitarianization of refugee govern-
ance (see also Ilcan, Rygiel and Baban, 2018). But producing unpredictability and 
arbitrariness through institutionalizing informality, liminality, and exceptionalism 
as a way to ‘sabotage accountability,’ ‘disable voice’ and control, and discipline 
rivalling authorities and constituencies is a crucial feature of ‘strong’ authoritar-
ian states as well (Glasius, 2018). As considered in detail in the Introduction, 
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practices like deliberate non-recording are omnipresent in liberal democracies 
too, suggesting that state control anywhere operates through ambiguity as well 
as specification (Hull, 2012: 248). The diffuse and polycentric assemblages and 
opaque regimes that emerge in contexts of New Public Management initiatives 
and neoliberal outsourcing are rife with strategic forms of ambiguity that might be 
different from those that prevail in hybrid orders, but can be very similar as well 
(Best, 2012; Guazzone and Pioppi, 2012; McGoey, 2019).
Strategic inaction and ambiguity may then well go hand in hand with bureau-
cratic illusions of legibility, expertise, and capacity (Griffiths, 2013: 279; Kalir and 
Van Schendel, 2017; Norman, 2005: 196). To define ‘modernity’ by its efforts to 
eliminate ambivalence is to buy into these illusions (Bauman, 1993; Scott, 1985, 
2009; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Those interested in the different guises that power 
can take should look beyond rituals of order. Although politics of uncertainty may 
be most palpable with regard to refugee populations in hybrid political orders, it is 
fruitful for scholars of political authority, governance, and public administration 
everywhere to infuse their analyses with the consideration that sometimes ‘uncer-
tainty rather than certainty is the norm’ (Horst and Grabska, 2015: 10).
Ignorance studies
As Gross and McGoey (2015) concluded in their seminal handbook on igno-
rance studies some years ago, the insight that ignorance is socially constructed 
is no longer a novel one. It is time, they found, to move on from marveling 
about the fact that ignorance is constructed to exploring how and why it is con-
structed. This book contributes to such emerging epistemologies of ignorance 
that reflect on how best to examine and understand the production and sustain-
ability of not-knowing or ‘unknowledges’ in several ways (Sullivan and Tuana, 
2007). My main contribution to ignorance studies concerns the conceptual 
framework outlined in the Introduction and sophisticated in Chapter 6. In put-
ting the notion of ambiguity centre stage, the book challenges residual dichoto-
mous understandings of knowledge and ignorance that at times still implicitly 
underpin ignorance studies (Bailey, 2007). The strategic value of not-knowing, 
I show, often lies not in the flat absence of knowledge but in its uncertainty and 
unpredictability.
My approach seeks to move away from the disciplinary fragmentation of the 
relatively young field of ignorance studies. It does so by suggesting a concrete, 
operationalized framework. The concept of institutional ambiguity is not a new 
one, but the operationalization furthered here, which takes cues from refugee 
studies by focusing on informality, liminality, and exceptionalism, gives the idea 
of institutional ambiguity new substance. My framework offers explicit handles 
on where and how to look for it and how to study it comprehensively, linking 
domains and levels of governance that are often investigated separately. Rather 
than researching, for instance, ambiguous legal categorizations, practices of non-
recording, spatial informalities, and temporal uncertainties on a case-by-case 
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basis, the framework employed here allows for an analysis that links different 
manifestations of institutional ambiguity.
The idea of institutional ambiguity puts forward a systematic and comprehen-
sive approach to locating and describing instances of unpredictable and uncer-
tain governance. The related concept of a politics of uncertainty engages with the 
possibly strategic dimensions of such ambiguity by interrogating how empirical 
instances of informality, liminality, and exceptionalism come to be and persist. By 
investigating different categories of behaviour in concrete settings and moments, 
the concept of a politics of uncertainty goes beyond construing ambiguity as a 
result and manifestation of not-knowing. Drawing on critical policy studies and 
Foucauldian work on governance, it links (not-)knowing to (not-)acting. It thereby 
suggests that studying what people do and do not do is a helpful way to approach 
the far more elusive question of what people know and do not know that is central 
to ignorance studies.
Through these dual concepts of institutional ambiguity and the politics of 
uncertainty, the book speaks to key debates in the literature on strategic igno-
rance. Central to this is the way in which my framework and analysis allow for 
differentiation, showing that institutional ambiguity is never a generic reality, 
but crucially varies on spatial and temporal dimensions and for different societal 
groups. These differentiations, moreover, do not emerge by chance but are pro-
duced through patterns of inaction and partial and arbitrary action. Such produc-
tion, crucially, itself occurs through actors that relate and interact in a hybrid – as 
in fragmented and often inconsistent – manner that complicates the attribution 
of particular manifestations of ambiguity. But, although complicated, my book 
shows that such attribution is now and then possible through carefully contextual-
ized analysis.
This relates to another central concern of scholars working on socio-political 
ignorance: the question of intentionality. As discussed in detail in Chapter 6, apart 
from explicit ‘confessions,’ it is extremely challenging and problematic to assess 
the possibly deliberate nature of not-knowing. Yet lack of evidence is not the same 
as evidence that something does not exist (McGoey, 2019: 142). And as my case-
studies have illustrated, linking specific outcomes for specific groups – in terms of 
informality, liminality, and exceptionalism in the domains of status, shelter, and 
representation – to specific behaviour of specific authorities – in terms of inac-
tion and partial and arbitrary action – and the stated as well as unstated objectives 
of these authorities – in terms of politics and economics – offers a way to make 
visible and credible the strategic dimensions of ambiguity and uncertainty. Since 
inaction and arbitrary action are contingent more often than they are strategic, this 
is not a plea for a purely functionalist reading of institutional ambiguity. Rather, 
it suggests an analytical toolkit for those interested in teasing out the aspects of 
ambiguity that are strategically pursued. This take on strategy is not limited to or 
centred on deliberate planning for ambiguity. Rather, it denotes the opportunistic 
toleration, elaboration, or appropriation of informality, liminality, and exceptional-
ism. It thereby underpins McGoey’s (2007: 228) conception of the rationality of 
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ignorance as a more situated legitimation of inaction or ambiguous action that goes 
beyond an economistic equation of rationality with self-interest (Friedman, 2005).
This concerns the dialectic between agency and structure that is fundamental 
to ignorance studies. The cases explored in this book have shown institutional 
ambiguity to be a governmentality that is produced by the mutual constitution of 
political structure, here referred to as hybrid political order, and political agency, 
explored as a politics of uncertainty. Hybrid order breeds a politics of uncertainty, 
which in turn props up hybrid order. This interpretation of institutional ambiguity 
also links the two constitutive analytical strands in the field of ignorance stud-
ies: imposing ignorance on others on the one hand and maintaining or feigning 
one’s own ignorance on the other hand. These two dimensions of socio-political 
not-knowing can be largely separate processes but, my analysis suggests, more 
often are intricately related. Defensive and offensive ignorance go hand in hand 
(McGoey, 2019). Professing or protecting that which one does not know (and 
does not want to know) often inevitably manufactures the not-knowing of oth-
ers, depriving them of potential sources of information. Similarly, while impos-
ing ignorance on others often requires knowledge on what these others should 
not know, it also means that having this knowledge should be hidden or denied. 
In revealing the productive aspects of not-knowing in Lebanese refugee govern-
ance, the book contributes to ignorance studies’ quest to put the phenomenon of 
not-knowing on the map as a process rather than an attribute, ‘an active accom-
plishment requiring ever-vigilant understanding of what not to know’ (Gross and 
McGoey, 2015: 5; see also Frye, 1983 in Sullivan and Tuana, 2007: 2).
By engaging with these questions of imposing, feigning, and maintaining igno-
rance, we enter the realm of knowledge and power. My empirical analysis draws 
on and in turn sophisticates the new perspectives on power in relation to epistemic 
politics that ignorance studies offers (Mallard and McGoey, 2018). Exploring when 
and where and how institutional ambiguity follows from lack of political will to 
govern more consistently and how this relates to a lack of capacity to govern in a 
comprehensive and comprehensible way makes visible and complicates processes 
of domination (Lemke, 2000: 7). It allows for a critical reading of institutional 
ambiguity, which can be a manifestation of failure but also of violence (Ansems de 
Vries and Guild, 2019). In Lebanon, Carpi (2019) has compellingly shown, state 
liminality should not be mistaken for neutrality. It is a deliberate stance that allows 
violent neglect and renders passivity a form of enmity. As Tapscott (2017) shows, 
institutionalized arbitrariness might be a way for ‘weak’ states to be powerful, 
but our understanding of agnotological power as a form of violence should not be 
limited to so-called weak states (Davies, Isakjee and Dhesi, 2017). Inaction and 
ambiguous action amount to structural violence and shift biopolitics to necropoli-
tics in governance dynamics in the Global North as well (Eule et al., 2018: 237).
A crucial concern for those studying socio-political ignorance is whether insti-
tutional ambiguity is a form of disorder or whether it constitutes a different order 
(De Waal, 2019). My analysis suggests it is both. The projection and production 
of disorder through imposing and feigning ignorance makes this disorder a given 
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for some and an instrument for others. This is never absolute or static. Controlling 
knowledge through imposing ignorance means that some people, namely those 
who can choose to maintain and feign their ignorance, understand a particular 
institutional setting better than others. This distinction is always only partial and 
temporary, however, as was illustrated by the fact that state authorities in dif-
ferent localities and operating on different bureaucratic levels or under different 
mandates have vastly different understandings of the same policies and practices.
My analysis shows that institutional ambiguity can nevertheless attain hegem-
onic properties. This might seem counterintuitive in light of the Lebanese state’s 
often proclaimed weakness and fragmentation. Dominance, however, here does 
not denote the coercive strength of individual state agencies, but rather the ines-
capability of the organizing logic of the Lebanese hybrid order and the politics of 
uncertainty that flourishes within it. Institutional ambiguity is often reproduced 
by those suffering from it. Following Hall (1988: 44 in Wedeen, 1999: 11), ‘it 
becomes the horizon of the taken-for-granted: what the world is and how it works, 
for all practical purposes. . . [and sets] the limit to what will appear as rational, 
reasonable, credible, indeed sayable or thinkable’ (see also Scott, 1985: 326). 
Refugees themselves, their representatives or authorities, and those humanitarian 
organizations claiming to help them have creative ways to deal with and at times 
subvert institutional ambiguity, but they are implicated in it as well (Cullen Dunn 
and Cons, 2014: 102), a situation that Ismail (2006: xxxv) has captured as ‘the 
mutual ensnarement of rulers and ruled.’
The dual nature of ignorance as a form of domination and a form of conten-
tion and contestation is of great significance to ignorance studies (Bailey, 2007; 
Mathews, 2008; Parnell, 2000; Sullivan and Tuana, 2007; Raj, 2000). My anal-
ysis connects strategic forms of uncertainty to widely recognized realities of 
socio-economic and political vulnerability and marginalization. This shows that 
such precarity is a component of a yet more encompassing and more nefarious 
institutional ambiguity (Van Kooy and Bowman, 2019). This also means that 
coping with such manufactured vulnerability often reproduces ambiguity. This 
complicates our understandings of (possibilities for) resistance. It opens up new 
ontological approaches to forms of resistance that are ‘silent,’ ‘everyday,’ and/or 
non-overtly politicized (Bayat, 1997; Scott, 1985). Most crucially, it drives home 
the inherent co-constitution of oppression and resistance not just practically or 
politically, but epistemologically.
Positionality and future research
The nature of academia as a knowledge-generating business is in special need 
of reflection when questions of knowing and not-knowing are objects of investi-
gation. Empirically studying not-knowing is fraught with inherent complexities. 
Most crucial of these is the question of whether something merely seems ambigu-
ous to the researcher but is legible to those working with and under it, or whether 
ambiguity extends beyond the researcher’s perceptions. Clearly, there is a lot I do 
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not know (for sure) about refugee governance in Lebanon. This is so for various 
reasons, many of which will elude me; ignorance, after all, ‘is often ignorant of 
itself’ (Code, 2007: 227). It is so because of my background and the restrictions 
this entails in terms of social and linguistic access and psychological and cultural 
comprehension; because of the restrictions placed on my research in terms of 
access to the field (see Mencütek, 2019: 14; Lindberg and Borrelli, 2019); and 
because of the limitations of my professional and theoretical conditioning, which 
may, for instance, harbor residues of methodological nationalism and sedentarist 
analytical schemes regardless of attempts to shed these.
Thankfully, what I did not know was not the object, but rather an instrument of 
research, always put into critical conversation with what was unknown, uncertain, 
or inconsistent to my interlocutors, who were all crucial stakeholders in Leba-
non’s refugee governance. My account highlights the value of starting off from 
the experiences of those on the ‘receiving end’ of governance and ‘study up’ from 
there, exploring what is, or might be, known by whom under which conditions. 
Silence and ambiguity in the data then become manifestations of ‘knowledge that 
fails to travel,’ and the investigation of what obstructs such ‘travel’ turns into the 
researcher’s core mission (Mathews, 2008: 490). Applying this approach offers 
several handles to, as Rappert and Balmer (2015: 330) propose, ‘locate ignorance 
and its implications squarely within institutional practices.’
As many of my interlocutors also pointed out to me, this requires a degree 
of speculation, of ‘what-if’ history, that allows us to explore potential alterna-
tive scenarios (Alcoff, 2007). While this can never produce ‘proof,’ it can yield 
innovative understandings of knowledge economies. Considering that one can 
never indisputably prove what anyone else ‘truly’ thinks, this may be the next best 
approach to venture the examination of the minds of others that is uncomfortable 
but unavoidable in studying knowledge and ignorance (Gross and McGoey, 2015: 
373). Being attuned to the possibility of a politics of uncertainty also reminds 
us that aspiring to academic closure and ironing out inconsistencies in research 
supply chains risks limiting our understanding of the workings of power (Goode, 
2016; Desai and Tapscott, 2014: 6). Studying institutional ambiguity entails 
embracing confusion as a ‘productive irritation’ (Sedlacko and Dahlvik, 2017: 2).
In the analytical journey that followed from this embrace, I took to heart the 
mission of critical academia to challenge the dominant perspectives that contribute 
to oppression. But much like the creative contention of refugees might entrench 
the ambiguity that marginalizes them, critiques of dominant discourses may end 
up reinforcing them (Ahmed, 2006; Faist, 2018; Horst, 2018). This especially 
regards the basic fact that I have focused my analysis on Lebanon. Despite my 
explicit reflections on how institutional ambiguity also permeates refugee govern-
ance in the Global North, this might nevertheless give credence to the idea that 
chaos, uncertainty, and disorder are unique features of governance in the Global 
South. As also acknowledged in the book’s Introduction, my research demarca-
tions risk obscuring how Lebanon’s (non-)policies are shaped by transnational 
migration regimes and the dominance of, in this case, European organizations 
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within it. Rather than validating European discourses that depict regional host 
countries as impertinent and unruly, my account of the strategic dimensions of 
institutional ambiguity in Lebanon’s refugee governance points to the need for a 
critical interrogation of the geopolitical parameters that incentivize this particular 
politics of uncertainty.
The potential of a ‘critical’ approach to backfire extends to the risk that in 
my effort to reveal the oppressive dynamics of strategic institutional ambiguity, 
I might have trespassed on interlocutors’ ‘right to silence’ (Poland and Pedersen, 
1998: 300; Bakewell, 2008; Landau, 2014). Refugees face a ‘moral economy of 
data sharing’ that primes them to share information and perspectives with humani-
tarians and researchers even though such ‘shareveillance’ has done very little to 
improve their lives (Halkort, 2019: 322). Despite my best efforts to avoid this, 
I might have compromised the coping mechanisms of those trying to navigate 
such oppression, which are equally dependent on informality, liminality, and excep-
tionalism. This touches on complex ethical considerations about researchers’, but 
also practitioners’, ‘right to know’ and their interventions in and co-optation of the 
knowledge economies of refugees and other societal actors involved in refugee 
governance.
The analysis presented in this book, inevitably shaped by personal, professional, 
and pragmatic considerations, thus reveals forms of institutional ambiguity, but 
may end up construing new epistemic and ethical ambiguities. It should, as such, 
be read as an explorative work that extends explicit invitations for future research 
in various directions. This includes an exploration of the linkages between statist 
and humanitarian regimes of ambiguity. It regards the extension and sophistica-
tion of the conceptual framework proposed based on empirical research beyond 
the confines of Lebanon, hybrid orders, or refugee communities. It concerns the 
cultural and societal dimensions of structural denial and ignorance that go beyond 
the more straightforward political aspects of strategic ambiguity. In particular, the 
insights furthered in this book can be enriched and nuanced by a more explicit 
focus on the experiences, perspectives, and considerations of political authori-
ties themselves. Organizational ethnographies of relevant state agencies – which 
were beyond the scope of the current research – would shed more light on what 
the state itself can know (Mathews, 2008: 485; Mountz, 2010) and on the quotid-
ian bureaucratic dynamics of assemblage and outsourcing that facilitate strategic 
ambiguity and diffuse responsibility (Eule et al., 2018: 196).
Political implications
Academic contributions are in themselves political interventions, as they have the 
potential to change how we see the world. The political implications of my analy-
sis thus concern, first of all, what we research. Ignorance studies shows that to 
understand the workings of power we need to trace what is not known, what is not 
said, and what is not done in addition to our usual focus on the information that is 
shared, the initiatives that are started, and the policies that are made. This requires 
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caution towards ‘evidence-based’ and ‘policy-relevant research.’ Being attuned to 
dynamics of strategic ambiguity and the related processes of imposing, feigning, 
and protecting not-knowing reminds us that the questions that political leaders or 
policy-makers do not want to ask or be asked are often the most relevant to under-
stand dominant governmentalities (Bakewell, 2008; Baldwin-Edwards, Blitz and 
Crawley, 2019; Scheel and Ustek-Spilda, 2019).
The political relevance of my conceptual contributions does not just regard the 
questions we ask, but also the way we conceive of answers to them. As Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh et al. (2014: 6) drive home: ‘The field [of refugee studies] needs to 
remember that when it comes to the question of how to best ameliorate condi-
tions, the right conclusions are often those that the powerful least want to hear.’ 
A key example of this is the often narrow understanding of policy success or 
failure. My analysis confirms extant insights that where policies fail with respect 
to their publicly stated aims, they may well be considered successful with regard 
to more private or partisan objectives (Castles, 2017; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 
Heyer, 2019; Verdeil, 2018). Addressing such ‘failures’ then is, as my case-studies 
have illustrated, not just a matter of building capacity or providing resources. It is 
equally crucial to shed the fiction of a coherent state that can be apprehended as a 
consistent actor and to engage with the more elusive question of political will of 
the various agencies that comprise state systems. The need to come to terms with 
the potential functionality of dysfunction revives the recurring demand of critical 
scholars for a political rather than a technical perspective on governance, develop-
ment, and policy-making (Ferguson, 1994).
It also means a fundamental reconsideration of what ‘counts’ as policy. When 
I asked him whether I was correct in understanding that there had been no new 
policy to deal with the Syrian refugee presence in the country since 2014, a mem-
ber of the Inter-Ministerial Committee tasked with overseeing the response to 
the Syrian refugee crisis commented: ‘No written one, yes.’6 Policy, he clarified, 
was not expressed in a single document or statement, but was rather the de facto 
sum of all the ‘bits and pieces’ of communication by the relevant institutions. It 
is such ‘undeclared policies’ that ask for our scrutiny (Atallah and Mahdi, 2017: 
33). Policy and practice, in this way, are even more intimately related than often 
assumed (Yassin, Stel and Rassi, 2016).
Embracing the political dimensions of what is often regarded through a 
humanitarian lens means that we have to concern ourselves not just with the 
outcomes of policies, but with the intentions behind them. This book has abun-
dantly chronicled how challenging this sometimes pyrrhic attempt to ‘prove the 
existence of something for which the very ability to evade detection is a key cri-
terion of success’ can be (McGoey, 2012: 559). As a regional refugee response 
coordinator poetically reflected on his engagement with policy-makers: ‘No 
matter how much we talk, there is a lot of smoke.’7 But it has also shown that 
exploring the interests and drivers of specific instances of institutional ambigu-
ity is essential in locating responsibility when it comes to refugee governance 
(Code, 2007: 228).
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To turn to policy-makers’ million-dollar question: what should we do faced with 
ambiguous refugee governance? At first glance, this may seem straightforward. If 
the problem is ambiguity and uncertainty, the solution should lie with promot-
ing and demanding transparency, responsiveness, accountability, and those other 
traits of ‘good governance.’ This seems at times to be taken up by the international 
community which, in the Global Compact for Migration (2018: 12), called for 
strengthening ‘certainty and predictability in migration procedures.’ Challenging 
ambiguity by a simple ‘call for clarity or precision,’ however, is illusory (Aradau, 
2017: 338). It is exactly because much of the lack of these things is strategic in 
many ways that they are so tenacious and that voicing the intention to reverse 
them appears ritualistic. Conceiving of policy recommendations, in this light, may 
be naïve at best and delusional at worst.
Any attempt towards formalizing the commitments and regulations of host 
states in terms of refugee status, shelter, and representation will need to take into 
consideration the interests behind their currently ambiguous nature. My case-
studies suggest that a concrete starting point in breaking the vicious circle of 
uncertainty and repression could be to support the development of collective, pub-
lic, and expressly political representation structures for refugees that are officially 
acknowledged and substantially capacitated to speak for refugee communities 
(Chatty, 2016; Horst, 2018; Stel, 2017). However complicated and problematic 
this may be, counterbalancing the repressive effects of institutional ambiguity 
should start with a more direct sense of representation beyond the humanitarian 
agencies, governmental bodies, and NGOs and civil society organizations that 
claim to work on behalf of refugees, but can hardly be held accountable by them 
(Silverman, 2008: 11 in Hanafi and Long, 2010: 135; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016; 
see also Malkki, 1996). Returning to the vignettes with which I opened this book, 
refugees’ ‘ignorance’ is not a form of inferior intellectual capacity, recalcitrance, 
or laxness. If refugees ‘don’t get it,’ this is often because they are not supposed 
to get it. Taking seriously their collective political representation might help to 
remedy the uncertainty and paralysis imposed on them.
A truly political reading of forced displacement that is cognizant of strategic 
ambiguities requires more reflexive forms of engagement with refugee govern-
ance. Instead of responding to knowledge gaps with routine data production, 
approaches to refugee governance need to question not merely what we do not 
know but why we do not know it. Addressing these questions also entails account-
ing for the ways in which the political decisions of the Global North facilitate and 
uphold the repressive politics of uncertainty that refugees face in the Global South. 
The political consequences of dynamics of imposed and feigned and maintained 
ignorance underscore that we have to confront our own deliberate not-knowing. 
This includes the violent conflicts that produce refugees and the geopolitics that 
determine refugee flows (Horst, 2018: 445). As Agier (2008: 3, 36) has proposed, 
one of the most tenacious foundations of the structural marginalization of refugees 
is ‘our own ignorance of it’; a willful ignorance that prescribes the desperations 
Reflections and contributions 233
that refugees face as ‘other people’s horrors, other people’s exclusions’ that do 
not concern us.
The politics of uncertainty described for Lebanon in this book is crucially rooted 
in and indicative of that country’s political order, but it is also enabled by other 
countries’ inaction. Europe has embraced the idea of shelter – now progressively 
rebranded as ‘protection’ or even ‘perspective’ – in the region as its foundational 
paradigm for refugee governance. It is keen on outsourcing refugee governance 
but does not care to understand how the governance it outsourced actually works 
or does not work. In fact, this outsourcing is dependent on maintaining an ideal-
ized fiction about ordered and benevolent refugee governance in regional host 
countries despite overwhelming empirical evidence to the contrary (Faist, 2018). 
These realities – whether it is looking away from the complications of the often 
celebrated ‘self-settlement’ of refugees in contexts bereft of any form of refugee 
protection or whether it is buying into the curtailing of access to livelihoods as a 
form of protecting refugees’ rights to return, to give just two of the more blatant 
examples – amounts to ‘unwelcome knowledge’ that is avoided or denied (Cohen, 
2011: xiii).
This sheds a problematic light on the routine championing of ‘resilience’ 
in engagement with regional refugee hosting countries (Mouawad, 2017). 
Europe’s dependence on Lebanon’s capacity to cope with the entirely dispro-
portionate number of refugees it is ‘asked’ to host leads it to cherish anything 
that reeks of stability. Efforts to help Lebanon respond to the Syrian refugee 
crisis have in this way reinforced the country’s status quo that only works for 
its oligopolistic elites (Geha, 2016; Hazbun, 2016: 1053; International Crisis 
Group, 2015). Rather than threatening the sovereignty of fragile states, as the 
conventional wisdom suggests, the regional governance of refugee ‘crises’ may 
further entrench the power positions of those that have made the ensuing insti-
tutional ambiguity work for them.
Strategic institutional ambiguity in the ‘region’ and its marginalizing effects 
exist by the grace of the strategic ignorance of the ‘international community’ 
(Faist, 2018; Horst, 2018). Refugees often speak of themselves as the ‘forgotten 
ones’ (Chabaan et al., 2010: 7).8 Such reflections concern the ‘cognitive disso-
nance’ of formal political actors as well as their constituencies, who partake in this 
‘deliberately cultivated ignorance of the privileged’ (Sullivan and Tuana, 2007: 
3). This willful ignorance allows refugees to be made invisible and forgotten 
despite crisis-peaks of hypervisibility and naturalizes marginalization and oppres-
sion as a seemingly inevitable result of displacement (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016: 
457; see also Agier, 2008: 8; Griffiths, 2013: 279). In response to this, with Code 
(2007: 219), I would argue for an epistemological understanding of responsibility 
in which we ‘singly and collectively – indeed, singly because collectively – are 
responsible for what and how we know.’ This might help to further question the 
protected obliviousness of and hence indifference to the systemic injustice that 
characterizes not just the Lebanese but the global refugee regime.
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Notes
 1 Author’s interview with Lebanese human rights professional – Skype, 17 January 2018.
 2 Interview – Zahle, 24 April 2018.
 3 Author’s interview – Skype, 12 March 2018.
 4 Author’s interview – Skype, 27 March 2018.
 5 Author’s interview with development analyst in Lebanon – Skype, 11 December 2017.
 6 Author’s interview – Skype, 30 January 2018.
 7 Notes from interview with an international regional coordinator of the refugee response 
in the Bekaa for an international humanitarian organization – Zahle, 10 April 2018.
 8 Author’s field notes – South Lebanon, 10 June 2014.
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